The Problem is Germany

Last Friday, December 9, I ended my post with this concern: “So much was made of the role that Angela Merkel was playing in the effort to get a more comprehensive solution to the European problems that concerns were raised about the possibility of German dominance of the European Union. I even saw articles that made the following assertion: ‘What Germany could not achieve by military might may be obtained through financial strength.’

If this is true then it appears that Europe is still fighting the old battles. As long as Europe continues to operate on the basis of prejudices established years ago it will not move itself into the 21^st century. If this is true, the European financial crisis still has a long way to go.” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/312920-initial-verdict-on-european-summit-the-can-got-kicked-further-down-the-road)

Tuesday, in the Wall Street Journal, Alan Blinder lays it on the line: “the eurozone has a big, visible Greek problem, which is a result of failure.  But, it also has a far bigger, though less visible, German problem, which is a result of success.” (“The Euro Zone's German Crisis: Blame Teutonic efficiency for what ails Europe. The other countries just can't compete”: (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203430404577094313707190708.html?mod=ITP_opinion_0&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj)

“When it comes to productivity, Germany has simply pulled away from the pack…Since 2000, German unit labor costs have risen about 20 to 30 percent less than unit labor costs in the other euro countries.  That gap has left Germany with a large intra-Europe trade surplus while most other countries run deficits.”

The referee could blow the whistle and call a foul…Germany is guilty of mercantilism!

On Wikipedia, mercantilism “is the economic doctrine in which government control of foreign trade is of paramount importance for ensuring the prosperity and security of the state. In particular, it demands a positive balance of trade. Mercantilism dominated Western European economic policy…from the 16th to late-18th centuries.”

But, mercantilism has not been an overt policy of the German government.  In fact, over the past decade or so, Germany has been trying to get its act together, dealing with putting two separate nations together as well as dealing with the newly constructed common currency area. 

But, Germany is Germany with a strong work ethic and a desire to pull things together with “thorough-going-labor reforms in the last decade.” 

It has not conducted a mercantilist economic policy, but the results have been roughly the same. 
Besides being ahead of most of the rest of its eurozone partners in terms of labor productivity, Germany also had the lowest rate of inflation.  The highest?  Well, of course Greece…and Spain…falling off to France, who had the second lowest rate of inflation.

The way out of this for the non-German eurozone countries?  Debt deflation!

The eurozone countries have one currency, so there can be no adjustment of individual currencies to revive some competitiveness among the nations. 

The eurozone countries have one central bank, so the individual countries cannot use monetary policy to correct their individual situations.

And, the eurozone countries in trouble have foolishly created so much debt in order to build up their economies through credit inflation that this avenue of spurring on economic growth has been closed.

According to Blinder, the only path left is debt deflation.  The countries, other than Germany, “can experience deflation, meaning a prolonged decline in both wages and prices, which is incredibly difficult and painful—which generally happens only in protracted recessions.”

Blinder closes, “Sadly, this may be the most likely way out.”

We knew it…the whole situation has been caused by those damn Germans!  They couldn’t get what they wanted by military means so they resorted to trickery…they worked hard, they innovated, they reformed their labor laws, and they didn’t issue too much debt.  Damn them!

If we blame the Germans, however, as I reported above, we…the Europeans…are just living off the same prejudices and wars that were fought in the past. 

Again, to quote Stephen Covey once more…”if we believe the problem is out there, that is the problem.”

This situation may be an uncomfortable one and the resolution of it may be “incredibly difficult and painful…and protracted.” 

Maybe that is what we need to work with.  Maybe the non-German countries need to get their budgets under control, get their labor laws reformed, get their educational systems up-to-speed, and move into the twenty-first century

Maybe the eurozone countries need to actually resolve the sovereign debt crisis, create a fiscal compact, and get on with these other problems that really need to be addressed.  

One final note…the United States is still benefitting from the role it plays as the country with the reserve currency of the world.  United States Treasury securities are still the place to go when there is a “flight to quality” and international investors become overly concerned with risk. 

But, let me just say that the world is becoming more competitive.  There are other countries in the world that may be less generous, more mercantilist.  There are other countries in the world that may be honing their productivity, their economic strength, their currency strategy to establish trade balances in their favor in order to change the relative power structure of the world. 

The United States is going to feel this is the future and needs to take a lesson from what is happening in the eurozone.  The unfortunate thing is that unless something is done the United States is not going to be in the position in the world that Germany now finds itself within the EU.    

Recent Monetary Policy and the Growth of the M1 Money Stock

Since the end of June 2011, excess reserves held by commercial banks have declined by about $107 billion. (Remember in August 2008 when excess reserves in the banking system totaled only $2.0 billion…for the whole banking system!) For the two-week period ending November 30, 2011, excess reserves averaged almost $1.6 trillion.

Reserves balances held at Federal Reserve banks dropped by about $110 billion over the same period of time. On December 7, 2011, reserve balances were slightly under $1.6 trillion.

Excess reserves held by the banking system and reserve balances at the Federal Reserve tend to move in the same direction and in about the same magnitude.  The reason for focusing on reserve balances held at Federal Reserve banks is that this number comes from the Fed’s balance sheet and can be related the movements of line items that appear on the balance sheet.

This decline in reserve balances has not been overtly driven by Federal Reserve actions.  In fact, three factors have dominated this decline, and each of the three is independent of what the Federal Reserve might be overtly doing. 

The first two factors relate to components of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio of securities.  After the Fed’s holdings of U. S. Treasury securities, the largest part of the portfolio is made up of mortgage-backed securities.  From the end of June through the current banking week, the amount of mortgage-backed securities on the Fed’s balance sheet dropped by $82 billion and represented maturing securities. 

The Fed’s holdings of Federal Agency securities also feel by almost $11 billion during this same time period again from the run-off of maturing issues. 

The third factor that helped to decrease reserve balances was a $31 billion increase in currency in circulation outside the banking system.  That is, when currency is drawn out of the banks and moves into the hands of individuals, families, and businesses, bank reserves go down…unless these outflows are offset by other actions of the Federal Reserve. 

Just these three factors alone resulted in a $124 billion reduction in bank reserves.  Some open market operations as well as other operating factors offset this decline, but the net result, as mentioned above, was that overall excess reserves in the banking system decline by more about $110 billion over this time period.

While these excess reserves were declining, however, we observed during the same time period, a sizeable change in the speed at which the money stock was growing.  For example, in June, the year-over-year rate of growth of the M1 measure of the money stock was about 6 percent.  In July, the rate of growth increased to 16 percent, in August it was slightly more than 20 percent where it has stayed. 

The M2 measure of the money stock did not show such dramatic increases, since the M1 measure is a subset of the larger total, but it, too, increased during this time period.  In June, the year-over-year rate of growth of the M1 measure was about 6 percent.  In July the growth rate of this measure rose to 8 percent and then jumped to 10 percent in August where it has remained. 

In July and August, the banking system experienced huge gains in demand deposits while in June, July, and August savings deposits at depository institutions rose dramatically. 

These movements along with the continued strong demand for currency in circulation can still be used as evidence that the economy remains very weak.  The $31 billion increase of currency in circulation mentioned above has resulted in the currency component of the money stock measure showing a year-over-year rate of growth by the end of October of almost 9 percent, which is a very high figure historically.  

The movements taking place in the money stock figures point to the weak economy in two ways.  First, with people under-employed, with people trying to stay away from debt, and with businesses trying to build up large stashes of cash, the demand for currency and for transaction balances at financial institutions rises.  Weak economies cause economic units to keep more of their wealth in a form that is readily accessible and spendable.

The second piece of evidence, however, is the extremely low interest rates associated with the weak economy.  With interest rate so low, it just does not pay for people to keep funds in interest-bearing accounts. Over the past five months, savings deposits at financial institutions have dropped by almost $75 billion and funds kept in institutional money funds have dropped by $160 billion over the same time period.  A large portion of these funds has apparently gone into currency and transaction balances.   

People are still getting out of short-term assets and placing their funds, more and more, in transactions-type accounts.  This is a sign of the weak economy and not of economic growth or a successful monetary policy. 

This is “debt deflation” type of behavior. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/307261-debt-deflation-is-it-a-possibility) It is a type of behavior that the Federal Reserve has not yet been able to over come. And, having the Fed toss more “stuff” against the wall does not seem to be the policy to turn things around.

Federal Reserve officials keep talking about up the fact that they have not run out of things that they can do to continue to try and stimulate the economy.  Unfortunately, it seems to me that fewer and fewer people are listening to their pleading. 

With a banking system that is still much weaker than the authorities are willing to talk about; with a consumer sector and business sector that, for the most part, are still trying to reduce their debt load; and with a public sector that is sorely out-of-balance and doesn’t seem to know where it wants to go; people are confused and uncertain about their future and about what to do.  

In this kind of environment, people want to hold onto what they have and want to avoid as much risk as they can.  They don’t want to borrow if they don’t have to and they want their assets to be as liquid as possible.

This is what the Federal Reserve is facing. 

Debt Deflation: Is It a Possibility?

There is still too much debt around.  The fact that there is too much debt around is a result of fifty years of credit inflation and financial innovation that resulted from it. 

The concern now as financial deleveraging takes place is whether or not we will go into a spiral of debt deflation.

The headlines currently are coming out of Europe.  Austerity plans are forthcoming everywhere.  Sovereign debt is the crowning issue…but there is growing concerns over corporate debt. 

And, with the cutback in government spending, the cutback in business spending, and the cutback in personal spending people are getting gloomier and gloomier about a new, European recession.  The clouds seem to be on the horizon.

But, a spillover of a European recession would be another American recession.  The United States depends upon the exports that it sells to Europe.  If Europe goes into a recession then the probability of the United States going into another recession increases. 

The problem is that America still has lots of problems on its own.  Just note some of the issues that have recently been floating around.

For one, corporate bankruptcies still are taking place on a regular basis.  Just recently we have Solyndra going bankrupt which brought attention to the solar industry area as a source of more financial difficulties.  Then we had Syms and its Filene’s Basement go into bankruptcy.  And, then who could forget MF Global.  And, there are many more still on the edge of considering such action…one of them possibly being Kodak.

And, what about the financially tenuous position of state and local governments?  Just Wednesday, Jefferson County, Alabama filed for the largest municipal bankruptcy in United States history.  And, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was just taken over by the state of Pennsylvania because of its financial problems.  Now we learn that Flint, Michigan is on the verge of insolvency where the state government will takeover there.  And, what about Detroit, Michigan?  Again, the state is about to take over this financially distressed city.  And, there are many more still cities and states still on the edge of financial ruin with underfunded pension funds and so on.

Then we hear that mortgage problem is still not over and that banks are facing further write-downs of the mortgages on their books.   The latest case is that of HSBC which has garnered all sorts of attention over the past few days.   HSBC is still paying for its move into subprime loans earlier.  But, it is also facing a relatively new thing…a customer taking a mortgage payment “holiday.”  Given the political climate financial institutions are finding that people feel that they have very little to lose if they just stop payments on their mortgages.  Banks are finding it very difficult to foreclose on delinquent properties these days and that people fear little retribution if they just quit on any kind of payment to the bank. 

“Customers realized that if they stop paying, there’s very little we (HSBC) oar other banks can do.  This is an emerging trend.” (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/hsbc-warns-of-economic-challanges-even-as-profit-rises-66/?scp=3&sq=julia%20werdigier&st=Search)

The commercial real estate market is not in very good shape either.  Although commercial real estate is picking up in some areas of the country, a look at the commercial banking data indicates that loans on commercial real estate is the item that is declining the fastest on the balance sheets of commercial banks…especially those that are smaller than the largest 25 in the country. 

Of course, these problems come through when we consider the condition of the banking system.  The commercial banking industry is still not very healthy yet and the prospect of it getting much better through 2012 is not that great.  Many small- and medium-sized banks are still really suffering. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/303929-business-lending-is-increasing-especially-at-the-largest-u-s-banks)

The Federal Reserve can’t really afford to tighten up at all because of the weakness that still exists within much of the banking system.  (See my post, “Post QE2 Federal Reserve Watch: Part 3” of November 7: http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/. ) And, the FDIC still continues to close two banks per week and this does not include any banks that have been acquired and absorbed into other banks within the system.

The general desire within the economies of both Europe and the United States is to continue to shed debt…to de-leverage.  But, if this de-leveraging takes place at the same time that the economies of Europe and the United States go into another recession, the situation can become a cumulative one.  That is, de-leveraging can contribute to slower economic growth or even declining growth, which leads to more de-leveraging, which leads to even slower economic growth and so on.

This is a debt deflation.

We are not there yet, but, it seems as if we are edging closer to the precipice. 

The problem seems to be that this situation cannot be undone by fiscal stimulus.  If people want to de-leverage they will de-leverage.  Adding more debt to the situation, even government debt created through more government spending, does not help the situation as the “fundamentalist” Keynesian would like to think.  More debt implies more taxes in the future, which just adds that much more of a burden to the person trying to de-leverage.  And, maybe, this just adds incentives to the equation leading the individual to take a debt payment “holiday”.

But, more debt write-downs can cause more debt write-downs.  And, this is the problem of a debt deflation.  It can become cumulative.  And, this is something the Keynesian models cannot pick up.

And, writing down debt for some people just means that someone else has to “eat” the loss elsewhere…and then someone else has to take a loss…and so on and so forth.  The consequences of debt do not just go away. 

The dilemma: if fiscal spending is not an option and monetary policy is basically “spent”, what is there left to do?  Not much?  Is the problem of creating a situation where there is too much debt outstanding that you just have to wait until people work off the excess debt?

This is a conclusion that most people don’t like.

Will Bernanke Policy Actually "Destroy Credit Creation"?

PIMCO’s founder and co-chief investment officer Bill Gross presents an interesting perspective on the US government’s policy of credit inflation policy over the last fifty years in the Financial Times this morning. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/04868cd6-d7b2-11e0-a06b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1XGri4Us6)

“Borrowing short-term at a near risk-free rate and lending at a longer and riskier yield has been the basis of modern-day finance.” 

This statement captures two of the three major fundamental components of the government’s policy of credit inflation that has existed since the early 1960s.  The first is that in a period of credit inflation, financial institutions are willing to take on “riskier” assets because the inflation that is created helps to “buy” them out of riskier deals. 

The second fundamental component is that the financial institutions finance these “longer and riskier yields” with “short-term” funds “at a near risk-free rate.”  That is, the financial institutions mis-match credit risks and maturities on their balance sheets. 

Gross does not ignore the third component: this component is financial leverage.  This financial leverage can, of course, turn a modest yield spread that is present in the yield curve into a very lucrative return on equity.  And, the more leverage used the higher the return on equity can become.

The consequence?

“Thousands of billions of dollars of credit were extended on this basis, some of it as short as a one-week or one-month maturity extension, but all of it—almost everywhere , nearly all the time—on the basis of a positive yield curve…”

And, there you have the scenario for the credit inflation of the last fifty years. 

Mr. Gross points out that the post-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky identified this problem in the model developed within the Keynesian “neo-classical” synthesis.  Minsky’s concern, and this was one reason he is considered to be a post-Keynesian economist and not a Keynesian economist, was that leveraging this way resulted in a build up of excessive amounts of debt in the economy.  In this Minsky drew on the work of the economist Irving Fisher who wrote about credit inflations and debt deflations. 

Minsky, like Fisher, argued that during the period of credit inflation the cumulative build up of debt would at some point become unsustainable and the debt load would have to be reduced.  This would lead to a cumulative contraction of debt, or the period of debt deflation.  

That is, regardless of the fiscal policy of the government, the build up and contraction of credit in the economy would cause major economic restructuring, both on the upside and the downside.  That is, credit cycles would result from a government policy that supported s positive slope to the yield curve. 

Within this framework, the financial collapse of the 2008-2009 period can be thought of as the culmination of the “credit inflation” cycle.  Debt burdens became excessive and, with the ultimate break in the cycle, the period of de-leveraging began. 

We now find ourselves in the period of financial de-leveraging…the period of debt deflation. 

What is of concern to Bill Gross is that the Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve may be acting in a way that might exacerbate the period of debt deflation. 

Whereas Bernanke has attempted to avoid a second Great Depression by throwing everything he and the Fed could against the wall to see what stuck and to avoid a second 1937-38 depression by throwing everything he and the Fed could against the wall to see what stuck, (http://seekingalpha.com/article/290416-quantitative-easing-theory-need-not-apply), Gross is arguing that Bernanke and the Fed may be doing just the opposite in the latter case.

In essence, Gross is arguing that in attempting to keep interest rates so low for such a long period, the Fed is creating a “flat” yield curve and this, according to the ideas presented by Minsky, may result in the further de-leveraging of the financial system which would be detrimental to an economic recovery.

In other words, “the posit of American economist Hyman Minsky of an unstable financial system based on the leveraging of a positively sloped yield curve—and de-leveraging when it was not—would be obvious for all to see.”

“The further out the Fed moves the zero bound towards a system wide average maturity of seven to eight years (through an interest-rate “twist” policy) the more credit destruction occurs, to a US financial system that includes thousands of billions of dollars of repo and short-term financed-based lending that has provided the basis for financial institution prosperity.” 

Carrying this argument one step further, Gross could be arguing that by following its policy of extremely low interest rates for an extremely long period of time, Bernanke and the Federal Reserve are risking a second dip in economic activity akin to the 1937-38 depression. 

Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve want to preserve the commercial banking system and get the banking system lending again.  Their policy efforts have been to flood the financial system with so much liquidity that bank failures can be handled effectively and smoothly without disrupting the whole banking system and that so much liquidity will be around that commercial banks will eventually begin to loosen up their lending again. 

What Gross is arguing that the banking system will not begin lending in an aggressive way with the yield curve as flat as it is and if the flatness of the yield curve extends out to seven and eight years, very little lending will take place at all.  Taking on riskier loans just does not pay in such an environment and the mis-matching of maturities produces only a minimal spread.  In order to achieve competitive returns on equity, given these spreads, financial institutions would have to take on massive amounts of leverage…something that the banks themselves don’t want to do right now and something that the regulators would not allow them to do.

Mr. Gross closes by saying that Mr. Bernanke needs to be careful keeping interest rates so low and trying to “twist” the yield curve to reduce longer-term yields to the levels now seen in the short-term end of the market.  The fear is that Bernanke may produce, not a “take-off” but a “crash.”

Post QE2 Federal Reserve Watch: Part I

Should there be a QE3 or not?

This seems to be the debate now going on given the sluggish performance of the United States economy.  Not only have most of the recent statistical releases been relatively weak, the government also released revised figures for real growth during the two years of economic recovery since July 2009 that were revised downwards from the previously released mediocre data. 

There is no joy in Mudville. 

President Obama is talking up jobs and infrastructure investment and business innovation, but his “room to maneuver” given the debt wars going on is “little” or “none”.  And, the White House is not feeling really good going into the re-election season.

Only a small minority seems to be calling for substantial fiscal stimulus at this time and they do not even seem to be a part of the current discussions going on.  They are like “voices calling in the wilderness” but few are listening. 

Thus, attention is focusing once again on the Federal Reserve and its increasingly unpopular Chairman Ben Bernanke.  Mr. Bernanke seemed to be the savior of the financial system at one time but now seems to be talking about a different world than the one most people live within.  His efforts at stimulating economic growth have achieved very little with the exception of providing liquidity for world commodity markets and stock markets in emerging countries. 

Yet, people keep looking for more “guns” or “tools” to address the economic malaise that we are now going through.  The FED seems to be the only game in town.  So, are we going to get QE3?

QE2 ended on June 30, 2011.  In the first six months of 2011, the Fed caused Reserve Balances with Federal Reserve Banks to increase by $642 billion reaching a total of $1.66 trillion on July 6.  (Just a note: on August 6, 2008, before the deluge, Reserve Balances with Federal Reserve Banks totaled less than $4.0 billion.)

As we know, most of these reserve balances were held as excess reserves, the growth of bank lending in the United States over this time was non-existent.

In July, the Federal Reserve “backed off” from its program of aggressive security purchases with almost all purchases of United States Treasury issues going to offset the run-off of Federal Agency issues and Mortgage-backed securities from its portfolio during the month. 

The only real activity that took place at the Federal Reserve in July was “operating” transactions, basically balance shifting between Treasury accounts and commercial banks.  These “operating” transactions generally “netted” out close to zero and did not result in much change in reserve balances with Federal Reserve banks. 

So, we watch and wait and listen. 

Will the Federal Reserve do anything more?  And, if they plan to do anything…what will it be?

In my analysis, so much of the county has too much debt that people, businesses, and state and local governments are attempting to de-leverage their balance sheets.  Too many financial commitments have been made relative to cash flows that there is a substantial effort increase savings and re-structure balance sheets. 

This is why people, businesses, and governments are not borrowing…and are not spending. 

The efforts of the Fed to stimulate bank lending has failed to this point because the banking system is, itself, still retrenching, financial institutions are still going out-of-business in a steady stream, people aren’t borrowing to buy houses, small- and medium-sized businesses are not hiring and are not borrowing to expand their operations, and state and local governments are downsizing and trying to keep themselves solvent. 

The economy is not growing because too many are trying to get back on their feet, they are trying to keep from drowning, and adding on more spending and more debt is not on their agenda.

Here is where the paradox comes in.  The massive shift in the income/wealth distribution in the country has put a huge burden on the less wealthy while those with more wealth can continue on.  We hear that the “expensive” stores are doing very well…and the dollar stores are not doing all that well.  We hear that there is a pickup in the sales of the more expensive homes, yet sales in the rest of the market continue to decline.  And, so on and so on.

In such an environment of “debt deflation” for a large proportion of the population (see http://seekingalpha.com/article/279283-credit-inflation-or-debt-deflation) it is extremely difficult for the government’s economic policy to overcome the drag on spending created by the restructuring of balance sheets. 

Keynes interpreted such a situation as a “liquidity trap”, a situation where the central bank could not drive interest rates any lower because people would just as soon hold cash as hold interest-bearing debt. See David Wessel’s column in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal: http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903454504576490491996443926.html?mod=ITP_pageone_2&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj.

Wessel presents one case for getting out of this trap…a period of (hyper)inflation that would substantially lower real interest rates.  This, one could argue, is what the Fed (unsuccessfully) tried to do in QE2 and it is what would be the objective of following QE2 up with QE3.  But, the strength of QE3 would have to be great enough to get over the “debt deflation” efforts of the people, businesses, and governments that are trying to get their balance sheets back in order. 

Wessel writes, “Failure to arrive at the correct diagnosis, in economics as in medicine, prolongs the illness; so does refusing the remedies. There's a reason the Great Depression lasted for more than 10 years.”  But maybe the correct diagnosis is that the problem is not a liquidity problem but is a solvency problem.  And, the people of a society may take a long time to deleverage their balance sheets when it took fifty years of credit inflation to get them in their current position.
If this is true, having the central bank create a policy of (hyper)inflation will not really resolve the issue but only postpone it for another day…something politicians are very good at.
And, as we contemplate the possibility that the Fed will engage in another round of monetary easing, word comes that the European Central Bank (ECB) is going to engage in the purchase of the sovereign debt of several European nations so as to support eurozone commercial banks and the newly proposed severe budgetary policies of Italy and Spain.  The ECB announcement came after several European commercial banks wrote down the value of the Greek debt on their balance sheets everywhere from 21 percent to 50 percent. 
To the ECB, it seems, the situation in Europe is still a liquidity problem.  But, if this is the incorrect diagnosis, as it may be for the United States, the ECB may have the same success as the Fed’s QE2 had.  Keep watchin’.  

Please Listen: The Problem is Too Much Debt

For the past two years or so, my prediction for the cumulative debt of the United States government over the next ten years has been in the $15 to $20 trillion range.  This would more than double the current amount of government debt outstanding.

Since the events of the past few days in Washington, D. C., my prediction for the cumulative debt of the United States government over the next ten years is still in the $15 to $20 trillion range.

The most descriptive characterization of the “debt deal” that I have heard is that Congress (and the President) has just “kicked the can down the road.”

In this, the United States government seems to be in the same league as their “kin” in the eurozone.  One has to look hard to see any evidence of leadership. (See my post http://seekingalpha.com/article/280658-in-europe-the-issue-is-leadership.)

As far as the Obama administration is concerned, in my mind, this “team” has observed the creation of three “camels” on its watch.  The first camel was the health care bill.  The second was the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill. (See my post http://seekingalpha.com/article/281090-the-future-of-banking-dodd-frank-at-one-year.)

The third camel is, of course, the just passed “debt deal”. 

The general comment about all three is that at the birth of all three, people were very unhappy with them. 

Never can I remember, except maybe under President Jimmy Carter, a President that exhibited less leadership in such important areas.  President Obama presented no “plan” to Congress in any of these efforts.  People say that the administration was responding to the “health care plan” rebuff experienced by the Clinton administration in the 1990s and wanted to involve Congress more from the start of any legislative attempt.  I believe that this was a gross mis-reading of the events surrounding the Clinton initiative. 

However, this strategy of holding back and letting Congress take the lead in proposing and disposing resulted in something more like chaos or anarchy than leadership.  And, this strategy has produced three camels that nobody really likes. 

And then people worry about jobs and the state of the economy.  How can you create smaller deficits through cuts in government spending without causing further danger to the health of the economy?

It seems like we are in some kind of situation in which everything that is proposed contradicts everything else.  President Obama, after the passage of the “debt deal” stated very clearly, that the issue now becomes one about jobs.  
In fact, the President plans a bus trip in the Midwest the week of August 15 as part of his new jobs push.  Whoopee!

To me, there is only one thing that ties all the different problems we are experiencing together.  It is the fact that there is just too much debt outstanding today…and, this debt load extends throughout the nation (and throughout Europe).  Consumers are still burdened with too much debt.  So are many businesses.  So are state and local governments.  And, so are sovereign nations. 

“Consumer Pullback Slows Recovery,” we read in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903520204576483882838360382.html?mod=ITP_pageone_2&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj).  Why are consumers not spending?  They are saving…they are paying back debt…to get their balance sheets in line.  They are not buying homes because of the problems with bankruptcies and foreclosures (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904292504576482560656266884.html?mod=ITP_pageone_1&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj).

Many businesses are not borrowing because of a decline in their economic value and the increased pressure this puts on the amount of liabilities they are carrying on their balance sheets.  (See my post http://seekingalpha.com/article/279506-debt-deflation-and-the-selling-of-small-businesses.)

And, the state and local governments are also getting headlines about their budget problems.  What about the city in Alabama that is declaring bankruptcy?  And the municipality in Rhode Island?  And, what about the problems in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania?  And, California?  And so on and so on?

This is the scenario called “Debt Deflation”.  Debt deflation occurs after a period of time in which credit inflation has dominated the scene.  Credit inflation eventually reaches a tipping point in which the continued inflation of credit can no longer be sustained.  Once this tipping point is reached, people, businesses, and governments see that they can no longer continue to operate with so much debt and so they begin to reduce the financial leverage on their balance sheets. (See my post http://seekingalpha.com/article/279283-credit-inflation-or-debt-deflation.)

This process is called “Debt Deflation” because it is cumulative.  As these economic units begin to reduce their financial leverage, it becomes obvious to them that they must reduce this leverage even further than first imagined.  Whereas “Credit Inflation” is cumulative and leads to people adding more and more debt to their balance sheets, the reverse process is also cumulative.

The only short-term way to avoid this debt deflation from taking place is to create the condition called “hyper-inflation.”  This is exactly what Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve System has tried to do.  I say short-term because all hyper-inflations come to an end sometime.

We have had fifty years of government economic policy based on the Keynesian assumption that fiscal deficits and the consequent credit inflation that results from the deficits are good for employment and the economy.  This assumption has, to me, been disproved given that the compound rate of growth of the economy has averaged only slightly more than 3 percent over the last fifty years, about what was expected in the 1960s, and the amount of under-employment in the economy has gone from less than 10 percent of the workforce in the 1960s to more than 20 percent of the workforce, currently. 

Furthermore, the income/wealth distribution in the country has become more skewed than ever toward the wealthy during this time period.  This is because the wealthy can protect themselves against inflation and even position themselves to take advantage of it.  The less wealthy do not have similar opportunities.  And, in the current situation, some, the more wealthy, are doing fine because they are not as indebted as others and so can continue to prosper during these difficult times of excessive debt burdens.

Getting back to my projections for the cumulative federal deficit over the next ten years and the “debt deal”: I really don’t see a fundamental change in the underlying economic philosophy of the Obama administration (which includes Mr. Bernanke) and/or Congress.  They seem to see the current problems as a “temporary” aberration from the existing “Keynesian” credit inflation philosophy that underlies all that they do.  They seem to believe that once this “period of discomfort” is passed that business will continue on as usual. 

Until this attitude is changed, I see little reason to change my prediction for the cumulative federal deficit over the next ten years.

U. S. Corporate Profits are being earned "off shore"

Recently I have written about how the Fed’s injection of funds into the banking system has gone over seas because that is where the profits are.  See “Federal Reserve Money Continues to Go Offshore,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/276909-federal-reserve-money-continues-to-go-offshore. 

Now we are getting more and more information that non-financial resources are also going offshore because that is where manufacturing profits are as well.  See the Wall Street Journal article “Business Abroad Drives U. S. Profits,” http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904772304576466003840674770.html?mod=ITP_marketplace_0&mg=reno-wsj.

“A third of the way through the second-quarter reporting season, earnings at companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500–stock index are the highest in four years…”

“Corporate profits—one of the few areas of strength in the limp U. S recovery—appear to be weathering the economy’s soft patch.  But the gains in many cases have come from international operations, particularly in emerging markets.”

Companies conforming to this pattern include Air Products & Chemicals, United Technologies Corp., Hasbro Inc., McDonald’s Corp. and General Electric Co. among others.

While American consumers and small- to medium-sized businesses fight through a period of debt deflation trying desperately to get their balance sheets under control (http://seekingalpha.com/article/279283-credit-inflation-or-debt-deflation) larger American corporations seem to be doing just fine, thank you, in international markets. 

It seems as if about half of the monies these corporations are spending on capital investment is going into other countries.  That is where the sales are so that is where the funds are going.

Also, the investment that is being done in the United States is going more to increase productivity and lower costs than it is to expand employment and generate further economic activity. 

In terms of aggregate figures, the article reports that “U. S. multinational corporations cut their work forces at home by 2.9 million during the 2000s while increasing them overseas by 2.4 million, according to data from the U. S. Commerce Department.” 

In contrast to the slow-growing United States economy, companies found substantial purchasing strength elsewhere.  General Electric, for example, said it experienced double-digit revenue growth in each of its international divisions in the second quarter.  The largest growth came in India, registering a 91 percent gain; in China, revenues rose by 35 percent and orders increased by 80 percent. 

This is what happens when capital can flow freely around the globe. 

Money will follow opportunity.

The United States prospered through the last fifty years of credit inflation because it had the reserve currency of the world.  Others were willing to take on United States debt because the world still traded in U. S. dollars. 

But, this credit inflation did two things.  First, it eroded the productive ability of the United States. See my post “Why This Economic Expansion is Going Nowhere,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/279928-why-this-economic-expansion-is-going-nowhere.

Second, it resulted in a build up of consumer debt and business debt that was unsustainable and had to be reduced.  The reduction of this is the debt deflation the United States is now experiencing. 

The government’s attempts to push further credit inflation on the economy is just pushing money out into the rest-of-the- world, as reported in some of my posts mentioned above, and has created economic growth…and profits…elsewhere.

In a world of freely flowing capital, a nation cannot just conduct its economic policy independently of the rest of the world.  As stated above, the United States got away with it for a long period of time because it had the reserve currency of the world.  But, this lack of discipline has caught up with us and more and more the statistics are supporting this conclusion.

The other thing the credit inflation policies of the United States government has done is to skew the income/wealth distribution in America toward the wealthy.  Small- and medium-sized business are not profiting from the current efforts to stimulate the economy.  However, as reported, the larger, wealthier companies are doing very, very well. 

Why This Economic Expansion is Going Nowhere

This economic expansion is now in its twenty-fourth month.  It is one of the weakest expansions on record.  And, it seems to be going nowhere.

One reason for this is that there is just too much debt still outstanding in the economy.  The economy is experiencing a debt deflation where more and more people and businesses feel over-burdened with the debt loads they are carrying on their balance sheets.

The government, especially the Federal Reserve, is trying to counter this by pushing hard on the credit inflation button to extend the fifty years or so of credit inflation we have already experienced.  The problem with this is that each new round of credit inflation puts more and more people and businesses into unsustainable positions so that expansions rely on a smaller and smaller proportion of the economy to drive further economic growth. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/279283-credit-inflation-or-debt-deflation)

 Debt takes time to work off or work out.  The bigger the debt-load the longer and harder it is for the people and businesses to climb out of their holes.  Repeated cycles of credit inflation not only end up with more people digging holes, it also contributes to some existing holes becoming deeper. 

Hence with every cycle recoveries become harder to achieve and the subsequent economic growth becomes less and less robust.

Another reason why economic growth is having trouble picking up momentum is because of the dislocations that exist within the economy.  Credit inflation causes many distortions beyond what it does to the balance sheets of people and businesses.

Most analysts concentrate on the unemployment rate.  Right now this figure rests just over 9.0 percent.  Analysts focus on this variable as the crucial one for the upcoming 2012 election. 

To me, a more important measure of the dislocation of human resources in the economy is the amount of under-employment we are experiencing.  This number includes those individuals that have left the workforce or are employed but are not fully employed.

The under-employment rate in the United States right now runs about 20.0 percent.  About one out of every five Americans is under-employed. 

This number was under 10.0 percent in the 1960s and has trended up ever since. 

The reason:  the number one goal of the economic policy of the United States government was to achieve high rates of employment…low rates of unemployment.  The best way to do this when unemployment arose was to stimulate the economy through the monetary and fiscal policies of the United States government to put people back to work in the jobs they have previously been laid off from.  This, of course, resulted in more and more of the human capital in the country being underutilized…a capacity utilization problem.

Adding to this was the shift in employment in the country with relatively more and more of the new jobs opening up being in finance and financial services and less and less in manufacturing.  Many “potential” workers find themselves limited in terms of opportunity either through geographic location or educational training.  Both of these results came from the governments attempt to achieve high levels of employment through credit inflation.

Finally, there is the problem of capacity utilization of physical capital.  As one can see in the accompanying chart, capacity utilization in American industry was in the 87.0 to 90.0 percent range in the 1960s.  As the proportion of human capital being used in this country trended downward from the1960s to the present, capacity utilization in manufacturing has also trended downward.  

One can observe very clearly in this chart the cycles of capacity utilization associated with each recession during this time period.  Also, one can not that with every cycle in capacity utilization that the “new” peak achieved is lower than the peak reached during the previous cycle…with the exception of the 1995-1997 experience.

Right now, United States manufacturing seems to be “peaking” out just below 77.0% of capacity, down from a previous peak of about 82.0 percent of capacity.  It has been stuck at this level for at least seven months now, through June.

My argument is that just as credit inflation is responsible for the growing under-employment in the United States work force, credit inflation is also responsible for the growing under-employment of the physical capital of the United States.  Credit inflation distorts business decisions and leads to a capital stock that is less and less productive over time.

So, here are three reasons why I place a low probability on the United States economy achieving a more robust economic recovery: the debt load on people and businesses; the dislocation existing in the labor market leading to high rates of under-employment; and the dislocation existing in the use of physical capital in the United States leading to low rates of capacity utilization. 

Note that credit inflation can only be a short run panacea for these problems.  Credit inflation leads to greater debt buildup adding to the unsustainability of the debt load being carried by people and businesses.  Credit inflation works to put people back into the jobs they recently lost but as the society changes, the old jobs go away.  And, credit inflation affects the productivity of the country’s physical capital making the existing capital stock less and less usable.  There are no good answers here.