European Sovereign Debt Must Be Restructured

A debt crisis for an organization occurs when either its debt repayment cannot be covered by the cash flow being generated by the organization or the outstanding debt of the organization cannot be reduced sufficiently to reduce the debt repayment needs. 

In the case of a governmental organization, the cash flow needed to cover the debt repayment requirements comes from economic growth that is large enough to generate governmental revenues that cover the government’s cash outflow.

Or, the cash needed to reduce the amount of government debt outstanding comes from a cash surplus generated by the government’s prudent fiscal budgets.

If neither of these conditions is met, then the government is insolvent and the debt outstanding must be restructured.

What is so hard to understand?

The growth rate of many countries in the eurozone is exceedingly low or non-existent. 

The new budgets being generated in these countries do not reduce deficits sufficiently to reduce their ratio of government debt to Gross Domestic Product.

The current efforts of the effected governments produce a cumulative result that just exacerbates the situation.  If the deficits cannot be reduced sufficiently, the debt repayment crises continues which puts greater pressure on governments to reduce budget deficits, and so on, and so on.  The experience of the eurozone over the past few years just confirms this dilemma.   

This reality pervades the bond markets. 

But, this reality is still being evaded by eurozone officials. 

A movement to enact a “fiscal union” to go with Europe’s “currency union” cannot correct the current situation without a debt restructuring because it ignores the reality of what the current situation has inherited.

A “fiscal union” can only be achieved if, at the same time, a debt restructuring takes place in those nations that are fiscally insolvent.  That is, the resolution of the current problems can only be achieved when the fact of insolvency is dealt with AND some form of a “fiscal union” with sufficient power is put in place. 

The past must be dealt with and some hope must be established for the future.     

A debt restructuring will be costly because of the impact this restructuring will have on European banks…and other banks and financial institutions throughout the world.  Any new “fiscal union” combined with a debt restructuring must include some plans to “backstop” banks.  This “backstopping” may spillover into other countries, like the United States and the United Kingdom.

And, all of this will have further negative repercussions on economic growth…in Europe, in the Untied States, and elsewhere. 

As Milton Friedman warned, “There is no such thing as a free lunch.”  Well, it appears as if the “free lunch” we have been trying to live off of is just about over. 

The Solution to the European Problem?

“The bare minimum the eurozone needs to cope with its crisis is an effective mechanism for writing down the debts of evidently insolvent private and sovereign borrowers, such as Greece; funds large enough to manage the illiquid bonds markets of potentially solvent governments; and ways to make the financial system credibly solvent immediately.”

‘

This is the prognosis of Mr. Martin Wolf, the economics editor of the Financial Times, in today’s edition of the paper. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ba2f7c4-ee76-11e0-a2ed-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ZuI4wzxo)

“Yet, alas, the eurozone requires more still: it needs a credible path of adjustment, at whose end we see weaker economies restored to health.”

The word is getting out…the European banks are going to have to take bigger write downs of their holdings of sovereign debt than ever imagined. 

Can the eurozone governments cover the hole in the balance sheets of these banks?

The United States stock market seems to think that they can.  This is the reason given for the rapid recovery of stock prices in the market yesterday. 

But, let’s look more closely at what Mr. Wolf is saying.  In the first condition, he writes about how the amount of the write down will be determined along with how the write down will be administered.  This is a daunting task in, and of, itself. 

Note further, however, that he is including ‘private’ debt along with the debt of sovereign borrowers.  The need to write down the ‘private’ debt is something new, something that has not gotten a lot of attention in the press in all the noise relating to the sovereign debt issue.  

The second point Mr. Wolf makes is about contagion.  How is any write down of the debt of the peripheral nations going to be kept to just the peripheral nations bonds, themselves?  The concern is that once write downs take place in bonds of the fiscally weaker nations that some spread is bound to occur to the nations that are in a stronger position, fiscally.

Then, Mr. Wolf addresses the issue of credibility.  Given all the “messing around” for the better part of almost three years, how can financial markets come to believe that solvency has been restored to the impacted nations?  If anything has increased over the past three years or so, it is the lack of trust in the eurozone governments when it comes to how the politicians carry out their responsibilities.  There is little or no trust in the people heading up most of the governments in Europe.  Can this “trust” be regained…and in time?

The add-on to this analysis is that the eurozone countries also need an immediate return to a robust economic recovery.

The happy conclusion to the analysis: “If such a path is not found, the eurozone, as it is now, will fracture. The question is not if, but when. The challenge is simply as big as that.”

Two comments on this analysis: first, I am glad to see that some people are finally seeing the problem as one of solvency and not one of liquidity.  It has taken a long time for the analysis to get to this point.  Now, it is time for the policy makers to accept this fact.

Second, Mr. Wolf pretty well lays out the dislocation that is going to have to take place in order to restructure and restore the eurozone to some sense of order and balance. 

“How, then, did the eurozone fall into its plight? The easy credit conditions and low interest rates of the first decade (of the European Union) delivered property bubbles and explosions of private borrowing in Ireland and Spain, incontinent public borrowing in Greece, declines in external competitiveness in Greece, Italy and Spain and huge external deficits in Greece, Portugal and Spain.”

The European condition is the result of credit inflation!  Quite an admission for a dyed-in-the-wool Keynesian!

The point is, however, that a long period of excesses must be matched by a painful and uncomfortable period of restructuring. 

In conclusion, however, one cannot ignore the social situation in Europe.  The “social contract” of the post-World War II era appears, to many, to be broken, and there is protesting and rioting in the streets.  Strong economic growth and low levels of unemployment, something that seems more and more unlikely to happen in the near future, of course, can resolve this situation.  Writing a new “social contract”, as history shows us, is not an easy thing to do.

Are there any lessons here for others?

Our Two Choices

It seems as if our policy choices have been reduced to two.  First, our basic problem is that there is too much debt outstanding, debt of consumers, debt of businesses, and debt of governments…state, local, and national.  According to Ken Rogoff of Harvard (and co-author of the book “This Time is Different”), “By far the main problem is a huge overhang of debt that creates headwinds to faster normalization and post-crisis growth.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1e0f0efe-c1a9-11e0-acb3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1UdDrJfzK)

During the past fifty years of credit inflation, the incentive existed for economic units to increase financial leverage.  Consequently, we have reached an extreme position of financial leverage, one that many believe is unsustainable.  As Rogoff claims, people attempting to reduce this “huge overhang of debt” will not borrow, will not spend, and this will result in a period of time in which economic growth and the expansion of employment will be modest at best, and downright slow at worst.

The resulting policy choice, therefore, is to allow the debt reduction to take place and let the economy adjust to more “normal” levels of debt.  This “adjustment” is going to have to take place some time and the best thing for the future of the economy is to let it adjust naturally for this adjustment must take place sooner or later.  By not allowing it to take place, we just postpone the final day of reckoning.

The second policy choice is to pursue a significantly aggressive program of credit inflation, one that would force people and businesses to return to borrowing and hence to spending.  Such a policy would help to accelerate economic growth and put people back to work.

This argument is based on the assumption that the United States cannot afford the consequences of a long, slow period of debt reduction and a lengthy period of mediocre economic growth.  The cost of following a “do-nothing” policy in terms of human suffering due to the unemployment and social dislocation created by such a policy would be unacceptable.

The second policy has been the approach taken by the Obama administration, arguing for a resumption of credit inflation, both in terms of government deficits and in terms of expansionary monetary policy.  The question that supporters of this policy debate about is the degree of the credit inflation.  The Obama administration, itself, has tended to follow a more modest level of credit inflation whereas its liberal critics have argued the Obama team has been too timid in how much credit inflation should be imposed on the economy.

Here we get into a debate over timing.  The first policy is needed, according to its proponents, because that is the only way the United States will regain its competitiveness and be able to go forward with the finances of its people in a strong position.  Following the second policy would only postpone the adjustments needed and leave the “day of reckoning” somewhere out there in the future.

The supporters of the second policy argue that we cannot allow economic growth to be so low and unemployment stay so high because of the human cost.  We need to address this now and worry about the debt re-structuring problem later.

The concern over the second policy program has to do with the “tipping point.”  Let me explain.

Right now, the debt overhang appears to be the predominant force in the economy.  Consumers, at least a large portion of them, are not borrowing and spending because of the debt loads they are carrying. (The wealthier consumers seem to be going along fine, thank you.) They are increasing savings in an attempt to get their balance sheets back in line.  Small- and medium-sized businesses are not borrowing to any degree, are not hiring people, and not expanding much at all because they have too much debt on their balance sheets and are trying to keep their heads above water.  Many state and local governments are facing real budget crunches and are cutting back on employment and capital expenditures because of their legal obligations. 

The government fiscal stimulus programs initially attempted by the federal government have been ineffective and disappointing, at best.  The efforts of the monetary authorities to generate bank lending have also been exceedingly ineffective despite historically extreme injections of liquidity into the banking system. Those people supporting the “second policy” continue to call for even more credit inflation whether it be for an new round of “quantitative easing” on the part of the Fed or some other innovative uses of monetary policy. 

The problem with the “tipping point” is this: how severe the tipping point will be if/when the new efforts at credit inflation overcome the efforts of economic units to restructure their balance sheets and eliminate the “debt overhang” connected with the past fifty years of credit inflation. 

The current policy makers seem to believe that the “tipping point” can be managed and the adjustment from debt restructuring to further borrowing can become incremental.  That the trillion or so dollars injected into the banking system by the Federal Reserve can be smoothly removed from the banks once borrowing from them picks up steam.   In this way, faster economic growth could resume again and employers could begin hiring workers at a speedier pace.  

The alternative view is that the “tipping point” cannot be “managed” and that once the gates are open, borrowing will only accelerate and credit inflation will get “out-of-control”, given the magnitudes of liquidity already pushed into the financial system.  Does this mean hyper-inflation?

This discussion leads to a question about whether or not the current policy makers can recognize the “tipping point” (let alone anticipate it) and whether or not they can then smoothly remove all the excess liquidity that has been forced into the banking system.

If one is to look at the record of Chairman Bernanke and the Federal Reserve system one cannot have very much confidence that they will be able to recognize a turning point let alone manage their way through the “tipping point”.  Historically, Chairman Bernanke has had trouble recognizing bubbles, stays with a policy stance far too long and then over-reacts.  Take a look at what happened before the financial crisis of 2008.  The “housing bubble” and the “stock markets bubble” in the middle 2000s were not recognized by Bernanke or the Fed.  Bernanke and the Fed fought the “fear of inflation” for too long into the initial stages of the financial collapse.  And, then Bernanke and the Fed had to over-adjust to the financial crisis they contributed to by “throwing open the windows…and the doors…and whatever…at the Fed” in order to “save the world”. 

Managing a “tipping point”, I would argue, is not one of Ben Bernanke’s strengths.  But, governments, I would argue, are not very good at managing “tipping points.” 

Where does that leave us?  Between a rock and a hard place. 

The government will continue to try to alleviate the suffering of those that have been hurt in the Great Recession and its aftermath.  The Obama administration and the Democrats and the Republicans will compromise on a policy that can still be labeled credit inflation.  The Federal Reserve will continue to look for ways to stimulate bank lending.  And, the only way I can characterize this situation is one of HIGH RISK.  Volatility is going to continue to dominate the financial markets over the next two years or so for the very reasons I have cited above. 

The reason for this is the timing of the “tipping point.”  The private sector is going to continue to push for balance sheet restructuring.  The government is going to continue to push for more and more credit inflation.  This leaves the future highly uncertain.  Consequently, markets will move this way and that way until some leadership and stability are brought into the picture.

Are There Any Leaders in Europe?

On March 10, I asked the question, “Is this Europe’s month of reckoning?” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/257590-is-this-europe-s-month-of-reckoning).

Well, the answer is no! The result of the meetings held this past weekend at the emergency summit in Brussels: “Not if we can postpone it for a while!”

In essence, however, we got the worst of two possible worlds...a combination of the two.

The leaders came together and seemed to say, “On the one hand we will provide some bailout protection for the nations struggling to right their fiscal distress, but on the other hand in our plan we will not get penalized for the funds we advance because our repayment will stand first in line over any prior claims.”

No real bailout, no real restructuring…which, in the longer run will mean that we will get a restructuring...we just don’t know when this restructuring will take place.

Current holders of Europe’s sovereign debt can now respond to Europe's leaders, “Don’t do us any favors.”

My patience is gone.

Let’s have the European sovereign debt restructuring now and get this thing over with!

The European Union does not seem to be workable in its present form. No one can lead.

I still believe that there should be a Euro, a common currency for Europe, but there needs to be
some other serious governing body behind it.

The current structure is awful!

Get on with it!

Bring on the debt restructuring!

Let’s move on to something else that we might have a chance of resolving!

Known Unknowns: Debt Refinancings in 2011

When does a financial institution write down an asset?

To those in the banking industry the answer has always been, “Not until I am not responsible for that portfolio anymore.”

My experience with lenders is that when making a loan they tend to be pessimistic and, in addition, require collateral. Unless, of course, they are securitizing the asset created and selling it off.

However, when overseeing a loan portfolio, lenders tend to be very optimistic. “Well, the borrower is just experiencing a slight setback, but things will get better.” “The economy is going to improve soon and then the loan will be alright.” “Yes, the borrower made a mistake, but he has learned from the mistake and is getting his act in order.”

Lenders (bankers) are reluctant to write down anything if they don’t have to. And, this applies to all aspects of their asset portfolios.

But, a big cloud is hanging over the financial industry going into 2011 in the United States, and also in Europe. The big cloud relates to number of bank assets that will need to be refinanced during the year. These numbers are staggering.

My guess is that this is one of the major reasons why commercial banks are not lending now. (See “Little or No Life in the Banking Sector,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/241507-little-or-no-life-in-the-banking-sector.) Banks do not want to write off any more assets now and are reluctant to add any more funds than they have to in order to build up their loan loss reserves. They add to these reserves as little as possible, as little as the regulators will let them get away with, so that they can build up their equity capital positions. If they then let the loans that are maturing run off without replacing them, their capital positions improve. The debt/equity ratio can fall as debt can be reduced while capital is being increased.

Making new loans does not fit into this strategy because the new loans will have to be financed and that will tend to raise the debt/equity ratio. So commercial banks are not lending now.

So what is this cloud and why is it so scary?

There are two specific areas that are being highlighted these days that stand out as potential problems for the banks: the first is the commercial real estate sector; and the second is governments, local, state, and nation.

In all cases a lot of loans or securities are going to mature in 2011 and the bet is that a large number of these assets that are found on bank balance sheets will either not be sufficiently credit worthy to be able to refinance or will not be able to handle the interest rates they will have to pay on the new debt to be issued..

In November 2010, commercial real estate loans made up almost 40 percent of the loan portfolios of the banks not among the largest 25 commercial banks in the United States and over 25 percent of their total assets. If these “smaller” banks had to write down 10 percent of their commercial real estate loans that would amount to about 3 percent of their assets: a substantial blow to their capital positions.

The problem is not so great in the largest 25 banks in the country as commercial real estate loans make up only 14 percent of their loan portfolios and about 8 percent of total assets.
This situation is the one pointed to by Elizabeth Warren in congressional testimony when she stated that 3,000 commercial banks, primarily the smaller ones, faced substantial problems ahead in this part of their loan portfolio.

The other problem mentioned has to do with government securities. More and more concern is being expressed about the condition of the finances of state and city governments in the United States. Layoffs are taking place all over the place, with many of the layoffs threatening health and safety. Yet, there is still substantial concern that the unfunded commitments of these state and city governments embedded in their pension funds have not really fully been addressed.
They may have to be addressed in 2011.

And so we get articles like “Bankrupt City, USA” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/07eabcdc-06c8-11e0-86d6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz185wrM18g) which carry statements like this, “A Congressional Budget Office report reaches a conclusion to terrify investors in America’s $2.8 trillion municipal bond market. Municipal bankruptcy, permitted in 26 states, should be considered by city leaders to restructure labor contracts and debts.”

And the yields on municipal securities are the highest they have been in over a year. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704681804576018022360684088.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_0) The situation related to state-issued securities is not too different.

The smaller banks, as defined above, have around 25 percent of their securities portfolio in state and local political issues. This makes up about 5 percent of the total assets of these banks. Again, a write down in this area could cause substantial damage to bank capital positions.
But, this problem relating to government debt is not constrained to United States banks. “Eurozone countries will have to refinance more debt next year than at any time since the launch of the euro amid investors’ warnings that the debt crisis in the region will intensify in the new year….Eurozone nations will have to refinance or repay €560 billion ($740 billion) in 2011, €45 billion more than 2010 and the highest amount since the launch of the single currency in January 1999.” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9d781f6-0619-11e0-976b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1860QqksJ) Much of this debt is held by banks.

What would you do if you were running a bank and were facing the possibility that a substantial portion of your portfolio would have to refinance in 2011? Oh, by-the-way, you also have foreclosures and business bankruptcies running at a relatively high rate as well.

You probably would stop lending, try to shrink you balance sheet as much as you could without damaging profitability and build up as much capital as you could before the time of refinancing arrived.

The question that we don’t have an answer for at the moment relates to whether or not the bankers, themselves, have a good handle on which assets will present the biggest refinancing problems and just how much will have to be written off due to these refinancings. Are they still just “hoping for the best.”

In addition, a rising interest rate environment would be one of the worst scenarios possible given all the refinancings that are going to have to take place.

Happy New Year!

Europe and the Solvency Issue

More and more people are becoming aware of the fact that the problem in Europe is one of solvency and not liquidity! Yesterday, the European Central Bank warned “that euro-zone banks face a €195 billion in write-downs this year and next due to an economic outlook that remained ’clouded by uncertainty.’” (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703406604575278620471963334.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.) This is equivalent to slightly more than $239 billion.

Not only that but it is estimated that these banks will need to refinance roughly €800 by the end of 2010. (See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/business/global/01ecb.html?ref=business.) This is equivalent to about $984 billion or roughly $1.0 trillion.

More and more people are beginning to realize that countries within the European Union are going to have to restructure loans and this will mean that many euro-zone banks are going to have to write down many of the assets they have on their balance sheets. Hence, we face the problem of the solvency of the banking system.

Why has it taken so long for these people to realize that the problem is a solvency problem?

The reason, I believe, is that the mainstream economic models we have been working with over the past 50 years have focused upon “liquidity” issues. Debt has played very little role in these models.

Yes, I know that some ‘fringe’ economists like Hyman Minsky wrote about these issues, but try and find any kind of a discussion of debt and solvency in major macroeconomic textbooks.

Many post-World War II discussions of money and the demand for money are “framed” within the terminology developed by John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s, around the term liquidity preference, “The term introduced by Keynes to denote the demand for money.” (This is from the Glossary of the macroeconomic textbook by the Keynesian economist Olivier Blanchard.)

Moving from liquidity preference we get the concept of “liquidity trap” from the Keynesian dogma: “The case where nominal interest rates are equal to zero and monetary policy cannot, therefore, decrease them further.” (This, too, comes from Blanchard.) That is, people want to hold money and don’t want to loan money to invest in plant or equipment or inventories and so forth.

Obviously, this latter possibility resonates with Keynesian fundamentalists in terms of the situation that has existed over the past year or so.

The problem with this is that the idea of liquidity preference and the liquidity trap apply to the future. People don’t want to invest privately and just want to hold money because the expectations of future investment performance are so low and so risky that money is the safer way to hold their wealth. This is why, in the Keynesian paradigm, government deficit spending works because people will buy the government debt and the government can then “invest” and put people back to work whereas the private sector cannot.

But, what if the problem is that people and businesses (including banks) are so in debt that they cannot spend and that the cash they are holding is to provide them with funds to exist on in the future? That is, what if people and businesses are bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy because of the debt they have accumulated and are hoarding their wealth in very liquid assets so that they can buy what they need out of what remains of their wealth?

Maybe economic cycles are connected with credit inflations or debt deflations, cumulative buildups of debt followed by the need to unwind the excessive use of leverage built up in the earlier period. This cyclical behavior contains the problem of solvency, not liquidity. (Keynes, interested in the short run, focused on liquidity. Irving Fisher, the prominent American economist from the 1920s, focused on the longer run and wrote about debt deflations.)

It seems that economic policymakers in Europe (and in the United States) have been interpreting the problems of the last two years or so as a liquidity problem. Hence the responses of the leaders of the European Union have been couched in terms of solving their economic and fiscal issues by making sure that there is sufficient liquidity in financial markets for them to continue to function. Yet, the problems have not gone away because the issues of restructuring the debt and asset write-downs have either been ignored or pushed under the covers so that they don’t have to be discussed.

This has been true in the United States as well. The United States Treasury Department responded with the TARP program that was, at least initially, aimed at providing liquidity for ill-liquid assets on the books of banks and other institutions. (See my post of November 16, 2008,”The Bailout Plan: Did Bernanke Panic?” http://seekingalpha.com/article/106186-the-bailout-plan-did-bernanke-panic.) Furthermore, much of the effort of the Federal Reserve in 2008 and 2009 was aimed at providing liquidity to the banking system and the financial markets and not to problems of solvency.

In fact, I have been arguing over the last six months or so that the real reason why the Federal Reserve is keeping its target Federal Funds rate so low is that there are real asset problems in many of the small- to medium sized commercial banks. The Fed is keeping the rates low so as to help the banking system escape the “solvency” problem of the smaller banks from getting worse while the FDIC works through the liquidation process. Note, again, that the FDIC is closing more than 3.5 banks per week through May 28, 2010 and has 775 banks (There are about one out of every eight commercial banks on the problem list!) on its watch list, a number that is still increasing every quarter.

“The challenges for banks in the 16-nation euro-zone include exposure to a weakening commercial real estate market, hundreds of billions of euros in bad debts, economic problems in East European countries, and a potential collision between the banks’ own substantial refinancing needs and government demand for additional loans.” This quote is taken from the New York Times article referenced above.

The source of this concern? The European Central Bank!

The problem with a solvency crisis is that ultimately assets must be written down to more realistic values. In the cumulative process that occurs in the euphoric credit inflation that precedes a debt problem, asset values attain unrealistic levels. That is why people and businesses (including banks) continue to leverage up their balance sheets.

Valuations eventually must be put on a more realistic basis. This is where the European Union is at the present time. The unanswered question is, how far must valuations be reduced to achieve this realistic basis. And, of course, the bigger concern is whether or not these reductions can be achieved without inducing a cumulative debt deflation. No one really has the answer to either of these questions before the fact.

However, the excesses of the past must be paid for!

The Deleveraging Continues

There are three major factors that will contribute to the timing and the strength of the economic recovery. First, there is the ability and speed at which individuals and businesses are able to get their balance sheets in order by reducing the amount of debt they have on them. Second, there are supply side questions about the restructuring of the economy. This has to do with the large number of people that have left the labor force and may not return in the near term and the secular decline in the capacity utilization of industry. (See my post of June 22, 2009, “Structural Shift in the U. S. Economy is Really in Supply”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/144508-structural-shift-in-the-u-s-economy-is-really-in-supply.) Third, there is the tremendous amount of debt the federal government is issuing and the fear that this re-leveraging will create a credit inflation that may go right into prices rather than output and employment.

In this post, I am primarily focusing on the first of these factors. I will discuss the progress of the second two issues in future posts. There is more immediate information on the first and it is vitally important that this deleveraging takes place in an orderly fashion or the near term concern over the latter two will be misplaced.

Perhaps the two most highly publicized methods of deleveraging continue to speed along at a rapid pace. The American Bankruptcy Institute has reported that the total number of bankruptcies in the United States filed during the first six months of 2009 increased by 36 percent over the same period of time in 2008. The only time bankruptcies have been so large is right before the bankruptcy law change earlier in this decade. Business filings during the first six months were up 64 percent over the first six months in 2008 and individual or household filings were up 35 percent.

Bank closings reached 81 for the year with four new banks added to the list on Friday, one of them being the 10th largest bank failure in United States history. Talk now is that there will be 300 or more bank closures in the near future. The FDIC is scrambling to find ways to increase its financial resources to handle the upcoming deluge of failures and is also easing restrictions on those that can bring private equity into the mix to carry some of the financial burden in taking over these failed institutions.

Getting less publicity is the effort that individuals and businesses are making to bring their own financial situation under control. Cutting expenses is, of course, one of the immediate ways that people can work toward their own best interest. Another way of saying this is that people and businesses are increasing their savings. Every week, more and more articles are appearing informing people how this saving might be accomplished and presenting stories of how households and companies are successfully meeting this challenge.

Furthermore, there are a growing number of stories of people and businesses getting in touch with those they owe money to and working with the lenders to set up terms and conditions that will increase the probability that debt will be repaid in a timely manner. My experience in banking supports the contention that financial institutions and other lenders really would prefer to work something out with those they have lent money to, but depend on those borrowers that perceive that they are going to face some difficulties in the future to get with them and initiate discussions about how things might be worked out. Postponing discussions only puts more pressure on both parties and tends to make things harder to resolve.

Refinancing is another problem looming on the horizon. There seems to be dark clouds hovering over the commercial real estate industry and less credit worthy corporate debt issuers. A lot of debt is going to come due over the next 18 months or so. The big concern is whether or not this debt will be able to be re-financed since very little of it will be able to be re-paid. The bits and pieces of news coming out of this area is that discussions are being held and although there may be failures coming out of these situations that the problems are recognized and will be absorbed in a relatively smooth fashion as time passes.

The areas of the bond market that contain firms with higher credit ratings are performing remarkably well. Volumes of new issues are up and the financial markets have absorbed these rather smoothly. If anything, corporations have turned to the bond market for funding since the commercial banking system is actually shrinking its base of commercial and industrial loans. This is an interesting thing happening to substitute bond credit for the credit extended by the banking sector at this point, but, as they say, whatever works.

Another method for de-leveraging that seems to be picking up steam is that corporations are buying back their own debt off the open market. In some cases it is reported that these companies can buy back their existing debt at 50 cents on the dollar which is a pretty good exchange for the company going forward. Look to see this pick up this fall.

Finally, the Federal Reserve does not look like it is going to pull the rug out from the banking system and the financial markets going forward. Yes, there is a lot of concern about all the reserves the Fed has put into the banking system and whether or not it is going to be able to “exit” the banking system in an orderly fashion. However, the Fed does not want a replay of the 1937-38 experience when it caused a collapse in the banking system by trying to withdraw excess reserves from the banks by raising reserve requirements. (See my post of August 21, “Federal Reserve: Exit Watch”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/157620-federal-reserve-exit-watch.) The best guess here is that the Fed will continue to keep the banking system very liquid in order to help underwrite the de-leveraging now underway.

The important thing to remember at this time is that “quiet is good”! The de-leveraging is taking place. However, the de-leveraging will take time. We just can’t become too impatient for we must let the system do its work and restructure its balance sheets. We just don’t want any more shocks! There still is a long way to go toward a full economic recovery and the other two issues I mentioned in the first paragraph are of great concern. But, we move forward by just putting one foot in front of the other.

Renouncing the Debt

There are three ways to get out of a debt crisis. First, you can work off the debt, but this takes a long time. An impatient public and an impatient government will not have the stomach the wait that would be necessary for individuals, families, and businesses to get their balance sheets in order so that a recovery can get started.

The second method is to inflate or reflate yourself out of the nominal debt burden you have created. The Federal Reserve is doing its best to create an inflationary environment so that the real value of the debt will be reduced and individuals, families, and businesses will feel comfortable enough to begin borrowing and spending once again.

The third way to reduce the burden of your debt is to repudiate the debt. That is, declare that you will not pay the debt and that those that issued the credit to you will have to take only a partial payment on the amount of funds that they advanced to you. The partial payment, of course, can be zero.

The latter two methods have an “honorable” history that goes back centuries. (Read almost anything by Niall Ferguson.) Usually, it is the government that can get away with either or both of these efforts, but in the 20th century, the private sector got much better in following the lead established by governments, especially repudiating the debt. Individuals, families, and businesses learned the ropes of debt repudiation and are now taking this knowledge to new extremes.

The case that is before everyone’s eyes these days is that of the automobile industry. Both General Motors and Chrysler argue that bondholders must take a huge cut in the amount of money they are owed by these companies so that the companies can survive and thousands and thousands of jobs can be saved. The bondholders, remarkably, have some reluctance to consent to this offer. As of this date, the aimed for restructuring of these two companies depend upon what is worked out between the companies and the bondholders.

Best guess is that the bondholders will lose. And, who will own the auto companies? Not the existing shareholders. The figure I have heard for General Motors is that existing shareholders will end up with about 1% of the ownership of the company after the restructuring takes place. And, not the existing bondholders. The biggest shareholders? The federal government and the labor unions.

The important thing, however, is that the debt problem being experienced by these automobile companies will be resolved. That is, the companies can move forward, leaner and meaner, without the terrible burden of having to honor the debts they had contracted for.

Furthermore, this is what has been proposed for the banking industry. In the plan to sell off bad assets, aren’t the banks being asked to repudiate a large portion of the debt they have on their balance sheets? The assets will be sold to investors and private equity firms to “manage” and this will get the banks out from under the burden of the “toxic assets” they have accumulated.

And, who will bear the risk of this buyout? The federal government, with the real possibility that it may, depending upon the way things work out, end up owning large portions of some of the larger banks. (An important critique of this program is presented by the economist Joseph Stiglitz in “Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/opinion/01stiglitz.html?scp=8&sq=jospeh%20stiglitz&st=cse.)

Might this plan work? Well, the people that the federal government wanted to get interested in the plan seemingly smell blood. We read this morning that Wilbur Ross and his firm’s parent company, Invesco, are leading a consortium that is going to bid on some of the assets in the government’s P-PIP. He is joining some other prominent money, like BlackRock, Pimco and Bank of New York Mellon, interested in getting involved in the program.

Do these people think that they might make some money out of this program? Do they believe that the risk-reward tradeoff is skewed in their direction? Damn betcha’.

Here is another case of “watch where the big money players put their money.” My guess for the future is that the evolving banking system is going to be somehow connected with the hedge funds and the private equity funds and will not have the same old “bank on the corner” feel to it that we experience now. And, somehow, this new banking system will be even harder to regulate than the current one. Otherwise, this money will not flow there. (Something to think about for the future.)

With these funds flowing into the P-PIP, one of the things the federal government is going to have to face is the huge profits that these companies will make out of the program. On the one hand, if P-PIP is successful in this way and these funds make huge profits, the banks will be freed up of their “toxic assets” and the tax payer will not be burdened with more taxes. On the other hand, the federal government will have to explain how it catered to all these “Wall Street Interests” and left the poor Main Streeter in his or her poverty.

The essence of the plan, getting back to the story here, is that the banks will have to take the “haircut”, the write down on the value of their assets. This is just another way of repudiating the debt, with the federal government standing behind the banks. Is it fair? Of course not!

A fund that made the wrong bet was Cerberus Capital Management. In a real sense, it hoped to do with Chrysler Corp. what Invesco, BlackRock, Pimco, and others, are hoping to do with the bank assets. It just got in too early when Chrysler was not in bad enough shape for the federal government to attach a “put” to the investment Cerberus made in the company. Too bad for Cerberus.

But, what about all the other debt out there? Mortgages on homes, debt on commercial real estate, consumer credit and credit cards, and small business loans? Why shouldn’t the people that accumulated all this debt get some relief as well? This is, of course, the big question and the big issue in terms of fairness. The basic answer to this is, as usual, size. The banks and the auto companies and others are big, their failures could case systemic problems for the system, and they have expensive lawyers and lobbyists working for them. Is it fair? Of course not!

The fundamental problem that is being faced around the world is a debt problem. There is just too much debt outstanding. And, actually, the amount of debt outstanding in the world is really not shrinking. Especially, as governments increase their debt to cover the debt that has been built up in the private sector. The debt problem is going to be with us for a while and will continue to get in the way, one way or another, of any kind of a robust recovery. How we get through it is going to set the stage for the type of world we have to deal with in the future.

The Trouble With Conglomerates

If one wants to find the weak spots in companies or industries, there is no better time to identify them than during periods of economic or financial distress. What seemingly worked very well during a time when the economy appeared to be strong and financing was readily available, can often crumble as the stress of the marketplace works its way through the company or industry.

The stress of the current financial and economic crisis is really starting to highlight these weak links. To focus on just one weak link, it seems as if every day another conglomerate gathers headlines about the problems it is having and the difficulties it sees in turning the organization around.

A conglomerate is a company of companies: the companies are generally distinct from one another and are very often in unrelated businesses. The rationale for creating a conglomerate is that those that run the conglomerate can do a more efficient job of allocating capital to where it can be best used than can financial markets.

Many people argue that, in almost every instance they know, this rationale does not prove to be true. There are several arguments for this statement:

• First, since the businesses are unrelated there will be very few, if any, synergies achieved in putting the disparate companies together;

• Second, there is the overhead expense of the corporate holding company that always seems to be rather extensive in order to present the image that the proper oversight is being conducted to ensure that capital is allocated appropriately to the companies that make up the conglomerate;

• Third, sufficient oversight is rarely achieved in the management of large conglomerates because top level of executives can adequately oversee just so much given, the complexities of the organizations that they are ultimately responsible for;

• Fourth, as we have so recently seen, whereas risk management can be difficult enough for just one company to manage, attempting to oversee the risk management within a conglomerate can be impossible.

Yet, this does not stop people from trying to put conglomerates together. Especially in those times that an economy is expanding and there is plenty of financing available, more and more people seem to want to try their hand at assembling new conglomerates. And, many of the efforts seem to succeed…for awhile…or, once in a while for even an extended period of time.

There seem to be several reasons for such success:

• First, companies may be acquired when they are in the stage of their evolution where they do have a competitive advantage that allows them to earn exceptional returns for a time, even though these exceptional returns are not lasting;

• Second, a company may be acquired that requires a turnaround or a re-structuring and a successful execution of such an effort can produce some exceptional returns, again, for only a limited amount of time;

• Third, a conglomerate company that is losing its competitive advantage may successfully switch its business model to that of a very competitive firm and engage in severe cost cutting that allows it to perform very well in the short run;

• Fourth, the conglomerate can just be lucky and hit the right acquisition at the right time when there is a change in tastes, or market needs, or cultural shifts and ride through a wave of good fortune.

These events almost always happen when the economy is expanding and when there is plenty of money available. In such cases, the overall performance of the conglomerate is achieved when one or more of the conglomerates’ companies can carry all its sister companies by the exceptional performance it achieves. If a management is lucky it can have one or more companies carry all of the others for a while and then have another company come forth to carry every one during the next period of time and so on.

There are even cases where the conglomerate finds that its companies are sufficiently mature so that the ability of any of them to achieve competitive advantage is non-existent. In such cases, one needs a “Neutron Jack” Welch to cut the hell out of costs and preserve the integrity of the conglomerate for a while longer. However, pity the person that takes over after “Neutron Jack” leaves.

Even in good times conglomerates are plagued by the need to continue to buy and sell companies in an attempt to keep rates of return for the holding company at a sufficient level. The portfolio of companies is never right and one must continually shed those that are dragging down the total performance of the conglomerate in order to replace them with new acquisitions that might make a contribution…at least for a while…to the performance of the holding company.

Investors, in my view, should always be suspicious of conglomerates. The economics is just not there for exceptional longer run performance. And, this belief applies even to the “good” times.

Now, we have entered “bad” times and the conglomerates appear to be coming apart. The exceptional performers in their portfolios have ceased to perform in an exceptional way anymore. And, we are seeing that the risk management of these organizations has been almost totally inadequate. Furthermore, this is happening to conglomerates that operated in the finance area as well as those conglomerates that focused primarily on manufacturing or retail distribution.

The stresses caused by the financial and economic crisis are revealing the fallacies upon which the conglomerates were constructed. Again, we see that excessive credit expansions can result in organizational structures that appear safe and sound in “good” times but turn out to be extremely fragile in the face of a less than favorable environment. As we are seeing in other areas of the economy, these excesses must be worked out over time before expansion in the economy can take place.

In other words, the managements of these organizations are not focusing on expanding business at this time and will not be in that mode for an extended period of time. These managements are focused elsewhere…as on the value of their portfolio companies…what companies should be kept…and, what companies should be sold…where might they find a buyer for the companies they want to sell…and, what will they do with these companies if they have to kept them. And, an economic recovery plan will not help them to resolve these questions.

The Three Problems We Face: Debt, Debt, and Debt!

The focus is wrong. The focus is on the demand side of the economy. As John Maynard Keynes argued, “most practical men are indeed in thrall to the ideas of some long dead economist”…and that long dead economist is John Maynard Keynes. Niall Ferguson refers to the policy makers of today as “born again Keynesians”! And, so the focus remains on stimulating demand.

As a consequence there seems to be a disconnect between what the policy makers are producing in terms of stimulus and bailout and what others, financial markets and individual consumers and families, are experiencing. The debt overhang is stifling everything and this must be corrected before the contraction can be stopped.

This makes the problem in the economy a “supply” problem and not a problem of demand. It is a supply problem because the response to excessive amounts of debt is to save and to reduce leverage. And, this delevering is a cumulative process and either must be overcome by massive inflation…or, it must work itself out.

The explosion of credit is like a house of cards…with the underlying danger being that once the house begins to collapse…the whole house is affected. Given the incentives created by Bush43, the credit pyramid grew. The increases in government debt and the excessively low interest rates maintained by the Greenspan Fed set the standard for the day. And, the private sector followed…the private sector took on more and more risk…and financed their riskier positions with more and more leverage. The whole credit structure became shakier and shakier.

The problem with a house of cards is that once one of the cards on a lower level is removed…the whole house can come down. Experience teaches us that some portions of the house may not collapse…but, if the card removed is at the base of the house…it will likely be the case that a large amount of the house will fall…

The card that was pulled out of the house of cards this time was housing finance. As we know now the subprime market can be identified as the place where the collapse began. But, this level of finance supported a large component of the house of credit in the form of mortgage-backed securities and then other derivative securities and tools that used this base of mortgages as the foundation of the structure. And, the house began to fall.

Of course, we are waiting for other parts of the mortgage house to fall…those connected with the next wave of interest rate re-pricings connected with Alt-A mortgages and options mortgages that will be taking place over the next 18 months or so. And, this does not include other consumer debt like equity lines, credit cards, car loans and so forth. It also does not include the collapse of the banking system and other components of the finance industry.

As we have seen the collapse in the housing market has spread to other areas of the financial market. Contagion is the word to describe this spread. And, the problem has become a world wide problem with problems in financial institutions and beyond throughout the developed world and into the emerging nations.

What is the response to the existence of too much debt?

Well, there are two. The first response is to create inflation. Pour money into the system and artificially create spending so that resources are put back to work…eventually creating sufficient demand so that prices begin rising again. This is the Keynesian way…reduce the real value of the debt outstanding. And, the only way to do this is by “printing money.” If the banking system seems to be clogged up…why then let the Federal government begin to spend…finance the spending by selling Treasury securities…but sell the debt directly to the Federal Reserve where the central bank will just give the Treasury Department a demand deposit at some commercial bank. That is the demand side response.

The other response to the fact that there is too much debt is for people to pull back their expenditures…withdraw from the spending stream…and pay down debt in whatever way they can. This is what is happening now and this has been called historically a debt/deflation. It is basically the process of delevering the economy so that economic units can return to reasonable debt levels on their balance sheet.

Unless people come to believe that the government is going to create a substantial enough inflation to reduce the “real” value of their debt to reasonable levels…they will not stop their attempt to get their lives back in order with a reduced amount of debt on their balance sheets. This is why this process is a cumulative one…a process that eventually must work itself out before the economy bottoms out and a return to growth can occur.

One of solution to this overhang is to write down the debt. I dealt with this issue in my post of February 4, 2009, “Two Painful Proposals to Reduce Our Excess Debt,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/118475-two-painful-proposals-to-reduce-our-excess-debt, so I won’t go into it further here. A plan like this is politically difficult because writing down the debt of those that over-extended themselves looks like we are bailing out the undisciplined or the scoundrels at the expense of the prudent and honest. Such an appearance carries with it severe political risks.

However, if the debt levels have to be reduced at some time…this overhang of excessive debt is going to have to be worked out one way or another. Half-way plans are not going to work. (See my post of February 9, 2009, “Obama Stimulus Plan: Bailout or Wimp Out?”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/119347-obama-stimulus-plan-bailout-or-wimp-out.) The government in Washington, D. C. is going to have to bite-the-bullet sometime…the question is just whether they are going to do it now…or do it later when things get worse.

And, let me just re-enforce my argument of above. Ultimately, this is a supply side problem…not a demand side problem. The attempt to pull off a demand side victory hangs on the balance of when inflation can be restarted and how much inflation can be generated to significantly reduce the “real” value of the debt.

The problem with this effort, however, is that an inflationary environment is one in which the incentive is to add on more debt…just what we are trying to get away from. Hasn’t the experience of the 2000s convinced us that this is not what we want to do?

The problem with supply side solutions is that they take time and are not as showing as are demand side “stimulus plans.” Also, they tend to be directed toward those individuals and organizations that are under a dark cloud these days. For example, there is the proposal put forward by Bob Barro to eliminate the corporate income tax. (See “Government Spending is No Free Lunch,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123258618204604599.html?mod=todays_us_opinion.)

The stock market did not respond well to the initial showing of the Obama Bank Bailout plan presented by Tim Geithner yesterday. To me this plan is sending mixed signals…mainly because it is on the tepid side. We have a demand side plan…the Obama Stimulus Plan…and we have a plan to cushion the problem of excessive debt…the Obama Bank Bailout Plan. The two plans don’t seem to mesh and give off the signal that the administration has not yet got its act together. The question then becomes…will it get its act together?

The debt issue must be dealt with…and firmly. At this time…firmly is not a word I would use.

This Issue Is Debt! Too Much of It!

Going forward…the primary issue the world is going to have to face is debt…lots and lots of debt. Debt is clogging the blood vessels of the world financial system!

And the proposal to get us out of this dilemma?

Create even more debt!

If the problem is too much debt then the economy has to go through the pain of working this debt off…and this is called a debt/deflation. As people and companies and government reduce the amount of debt on their balance sheets they withdraw from the spending stream…and save…exactly what people and companies and governments are doing at the present time. But, removing spending from the spending stream reduces the demand for goods and services, causes firms to cut people from their employee rolls…and creates a downward spiral in economic activity. The economy engages in cumulative behavior and gets deeper and deeper into a hole.

This is what the people and the government want to avoid…if possible.

The Obama stimulus proposal is a way to get us out of the current economic crisis.
(There is another way that I will discuss below.) Basically, it is an attempt to inflate our way out of all the debt that exists. The Federal Reserve is doing its part in trying to pump up the amount of cash that exists within the system. But, creating money in this way takes time for the inflation to work its way through the system because it must go through banks and other financial organizations. And, this system, right now, seems to be functioning at a very low level.

Keynes saw this problem in the 1930s and proposed a way of getting around the banking and financial systems…create massive amounts of government expenditures and put this spending directly in the economic system…financing the deficits with government debt. Then, as the economic system starts to turnaround and pick up steam…the banking and financial system will pick up some steam and provide the “kicker” to create the inflationary environment needed to reduce the real value of the debt that had been built up…including the debt the government deficit spending just added to the pile.

Therefore, the first way to reduce the amount of debt that is outstanding in the economy is to create more debt so as to un-clog the banking and financial system…create an inflationary environment…and watch the “real value” of the debt decline.

This is a long term process and has several problems to face along the way. One of these is the question of how much spending should the government undertake? The issue here is about what the “multiplier” of government spending really is. I treated this in a post on January 26, 2009, titled “What will be the impact of Obama’s stimulus plan, http://seekingalpha.com/article/116414-what-will-be-the-impact-of-obama-s-stimulus-plan. Another question has to do with the process of enacting the stimulus plan into law. This I treated in a post on February 2, 2009, titled “the Obama Stimulus plan: Why I’m Concerned”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/117878-the-obama-stimulus-plan-why-i-m-concerned.

However, the ultimate issue relates to the amount of debt that is outstanding…in the United States…and in the world. If the amount of debt HAS to be reduced…and it must be reduced in order to get the economy functioning again…then, following this approach, inflation must take place to reduce the real value of the debt. The danger with this plan is that if inflation is not cut off at some time in the future, the incentives in the economy will be to return to a “go-right-on” and “business-as-usual” approach to living. That is…we will be right back where we were around the middle of this decade, where leverage was good and more leverage was even better, especially within an inflationary environment where things need to be kept “pumped up”! If this happens, we will still be addicted and still have the “monkey on our backs.”

Another way to reduce the amount of debt outstanding in the economy is to basically “write down” or “re-write” the debt and not create any more through an enormous fiscal stimulus plan like that proposed by the Obama administration. This would involve a massive restructuring of existing business balance sheets…both financial institutions as well as non-financial institutions. Insolvent institutions…including the auto companies…need to be recognized as such. In effect, existing shareholders in these companies have lost their investment…so much for good governance and oversight. Bondholders will have to accept an exchange…taking “new” debt at, say, 75% or 50% of the current face value…or preferred shares for the debt they hold…or taking an equity position in the company…maybe even warrants.

These exchanges would have to be negotiated…but the bondholders would have to understand that, as things now stand, the companies are insolvent and they could get nothing if the restructuring does not take place. Plus, the companies or the bondholders…or the public…really does not want the government to take over these institutions. We do not want state-run companies…financial or non-financial…because the fate of the nation would be much worse with a nationalization of industry than it would with an imposed “re-structuring” of the balance sheets of these businesses…financial and non-financial.

In terms of the consumer…a similar thing would have to take place. The major concern has been related to the housing sector and mortgages. But, we are now seeing a massive wave approaching of defaults on credit cards, car loans, and other types of debt that the consumer has taken on. Similar to the re-structuring of the business sector, the balance sheets of consumers must be re-structured. How we do this cannot really be discussed in this short post, but the idea would be that organizations that have extended credit to the consumer sector will have to take a haircut on the amount of debt that is owed by each consumer and the terms of repayment will have to be restructured in order to make the probability of repayment of the debt realistic. Again, this re-structuring would have to be negotiated…but we are talking here about much lower costs than would accumulate if there were more foreclosures and bankruptcies…more lawyers’ fees…and more costs all the way around. And, this could be done in a much shorter period of time than if all these bad assets had to be “worked out”.

I have given two extreme solutions to the problem of the debt overhang. The fundamental crisis is connected with the fact that there is too much debt in the system. For the system to work this dislocation out we would have to go through a period of debt-deflation. The two extremes presented here are, first, the Keynesian approach which is to inflate the economy and reduce the real value of the debt, or, second, to impose a debt-restructuring on the economy which would allow for a negotiated reduction in the debt loads of all economic units in the system.

People will really not be happy with either of these extreme solutions…or, for that matter…any combination of the efforts. But, once one loses their discipline, as the United States and the world did in the 2000s…there are no good solutions available to get out of the hole that has been dug. All people can do is to “take their medicine” and vow not to let such a situation ever occur again. However, looking back at history, one cannot be very confident that we will maintain our discipline once we get over the crisis.

I would like to make just one more suggestion. There is only one real change I would like to see to the regulatory structure…for both financial and non-financial firms…and that is the imposition of almost complete openness and transparency of the business and financial records of companies. Whatever a company does…it should be open to its owners…and to anyone else that might be interested.