Restructuring Big Banks

The “new” trend amongst the big banks is to cut jobs.

The “big” HSBC has announced that it will be cutting 10,000 jobs in the near future, part of what many analysts expect to be part of a 30,000 reduction in jobs that will occur over time. 

This joins the efforts of other major banking organizations to scale down such at the Swiss banks Credit Suisse which announced earlier that it was eliminating 2,000 positions and UBS which said it was eliminating at lest 5,000 jobs.

In the UK, Lloyds Banking Group stated in June that it was cutting about 15,000 jobs which follows the news that the Royal Bank of Scotland has already dropped 28,000 positions with more to come in the near future.  Goldman Sachs is also cutting staff, as is Barclays Bank. 

Then, of course, there are the European banks in Ireland, Spain, Greece, and elsewhere that are facing massive amounts of restructuring. 

The big banks have had a fifty-year ride becoming over time huge global empires.  They have gone into this business and they have gone into that business without taking a breath in the process.  As “Chuck” Prince, former Chairman of Citigroup said…the music kept playing, so that the dancers had to keep dancing.

Which led to the situation that I discussed in my last post,  “Can Anyone Manage the ‘Too Big To Fail’ Banks?” (http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/). 

A problem associated with this situation is whether of not these “Too Big To Fail” banks can be regulated.  There is, of course, some belief that these banks cannot really be controlled, especially with the advances that are taking place in the world of information technology. (See my “The Future of Banking: Dodd-Frank at One Year”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/281090-the-future-of-banking-dodd-frank-at-one-year.)

The question I asked in the first post mentioned was whether or not their shareholders could significantly influence these large commercial banks so that some control could be established over bank managements to reign in “undisciplined” growth and risk taking.  That is, could market performance become a sufficient reason for shareholder governance in the case of these financial institutions that were deemed “Too Big To Fail”? 

The basic reason given for the reduction in jobs given by the banks mentioned above was that revenue growth had deteriorated and cost cutting was needed to bring return the banks to greater profitability.  

Banks profits rebounded after the financial crisis, first, because of trading profits earned in volatile financial markets, and, second, due to reductions in provisions for loan losses. 

However, the banks have not been able to continue producing higher profits due to these factors and with lending, even at the larger banks, so anemic, managements have had to look elsewhere to beef up margins. 

In my mind, this effort at cost cutting does not answer the fundamental question about the future of the large commercial banks. 

Cost cutting is one, immediate management response that can improve profit margins.  The fundamental question to me is whether or not this cost-cutting is connected in any way with a management effort to restructure an organization so as to make sense establish the economic rationale of the bank and to be able to better manage the risk profile of the bank. 

The concern here is that the cost cutting is tactical and not strategic. 

These large financial institutions have grown almost without limit for fifty years and have added businesses more often than not just to increase the size of the organization and have added risk to their business structure without sufficient knowledge or control of what was being assumed.  Furthermore, many organizations used accounting “gimmicks”, financial leverage, and inadequate risk-taking oversight to achieve reported performance goals, which hid basic structural weaknesses.

The fundamental question has to do with whether or not bank managements are to be held accountable for their poor performances.  Will the focus of bank management’s change? 

Many times a change in the focus of bank management will only occur if there is new leadership of the management team.  In the case of HSBC, Lloyds, and Barclays, there has been a change in the past year.  These “new” leaders are expected to shift the direction of their organizations.  Citigroup and Bank of America have had new leaders in the past two years or so.  Citi has seemingly undergone a significant change in direction although better performance is still in the future.  Bank of America seems to be going nowhere, fast.

HSBC also announced another move that seems more “strategic” in nature.  It has agreed to sell 195 branches in upstate New York to First Niagara bank.  This effort, along with the closing of branches in Connecticut and New Jersey, is part of an attempt to rationalize its branch network, worldwide.  HSBC is also seeking to sell its credit card business.    Other areas of the bank are under scrutiny.

Of course, these moves are only “strategic” if they are more than just the “fad” of the moment.  And, this is the ultimate question.  Cost cutting can be a fad.  Other organizations are doing it so I cannot be criticized for cost cutting since others are doing it. 

This “strategy” can be extended to other efforts that only last until “things start to pick up again.”  That is, this “strategy” will only continue until the music starts to play again and everyone must get out, once again, on the dance floor.

Thus, one can still ask, “Can anyone manage the ‘Too Big To Fail’ banks?”

My view is that it is too early to tell. 

Right now the incentive is to re-trench and re-structure.  However, in man circles, especially in the United States, there is still a lot of pressure for governments to inflate credit.  (Need one mention Paul Krugman of the New York Times, “The President Surrenders”, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/opinion/the-president-surrenders-on-debt-ceiling.html?_r=1&hp.) 

If credit inflation remains the policy of choice of the United States…and others…and continues to dominate the economic scene then I believe that the “fad” will end and the financial institutions will start to dance again.            

If debt deflation dominates, then I truly believe that we will see better management in the financial sector and financial conglomerates will become more rational and risk-taking will be better controlled.  As I have written elsewhere, this is the other side of the process where government provides too much stimulus for an extended period of time, people and businesses respond accordingly, and then, since this situation becomes unsustainable, people and businesses must adjust back to a position that is more sound, economically, and therefore more sustainable. 

Can Anyone Manage the "Too Big To Fail" Banks

An interesting article: “Once Unthinkable, Breakup of Big Banks Now Seems Feasible,” (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/once-unthinkable-breakup-of-big-banks-now-seems-feasible/?pagemode=print) appeared in the New York Times on Thursday.

The basic question posed in the article: “Lawmakers and regulators have failed to remake our system with smaller, safer institutions.  What about investors?”

Our largest banks are not performing that well.  Shouldn’t stockholders demand better performances?

In terms of Return on Shareholder’s Equity (ROE), Wells Fargo has been at the top of the list of the Big Four.  With the exception of 2008, Wells has earned an ROE of around 10 percent, give or take a little. 

JPMorganChase has not done as well since it was attempting to play “catch up” with the others in the Big Four in the middle 2000s.  Other than in 2008, it has consistently improved its performance with some analysts arguing that it will earn around an 11 percent ROE in 2011.

Citigroup and Bank of America are lagging substantially behind these two.  Citi seems to be recovering from the disasters of 2007, 2008, and 2009, but its performance is still far from stellar.  Bank of America is…terrible.  Both companies will probably not see a 10 percent ROE for many years. 

The point the author of the above article, Jesse Eisinger, is trying to make is that such terrible performances should be met with shareholder demands to restructure in order to improve performance.  Of the four, Citigroup has made the greatest effort to do this but it is an indication of how badly the bank was managed that even this effort has left a lot of work still to be done. 

Bank of America seems to be in a daze.  I don’t think anyone there knows what they are doing.

JPMorganChase, having survived the financial collapse as well as anyone, is trying to expand into areas round the world in which it has not previously been competitive. 

The question proposed by Eisinger is a good one.  Given the performances of these organizations, shouldn’t the shareholders demand some leadership that would rationalize these organizations and get them back on the track to earning competitive returns, which in my mind is an ROE, after taxes, that exceeds 15 percent?

How has the market reacted?  Well, the only bank whose stock price trades above book value has been Wells Fargo trading at about 1 ¼ times book.  JPMorganChase trades at book; Citigroup trades at about ¾ book; and Bank of America trades at around ½ book.

The banking industry, led by these four banks, spent the latter part of the twentieth century building up financial conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions.  The push was to build, build, build.  Financial performance came from financial engineering and financial innovation.  Increased risk taking and greater and greater financial leverage were the games to be played.  Off-balance sheet accounting became a way to hide risk and to “jack up” returns.

As former Citigroup chairman and CEO “Chuck” Prince is famous for saying, “If the music is still playing, you must keep on dancing.”

The problems that accumulated due to the merger and acquisition binge that took place before the financial crisis hit was exacerbated from actions taken after the financial crisis hit by the acquisitions these organizations made in cooperation with the federal government.  Need one mention the acquisitions of Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, and Bear Stearns, among others?

Conglomerates, generally, have never had a history of being great financial performance.  Just putting together different kinds of businesses without any reason, without the possibility of achieving any synergies, has not produced exceptional results.  In most cases the resulting performance of such combination is abysmal.

Given this belief, one really needs to ask a question about the “quality” of the performances recorded before 2007.  The amount of accounting tricks, off-balance sheet “slight of hand”, failure to mark-to-market underwater or bad assets and so on sure made some of these banks look like they were really something.

Yet, when things got tough all this “magic” went away.  Banks even stated that some of the calls for accounting “sanity” caused them all the troubles they ran into.

Again, “If you say the problem is out there, that is the problem.”

In my view, the regulators are never really going to get these organizations under control, make them economically sound.  The pressure to do this must come from the owners, the shareholders.

Eisinger presents three reasons why this is unlikely.  First, a large number of bank owners (institutions) tend to be “passive and conflicted.”  Second, top managers get paid for running larger institutions.  If the banks became smaller, top executive salaries would decline.  Third, the growth in world trade requires large banks to support the large, multinational corporations. 

To me, the only true test is performance.  Can large, multinational banks earn a return that justifies people and institutions investing in them?  Can they earn a 15 percent ROE after taxes through achieving sustainable competitive advantage?  Or, do they need to take on excessive business and financial risk accompanied by accounting “gimmicks” to earn such a return?

I have three immediate responses to this.  First, financial regulators and legislators can never do the job we would like to think they might do.  For one, they are always fighting the last war.  They are still trying to prevent a 2008-2009 crisis from happening again.  In addition, given the changes taking place in information technology, it will be extremely difficult to keep up with everything that is going on in the banking system thereby making these institutions even harder to regulate.

Second, the number of “banks” in the banking system is going to continue to decline.  Small- and medium-sized banks are going to find it harder and harder to find niches that are not being eroded by the Internet, mobile devices, and non-banking organizations.  My prediction has been that America will have less than 4,000 banks in five years and this trend will continue. 

Finally, the best thing that Congress and the regulators can do is to require more openness and transparency in the banking system.  We have seen what accounting tricks, lack of disclosure, and failure to record realistic asset values can do to “pumping” up the banking system.  Required greater disclosure can go a long way toward investor understanding what a bank and its management are doing. 

Also, other tools can be used to bring market instruments into the picture as an early-warning system like the one recently proposed by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales in the journal National Affairs, and “To Regulate Finance, Try the Market” in Foreign Policy.

The regulators are not going to correct the “Too Big To Fail” problem.  Maybe the owners of the “Big” Banks should correct the problem.

Debt and Accounting Gimmicks

Isn’t it interesting that highly leveraged institutions and organizations seem to bring out very innovative accounting strategies?

It is in times like these that were learn just how creative accountants can be. 

“Weekend elections that threaten to drive Spain’s ruling Socialist party from power in several regions and cities also promise a potentially nasty surprise: the revelation of piles of undisclosed debt in local governments that could undercut the country’s drive to avoid an international bailout.” (See “Spain Vote Threatens to Uncover Debt,” http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704281504576331280001740702.html?mod=ITP_pageone_2&mg=reno-wsj.)

“Five months ago, a government change in Spain’s Catalonia region revealed a budget deficit more than twice as big as previously reported.  Now a growing chorus of economists, local politicians and business leaders say that new governments are likely to discover, as Catalonia did, piles of ‘hidden debt’ owed to health clinics and other suppliers.”  It is suggested that “there is widespread, unrecorded debt among once-free-spending local governments.  Some companies are complaining that fiscally frail administrations are pressuring them to do business off the books and not immediately bill for goods and services…”   

“Such bills could add tens of billions of euros to the official debt figures reported by local and regional governments.  If such skeletons come out of the closet in coming weeks, Spain’s cost of funding could continue to rise—throwing the country back into the limelight after it has struggled to demonstrate it doesn’t need to be bailed out like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.”

Wait a minute…didn’t the renewal of concern over the debt situation in Greece come about because it was discovered that the amount of debt owed by the Greek government was worse than had been previously accounted for. 

We don’t need to just keep picking on European states.  What about state and local governments in the United States?  Pension funds grossly underfunded?  Off-balance sheet financing?  And more?

But, why stick with governments?  What about Lehman Brothers?  What about AIG?  What about Citigroup?  The amounts of off-balance sheet tricks used by these organizations fill the current library of books about the recent financial crisis.  The story is about CDOs and SUVs and so forth.  Trying to disguise liabilities is not just a gimmick of the public sector. 

To me, however, this mis-accounting goes even further.  The question really is one about where do you draw the line.  That is, what types of accounting efforts are meant to evade discovery and hence are not exactly kosher…and which ones are of little or no harm? 

For example, how do you value an asset on the balance sheets of financial institutions?  If you hold a marketable security you must be concerned with the liquidity of that security when valuing the asset.  If interest rates rise and the market price of the security goes down, do you mark-to-market the value of the security on your balance sheet?  If the security is a part of the trading portfolio of the institution then the general answer is that the value of the security on the balance sheet should be marked down.

But, if the institution bought the security to hold then the question becomes more difficult for some people to answer because the intention is to hold the security to maturity at which time the full amount of the principal would be repaid to the institution.

Now, what if the credit quality of the security comes into question?  There are really two questions here: the first has to do with the credit quality of the security; the second has to do with the liquidity of the security?  If the credit quality of the security declines, then, given the value of the asset should decline…its price should fall.  Thus, the market price of the security should decline.  However, if the market is uncertain about how to price the asset, given the decline in its quality, the market for the security may “dry up” and the security may not be able to be sold immediately.

Thus, the value of the asset on the balance sheet should be adjusted downward, but without any market judgment about what the price of the security should be…how do you determine the amount the asset should be written down?

Here we have a problem that was addressed by the US government’s Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP) during the financial crisis.

Many in the financial industry have argued that the assets should not be marked-to-market in such cases because there is really no market for the asset.  Hence, these securities should be retained on the balance sheet at book value.

Now, what about the direct loans a financial institution makes?  Almost all of these do not have markets in which they can be sold.  So, the loans are totally “illiquid”.  Furthermore, bankers consider that most of the problems the borrowers face are “cyclical” and all that is needed when economic times are not good is for the economy to improve and the loans will work themselves out.  That is, the financial institutions must hold the loans “to maturity” and, thus, they can be held on the balance sheet at book value. 

The question is…what should be the accounting treatment of these assets of financial institutions?

Of course, this problem only occurs during bad times after most of the economy has become excessively leveraged and loan value are under attack.  For example, currently, in terms of residential real estate loans, mortgages, we see that seriously delinquent loans (90 days or more delinquent) are declining but still near historic highs, the number of borrowers in foreclosure remain near record highs, and the sale of houses and housing prices continue to decline. (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704816604576333222700445278.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_1&mg=reno-wsj) The commercial real estate area remains depressed.  The loans of these two kinds of loans continue to plummet. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/270074-fed-continues-to-pump-reserves-into-foreign-related-institutions-in-the-u-s)  But, has the status of these loans been changed on the books of the banks?

The concern, in these cases, is not with the liquidity of the asset.  The concern is with the solvency of the financial institutions.  Have accounting practices not given investors…and others…a true picture of the financial condition of the institutions under review? 

My concern in all these cases is that we really don’t find out the truth until too late…until it is “after-the-fact.”   Then we blame speculators or others, who take advantage of the situation, of preying on the innocent, of creating the crisis, and, of course, we don’t want to reward speculators. (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704904604576333393150700686.html?mod=ITP_pageone_2&mg=reno-wsj)  

The bottom line: the pressure to use accounting gimmicks to cover up the “real picture” grows as high degrees of leverage come to dominate an economy.  This is because debt requires contractual payments.  Debt requires an obligation and a responsibility. 

And, so we see a pattern.  Just as credit inflation is the foundation for greater risk-taking, higher degrees of leverage, and more financial innovation, we see that greater risk-taking, higher degrees of leverage, and more financial innovation is the foundation for more creative accounting practices. 

In both cases, we all ultimately lose in the end!

Where the Action Is

Commercial banks aren’t lending. That we know.

But, there is action elsewhere and, I believe, that this behavior tells us a lot about how the recovery is working itself out…although it is not a recovery like the ones of the recent past.

There is a lot of money in the financial markets…in the shadow banking system…and worldwide.

Where is the action taking place?

Well, for one, in the bond market. We have major companies issuing bonds at ridiculously low interest rates. For example, Microsoft just completed a new bond deal. On September 23, 2010, Microsoft Corp., the world’s biggest software maker, sold $4.75 billion of bonds, “at some of the lowest rates in history for corporate debt.” The offering information stated that “Proceeds may be used to fund working capital, capital expenditures, stock buybacks and acquisitions.”

This follows Microsoft’s “first ever” debt issue which came in May 2009. An analyst noted at the time, “Redmond, Wash.-based Microsoft is sitting on $25 billion in cash, so the company doesn’t need the bond proceeds ‘unless they have something big in mind.’”

And, Microsoft is not the only major company taking advantage of the AAA bond market.

Then there is the “Junk Bond” market. The New York Times trumpets “Junk Bonds Are Back on Top.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/business/08bond.html?scp=1&sq=junk%20bonds%20are%20back%20on%20top&st=cse)

Jim Casey, “one of today’s junk-bond kings” and who runs the junk-bond business at JPMorgan Chase claims that “even those heady days of the 1980s” when Michael Milken ruled Wall Street and who Mr. Casey worked for at Drexel Burnham Lambert, “seem a little tame.”

So far this year, it is reported, that in the first nine months of this year corporations have raised $275 billion in this market worldwide, up from $163 billion in 2009.

“In high-yield, it’s undeniable that these are the best years that anyone has seen in their career.”

Whew!

It is estimated that “about 75 percent of the deals are aimed at refinancing, rather than taking on additional debt.” The risk profile of the companies has gone up!

And, who are big players helping to underwrite these deals? Let’s see, JPMorgan, Bank of American and Merrill Lynch and Citigroup…the top four!

Further action?

Well check out the private equity interests. They are raising capital in the billions. To do what? “Many banks are looking to sell large portfolios of commitments to private equity funds that they made during the credit bubble.” Banks are doing this because these “assets” are underwater and also because new higher capital requirements will make their “ownership” very expensive.

This just points to a whole host of private equity interests moving into the area of distressed assets. And, they are moving in aggressively. We read the article in the New York Times this morning about short-seller David Einhorn, the founder of Greenlight Capital. (See “A Bear Roars”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/business/14views.html?ref=todayspaper.) One of the interesting insights relating to the work of Mr. Einhorn is the detail that Greenlight Capital put into its “due diligence” of the target.

The attention being focused on “distressed assets” today is not just a casual thing. Fund managers are aware of the risks they are under taking, just as they are aware of the potential returns that are available. As some have said, they are “taking care.”

One analyst remarked on the condition of the market: “We are seeing a steady river of deals” and “we expect this stream to carry on for some time.”

This is all part of the movement I reported on in “Corporations are Hoarding Cash and Keeping Their Powder Dry,” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/228507-corporations-are-hoarding-cash-and-keeping-their-powder-dry).

There seems to be a tremendous re-structuring of the economy taking place. I now believe that the re-structuring that is going on is beyond the power of the government to reverse. I believe that a similar re-structuring took place in the 1930s and 1940s, a re-structuring that the government, at that time, could not reverse. The 1950s represented the start of a “new era”.

The structure of the industrial base of the United States is dis-located with American industry using only 20% to 25% of its capacity. The structure of the work force is dis-located as 20% to 25% of the age-eligible workers in the United States are under-employed. And, the income/wealth distribution in the United States has become more and more skewed over the past fifty years.

These “dis-locations” will not be resolved by what corporate America seems to be doing now. Large companies, large banks, private equity funds, hedge funds, and other money sources are building up their cash reserves. They are looking, I believe, to buy assets, to buy “distressed companies” and so forth.

Imagine that Microsoft, a company that had never issued any debt in its history, has raised over $8.5 billion in new cash over the past 18 months or so while it is sitting on $25 billion in cash. Can you picture this money going to fund working capital and capital expenditures? I can’t but I can certainly see it going to fund stock “buybacks” (which raises its ability to purchase other companies) and to fund acquisitions.

Actions like this, however, will not result in higher levels of employment or greater investment in capital that would spur the economy along. If anything, a re-structuring, like the one I am writing about will have exactly the opposite effect.

Yet, this may be how the economy goes about recovering!

As I said above, I now believe that the re-structuring that is going on is beyond the power of the government to reverse. If this is true, neither a further quantitative easing on the part of the Federal Reserve System nor additional fiscal stimulus on the part of the federal government will do much in the way of achieving a more rapid economic recovery. If I am correct, the economic re-structuring will take place at its own speed. But, this will require a different response on the part of the government.

The Changing Banking System

I remember when there were more than 14,000 banks in the United States. I also remember when there were 12,000 banks in the banking system. Even in those days, the financial industry only accounted for no more than about one-sixth of total domestic profits in America.

Now there are about 8,000 banks in the United States and about one in eight of these banks is either on the problem bank list of the FDIC or in rather serious trouble. The FDIC is closing three to four banks a week and it is expected to continue on this pace for another twelve to eighteen months.

The biggest banks in the banking system are doing well, profit wise. The reported earnings this week of JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Citigroup, and so on just re-confirmed the recovery of these giant institutions. Of course it is not the banking side of the business that is producing these results, although their loan problems seem to be diminishing. It is the trading side of the business that is creating such significant gains subsidized by the Federal Reserve zero interest rate policy. This is the “quiet” bailout of these banks because it does not require Treasury funds to support the effort and it helps bank assets improve so that insolvency becomes less and less of a problem.

Furthermore, regional banks appear to be recovering. PNC and BB&T have been doing well, but those lagging behind, Fifth Third Bancorp, KeyCorp, SunTrust Banks, and Huntington Bancshares all seem to be showing improvements which respect to their problem loans. PNC and BB&T actually reported profits for the first quarter, $671 million for PNC and $194 million for BB&T. So, the improvements continue down the supply chain (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703876404575200240959419542.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.)
We are still waiting for the small- to medium-sized banks to start perking up. But, this is where more of the problem or troubled banks lie and where most of the bank closures or acquisitions are going to be.

This fact points to one of the major changes taking place in the banking system. We are going through another period where the number of banks in the banking system is declining. I would not be surprised at all if the number of banks dropped to the 5,000 to 6,000 range over the next few years.

This movement will continue the consolidation of the banking industry in the United States. Right now, $2 out of every $3 in domestic banking assets resides in the largest 25 banks in the country. These are the huge banks mentioned above and the large regional banks mentioned above.

How high might this concentration go? I believe that regardless of what Congress does with respect to financial reform and trying to limit the size of banks that the total amount of domestic assets residing in the largest 25 banks in the country will go to about $4 out of every $5 in the relatively near future. This means that there will be at least 5,000 banks competing for that other $1!

Another change that is taking place in the United States banking system is the presence of more and more foreign banks. This seems to be a perfect time for foreign owned banks to pick up acquisitions in the United States and not only gain size but also gain presence in different regional markets. In this respect, note the article “Foreign Firms Scoop Up Failed U. S. Banks” in the Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704830404575200134085458128.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing. Canadian banks are especially taking advantage of the banking situation in the United States, but banks in Japan and other countries are seizing the opportunity as well.

In March, foreign-related institutions controlled over 11% of the assets in the United States banking system. This is up substantially from thirty years ago and is expected to climb further in the near future. My guess is that this number will be in the 15% to 20% range over the next five years or so. And, these assets will not be owned by small- or medium-sized financial organizations.

This is the problem now faced by President Obama and the Congress in terms of financial reform. I just don’t see these trends reversing themselves. And, as banks get bigger they will also be controlling more and more of the banking assets in the United States. And, as the banks get bigger they will continue to move into more and more areas of the financial market and they will continue to create more and more financial innovations.

And, if they are not done in the United States they will be done somewhere else in the world for commercial banking is, in fact, worldwide and not just the playing field of Americans. Big foreign banks are becoming a bigger part of the United States banking scene just as big United States banks are becoming a bigger part of the banking scene in other countries.

The difficulty in writing regulations that try to control what these banks can do is, in the words of economists Oliver Hart of Harvard and Luigi Zingales of the University of Chicago, “doomed to fail because such regulations are extremely easy to bypass. It takes no time for a clever financier to design a contract that gets around most restrictions.” Finance is just information and information can be restructured in almost any way that someone wants it to be structured.

The evolution of the financial system is going to continue to be fought by those constrained to the old Keynesian fundamentalism. The current financial environment has been created by fifty years of government policy conforming to a dogma that considers an inflationary bias to the economy an necessary pre-requisite for sustaining high levels of economic growth and low levels of unemployment.

Well, this inflationary environment has fostered the undisciplined expansion of credit, the excessive leveraging of financial capital, and the creation of more and more financial innovation to underwrite both the expansion of the debt and the aggressive financial leveraging. It has also resulted in the relative growth of the financial industry.

Many of these same commentators have remarked about how the financial sector has grown relative to the rest of the economy. For example, Paul Krugman in “Don’t Cry for Wall Street”, has written: “In the years leading up to the 2008 crisis, the financial industry accounted for a third of total domestic profits — about twice its share two decades earlier.” He then makes the value judgment that “the fact is that we’ve been devoting far too large a share of our wealth, far too much of the nation’s talent, to the business of devising and peddling complex financial schemes — schemes that have a tendency to blow up the economy. Ending this state of affairs will hurt the financial industry. So?” (See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/opinion/23krugman.html?hp.)

Well, this is the financial industry that a government following the Keynesian economic philosophy has created. Two final comments: first, care needs to be taken in creating economic policies because the long run effect of the policies may not be what you want even though the short run effects are what you want; and second, once the size and structure of an industry has been created, it does not go away until the industry becomes technologically obsolete. The financial industry is thriving using information technology, a field that is just in its infancy. Finance and information technology have a long way to go.

Mr. Volcker Speaks

Former Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker spoke yesterday at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. All week I had been hearing comments about this speech and how people seemed to be waiting for Volker’s remarks. Yet, this morning, there was only one report on the speech which appeared in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/business/31regulate.html?ref=business) and then it was buried at the bottom of page B6 of the business section.

It seems as if Volcker didn’t really say very much. In fact, the discussion of his remarks was combined with a discussion of the words of Robert Gibbs, the White House Press Secretary. The bottom line: it is highly likely that the United States will get a re-regulation package for its financial system this year. Gibbs even said that “the Senate might move on the legislation by the end of May”.

Just a couple of comments on the issues that were mentioned in this article.

First, the article states that the legislation to “overhaul the nation’s financial system…is intended to prevent a recurrence of the conditions that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the government bailouts that followed.”

If this is what the legislation is intended to do, we have already lost the battle. As I have stated over and over again, the problem with regulatory legislation is that it is always fighting the last war.

Let me state this as bluntly as possible: We will never have “a recurrence of the conditions that led to the 2008 financial crisis!”

Financial crises do not repeat themselves.

I do agree with Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff in their book “This Time is Different” that the buildup to a financial crisis is always accompanied by the cry of those riding the crest of the economic expansion that “This time is different!” This claim, however, refers to the belief of the perpetrators of the claim that no collapse will follow the buildup that they are going through.

When I say that financial crises do not repeat themselves I mean that the specific conditions preceding a financial collapse, the specific behavior of the financial institutions and the financial leaders, are always different from past collapses. There is new technology, new instruments, new institutional arrangements, and so forth. Things change significantly enough so that the new regulations put into effect at the end of the last financial collapse don’t quite apply to the conditions that exist before the next financial collapse.

This gets into my second point which addresses Volcker’s concern about the growth of the financial services industry relative to the growth in other sectors in the rest of the economy.

We are told that “Mr. Volcker was critical of the broad growth in the financial services industry in recent decades. Finance came to represent an ever-greater share of corporate profits, even as average earnings for most American workers did not rise.”

Volker is quoted as saying “The question that really jumps out for me is, given all that data, whether the enormous gains in the financial sector—in compensation and profits—reflect the relative contributions that sector has made to the growth of human welfare.”

The article continues, “He also asked whether the financial sector contributed to underlying imbalances in the economy, as Americans raided their savings and relied on a housing bubble to maintain excessively high consumptions levels.”

My response to this is that from 1961 through 2008, the purchasing power of the dollar declined by almost 85%. In this inflationary environment, many American families came to believe that the best way to “save” was to buy a house and watch the value of the house rise. In addition, they could further leverage the constantly rising value of their house to “maintain excessively high consumptions levels.”

Mr. Volcker, more than anyone else in the United States, recognized the problem created by the inflationary environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s and, during his tenure as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, fought inflation with all that the Fed could bring against this destructive dragon. He deserves major praise for what he accomplished at this time.

Still, over this 1961-2008 period, inflation was the major economic incentive in existence in the economy. By the end of the 1960s, commercial banks had innovated to the point that they became “liability managers” and created the ability to expand to any size that they wanted. This happened because the start of this inflationary period made it necessary for banks to have the flexibility to expand beyond the geographic and asset constraints that restricted their ability to compete.

In the early 1970s the mortgage-backed security was invented (by the government by-the-way) and in the middle 1980s the mortgage market became the largest component of the capital markets. As inflationary expectations rose and resulted in higher interest rates during this time, interest rate risk became more of an issue and the interest rate futures market was created.

Need I say more? Financial innovation thrived in the inflationary environment and, as a consequence, the financial industry grew! And, grew! And grew!

Did the “enormous gains in the financial sector reflect the relative contributions that sector has made to the growth in human welfare”? Did “the financial sector contribute to underlying imbalances in the economy”?

I think you know how I would answer both of these questions.

Another piece of the news this morning struck me. Citigroup is spinning off Primerica (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cef26d7c-3c41-11df-b316-00144feabdc0.html). Primerica was one of the first companies purchased by Sandy Weill in the late 1980s that became part of the financial conglomerate Citigroup. Everything about financial innovation and the relative growth of the financial services sector of the economy during this inflationary period is captured in Weill’s wild ride to the top as he constructed Citigroup piece by piece.

And, now we have the dismantling of Citigroup. Is this picture the icon of the new age of finance?

Higher capital requirements can contribute to sounder financial behavior. More disclosure and increased audit standards can also contribute to sounder financial behavior. Still, we cannot build a regulatory structure that will prevent a recurrence of financial crises whether based on the 2008 experience or the experience of some other time period. Furthermore, we cannot prevent greedy politicians from supporting policies that create an inflationary bias to the economy in order to get re-elected.

Regulation of the “bad guys” on Wall Street is popular now. However, it won’t prevent a volatile future.

Blame the Central Bankers more than the Private Bankers

“I cannot help thinking that the central bankers are escaping very lightly in the post-crisis dust-up. For while incentive structures in banking exacerbated the credit bubble, they were a much less potent cause of trouble than central bank behavior across the world.”

So writes John Plender in the Financial Times this morning (See “Blame the Central Bankers more than the Private Bankers”: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58aa12a8-0575-11df-a85e-00144feabdc0.html.)

This article should be read!

One point that Plender makes is that maybe we need fewer academic central bankers and “more private sector bankers with a practical understanding of markets.” You mean heading up the Economics Department at Princeton is not enough to be the head of a central bank?

“The academics who dominate modern central banking were ideologically committed to the notion of efficient markets and to exclusive reliance on inflation targeting regardless of imbalances arising from easy credit and soaring asset prices.”

The consequence? An asymmetrical approach to monetary policy: “Interest rates were reduced when asset prices fell, but were not raised in response to wildly overheating markets.”

This focus gave us the ridiculously low interest rates in the United States from 2002 through to 2004 and the subsequent asset (housing) bubble which accompanied them. This conclusion comes even after and “In spite of the bizarre recent assertion by Ben Bernanke…that the Fed was largely innocent in the matter of bubble creation.”

This mindset, Plender argues, is still around and is present in some of the approaches to fight systemic risk and to provide “macro-prudential” regulation and supervision. The mix of policy that these “academic” officials are proposing “suffers from the single disadvantage that it will not work.”

What Mr. Plender really asks for is central bankers that have less experience with the academic study of banking and financial markets and that have more practical experience in these markets.

The particular approach followed by central bankers, Plender continues, led to the rise in bank leverage which was “a far more important factor” in the crisis than was financial innovation.

How could this be?

Well, the incentive structures in banking placed emphasis on current bank earnings. And, the surest way to increase performance during the 1990s and 2000s was to leverage up the portfolio so as to earn a few more basis points. This behavior had to continue because competitors kept doing it. As “Chuck” Prince, the Chairman and CEO of Citigroup, so eloquently put it, if the music is still playing you must continue to dance. Competition demanded more basis points to keep in the dance for investor’s money.

And, the continued increases in leverage were underwritten by the monetary authorities who followed the philosophy of central banking described above. When the bubble burst, the leverage, of course, worked in the opposite direction.

I would highly recommend reading Plender’s article.

Bank of America and the Appointment of Sallie Krawcheck

This continues to be a trying time for the finance industry. Articles like the one that appeared this morning in the Wall Street Journal just do no good for the stature of those who admit to working in finance in one way or another. The article I am referring to is “Behind BofA’s Silence on Merrill,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124952686109510009.html.

The problem is one similar to that described by John Plender, the Chairman of Quintain PLC, in the Financial Times yesterday, “Ditch Theory and Take Away the Punchbowl,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8b88624-8107-11de-92e7-00144feabdc0.html. Plender presents the folksy strategy for central banking ascribed to William McChesney Martin, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Martin is reported to have said that the task of a central banker was to take away the punchbowl before the party got out of hand.

To me, the role a financial officer, especially a Chief Financial Officer, is similar. A financial officer ultimately must be the naysayer in an organization. If the financial officer does not act out this role in an organization then the Chief Executive Officer is not going to be well served by the finance function and the organization is going to be exposed as it grows and considers alternative business options!

No one else in the organization performs this function. A “good” Chief Executive Officer wants a strong person in this position because without someone there to say “no” from time-to-time, the CEO will be like the emperor that is wearing no clothes. A “good” CEO knows this. One thing I look for in evaluating a management team is the strength of the people a CEO surrounds him- or herself with, especially the strength of the CFO.

A strong Chief Financial Officer knows that there is no such thing as a free lunch. That is, when it comes to finance, you never get something for nothing. If you want a greater return on your assets, you can take on riskier assets, or you can increase you financial leverage which, of course, increases risk, or you can mismatch the maturities of your assets and liabilities which, of course, increases risk. Of course, we can extend the idea of “no free lunch” to proposals coming from marketing, or information processing, or purchasing as well, but I am sticking with financial issues because that is where the concern is today.

In the euphoria of the credit bubbles that took place in the 1990s and the 2000s, CFOs and other finance people that believed that there was “no fee lunch” and acted upon this belief seem to have fallen out of favor with CEOs seeking to make bundles of money in the bubbles. Of course, not everyone acted in this way but a significant number did and we are all paying the price for this today.

When one sees articles like the one in the Wall Street Journal mentioned above, you can understand why people on Main Street and why Senators and Representatives in Congress can pick on bankers and others who are in the finance profession. It certainly seems as if a trust was broken and greed ruled the kingdom.

The hiring of Sallie Krawcheck by BofA is, therefore, a hint that maybe BofA understands that it needs to build up its credibility. Krawcheck has a reputation for openness and integrity that has stayed with her throughout her career. The argument is that this trait got her in trouble with the CEO of Citigroup, Vikram Pandit, and cost her the position of CFO which she held at Citi. Taking over responsibility for BofAs global wealth and investment management business in not the same as becoming CFO of the institution, but it indicates that BofA is pulling in someone that is not only talented and capable in finance, but also will add some credibility to the organization in terms of honesty and transparency.

One can learn a lot about leaders and the organizations they lead by observing how they respond to people that possess these qualities, especially in times of trouble. Citigroup seems to have a history of releasing top people that question how financial affairs are being handled. Richard Bookstaber comments on how Citi operated in the area of risk management in his book “A Demon of Our Own Design”. We also see that Jamie Dimon was asked to leave Citi when he began to clash with the leadership of that organization on issues of risk and management. (See my review of a book about Dimon: http://seekingalpha.com/article/148179-book-review-the-house-of-dimon-by-patricia-crisafulli.) It seems as if Citigroup worked hard and long to get itself into the position it is now in.

Of course, BOA and Citi are not isolated cases. One can name any number of organizations from Bear Sterns to Lehman Brothers to AIG to Wachovia to Countrywide to so and so and on and on. The depth and breadth of the problem just indicates how far the finance profession has lost credibility.

That is why I would advise at this time that investors look even more closely at the people, especially the finance people, that the leadership of an organization brings on board. Strong financial leadership is needed within an organization, leadership that stresses telling the truth, reporting asset values at realistic levels, and leadership that rejects accounting rules that only muddle if not mislead investors and regulators.

In this regard I would argue that we have to get back to mark-to-market accounting. To me, people only kid themselves when they finance long term assets with short term liabilities in order to capture additional return and cry and whine when they have to mark down the values of their longer term assets if the market goes against them. They are brave enough to gamble on this mismatch of maturities. They also need to be brave enough to accept the consequences of their actions. There is no free lunch!

In my experience there is one thing that financial integrity does: it causes people to act earlier than they would otherwise. The situation I saw over and over again in doing bank turnarounds was that people postponed doing anything about a bad position because they were not forced to recognize a problem early on. As a consequence they put off doing something about the bad situation and put it off until the problem grew into a much larger problem where they could not postpone action any longer. Good management recognizes problems and deals with them early on.

Hopefully, the hiring of Sallie Krawcheck is a sign that organizations are recognizing the need for strong financial leadership. Then, in hiring more people like her, maybe emperors won’t have to go out into crowds to discover that they don’t have any clothes on. The absence of clothes will have been discovered long before then and the situation will have been corrected.

The State of the Banking System

There are three preliminary indicators that the banking system is coming along on its way to recovery. First, there is the “letting go” of CIT Group, Inc. The government must feel that it does not need to extend itself to help out this institution given its present troubles. (See my recent post on the CIT situation: http://seekingalpha.com/article/148730-cit-s-debt-issues-show-why-the-economy-won-t-be-picking-up-any-time-soon.) We’ll see if they continue this approach with other troubled institutions as additional situations arise.

Second, there is evidence that the regulators are taking a harder line at Bank of America and Citigroup. Each has its own problems, but the Feds seem to believe that they can step up their demands on these two financial institutions concerning boards, managements, business affairs, and so forth. They would not do this if they believed the system to be too fragile.

Third, I sense the Federal Reserve backing off from the more aggressive stance it took with respect to the bond markets one to two months ago. This is just a feeling that I will be following up on in the near future.

These actions provide some preliminary evidence that we are in the “working out” stage of the credit cycle where time is the biggest factor to contend with. Bailouts are needed to prevent “liquidity” problems when markets might crumble under cumulative selling pressures. But, this is a short run problem.

The “work out” phase of a financial crisis is the period when institutions still have severe credit problems but are not under short term pressures to relieve their balance sheets of “toxic” or “underwater” assets.

This does not mean that there will not be more failures of financial institutions and some of them may be relatively large ones. What it does mean is that the problems that still exist within the financial sector can be handled in a relatively orderly fashion. So, the banks and the regulators can operate within an environment that does not seem “desperate.” Severely troubled still, but not in a state of panic.

Within this scenario, the questions that remain about the banking system relate to earnings. We have seen Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase & Co. post strong gains for the second quarter. However, most of the gains were attributed to trading activities, with secondary help from their underwriting business. These are not good, solid “banking” results. And, these organizations are highly diversified and can post returns from these areas, something that most other banks in the United States cannot do.

Still, the banking system seems to be in the stage of recovery where current cash flows can allow the individual banks to write off more and more of their loans and other assets over time and thereby restore the integrity of their balance sheets. With the results it achieved in trading and underwriting, JPMorgan Chase was able to take large write downs of home equity loans, mortgage defaults, and credit card charge offs while also increasing the amount of funds it set aside to increase its loan loss reserve. This is what other banks will be doing to reduce the burden of bad assets they are now carrying.

Overall, Total Assets in the commercial banking system grew by 8.9% from June 2008 to June 2009. The capital residual (Assets less Liabilities) in the system grew by 7.6% so that the capital asset ratio of the banking system dropped from 10.2% to 10.1%.

In terms of how the banks are attempting to protect themselves, the Cash assets of Commercial Banks in the United States were up 186%, year-over-year, in June 2009, although this rate of increase is down from a year-over-year rate of increase of 236% increase in May 2009.

Total Loans and Leases in the banking system rose just about 1.4%, year-over-year, in June while Commercial and Industrial Loans actually decreased by 3.1%. Commercial banks are just not lending to businesses which continues the trend which began last year. Banks are lending to consumers, up 5.5% year-over-year (primarily on credit cards and other revolving credit plans), and on real estate, up 6.4% year-over-year (the largest jump coming in revolving home equity loans).

The cash assets held in the commercial banking system declined regularly throughout June as the peak in cash assets held was reached in May. Thus, it appears that banks are backing off from taking everything the Federal Reserve has put into the banking system and stashing it away in “cash accounts”. This is confirmed by the aggregate banking data put out by the Federal Reserve which indicates that total reserves in the banking system dropped throughout June 2009 and the excess reserves also fell from peak levels reached in late May.

Thus, it appears that things are working out pretty much as the Fed hoped they would. (See my explanation of what the Fed has been trying to do, http://seekingalpha.com/article/145913-is-treasury-s-tarp-debt-already-monetized-part-ii.) Of course, the game is not over yet!

Bottom line: the banking system is working through its problems. The Federal Reserve and the regulators seem to be backing off a little, allowing the system to adjust over time to its dislocations. There is still room for a surprise, but, the more time passes, the less likely a surprise is likely to occur. In other words, the unknown unknowns have been substantially reduced and the known unknowns are what we are working on.

The banks are not lending except on established credit lines (credit cards and home equity loans) and there appears to be plenty of liquidity in the system as a whole. Whereas the lack of lending slows up the possibility for an economic recovery, it is an essential component of getting the banking system healthy again which is needed if there is to be any chance of a robust economic recovery in our future.

A Lesson from AIG for the Bank Bailout Plan

One of the reasons given for the awarding of bonuses at AIG was the need to keep people around that had “expertise.” That is, if we lose the “experts” we are really in trouble!

This, to me, is one of the greatest fallacies in the corporate world.

It is a fallacy for two very important reasons. The first fallacy is that people are irreplaceable. The second fallacy is that the people that performed badly in the past can get you out of the mess they got you into.

In my experience, no one is irreplaceable and the minute that you begin to believe that either you or the people in charge are irreplaceable you are setting yourself up for big problems. We do not need Rick Wagoner of General Motors nor do we need Vikram Pandit of Citigroup. They are not indispensable in any recovery or turnaround of the companies that they are a part of. Neither are the traders, or the quants, or other executives that got these companies where they are.

We are sold a “bill of goods” about how important these people are to the organization, yet it is remarkably surprising that when they are gone things don’t fall apart. In most cases the situation improves and the company performs at a higher level. It just seems as if in a complex and difficult situation that putting “someone new” in authority is the more dangerous path.

Time-after-time we see that replacing these people is not dangerous. In fact, it turns out to be the best thing that could happen.

Obviously, the incumbents want you to believe that they are indispensable. They will do everything that they need to do to convince you of their importance to future success. And, this includes groveling to the government to assure that they will be kept in place when and if the government bails out their organization or takes it over. Rick Wagoner is sure acting different these days when he is desperate to retain his position at General Motors that he did when he arrogantly arrived in Washington, D. C. on his first trip to the “big” city to appear at Congressional hearings.

Let me add here, however, that this is one of the worst things that the government does when it bails out a company. Because government doesn’t know any better, it often buys into the argument that the current leadership should stay on after the bailout because it has the experience and knows the company better than anyone else does. Government assistance tends to entrench existing management. After all, since the government has worked with this management team to create the bailout in which they are now companions rather than adversaries. That is, they are in bed together.

This is a good reason why government needs to let the shareholders or the bankruptcy courts handle most of these situations. If a management change is needed, there needs to be a practiced means of proceeding toward an orderly transition of power rather than have government insert its heavy hand into the process. Even if government appoints new executive leadership, the choice is usually a person who is an “expert” with “experience” in that firm, which, again, limits the possibilities that the firm will move ahead into the future rather than stay mired in the past.

My experience with the second fallacy also leads me to believe that the “experienced” people should be removed. During the savings and loan crisis, I don’t know how many times I heard the executives of failing thrift institutions seeking money in an IPO tell potential investors, “Yes, we were the ones that managed the organization that brought it to the edge of failure, but, we have learned from this experience! You should give us $100 million in our IPO.”
What have these executives learned?

They have learned how to fail, that’s what they have learned!

There was an interesting article in the business section of the Sunday New York Times which discussed investing in start up companies. I remember myself, because I have worked in that space, that one of the old “truths” of investing in young entrepreneurs is that you should look at people who have failed in earlier business attempts and it even was a “badge of honor” to have failed many times. Recent research does not support this conclusion. On average, those that have failed starting businesses tend to continue to fail. This attitude relating to failure was advice given to venture capitalists or angel investors that are looking desperately to place money. The situation arose during “booms” when there was too much money chasing too few deals. Nothing replaces the success of an entrepreneur as a guide to potential future success.

Still one has to be careful here. Two cases come to mind. First, Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his book “Fooled by Randomness” discusses traders that succeed fantastically because they are in the right spot at the right time. Through no skill of their own do they achieve success, and, because they now think that they are geniuses, go on and lose most if not all of what they gained in their one success. Obviously, these people are not geniuses and should not be treated as such. What you want is people that continue to succeed and succeed in ways that are not just lucky successes.

Second, in an “up” market, almost everyone can succeed, sometimes spectacularly. This can happen in overheated housing markets, in firms that are of the dot.com variety, and in growing and running financial institutions. Credit bubbles help. The sad thing about this is that the people that have just benefited from the “bubble” and not from their “skill” are not found out until the “bubble” bursts. Then the true reason for the success of these individuals becomes obvious.

Furthermore, if a chief executive or a management operated in an environment that was “hot” and where increased risk taking and adding additional leverage were the skills needed in order to succeed they are not the chief executive or management to operate within an environment that is “cool” and where reducing risk and de-leveraging are the tools required. Speed racers are not needed on streets where the speed limit is 25 miles per hour.

It should be clear that the people that get you into a mess are not the people you should count on to get you out of the mess. But, again, the government usually does not see this except in cases of fraud or other types of criminal behavior. Therefore, the government will often stick with those people that are experienced in failure.

These comments can be applied to any approach the government takes to resolving issues in the private sector, whether it be in terms of dealing with the toxic assets of financial institutions or bailing out failed managements in the auto industry. The government must be realistic in what it can do. A bank bailout plan that just brings in private investors to relieve institutions of bad debts while leaving bank managements in place is not going to give the financial sector and the economy what it needs.

Yes, something needs to be done about the bad assets banks have on their books. Losses have to be absorbed by the banks and their owners, themselves, or the government must absorb the losses. The insolvent banks, and auto companies, need to be closed or put into bankruptcy. The world needs to move on and the bad decisions of the past must be accounted for. Someone must pay—sometime. Unfortunately, when government gets involved, the solutions to things often only get postponed or delayed. That is not what the financial markets or the economy needs at this time.

And, this includes Cerberus and Chrysler Corp. Cerberus made a wrong deal at the wrong time. They need to move on.

Households and the Debt Problem

The Federal Reserve released new data on the financial condition of the household sector of the United States. Like other sectors of the economy, the financial condition of this sector has deteriorated over the past year.

The value of household assets dropped about 15% falling from $77.3 trillion to around $65.7 trillion. Most of the decline came from the fall in housing values and in their stock market portfolios.

In terms of household holdings of stocks, the value of the stocks households owned, mutual funds that were held and funds in retirement plans, the loss was $8.5 trillion. That is, the value of stock holdings fell from $20.6 trillion to $12.1 trillion.

Although mortgage credit fell during the year, total household liabilities stayed roughly the same at about $14.2 trillion. This means that debt as a percentage of assets rose from around 18% to 22% during the year (or net worth as a percentage of assets dropped from 82% to 78%).

Mortgage credit at the end of 2008 was $10.5 trillion so that other household liabilities totaled around $3.7 trillion, with consumer credit making up $2.6 trillion of this latter number. Mortgage credit fell during the year, but not because the household sector was trying to get out of mortgage debt. The primary reason for the decline was foreclosures and the reduction in the willingness of financial institutions to lend.

What this means is that households took on increased leverage during the year, not because they wanted to in order to grow their balance sheets, but because of the decrease in the value of their assets and because of the need to borrow due to lower incomes. The increased leverage was a result of the collapse of the mortgage market, in particular, and the economy, in general. The increased leverage just happened—it was not planned.

In order to protect themselves in the face of these changes, households moved assets into cash and cash equivalent accounts. Banks deposits held by households were at about $7.7 trillion at year end.

This is important information for understanding the state of the economy and the contribution the household sector might make toward turning the economy around. The household sector was in free fall in 2008 and was reacting to events, not leading them.

Households took three major shocks last year: first was the decline in housing prices; the second was the rise in unemployment; and the third was the fall in the stock market. Not only was their cash flow significantly hurt, but the value of their assets fell precipitously. They borrowed in an effort to hold on and they became more liquid so as to be prepared for that “rainy day.”

The year 2009 does not look any better than 2008. Housing prices continue to plummet. The stock market has dropped since the first of the year. And, unemployment has ratcheted up. That is, one can assume that the direction observed in the balance sheets of American household in 2008 will continue to be followed this year. Even if the stock market were to stabilize or rise through the rest of the year consumer spending, I believe, will continue to be weak. Even if housing prices stabilize. Even with the implementation of the Obama stimulus plan.

According to the best information we have there are three further shocks looming on the horizon. The first two have to do with the mortgage market: over the next 18 a large amount of Alt-A and Options mortgages are supposed to re-price. Given the weakness in employment that is expected to continue and the lower household incomes, this event could be devastating. And, on top of that credit card delinquencies are rising and these are expected to grow given the financial condition of the household sector.

Consumers will continue to withdraw from the marketplace as they add debt where they can in order to maintain at least a part of their former living standards. Also, consumers will continue to try and become more liquid so that they can be prepared should they need to need cash to tide them over a rough time. Any improvement in the stock market will be met with households selling more stock so as to move the funds into more liquid assets, the rise in the market making it easier for them to get rid of stocks—even at a loss.

And where are the funds going to go that come to households from the Obama recovery plan? My guess is that a good portion of them will go into liquid assets, or into paying down debt. Households are scared right now. They are going to use whatever they have as conservatively as possible. This even goes for those that have some security in their employment condition.

The data that are coming out confirm the strength of the problem that the policy makers face. The United States has a tremendous debt overhang. This debt problem is going to have to be worked off. Economists talk about “the paradox of thrift”, the problem that consumers are not spending at this time and probably will not spend much in the near future, even though if everyone opened up their pocketbooks and spent, everyone would be better off.

This situation is like a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game. If everyone else increases their spending reducing their savings and, willingly, increasing their debt and I don’t follow their lead, then I will be a lot better off that all these other people. But, if everyone else believes as I do and doesn’t reduce their savings and doesn’t increase their debt, then I end up losing big to everyone else. So, as in the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” everyone defaults to the decision to save more where they can and to pay off their debt. The consequence of this will be that consumer spending will remain weak and much effort will be extended, where possible, to work themselves out of debt.

The overall problem is that there is too much debt outstanding. The policy makers are focusing upon stimulating the economy by increasing spending. If the debt overhang is truly too great, then the stimulus package will only have a small multiplier effect on the economy as households try and get their balance sheets back in some kind of order.

Such behavior will not have much affect on the economy, and it will also not have much affect on the stock market. Government policy makers must direct more attention to resolving this debt problem. It seems to me that this is what the financial markets are trying to tell them. As Citigroup and Bank of America claim they are showing some signs of profitability. As General Electric survives a reduction in its credit rating, meaning that GE Capital has more of a chance to re-structure itself. As General Motors indicates that it has reduced costs sufficiently to rescind the request for another $2 billion from the government in March. And, as other financial institutions seek to repay to TARP money they had received last fall, the stock market rebounds.

It is the debt problem that is the big concern of the financial markets. In my opinion, as long as the government policy makers put their primary focus on stimulating spending, the financial markets—and the economy—will continue to flounder. When they refocus on the more crucial problem they will find that the financial markets will be more supportive of what they are doing.