European Defaults: Portugal is Next After Greece

It ain’t over until it’s over…

The yield on the 10-year Portuguese government bond closed above 14.80 percent yesterday, a new record for the euro-era. 

“The markets are pricing in a Portuguese default with 10-year bonds trading at about 50 percent of par, a deeply distressed level in the eyes of many investors.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/49916f7a-468a-11e1-89a8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kTbnc8Yy)

“Friday the 13^th may be an unlucky omen for Portugal.  On that day, almost two weeks ago, Standard & Poor’s became the last rating agency to downgrade Lisbon to junk, marking the moment for many investors when default looked inevitable for Portugal as well as Greece.” 

For more on this see my post on blogspot “Credit Downgrades and Europe” for January 16, 2012. (http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/).

The downward spiral in defaults will continue as long as Europe fails to honestly face its problems. (See my post on blogspot for January 25, 2012 titled “How Long Will Europe Continue to Lie to Itself”: http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/.)  

In the past, analysts, including myself, tried to explain what officials in Europe were doing by casually remarking that their actions amounted to “kicking the can down the road.”  Basically, the actions of the European officials were an effort to postpone dealing with the real issues, hoping that by delaying what was needed to be done the situation would eventually correct itself.

Now, it seems that the days of “kicking the can down the road” are reaching a climax. 

European officials hope to reach a deal on the Greek debt situation by the end of this month.  The current write down seems to be somewhere around 50 percent of face value, but there still remain issues to be decided like whether or not the European Central Bank will have to write down the Greek debt it has on its books. 

Bond markets have responded to this reality by dumping Portuguese debt.  Note that the yield on the ten-year government bond was about 10.40 percent (compared with 14.80 percent yesterday) around the middle of November, a time when it still seemed that maybe the European Union might be able to pull things together and avoid a Greek default. 

As the officials of Europe finally seriously travelled down the path to restructure Greed debt, the price of Portuguese debt started to weaken.  The price declines accelerated, as the possibility of a Greek write-down became more of a reality.  Today, the yield on the 10-year bond was around 15.00 percent.

I know that governmental officials hate to give in on these write-downs because they hate to concede to the “bond markets” and “speculators”. 

It is hard for governmental officials to admit that maybe the “bond markets” and the “speculators” might be right. 

It is a very difficult lesson for governmental officials to accept the fact that they cannot continue to cater to their constituencies with jobs and other benefits ad infinitum.  Over the longer-run, either taxes have to be raised or money has to be printed because the bond markets will not continue to underwrite debt that will be repaid, both principal and interest, by the issuance of more debt.

The economist Hy Minsky referred to this kind of debt financing as a “Ponzi” scheme.

 “Ponzi” schemes come to an end and the end cannot just be blamed on the “bond markets’ and the “speculators”.  In fact, the governments just line the pockets of the “bond markets” and the “speculators” by extending their uncontrolled spending until the collapse of the market becomes a “sure thing.” 

So the charade continues and Portugal seems to be next. 

Who will follow Portugal?  Spain…or Italy…who knows?

Yet, this is not the only concern that many of these officials are facing.  The austerity programs enacted by governments throughout Europe are not setting well with the people.  There is “discontent” and “upheaval” arising in many countries.

“The only consistent messages seem to be that leaders around the world are failing to deliver on their citizens’ expectations and that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media tools allow crowds to coalesce at will to let them know it.  That is not a comforting picture for the 40 heads of state  or leaders of governments who are attending the World Economic Forum (in Davos, Switzerland)…”  (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/world/europe/across-the-world-leaders-brace-for-discontent-and-upheaval.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=across%20the%20world,%20leaders%20brace%20for%20discontent%20and%20upheaval&st=cse)

The situation is quite uncomfortable.  But this is what happens when you fail to deal with a problem…when you continually try to “kick the can down the road.”  The situation does not go away and the delay in dealing with the situation often turns out messier than if the situation had been dealt with earlier. 

The only way for the officials to resolve a condition like this is to get in front of it.  I don’t see anyone around in a position to do this.  The only real possibility is Merkel but the resentment that already exists against Germany makes it that much more difficult for her to achieve what is needed. 

If no leader arises then the defaults will continue…and the austerity will grow…as will the “discontent” and the “upheaval.” 

“Europe risks being handicapped if it doesn’t deal decisively with this challenge to democracy.”  Thought provoking way to end the New York Times article.    

How Long Will Europe Continue to Lie to Itself?

“Bank Seeks To Avoid Taking Loss On Bonds.”

So reads the headline for the New York Times article on the dilemma of the European Central Bank. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/business/global/eu-officials-continue-to-press-for-a-quick-deal-on-greek-debt.html?_r=1&ref=business)

“European leaders have begun discussions with the European Central Bank on several options that might keep it from having to take a loss on its 55 billion-euro portfolio of Greek bonds.”

“The deal could address what has long been one of the more vexing questions in reaching a broad agreement on reducing Greece’s mountain of debt: how to get the central bank, the largest holder of Greek bonds, to participate in a debt restructuring without having to take a large loss that would have to be covered by European taxpayers, German ones in particular.

Private sector investors, including large European banks and hedge funds, have complained bitterly—and in some cases threatened legal action—over the central bank’s insistence that its 55 billion euros in Greek bonds were exempt from the loss that the private sector is facing, which some have estimated at 60 cents on the euro.”

The European Central Bank cries, “You can’t hold me responsible for my actions!”

There are articles all over the place on this issue. 

For example, on the front page of the Financial Times: “IMF urges ECB to take a hit on 40 billion-euros in Greek bond holdings.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74d2b31a-46b2-11e1-bc5f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kTbnc8Yy)

Greek debt will be written down…finally.

But, will people still be avoiding reality in some affected areas?

And, remember, this is all voluntary to avoid kicking off the credit default swaps outstanding…what a crock!

Still on the list of lies…Portugal…Spain…Italy…

Lies have a long life and can come back to haunt you in many…often, unfortunate…ways.  Just ask people up at Penn State these days. 

The resolution of a situation in which people cover up and try to avoid the truth never ends well.  The leaders (and I use this term lightly) of Europe that are perpetuating this comedy continue to draw it out as long as possible. 

The problem is that the European dilemma will continue to exist until it is dealt with.  For more on this see my blogpost “Credit Downgrades and Europe” posted on January 16, 2012 on my blogspot site (http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/).  

Government Incentives Do Matter--The European Case

Gillian Tett’s essay in the Financial Times this morning gives us another example of how government policies can create incentives that have very serious consequences on an economic system, consequences that are very often detrimental to the health and welfare of the economic system.  Tett’s excellent piece “Subprime moment looms for ‘risk free’ sovereign debt,” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/88151ed6-0639-11e1-a079-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1cfzAfdXG) examines the consequences of European bank regulators assuming that all sovereign debt in Europe were “risk free”.

“When regulators drew up the Basel I capital adequacy framework in the 1980s, they gave western sovereign bonds a ‘zero’ risk weighting, in terms of how capital is calculated.  This was subsequently modified in Basel II, to give banks some theoretical discretion to raise reserves against sovereign risk.  In practice, this zero-risk weighting policy has prevailed.

In some senses it has been actually reinforced in the past five years because regulators have demanded that banks raise their holdings of liquid, safe assets, following the subprime turmoil.  Those ‘safe’ assets have been—you guessed it—mostly government bonds.”

Furthermore, one can add that in both applications of stress tests to judge the vulnerability of European banks to a financial crisis, no allowance was made for the writing down of sovereign debt in financial simulations.  Obviously, European banks came out looking pretty good.

And, in the “deal” constructed last week by officials of the eurozone, only ‘private’ holders of Greek debt were required to write down the debt by 50 percent, ‘public’ holders of the Greek debt, the ECB and other governmental organizations, did not have to write down the debt at all.  The ‘private’ holders represented only about 60 percent of the total amount of the Greek debt outstanding.

Of course, assuming that the sovereign debt of many of the eurozone countries was “risk free” allowed the governments to issue much more debt than they might have otherwise at the cheapest rates possible. 

In the essay, Ms. Tett also makes reference to the fact that assuming that sovereign debt is ‘risk free’ is one of the most basic assumptions of modern finance.

The result?

“If regulatory systems had not encouraged banks and investors to be so complacent about sovereign risk in the past, markets might have done a better job of signaling that structural tensions were rising in the eurozone—and today’s crunch would not be creating such a convulsive shock.”

Ms. Tett compares this “mis-pricing” exercise to the earlier experience of the subprime market.  In the latter case, subprime securities were repackaged into bonds that the rating agencies gave Triple A ratings to.  Again, this pricing facilitated the purchase of these securities and allowed many financial institutions to acquire the securities, comfortable that they were holding assets of the highest quality.  But, one cannot ignore the pressure put on mortgage originators, lenders, rating agencies and such, by governmental officials pushing hard to provide home ownership to more and more people.   And, this situation, too, resulted in “a convulsive shock.”

My point is that in both cases, the financial institutions and their executives have been blamed or are being blamed for the mess and are assessed the title of “greedy bastards”!

As many people know from reading my blog posts over the past three years, I feel the same way about the credit inflation created by governments in the eurozone and in the United States.  I have argued over and over that the credit inflation that has existed over the last fifty years has provided incentives for banks, businesses, and individuals to leverage up their balance sheets to excessive levels.   This credit inflation has also promoted excessive risk taking and the financing of long-term assets with short-term liabilities.  And, this credit inflation has created perhaps the most desirable environment possible for financial innovation. 

Yet the consequence of people responding to these incentives has resulted in the worst financial and economic collapse since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 

In addition, these incentives have also produced the most skewed income/wealth distribution in the history of the United States since the 1920s.  The wealthy, top executives, and people with access to information and markets can protect themselves from inflation or even take advantage of inflation.  The less wealthy, etc., cannot even hold their own against inflation.

Again, those that responded to the incentives created by this extended period of credit inflation and benefitted from them are labeled “greedy bastards.”

And, nothing is said about the politicians, another set of “greedy bastards” that originally created the incentives because they wanted to get re-elected!

Ms. Tett is correct in wondering what might happen if people change their assumptions about the sovereign debt, assuming now that all sovereign debt is not “risk free”.

She argues that “more realistic assessments” of the debt “would probably fore banks to hold more capital, and raise borrowing costs.”

More realistic assessments might “force the central banks to change how they conduct money markets operations, and impose tougher haircuts not just for obviously impaired debt, but bonds carrying potential risk, too.”

Or, “The other 800 lb—or $500 trillion—gorilla in the room is the derivatives market.  Until now, sovereign entities have generally ot posted collateral for derivatives, partly because of that risk free tag.  But, Manmohan Singh, an economist at the IMF, believes that this anomaly has helped to create a severe under-collateralization problem, worth $1.5 trillion--$2.0 trillion for the 10 largest banks alone.  If ‘true’ counterparty risk were ever recognized in derivatives, in other words, the implications could be brutal.” 

One of the reasons why European public officials are denying that the problem they face are ones of solvency is because someone might discover that a good deal of the blame for the insolvency is due to what they have done in the past.   One of the nice things for politicians about economics is that the consequences of economic policies usually take a long time to work themselves out.  Because of this people find it difficult to connect the policy with the consequences of the policy or may even fail to identify any sort of a connection. 

This is where work like that provided by Ms. Tett is so enlightening and helpful.      

Super Mario and the European Central Bank

Tuesday, a new player moves into the top rung of European officials dealing with the European financial crisis. 

Mario Draghi is not “new” to the European scene, but on Tuesday he takes over as the president of the European Central Bank replacing Jean-Claude Trichet, and so is “new” in this important position.

A new head of a central bank is generally “known” but, not having ever been in the position before, he (when are we going to get a woman head of a central bank?) is untested and it is uncertain how he will really act under pressure. 

There is an interesting article in the Sunday New York Times about Mr. Draghi titled “Can Super Mario Save the Day for Europe?” that gives us some background on this “new” leader: (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/business/mario-draghi-into-the-eye-of-europes-financial-storm.html?_r=1&ref=business)

In this article Mr. Draghi is cited as vowing “that there would be no surprises on his watch.”

Vintage Draghi seems to provide a “performance so subtle and politic that it seem(s) to please everyone.  Which, it turns out, is the Draghi way: people often seem to see what they want to see in him.” 

Yet, Mr. Draghi seems to produce.  Although having sterling academic credentials, he in not some academic that gained his laurels by writing about historical events.  He has actually been in “real” administrative positions that have required tough decisions to be made and leadership to be shown.  In these positions he has shown well. 

He has been in the private sector and, although this is the place where people seem to question some of what he has done, he performed well in his role as a vice chairman of Goldman Sachs in Europe.  

He seems to be a person that let’s his actions define his positions and does not get all “hung up” about how best to communicate with investors and markets as does the current Federal Reserve System. 

I particularly like the description of Mr. Draghi given by Francesco Giavazzi, who worked for Mr. Draghi at the Italian treasury.  Mr. Giavazzi, a classmate of his at M. I. T., states that Draghi learned a very important lesson in his efforts to bring Italy’s fiscal problems under control so that Italy could join the new common monetary zone that was being created for Europe.  At that time Italy was dealing with “high levels of debt” and “runaway deficits” which led to Italy being expelled from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the European currency system that preceded the formation of the eurozone. 

The efforts of Mr. Draghi and his team brought things under control so that Italy avoided bankruptcy and could become a founding member of the new currency union.

Mr. Giavazzi states that the lesson that Mr. Draghi learned through this experience “is that rather than waiting for help, you need to regain the confidence of the markets through your own actions, and that if you do not do the right thing, no outside help is enough—you will have a solvency problem.” 

Encouraging.

Furthermore, people that have worked with Mr. Draghi claim that even though he is an economist he “put aside models and theories for what actually works.”  Mr. Draghi seems to be a pragmatist. 

So, Mr. Draghi appears to be an experienced, pragmatic leader who is confident enough in his abilities that he can let his actions speak for themselves.

Sounds too good to be true!

Best wishes, Mr. Draghi, we all wish you the greatest success!        

Post QE2 Federal Reserve Watch: Part I

Should there be a QE3 or not?

This seems to be the debate now going on given the sluggish performance of the United States economy.  Not only have most of the recent statistical releases been relatively weak, the government also released revised figures for real growth during the two years of economic recovery since July 2009 that were revised downwards from the previously released mediocre data. 

There is no joy in Mudville. 

President Obama is talking up jobs and infrastructure investment and business innovation, but his “room to maneuver” given the debt wars going on is “little” or “none”.  And, the White House is not feeling really good going into the re-election season.

Only a small minority seems to be calling for substantial fiscal stimulus at this time and they do not even seem to be a part of the current discussions going on.  They are like “voices calling in the wilderness” but few are listening. 

Thus, attention is focusing once again on the Federal Reserve and its increasingly unpopular Chairman Ben Bernanke.  Mr. Bernanke seemed to be the savior of the financial system at one time but now seems to be talking about a different world than the one most people live within.  His efforts at stimulating economic growth have achieved very little with the exception of providing liquidity for world commodity markets and stock markets in emerging countries. 

Yet, people keep looking for more “guns” or “tools” to address the economic malaise that we are now going through.  The FED seems to be the only game in town.  So, are we going to get QE3?

QE2 ended on June 30, 2011.  In the first six months of 2011, the Fed caused Reserve Balances with Federal Reserve Banks to increase by $642 billion reaching a total of $1.66 trillion on July 6.  (Just a note: on August 6, 2008, before the deluge, Reserve Balances with Federal Reserve Banks totaled less than $4.0 billion.)

As we know, most of these reserve balances were held as excess reserves, the growth of bank lending in the United States over this time was non-existent.

In July, the Federal Reserve “backed off” from its program of aggressive security purchases with almost all purchases of United States Treasury issues going to offset the run-off of Federal Agency issues and Mortgage-backed securities from its portfolio during the month. 

The only real activity that took place at the Federal Reserve in July was “operating” transactions, basically balance shifting between Treasury accounts and commercial banks.  These “operating” transactions generally “netted” out close to zero and did not result in much change in reserve balances with Federal Reserve banks. 

So, we watch and wait and listen. 

Will the Federal Reserve do anything more?  And, if they plan to do anything…what will it be?

In my analysis, so much of the county has too much debt that people, businesses, and state and local governments are attempting to de-leverage their balance sheets.  Too many financial commitments have been made relative to cash flows that there is a substantial effort increase savings and re-structure balance sheets. 

This is why people, businesses, and governments are not borrowing…and are not spending. 

The efforts of the Fed to stimulate bank lending has failed to this point because the banking system is, itself, still retrenching, financial institutions are still going out-of-business in a steady stream, people aren’t borrowing to buy houses, small- and medium-sized businesses are not hiring and are not borrowing to expand their operations, and state and local governments are downsizing and trying to keep themselves solvent. 

The economy is not growing because too many are trying to get back on their feet, they are trying to keep from drowning, and adding on more spending and more debt is not on their agenda.

Here is where the paradox comes in.  The massive shift in the income/wealth distribution in the country has put a huge burden on the less wealthy while those with more wealth can continue on.  We hear that the “expensive” stores are doing very well…and the dollar stores are not doing all that well.  We hear that there is a pickup in the sales of the more expensive homes, yet sales in the rest of the market continue to decline.  And, so on and so on.

In such an environment of “debt deflation” for a large proportion of the population (see http://seekingalpha.com/article/279283-credit-inflation-or-debt-deflation) it is extremely difficult for the government’s economic policy to overcome the drag on spending created by the restructuring of balance sheets. 

Keynes interpreted such a situation as a “liquidity trap”, a situation where the central bank could not drive interest rates any lower because people would just as soon hold cash as hold interest-bearing debt. See David Wessel’s column in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal: http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903454504576490491996443926.html?mod=ITP_pageone_2&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj.

Wessel presents one case for getting out of this trap…a period of (hyper)inflation that would substantially lower real interest rates.  This, one could argue, is what the Fed (unsuccessfully) tried to do in QE2 and it is what would be the objective of following QE2 up with QE3.  But, the strength of QE3 would have to be great enough to get over the “debt deflation” efforts of the people, businesses, and governments that are trying to get their balance sheets back in order. 

Wessel writes, “Failure to arrive at the correct diagnosis, in economics as in medicine, prolongs the illness; so does refusing the remedies. There's a reason the Great Depression lasted for more than 10 years.”  But maybe the correct diagnosis is that the problem is not a liquidity problem but is a solvency problem.  And, the people of a society may take a long time to deleverage their balance sheets when it took fifty years of credit inflation to get them in their current position.
If this is true, having the central bank create a policy of (hyper)inflation will not really resolve the issue but only postpone it for another day…something politicians are very good at.
And, as we contemplate the possibility that the Fed will engage in another round of monetary easing, word comes that the European Central Bank (ECB) is going to engage in the purchase of the sovereign debt of several European nations so as to support eurozone commercial banks and the newly proposed severe budgetary policies of Italy and Spain.  The ECB announcement came after several European commercial banks wrote down the value of the Greek debt on their balance sheets everywhere from 21 percent to 50 percent. 
To the ECB, it seems, the situation in Europe is still a liquidity problem.  But, if this is the incorrect diagnosis, as it may be for the United States, the ECB may have the same success as the Fed’s QE2 had.  Keep watchin’.  

Have Things Changed in the United States Budget Debate?

Last week, April 7, 2011 to be exact, things started to change. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, guided the ECB to an increase in its policy interest rate, moving from 1.00 percent to 1.25 percent. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/262429-trichet-delivers-ecb-hikes-its-interest-rate.)

The night before the announcement, Portugal declared that it would seek a bailout from the European Union.

Last Friday evening, President Obama, the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives reached an eleventh-hour agreement on the 2011 fiscal budget.

Yesterday, President Obama gave a speech laying out his ideas about improving the fiscal position of the United States government in the upcoming future.

Has Trichet and the ECB provided the turning point?

It is not altogether clear that the financial markets believe that the real attitudes in the United States have changed. Since the Trichet announcement, and through the political maneuvering in the United States over the past week, the Euro rose from about $1.42 per Euro to about $1.46 per Euro. Op-ed pieces in the Financial Times have argued that the Americans are really not serious about getting the budget under control. Seems as if people are not convinced yet that there is anyone in the American government that is intent upon really doing something about the situation. They are just posturing.

And, there is one person I have not mentioned that plays a vital role in this scenario: Ben Bernanke.

Bernanke in now on the opposite side of the picture from Trichet. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/261863-the-euro-trichet-vs-bernanke)

Trichet has turned the corner and raised interest rates.

Bernanke continues to promote QE2.

The Europeans cannot fault the Americans for messy governance. Since the sovereign financial cookie began to crumble in Europe in January 2010, the governments in Europe have fallen all over themselves trying to avoid any real fiscal action that would restore order to the national problems of the continent.

This has allowed countries to delay taking real actions that might resolve the European situation.

Then Trichet stepped up. Because of the pending ECB movement, Portugal had to move, they had to show some activity before the rate increase was announced.

Now, other European nations are on notice. Trichet has indicated that the recent move was not necessarily a part of multiple moves in the interest rate. But, I don’t think that any European nation doubts that Trichet and the ECB will continue to raise rates if the troubled nations don’t seriously attack their problems.

As I said, Bernanke is on the opposite side of the picture.

The Bernanke record? Before the Jackson Hole speech in late August (http://seekingalpha.com/article/222704-bernanke-in-the-hole), a Euro could be purchased for about $1.27. By early November, the price of a Euro had climbed to about $1.42. Into January, as the governments of the European Union messed around, this price dropped to around $1.30. Trichet started making noises that maybe the ECB needed to start raising interest rates and this resulted in value of the Euro rising again to around $1.40. And, Bernanke continued to defend the Fed’s quantitative easing!

What is Bernanke holding out for? What does he know about the economy or the banking system we don’t?

Of course, Bernanke has always been late to the dance. He was still promoting excessively low interest rates in the early 2000s when the housing bubble and the stock market bubble were accelerating. He was still fighting inflation in August 2007 as the regime of the Quants broke. He was still worried about inflation in August of 2008 until he wasn’t worried about inflation in September 2010. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/106186-the-bailout-plan-did-bernanke-panic)

Any bets that Bernanke will be late to the party once again?

But, when it comes to the lack of confidence in the will of the United States to support the value of the dollar, Bernanke is not alone. With two exceptions, the United States government has followed a policy of credit inflation for the last fifty years that has resulted in a decline in the value of the dollar against major trading partners of around 35 percent. The value of the dollar has declined against other, non-major trading partners, by even more than 35 percent over this time period.

The two exceptions came when the monetary policy of the United States was led by Paul Volcker, 1979-1987, and the fiscal policy was led by Robert Rubin, 1995-1999. During these periods the value of the United States dollar rose strongly. Yet, overall, the value of the dollar still declined by 35 percent.

And, the United States dollar is the reserve currency of the world. We should be really proud of having this responsibility. And, in carrying out this responsibility the economic policy of the United States government has caused other sovereign nations to lose part of their wealth due to the fact that the United States was inflating their currency and causing a decline in the value of the currency reserves these nations were holding.

For the near term, Bernanke is going to “stay with the fight”. That is quantitative easing is going to be continued through June. Between now and then the “debt ceiling” fight is going to heat up along with the competition now being billed as the “budget debate.”

And, the value of the United States dollar will continue to decline (baring other shocks to the world).

The value of the United States dollar will continue to decline over time as long as the rest of the world believes that we will not get our fiscal house in order and also believes that our central bank will continue to inflate the globe!

How will we know if the rest of the world begins to take our fiscal and monetary responsibilities seriously?
We will know that attitudes have shifted once we begin to see the value of the dollar firm up and even begin to rise on information about growing discipline over the budget and monetary policy. (I have written an Instablog on this: see “What is Needed to Reduce the Federal Deficit,” March 3, http://seekingalpha.com/author/john-m-mason/instablog.)

For now, we hear a lot of platitudes in the budget debate but very little noise of rubber hitting the road. We have a right to remain skeptical.

Trichet Delivers: ECB Hikes Its Interest Rate!

The European Central Bank raised its policy interest rate by 25 basis points this morning and, I believe, changed the game.

Mr. Trichet, president of the ECB, delivered on his promise initiatlly given in March.

To me, this is a “tipping point”, even though the Bank of England kept its policy rate constant. Other central banks around the world have been raising their policy rates over the past year but no “Western” central bank had followed.

Now, the “West” has followed and this alters, not the outlook for interest rates, but the timing of future increases.

There are three areas one needs to focus on within the current environment.

First, keep an eye on what goes on in the Eurozone in terms of country “bailouts” and the potential re-structuring of the sovereign debt within the nations of Europe.

It was not a coincidence that Portugal asked for help the day before the meeting of the ECB. Portugal has lots of debt coming due this year; its credit rating has gone through several reductions already this year; and the country is without a government and facing an election. Even Portuguese banks were saying that they would not buy anymore debt issued by the government of Portugal.

Facing a “new” attitude in the capital markets and rising interest rates, what is substituting for a government in Portugal had to act. In essence, the IOUs were coming due.

And this means, I believe, that the IOUs are going to be collected elsewhere within the Eurozone. The day of reckoning has been advanced. People are going to have to do something now.

Second, watch what European banks are doing and are going to do. On Wednesday, two European banks announced their plans to raise new capital. The total to be raised amounts to about $19 billion and brings the total capital raisings announced this year by European banks to almost $36 billion.

Again, I don’t think that the timing of the announcement, the day before the ECB raised its interest rate, was a coincidence.

Furthermore, the Spanish government this week stepped up efforts to get its “healthy” banks to buy up a good portion of its “savings” banks in an effort to shore up Spain’s threatened banking industry. With Portugal now seeking help, a greater focus is going to be placed upon the fiscal health of the Spanish government and its banking system. Spain is going to move because it appears as if it may be “next in line”.

In addition, there still are the results of the recently applied “stress” tests on the commercial banks of Europe. Two things here: there is the question about how valid the tests are; and there is the response of the banks, themselves, to the results of the tests.

The European “stress” tests are already being questioned relative to whether they are strong enough to really be anything but a subject of jokes. If the tests are too weak to prove anything, then the credibility of the European regulators will suffer a serve blow at a very crucial time. This will not raise the financial markets confidence in the European banks and the European banking system.

The European banks may have to “act on their own” to overcome this loss of regulatory credibility. The way to do that? The banks can raise a significant amount of capital on their own and take the whole question of capital adequacy out of the hands of the regulators. This may be a part of the strategy of the European banks that are now raising capital.

Third, continue to observe the behavior of the United States dollar in foreign exchange markets. My guess is that this move by the ECB to raise its interest rate will cause further erosion of the value of the United States dollar in foreign exchange markets. This move may not be immediate, but will persist over time.

By raising its policy rate, the ECB may be forcing Europe to get its act together and resolve some of its solvency and governance issues. The movement by the Portuguese is just a starting point. The movement of the banks adds momentum to the process. If this action truly brings events “to a head” then, I believe, everyone will be better off for it.

But, if Europe begins to move in the right direction, what is in store for the United States dollar?

Europe moving to resolve some of its issues will only result in more pressure for the value of the United States dollar to decline. And, this decline will only provide additional evidence that the international community has little confidence in the current leadership of the United States to really address its fiscal (and monetary) problems.

The question then becomes…will this change the nature of the discussion within the United States?

Will this twenty-five basis point change in the policy interest rate of the European Central Bank serve as anaction that creates the “tipping point” for the direction of economic and fiscal policy in Europe and the United States?

I’m sure that the wiley Mr. Trichet would like to see this happen.

I’m not sure that the former professor of law from the University of Chicago and the former chairman of the Princeton Economics Department would agree.

The Dollar: America versus the World

I look at the following chart and ask whether or not there is some constant factor that stands behind the decline in the value of the dollar over the past fifty years.

Well, you say the chart only covers roughly forty years, why are you talking about fifty years?

You are right that the chart covers only the last forty years or so, but the consistency that runs from the early 1960s to the present began around fifty years ago.

The constant that runs throughout this time period is credit inflation. The foundation for this credit inflation was a “new” philosophy of the government’s program of fiscal policy, one that aimed at achieving high levels of employment. And, this new philosophy was essentially adopted by both the Republicans and Democrats in the United States government.

The consequences of this policy:

• The gross federal debt of the United States increased at a compound growth rate of about 8.0% per year for the last fifty years;

• Up until 2008, the Federal Reserve increased the monetary base at a compound rate of 6.2%;

• Total credit market debt in the United States increased at a compound rate of almost 10.0%.

• A dollar which could purchase $1.00 worth of goods and services in 1960 could only purchase $0.15 in 2011.

The credit inflation was started in the 1960s. It became such a problem that the United States floated its currency on August 15, 1971, and, with two exceptions, declined by about 35% against major currencies from early 1973 through March 2011. The two exceptions were the Volcker-led monetary tightening beginning in 1980 and the Rubin-led efforts to balance the federal budget around 1995.

One could argue that the credibility of the United States government for maintaining a stance of fiscal discipline, with these two exceptions, has been very, very low. And, that is the problem the United States finds itself in at the present: the behavior of the government, especially represented by Chairman Bernanke at the Federal Reserve, is seen as “just more of the same” economic policy that has been followed over the last fifty years. Consequently, the value of the dollar continues to decline.

In terms of the euro, Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, seems strong relative to Mr. Bernanke, and the value of the dollar continues to decline against the Euro. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/261863-the-euro-trichet-vs-bernanke)

It has been argued that Mr. Trichet and Mr. Bernanke have been working together during the recent financial crisis. That may be true, but coming out on this side of the crisis it looks to me like Mr. Trichet was the “craftier” of the two. Check out the chart below.

Beginning in September 2008 Mr. Bernanke began to inflate the Fed’s balance sheet. The total assets of the Fed jumped from about $0.9 trillion to $2.2 trillion. Mr. Trichet saw the total assets of the ECB increase, but the increase was far short of what the Federal Reserve did. (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/98ad43ec-5fac-11e0-a718-00144feab49a.html#axzz1IeD3XCmo)

Now the ECB may not have had as much to work with as the Fed, but in any case it looks as if Mr. Trichet got Mr. Bernanke to do most of the work for him through the crisis. (Check out the Fed’s recent release of borrower’s during the crisis and all the various comments that reflected on this release. There is some feeling that maybe Mr. Bernanke did not always act in the most disciplined way during this time period: http://seekingalpha.com/article/106186-the-bailout-plan-did-bernanke-panic.)

As a consequence, the current position of the ECB is much more conducive for Trichet to begin raising the Eurozone policy interest rate and, if needed, begin to focus more on the fact that inflation in the Eurozone is starting to become of concern once again.

The United States still faces the reality that, in terms of monetary and fiscal policy, there are no leaders who possess any credibility when it comes to budgetary discipline. This is the underlying constant of the past fifty years (with the two exceptions mentioned) and this is the basis for a continuing downward trend in the value of the United States dollar against other major currencies.

Paul Volcker has argued that the value of a nation’s currency is the most important price in its economy for policy purposes. It seems as if very few people agree with him. So, it seems as if the future will be more of what we got over the past fifty years. This is not what is needed for an economically strong America.

The Euro: Trichet versus Bernanke

How important is reputation in monetary circles?

I believe that the general movement in the value of the Euro relative to the United States dollar over the past seven months or so gives a picture of how the reputation of a central banker, when compared with his peers, can be reflected in financial markets.

The particular comparison here is between Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank (ECB), and Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The winner has been Trichet; the loser Bernanke.

In general, the “bad” news has been coming out of Europe, the fiscal problems in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and, if we want to get even more picky, Italy and France. The fiscal crisis really began to heat up at the beginning of 2010. The “crisis” caused another “flight to quality” in foreign exchange markets, that is a movement into the United States dollar and this is shown in the accompanying chart. The U.S./Euro Foreign Exchange Rate dropped early in 2010 and bottomed out in June as the European Union seemed to be getting its act in order.

Notice that the value of the Euro really begins to rise again in early September. This marks the time just after Chairman Bernanke announced to the world that the Federal Reserve was going to enter into another round of Quantitative Easing, now fondly referred to as QE2. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/222704-bernanke-in-the-hole)

The rise in the value of the Euro against the dollar was almost 12 percent throughout the fall.

Still the Europeans dawdled and the dollar strengthened again as money left Europe for “quality” assets.

Trichet took care of this after the March rate-setting meeting of the ECB. At that time he sent out strong signals that the ECB should raise its target interest rate at the April meeting.

So, after a decline of something less than 8 percent following the peak value reached in early December, the Euro has climbed another 9 percent or so, even in the face of continued concerns about the health of the banks in these countries and the revelations about the fiscal condition of some of the governments trying to get their budgets back in order. These concerns were accompanied by several downgrades of some sovereign European debt.

“As traders continued to bet the European Central Bank would pull the trigger on the first of several interest-rate increases on Thursday, the euro hit five-month highs against the dollar,” (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703806304576242362812362214.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_3&mg=reno-wsj).

Thursday is the meeting of the ECB. The bets are obviously on the ECB raising its target interest rate.

Trichet has a credibility that Bernanke does not have. Trichet is standing up for some kind of monetary constraint. Bernanke keeps throwing spaghetti against the wall.

Trichet has moved ahead of events. Bernanke has always missed the turn of events and lagged sadly behind resulting in the need to over-react to situations.

But, this reflects the whole position in the United States. There is no one around that seems to have any credibility for establishing any financial or monetary discipline in the United States government. Why should anyone want to bet on the United States government establishing some kind of responsible budgeting when projections are for the government debt to increase by as much as $15 trillion over the next ten years? And, why should anyone want to bet on the Federal Reserve system controlling inflation during this time period when the leader of the central bank has injected $1.5 trillion dollars of excess reserves in the banking system and is always “late to the dance”?

The market is taking Trichet at his word. The market is also trusting his determination.

The United States? Maybe Paul Ryan, chairman of the budget committee of the United States House of Representatives, can build up some reputation in financial markets that someone in America is going to draw a “line in the sand.” Right now the financial markets are not betting on his success.

So for now, Trichet…and the Euro…seem to win.

Goldman Had A Perfect Quarter

This may sound like a ridiculous headline, but it appeared in the Wall Street Journal today. (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703880304575236132462861088.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.)
The reason for the headline is that the Goldman Sachs traders made money every day the firm traded in the first quarter of 2010!

The article states: “Traders raked in more than $100 million daily for 35 days and made no less than $25 million daily during the rest of the three-month period, according to the regulatory filing on Monday. The streak was a first for the Wall Street firm, which typically loses funds on at least a handful of days in a given period.”

On that basis Morgan Stanley had a more typical quarter. Morgan Stanley lost as much as $30 million daily on four days during the quarter. The other days, well, they made money far in excess of the losses.

What the government takes away with one hand the government gives back with another.

While the government chastises Goldman and its management and sues it for securities-fraud, the Federal Reserve subsidizes Goldman with super-low interest rates.

During the first quarter of 2010, Goldman could borrow money for up to six months for 20 to 50 basis points. They could lend these funds out for almost 400 basis points, RISK FREE. And the Federal Reserve promised them that these spreads would continue to exist for an “extended period” of time!

Goldman Sachs should send Mr. Bernanke a big basket of fruit accompanying a big “THANK YOU, MR. BERNANKE” card.

Wish I could play this game!

And, now the European Central Bank seems to be getting wise to the game. And, our Federal Reserve system is going to support the ECB through currency swaps!

And, then the figures come in on Fannie and Freddie! And, with all the new spending programs coming from the Obama administration it is hard to take seriously the feeble coins that are tossed to the study of how to get the federal deficit under control. Official forecasts place the federal deficit under $10 trillion for the next ten years. I still believe that deficits will accumulate more toward the $15 trillion to $18trillion range.

The Fed is going to “tighten up” in the face of all this junk? Or, will they pull a “Trichet”. Or, has Jean-Claude Trichet, the Chairman of the ECB, pulled a “Bernanke”?

The problem, as I have written many times before, is that when a nation puts itself into a position like the United States (and many of the European nations and England) finds itself, there are really no good choices to left for it. However, the tendency is that once a nation finds itself in such a hole, they continue to dig deeper as the United States (and the European community) is now doing.

Peter Boone and Simon Johnson write in the Financial Times this morning about “How the euro-zone set off a race to the bottom.” (See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d666d5a-5c69-11df-93f6-00144feab49a.html.) The EU dug its own hole and now they continue to dig the hole deeper and deeper.

The Euro-zone system “encourages “a race to the bottom”—led by governments in smaller countries, which relax fiscal and credit standards to win re-election.”

I would add that this claim could be leveled against the United States and Great Britain just as well as they raced to provide more and more social services and housing to the electorate in order to get re-elected and justified borrowing massive amounts of money, both domestically and internationally, through Keynesian arguments that there was an infinite supply of funds available to governments.

The governmental emphasis on generating huge deficits, on financial innovation and creating massive incentives to inflate the amount of credit outstanding, changed the whole environment of finance. And, of course, the very people that created this environment, the various presidential administrations of the past fifty years and their co-conspirators in Congress, now condemn what they have created and sue it. Yet, they also continue to underwrite it through bailouts and subsidies like the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve called “Quantitative Easing.”

All I can say about the quantitative easing is that there must be a very large number of the remaining 8,000 “small” banks in the banking system that are in very serious financial difficulty for the Fed to continue to maintain this policy and subsidize the further growth of the “big” banks!

There are no good decisions left. And, I fear, that the ultimate resolution of this situation, as Boone and Johnson argue, is for these profligate nations to default, “either through repudiations or inflation.”

However, things don’t stop here. What this situation points to is the weakening of the influence of the Western nations, especially that of the United States. Given the current situation, why should China bow to any wishes made to it by the United States government except to those that are particularly in their interest? (See my post, “Why Should China Change?”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/193689-why-should-china-change.) The same applies to India (see a very interesting article in the Financial Times this morning, “India: The Loom of Youth”: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8aefdf1e-5c68-11df-93f6-00144feab49a.html) and Brazil. The United States (and Western Europe) have made these countries relatively more powerful and independent. And, given the current position of the United States (and Western Europe) why should the countries be generous to the dominant power in the world?

The world has changed over the past fifty years and the United States has contributed significantly to its own relative decline. (Watch this played out in future meetings, like that of the G-20.)

And, it has contributed to Goldman being perfect!