European Sovereign Debt Must Be Restructured

A debt crisis for an organization occurs when either its debt repayment cannot be covered by the cash flow being generated by the organization or the outstanding debt of the organization cannot be reduced sufficiently to reduce the debt repayment needs. 

In the case of a governmental organization, the cash flow needed to cover the debt repayment requirements comes from economic growth that is large enough to generate governmental revenues that cover the government’s cash outflow.

Or, the cash needed to reduce the amount of government debt outstanding comes from a cash surplus generated by the government’s prudent fiscal budgets.

If neither of these conditions is met, then the government is insolvent and the debt outstanding must be restructured.

What is so hard to understand?

The growth rate of many countries in the eurozone is exceedingly low or non-existent. 

The new budgets being generated in these countries do not reduce deficits sufficiently to reduce their ratio of government debt to Gross Domestic Product.

The current efforts of the effected governments produce a cumulative result that just exacerbates the situation.  If the deficits cannot be reduced sufficiently, the debt repayment crises continues which puts greater pressure on governments to reduce budget deficits, and so on, and so on.  The experience of the eurozone over the past few years just confirms this dilemma.   

This reality pervades the bond markets. 

But, this reality is still being evaded by eurozone officials. 

A movement to enact a “fiscal union” to go with Europe’s “currency union” cannot correct the current situation without a debt restructuring because it ignores the reality of what the current situation has inherited.

A “fiscal union” can only be achieved if, at the same time, a debt restructuring takes place in those nations that are fiscally insolvent.  That is, the resolution of the current problems can only be achieved when the fact of insolvency is dealt with AND some form of a “fiscal union” with sufficient power is put in place. 

The past must be dealt with and some hope must be established for the future.     

A debt restructuring will be costly because of the impact this restructuring will have on European banks…and other banks and financial institutions throughout the world.  Any new “fiscal union” combined with a debt restructuring must include some plans to “backstop” banks.  This “backstopping” may spillover into other countries, like the United States and the United Kingdom.

And, all of this will have further negative repercussions on economic growth…in Europe, in the Untied States, and elsewhere. 

As Milton Friedman warned, “There is no such thing as a free lunch.”  Well, it appears as if the “free lunch” we have been trying to live off of is just about over. 

How Do You Cover Up Your Failure: the Greek Case

I believe that Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times has done investors a big favor in writing her piece for the Sunday morning paper of November 20.  This article reveals the extent that officials will go to try and avoid the consequences of when they royally “screw up”! (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/credit-default-swaps-as-a-scare-tactic-in-greece.html?_r=1&ref=business)

The situation: “the debt mess in Europe.”

The event: “bankers are pressing Greece’s bond holders to swallow big losses.”

The intended consequence: “Leading the charge is BNP Paribas, the big French bank, which has been hired by the Greed government to help persuade investors to accept a deal that would cut the value of their investments in half.”

The cover-up: “On paper, this restructuring would be voluntary!”

The reason for this behavior: the Credit Default Swaps that are supposed to cover the losses on a write down like this.  “If Greece stops paying after the restructuring (the swaps that investors bought as insurance on the Greek debt) are supposed to cover their losses, much the way homeowners’ insurance would cover a fire.” 

The effort: if the restructuring is declared voluntary then the “credit insurance may not pay off down the road, because after the restructuring is completed, the terms of the old debt might be changed.”

Who stands to gain: “BNP which stands to profit from the restructuring.”  BNP will “generate fees from the exchange” or is concerned about “its own exposure to Greece.  A question being discussed is whether or not “BNP Paribas has written a lot of insurance on Greek debt.  If so, getting people to unwind such swaps now would be less costly for BNP than having the insurance pay off.”

Most suspicious, an official of BNP Paribas, Belle Yang, is also on the “powerful” International Swaps and Derivatives Association (I.S.D.A.) “determinations committee” that will decide what constitutes a “credit event” both in Greece and elsewhere in Europe. 

When you don’t do your job, things happen.  And, when things happen and you deny that things are happening, things get worse.  And, when things get worse you sometimes do very stupid things in order to keep avoiding what you really have to do.

Just ask Penn State University officials about this!

Politicians in Europe created too much debt in trying to remain in office by paying off their constituents in order to get re-elected.  When financial markets started to complain about the excesses of debt created, European officials claimed that the problems were caused by speculators and other “greedy bastards” that were trying to disrupt things for their own gain.  When things got worse, officials claimed that there was a liquidity crisis at hand, not a solvency crisis.  And, because it was a liquidity crisis, bailouts could resolve the issue by giving governments enough time to get their budgets in order. 

This did not work and when these officials finally came to accept the fact that they might have to deal with the insolvency of their countries, they began working on a “new gimmick” that a default really was not a default…if it were voluntary.

And, if the default was just voluntary then contracts written to insure against a default could not really be collected upon!

That is, the legal contracts that were written to insure parties against default are really worthless!

“If investors think debt terms can be changed by fiat, they will flee the market.  Ditto, if they find that their insurance can be made worthless.” 

“The discussions with BNP Paribas confirm the view of some investors that credit default swaps are not insurance at all, but rather instruments that big banks use to benefit themselves.”

Hello, Occupy Wall Street!!!  

My prediction: “the debt mess in Europe” is not going to be cleared up until people stop lying to themselves and really start to address the issues that are outstanding.  The problem with this, as I have written about many times before, is that I see no leaders in Europe that are willing to stand up and really discuss the issues that are outstanding. (See my post: “In Europe the Issue is Leadership,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/280658-in-europe-the-issue-is-leadership.)  

The sovereign debt problems that Europe faces are problems of solvency.  How many times does someone have to say this!  Until the officials of Europe address this problem “head on” and really try to “get their hands around it” they will continue to come up with “screwball” ideas like the one that Morgenson writes about in the Sunday NYTimes.

Resolving solvency problems are not easy and I’m sure this is why many European officials “put off” going for a real solution.  Solving solvency problems are going to cause a lot of hurt and pain…and will take a lot of time to correct. 

Unfortunately, there was a lot of hubris connected with the conceit of many European governments, a conceit that these governments could engineer high rates of employment and a social infrastructure that took care of all ills within a world in which there would be no international repercussions for such excessive and undisciplined behavior.

Unfortunately, there are no “good” solutions to living beyond ones means for an extended period of time.  If you “screw up” you finally end up paying for it.  And, solving the problem can hurt many, many people.     

What If Europe "Marked-to-Market"?

“The now inevitable restructuring of eurozone debt…”

So writes Jim Millstein, Chairman of Millstein & Co. and former chief restructuring officer of the US Treasury Department. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/461464fa-0617-11e1-a079-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dmPTNMw5)

Have people really come to accept this fact?

The full sentence: reads “The now inevitable restructuring of eurozone debt will result in bank capital deficiencies that the IMF estimates could exceed €300 billion.”

Now, what if we added a European recession on top of this, a recession that would slow down government receipts and increase unemployment payments and so forth?

Just out this morning: “A rebound in German and French growth propelled a modest expansion of the eurozone economy in the third quarter of this year – but failed to dispel fears of a looming recession across the 17-country region.

Eurozone gross domestic product expanded 0.2 per cent compared with the previous three months – the same pace of expansion as in the second quarter, according to Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical office. But with the escalating debt crisis already feeding into falling factory production, growth may already have gone into reverse, economists warned.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1b0e2c6-0f5f-11e1-88cc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dmPTNMw5)

Are we coming to the end game?

Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, is now calling for a political union of Europe as the only way to “underpin” the euro and help the members of Europe emerge from their “toughest hour since the second world war.”

Doom and gloom seem to be all around us.  Just in the past two days we have articles like “New Austerity Incites a Bitterness the Postwar Generation Did Without,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/world/europe/austerity-in-europe-brings-bitterness-unknown-in-postwar-era.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=alan%20cowell&st=cse) and David Brook’s “Let’s All Feel Superior,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/opinion/brooks-lets-all-feel-superior.html?hp0).  Also, this morning there is a review of Niall Ferguson’s new book “Civilization” whose subject matter is “the end of western civilization as we know it”  (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/books/niall-fergusons-empire-traces-wests-decline-review.html?ref=books).

Do these pieces of information point to the existence of a debt deflation cycle that is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the credit inflation cycle that we have been going through for the past fifty years? (http://seekingalpha.com/article/307261-debt-deflation-is-it-a-possibility)

The solutions Mr. Millstein proposes for the writing down of European sovereign debt are focused on the banking system and the estimated bank capital deficiencies.  But, part of the solution involves more debt: “a federal financial body, such as the European Investment Bank, must provide a capital backstop…”  In other words, more debt!

But, “To give it the firepower it needs for the size of the problem, the EIB must be empowered to raise debt supported by a stream of new tax revenues dedicated to retire the debt incurred.”  And, “the EIB’s capital backstop should be funded through a new federal tax on bank salaries and profits above defined levels.”

This does not seem like a solution to me.  The solution to the problem of too much debt around is not more debt and more taxes.  Yet that seems to be the best that many people can come up with.  However, this seems to me to be more of the same “thinking” that got us into this situation.

This brings me back to the opening quote: “The now inevitable restructuring of eurozone debt…”

The European problem is not a new one; it has been growing for several years now.  Government officials have just not been willing to accept the reality of the situation and economists have helped them to hide their heads in the sand by arguing that Europe’s problem has been one of “liquidity” and not one of “solvency.” 

If the problem is one of “liquidity” then a bank…or, anybody else…does not have to mark down an asset because the bank will, they say, hold the asset until it matures.  If the bank accepted the fact that the asset was experiencing difficulties then it would have to “mark” the value of the asset down.  But, this admits that something might be wrong…and people don’t like to admit that a mistake might have been made.

And, as Steven Covey has stated, “if the problem is ‘out there’, that is the problem!”  Even a month ago, European officials were still claiming that their problem was one of “liquidity” brought on by speculators and other “greedy bastards.”  And, if the problem was someone else’s fault, real solutions could be postponed.  And that is what these officials did.

“Solvency” problems, however, do not just go away.  First, “solvency” problems have to be recognized…people have to “own” them before anything can be done about them. 

I am still not convinced that we have arrived at that point.  Yes, we have an editorial piece in the Financial Times that declares that “the inevitable restructuring of eurozone debt” must take place.  However, eurozone governments, I don’t believe, generally accept this conclusion. 

Until eurozone officials do accept the fact that “all” eurozone debt must be restructured, the problem will still be that these officials do not accept the fact that their debt must be restructured.  And, this is no solution.    

Post QE2 Federal Resserve Watch: Part 3

I didn’t post a “Post QE2 Federal Reserve Watch” last month because I was on vacation.  You have to go back to September 12 to get Part 2 of the “Post QE2” watch. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/292986-post-qe2-federal-reserve-watch-not-much-banking-system-activity)

Early in September, the excess reserves in the banking system totaled around $1,570 billion.  At the beginning of November, excess reserves were about $1,515 billion. 

A $55 billion drop in excess reserves might seem huge, especially when total excess reserves averaged around $2.0 billion, but in these days decreases or increases of this size don’t really seem to amount to a lot.

Federal Reserve policy for the past two years has basically been to throw all the “spaghetti” it can against the wall and see what sticks.  So far, very little of the “spaghetti” has stuck as total bank loans have not increased that much over the past year although business lending has picked up some at the larger banks (http://seekingalpha.com/article/303929-business-lending-is-increasing-especially-at-the-largest-u-s-banks)

On the money stock side, however, growth has picked up substantially over the past six months or so.  The M1 money stock growth (year-over-year) has risen from just over 10 percent six months ago to more than 20 percent in recent weeks.  

The growth rate of the non-M1 component of the M2 money stock measure also accelerated during this time period, more than doubling from around a 3 percent growth rate in early April to well more than 7 percent in late October. 

The reason for this acceleration seems to be a pick up in the movement from low interest bearing short-term assets like retail money funds and institutional money funds to bank deposits and a pick up in the demand for currency in circulation.  Movements of funds into currency holdings continue to rise at a rapid rate.

The movement of funds from other short-term, interest bearing accounts can be explained by the extraordinarily low interest rates being maintained by the Fed and because of the financial stress being felt by so many families and businesses who want to keep their funds in highly liquid form.  A number of large corporations are also holding onto large cash balances for purposes of acquisitions or their own stock repurchases. 

None of these actions contribute to bank loan growth or economic expansion.  All of these reasons are anticipatory of the need to have liquid assets “near-at-hand” in order to transact.  These are not signs of a real healthy economy.

As far as the banking sector is concerned, the increase in demand and time deposits has resulted in a need within banks to hold more required reserves.  Hence, over the past six months the required reserves of commercial banks have risen $4.5 billion to $96.4 billion from $91.9 billion in early September. 

   

Over the past six months, the required reserves at commercial banks have risen by just under $19 billion. 

This increase in required reserves seems to be the biggest operating factor that the Federal Reserve has had to deal with over the past six months.  Thus, although excess reserves at commercial banks have dropped over the past three months, they have risen over the past six months. 

The item on the Federal Reserve’s statement of “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions” (Fed release H.4.1) that is most closely associated with excess reserves in the banking system is called “Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks.”  This figure has risen by about $46 billion from May 4, 2011 to November 2, 2011.  The increase came about through a rise of $102 billion in “Total factors supplying reserve funds” and a $56 billion increase in “Total factors, other than reserve balances, absorbing reserve balances.”  The $46 billion is the difference between these latter two amounts. 

The $102 billion increase in factors supplying reserve funds came primarily from Federal Reserve purchases of U. S. Treasury securities, which exceeded the run-off from the Fed’s portfolio of Federal Agency securities, Mortgage-backed securities and the decline in other operating factors that supply reserves to the banking system.

There are two interesting factors that absorbed bank reserves during this time period.  The first interesting factor is the rise in “Currency in Circulation”, which increased by roughly $33 billion from May 4 to November 3.  This movement is a drain on bank reserves and hence causes reserves at commercial banks to decline.   This increase is interesting because currency in circulation usually increases during the summer months due to vacations but decreases in the fall.  Over the past three months, from August 3 to November 3, currency in circulation actually increased by more than $15 billion.  This just adds strength to the argument made above for the increase in currency outstanding.

The other interesting factor is that the Fed’s reverse repurchase agreements to foreign official and international accounts increased by almost $68 billion over the past six months, by $56 billion over just the last three.  This increase also reduces bank reserves. 

Here the Federal Reserve is selling securities under an agreement to repurchase the securities at some stated future time period. These are international transactions and the Fed uses U. S. Treasury securities, federal agency debt, and mortgage-backed securities as collateral in the transactions.  The timing of these transactions are interesting because of the events that have taken place in Europe of the last six months. 

My summary of these movements remains much the same as in previous months.  The Federal Reserve has done just about all it can at the present time to preserve the banking system and allow the FDIC to close as many banks as it has to without major disruption. 

The Fed has thrown just about everything it can into the financial system.  Given the economic weakness in the housing market, the desire of families and businesses to continue to reduce the financial leverage on their balance sheets, and the high level of underemployment in the economy, the demand for loans from commercial banks is very weak, so total bank loans are remaining relatively constant.  A further indication of weakness is the continued movement of wealth into currency holdings and bank deposits, a movement that has resulted in the rapid growth of the money stock measures.  Throwing more “spaghetti” against the wall at this time would not change the behavior of these people or businesses to any degree. 

The Fed may just have to wait until the deleveraging is completed before it sees people starting to borrow again or to hire new workers.  That is, unless the situation in Europe explodes and further ‘search and rescue” missions are needed to preserve western civilization.         

Europe is Still Struggling

The debt deal cut in Europe last week apparently did not get out in front of the markets through its own actions.  Interest rates and interest rate spreads over the German 10-year bond rate remained at or near Euro-era highs. 

There were a lot of questions still floating around financial markets last Friday.  (See my post on Blogspot of October 28, 2011: http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/.) But just where is the weak spot in last week’s deal…the write down of Greek debt?  The recapitalization of the banks?  Or, the European bailout fund?  Or, all of the above?

The point still remains that financial markets are not satisfied.

The yield on Italian 10-year bonds closed at 6.11 percent yesterday, a new euro era high and this was 411 basis points above the comparable German bond.  The yield on Portuguese bonds on Friday was almost 1200 basis points above the German bond, also a new euro era high.  And, yields on Greek bonds, Spanish bonds and other stay at lofty spreads above the German bond.

It is one thing when credit inflation pervades the financial system.  Credit inflation provides incentives to create debt, to speculate, to absorb more risk. 

When credit inflation is checked, as it is at the present time (although not through the explicit desire of a large number of governments) the fiscally and economically strong dominate.  That is why Germany is currently in such a strong position in Europe.

Credit inflation like we have experienced over the past fifty years encourages financial leverage, excessive risk taking, and cutting corners.  The incentives that exist at such times allow governments and businesses and banks to issue debt and leverage up…and the credit inflation buys them out. 

Speculation thrives in a time of credit inflation.  I read an article like that of Andrew Ross Sorkin in the New York Times this morning (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/its-lonely-without-the-goldman-net/?ref=business),  an article that discusses the trading and “big bets” placed by such names as John Corzine, John Thain, Robert Rubin, and J. Chris Flowers.  These individuals benefitted by taking on more and more risk during the time of credit inflation and financing this risk taking with lots of leverage, and especially short term debt.

The morning papers are filled with the news of the latest bets placed by John Corzine at MF Global.  Unfortunately, the environment was not one that was conducive to the recently placed bets of Corzine.

Furthermore, a period of credit inflation is a time when people cut corners on the truth, push hiddenness a little more, and engage in schemes that are on the edge of being legal if they are legal.  Greece hid its financial condition for a long time before it had to “fess up.”  Italy has not been fully forthcoming concerning its financial affairs.  Citigroup hid mountains of questionable assets “off-balance sheet”.  And, of course, look at all the instances of insider trading and Ponzi-schemes that have surfaced over the past few years.

As Chuck Prince, former CEO of Citigroup so famously stated: As long as the music is playing, you have to keep dancing.

When the music stops…

Or, as Warren Buffet has said, you have to wait until the tide goes out before you find who is swimming without a bathing suit!

Well, the music has stopped…the tide has gone out…

And, we are observing those who where not wearing bathing suits and the scene is not very pretty.

The financial markets are saying that the officials of Europe have not gotten out ahead of the situation…they are still behind.  And, since the tide has gone out, there is no credit inflation to buy them out of their situation.  As a consequence, some time or another, they are going to have to finally address the insolvencies that exist. 

And, it will be the strong that control the situation. 

Germany will be one of the strong…maybe gaining a position in the twenty-first century that they could not achieve in two world wars in the twentieth century. 

Will America be one of the strong?  People are raising questions about the ability of the United States to lead in the twenty-first century.  See John Taylor’s op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal this morning: http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204394804577009651207190754.html?mod=ITP_opinion_0&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj.

It does not appear that Europe has made it yet.  Consequently, there will still be financial market turmoil, social unrest, and political dislocation.  The European continent had its fun over the past fifty years financed by lots of debt.  Now, it must pay the debt collector…or default.

News From Italy: A Bargain is Struck?

The news out of Rome:

“Silvio Berlusconi has salvaged a compromise agreement on economic reforms with his coalition partners that commentators said lacks specifics and risks falling short of what eurozone leaders have demanded ahead of Wednesday’s summit in Brussels.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5945e250-ffba-11e0-89ce-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1bjQzVRpl)

The crucial point…the plan “lacks specifics and risks falling short”…

Prime minister Berlusconi and the head of his coalition partner, the Northern League, Umberto Bossi, negotiated the new compromise package to submit to other eurozone leaders.  Other than reaching some kind of agreement, the alternative is for Mr. Berlusconi to resign.

The prospects do not seem to be encouraging:

“Newspaper editorials on Wednesday said Mr. Berlusconi and Mr. Bossi may have staved off a collapse of their coalition for the time being, but at the risk of undermining a critical summit and failing to deliver the reforms Italy needs to lift an economy on the edge of a renewed recession.”

Mr. Bossi is not a fan of the European arrangement…a euro-skeptic.  Hence, his tradeoffs are substantially different from those of Berlusconi.  And, Mr. Berlusconi does not have much personal credibility…and little or no moral stature…to trade on.

In fact, Beppe Severginini in a Financial Post op-ed piece goes even further:

“How can the world’s eighth largest economy go on with a delusional prime minister, a weak government, an impotent opposition and its finances in disarray?” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c78b1142-fe6e-11e0-bac4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1bjQzVRpl)

How did someone like Berlusconi become prime minister in the first place?  Well, as one person commentated on my earlier post this week, Mr. Berlusconi became prime minister of Italy because everyone else running for the position was worse than he was.  Encouraging…

So where does that leave Europe?

Mr. Sarkozy and Ms. Merkel appeared to be applying the pressure to Mr. Berlusconi over the weekend.  This precipitated the efforts of the past two days. 

If the reports of the reform plan concocted by Berlusconi and his coalition are true and the plan really does fall short of what is necessary, the question becomes, will Sarkozy and Merkel “stick to their guns” and hold Italy’s “feet to the fire”?  Or, will the French and German officials back off and attempt to get by with something less than they stated was necessary. 

The crucial thing here, to me, is that the pressure on Italy was applied because several eurozone officials believed that the problems they faced were deep enough that an attempt needed to be made to “encircle” the major problems and not just work on individual nations on a case-by-case basis. (See my post “Italy is the Key to Solving the Euro Debt Crisis”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/301607-italy-is-the-key-to-solving-the-euro-debt-crisis.)  Whereas in the past, the European Union began with the smallest, weakest link in the chain and then moved up to the next, larger, crisis, the current move was to include the third largest economy in the EU along with the weakest, Greece, and this, then, would include all that was in-between, like Spain and Portugal. 

Now, this may not be achieved.  We wait to see how Mr. Sarkozy and Ms. Merkel respond to the new Italian proposal.

But, this is not all.  The banking situation in Europe still lingers. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/301369-europeans-facing-more-of-a-haircut-than-preciously-thought) European banks are balking over the proposed debt “haircuts” and the new proposed capital requirements. 

It would seem that if Sarkozy and Merkel “back off” any on the Italy effort, given the pressure put on Italy over the weekend, that the banks will smell the weakness and put up even more resistance to the effort to write down the debt issues under consideration as far as needed. 

This, of course, puts the eurozone in a more tenuous position because lack of cooperation by the banks on the write-downs has implications that relate to a “triggering event” which might set off “bankruptcy” questions leading to payoffs on Credit Default Swaps.  The possibility of this occurring raises the specter of contagion in the financial sector, ala’ the Lehman Brothers affair, something eurozone officials sincerely want to avoid.

It seems as if European officials are running out of choices.  Yet, as we have seen in the past, European officials are masters of the art of squirming out of difficult spots and postponing solutions for another time. 

The betting still seems to be on the conclusion that no real leaders will arise in Europe to resolve the problems that Europe faces.  We can only hope for a better outcome

The Solution to the European Problem?

“The bare minimum the eurozone needs to cope with its crisis is an effective mechanism for writing down the debts of evidently insolvent private and sovereign borrowers, such as Greece; funds large enough to manage the illiquid bonds markets of potentially solvent governments; and ways to make the financial system credibly solvent immediately.”

‘

This is the prognosis of Mr. Martin Wolf, the economics editor of the Financial Times, in today’s edition of the paper. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ba2f7c4-ee76-11e0-a2ed-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ZuI4wzxo)

“Yet, alas, the eurozone requires more still: it needs a credible path of adjustment, at whose end we see weaker economies restored to health.”

The word is getting out…the European banks are going to have to take bigger write downs of their holdings of sovereign debt than ever imagined. 

Can the eurozone governments cover the hole in the balance sheets of these banks?

The United States stock market seems to think that they can.  This is the reason given for the rapid recovery of stock prices in the market yesterday. 

But, let’s look more closely at what Mr. Wolf is saying.  In the first condition, he writes about how the amount of the write down will be determined along with how the write down will be administered.  This is a daunting task in, and of, itself. 

Note further, however, that he is including ‘private’ debt along with the debt of sovereign borrowers.  The need to write down the ‘private’ debt is something new, something that has not gotten a lot of attention in the press in all the noise relating to the sovereign debt issue.  

The second point Mr. Wolf makes is about contagion.  How is any write down of the debt of the peripheral nations going to be kept to just the peripheral nations bonds, themselves?  The concern is that once write downs take place in bonds of the fiscally weaker nations that some spread is bound to occur to the nations that are in a stronger position, fiscally.

Then, Mr. Wolf addresses the issue of credibility.  Given all the “messing around” for the better part of almost three years, how can financial markets come to believe that solvency has been restored to the impacted nations?  If anything has increased over the past three years or so, it is the lack of trust in the eurozone governments when it comes to how the politicians carry out their responsibilities.  There is little or no trust in the people heading up most of the governments in Europe.  Can this “trust” be regained…and in time?

The add-on to this analysis is that the eurozone countries also need an immediate return to a robust economic recovery.

The happy conclusion to the analysis: “If such a path is not found, the eurozone, as it is now, will fracture. The question is not if, but when. The challenge is simply as big as that.”

Two comments on this analysis: first, I am glad to see that some people are finally seeing the problem as one of solvency and not one of liquidity.  It has taken a long time for the analysis to get to this point.  Now, it is time for the policy makers to accept this fact.

Second, Mr. Wolf pretty well lays out the dislocation that is going to have to take place in order to restructure and restore the eurozone to some sense of order and balance. 

“How, then, did the eurozone fall into its plight? The easy credit conditions and low interest rates of the first decade (of the European Union) delivered property bubbles and explosions of private borrowing in Ireland and Spain, incontinent public borrowing in Greece, declines in external competitiveness in Greece, Italy and Spain and huge external deficits in Greece, Portugal and Spain.”

The European condition is the result of credit inflation!  Quite an admission for a dyed-in-the-wool Keynesian!

The point is, however, that a long period of excesses must be matched by a painful and uncomfortable period of restructuring. 

In conclusion, however, one cannot ignore the social situation in Europe.  The “social contract” of the post-World War II era appears, to many, to be broken, and there is protesting and rioting in the streets.  Strong economic growth and low levels of unemployment, something that seems more and more unlikely to happen in the near future, of course, can resolve this situation.  Writing a new “social contract”, as history shows us, is not an easy thing to do.

Are there any lessons here for others?

Europe: More of the Same

I haven’t written anything recently about the Europe financial crisis because…little has changed.

Still the same old “kicking the can down the road.”

I am in the same place as Stephen King, chief economist at HSBC: “The totality of financial claims in now too big to be supported by the new economic reality.  In this world of economic permafrost, someone, sometime, will have to accept losses.  Will those losses accrue to taxpayers, recipients of public services, equity investors, bondholders, domestic debtors or foreign creditors?” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3451258-da07-11e0-b199-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1XSP5Pmbe)

His answer: “…any resolution seems a long way off.”

The response from the international capital markets?  Fear!

Yesterday the ten-year government bond of Germany closed at 1.88 percent; the ten-year United States Treasury bond closed at 1.99 percent.  Never thought I would see rates like this in my lifetime.  

The fear is driving investors into the safest things that they can get their hands on.  And, within this “flight to safety”, Europe…and the United States…just plods along with business as usual. 

Although we don’t agree with his prescribed remedy, Mr. King and I agree with what was written by Martin Wolf this past week. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/079ff1c6-d2f0-11e0-9aae-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Wbu6HxQ0)  Mr. Wolf argued that the major problem behind all the “pussy-footing” around is that there is a substantial lack of leadership on the world scene. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/290934-struggling-with-a-great-contraction)

This lack of leadership comes out in so many ways.  Just take the case of Greek bonds and the value at which these bonds are carried on the balance sheets of European banks.  It seems as if these European banks can do just about anything they want to in terms of writing down the value of the Greek bonds they hold.

Floyd Norris writes in the New York Times: “British banks were most willing to swallow bad medicine and admit the bonds were worth far less than par value. Some German banks were equally forthcoming, but others were less so. Italian banks seem to have done as little as they could, but did take write-downs. French banks went the farthest to find ways to act as if Greek bonds were just fine.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/european-banks-apply-slippery-standards-on-greek-bond-valuations.html?ref=business)

So much for the “strong” rules and enforcement actions of international accounting and banking standards supposedly coming out of Europe.

Oh, yes, these are the European regulators that gave us the “stress” tests that were such a laughable matter.

The reason, to me, that no politician wants to stand up and take a strong position is that there are no good short-run solutions to the problems at hand.  The difficulty in taking a strong, longer-run position is that people are currently in pain and politicians must focus on “muddling through” to prepare themselves for the next election.

After all, the number one job of the politician is to get himself or herself re-elected. 

The difficulty faced by the politician is captured in the sub-heading of the New York Times article “Europe Steers Into a Zone of Uncertainty.   This sub-heading reads, “Path Out of Debt Crisis Involves Pain and Time.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/world/europe The /09europe.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper)

Imposing more “pain” is not a good way to get re-elected and taking too much time to achieve results does not match the timing of the politician’s next election.

And, where does the pain start?

Let me quote King once more:  “someone, sometime, will have to accept losses.”

Many of the governments in Europe are fragile because of the sovereign debt crisis.  Many of the banks in Europe are fragile because of the sovereign debt crisis.  There is rioting in the streets in Europe because of the efforts of governments to cut back budgets or raise taxes.

Yet, these same governments and public officials will not accept the reality of the situation…and so the crisis continues.

Steven Erlanger, tin the New York Times article just mentioned writes the following: “most experts agree that Europe’s crisis will persist until it adopts a far tighter fiscal and monetary union, expels weaker economies or divides into two, with different currencies. 

The hope among experts and economists is that the changes, if carried out with skill, may allow Europe to further isolate Greece and its unsustainable debts from other countries, reducing the risk of contagion and buying time for other countries to fix their budgets and work on how to better centralize control of fiscal policy. Though abstract on the surface, the changes will provide more flexibility to bail out or further restructure Greek debt, to aid Italy and Spain with their bond sales and even to recapitalize some European banks, weakened by their exposure to sovereign debt in the form of Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian bonds.”

Notice three things: first, the reference to “experts”; second, the statement “if carried out with skill”; and third “though abstract on the surface.”  Sounds like success is just around the corner. LOL

It took fifty years or so to create this financial crisis.  We are not going to get out of it “overnight” and we are not going to get out of it without more pain. 

Again, “someone, sometime, will have to accept the losses,” regardless of what the “experts” say.

This is what happens when you become a “debt junkie.’