Financial well-being is, in many ways, analogous to our physical well-being. We need periodic check ups and doctoral oversight, but in general true health is dependent upon the discipline and persistence and care that we bring to our own daily lives. However in other ways financial well-being in not the same. Our physical existence is limited to our natural selves: there are limits to how humans can grow and change. This is not true of the financial system.
In the world of finance we can innovate and change and find ways to get around regulation. This has been the modus operandi of the financial system during my entire professional career. Consequently, the financial system of today in substantially different than the financial world that existed in the 1960s. I have called the last fifty years or so the age of financial innovation. Regulation and oversight of the financial system does have to change. But, we need to be careful about the change in regulation and oversight that results and not just give in to populist calls to “put a stop to the greed on Wall Street”.
The characteristic about finance that fails to be taken into consideration when people believe that they can “control” finance is that finance is about nothing more than information. Finance is numbers, nothing more, and numbers can be packaged in any way that a person wants to package them. On our currency we read that “This note is legal tender for all debts, public and private.” That is, people and governments can pay you for things in this script and you must take it. And, what more is a check, or a bank deposit, or a bond, or a stock certificate? In most cases today, these are nothing but 0s and 1s in a computer system. Finance is nothing more than information and how information is handled and transformed.
The unique thing about information is that it spreads and, as we have found out historically, information cannot be contained. Of course, its spread can be postponed or stymied for a while, but eventually its spread takes place. All human history is a record of this fact.
We see this trend also works in non-financial areas. Information relating to modernity and science and democracy is spreading throughout the world. In some areas this spread is being resisted by some who are attempting to keep the world mired in the ideas of the 7th or 8th century (C. E.) This attempt to prevent the spread of the idea of the modern world has resulted in violence and tremendous pain to many. But, the spread continues. It has all through recorded history. In the end, the resisters cannot stop it and their efforts to slow it down do nothing but cause unhappiness and dislocation.
The financial system over the past 50 years or so has been an engine of new creations. In the 1960s, we saw the movement of banks from being asset managers to becoming liability managers through the creation of instruments like the negotiable certificate of deposit and Eurodollar accounts. This broke down the geographical limitations on banks and helped them continue to evade government rules and regulations. In the academic world increases in computing power combined with the vast amount of data available on the stock market allowed for the development of ideas relating to portfolio management and risk control, which culminated in the creation of CAPM and the efficient markets hypothesis. A third innovation related to the growth and development of venture capital that put money into the hands of more and more innovators starting up small businesses. All of these developments had to do with information and how that information was bundled and traded.
In the 1970s we saw the development of the mortgage backed security, the junk bond, and the leveraged buyout. The creation of the mortgage backed security by the federal government was the test case for “slicing and dicing” up cash flows into tranches that could be packaged in ways that met the specific needs of different investors. And, as they say, the rest is history.
The development of the junk bond? The legend is that Michael Milken, sequestered in the bowels of the Lippincott Library of the University of Pennsylvania discovered information about the performance of “fallen angels”. These were high quality bonds issued sometime in the late 1920s or early in the 1930s whose companies had had financial difficulties. The bonds fell out of favor and hence yielded very high returns. Milken discovered that because of the lack of interest in these securities their actual performance substantially exceeded the performance exhibited in their market pricing. This information, which was confirmed by more current information, led Milken to develop the junk bond, the first such issue coming to market in 1976.
In addition, fund managers arose, like KKR, which discovered information concerning the value of assets that were on the books of many corporations. Often, these assets were undervalued because they were recorded at historical values and were substantially below current market values. Previously, these companies were “out-of-reach” of corporate raiders, but with the creation of the junk bond, all companies in the United States came within the reach of well-funded organizations. So, finance could now reach the largest, as well as the smallest, businesses.
This evolution, of course, continued into the 2000s. The point is that as information becomes available it can be used in many different ways to serve many different purposes. “Slicing and dicing” the information known as cash flows is not new, but is a part of a process that has a long history. And, due to the nature of information this process is not going to go away.
The Obama administration is now making its attempt to re-regulate financial institutions and financial markets. The proposal offered yesterday is much watered-down from what the “more progressive” wing of the political spectrum had wanted: its thrust is not sufficiently “Rooseveltian”. Still others express concern that the administration is going too far in some areas.
My take on the Obama proposals for financial regulation: it will make little difference in the end. Obama needs to take some kind of action and look like he is attacking the problems faced by the society. In the longer run the new regulatory scheme will make very little difference.
Financial innovation is going to continue. If some efforts are constrained in the United States, they will pop up elsewhere in the world. The incentives to innovate are still there. If we force the innovation to go off-shore, then we are, in my mind, the losers. This innovation will help others but provide little benefit to us.
What is needed? To me the most important thing that is needed is openness and transparency. We need to know what is being done and by whom. As derivative securities and hedge funds grew and prospered, we heard over and over again that they could not tell anyone what they were doing because, if they did, the narrow spreads they were working with would go away. Well, guess what! Most everyone knew what deals were being struck and the spreads went away anyway. That is why these organizations needed to use more and more leverage to take on riskier and riskier deals.
Highly competitive markets where there are few if any barriers to entry cannot continually provide exceptional returns. “Trading” is not the source of sustainable competitive advantage and keeping things secret will not salvage trading schemes. Openness and transparency will result in financial institutions focusing on what really creates competitive advantage and what is sustainable. This is necessary for the existence of a strong and healthy financial system.
Secondly, we need methods to close or put-out-of-business in a more timely fashion financial institutions that are troubled or are insolvent. Re-instating and improving mark-to-market accounting is a must. Increased openness and transparency should help the market place carry out this function, but, the regulatory system needs to have more FDIC-type efficiency to move quickly into institutions and shut them down. (The Federal Reserve is not the institution to do this. It needs to keep its focus on the conduct of monetary policy.) Moving quickly to resolve problems has always been the best policy. Managing institutions based on wishful thinking, a major trait of the banking system, is not a good policy.
We need financial regulation and oversight, just as we need periodic checkups and advice from doctors. However, there is only so much that regulators can do. Unlike our physical systems, our financial systems are going to innovate and change. My guess is that in the future with the continued advancement of information technology financial innovation will continue to increase rapidly and will serve as the model for more and more of our non-financial markets. “Information markets” is the model for the future. This innovation will, in one way or another, get around whatever regulation that is imposed. That is why openness and transparency is so important. But, that is also why the system of failure and bankruptcy should be enhanced and enforced. These, to me, are the major requirements we should impose on the financial system.
Showing posts with label New Financial Regulation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label New Financial Regulation. Show all posts
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
The Special Case of Financial Institutions
In my last post, “Good Management Never Goes Out of Style”, I discussed what I believe to lie at the foundation of good management. The primary emphasis of this argument is that good management focuses upon what helped to create any competitive advantage it might have and maintains that focus over the longer run. In order to do this, good management must obtain good talent and then give the good talent the room and authority to put that talent to work. Good management facilitates good talent by creating a culture of high performance while keeping the focus of the business on what can sustain the competitive advantage of the firm.
Competitive advantage produces exceptional returns but these returns are difficult to sustain because potential competitors, seeing the exceptional returns, attempt to duplicate the results and aggressive market response reduces the firms’ advantage and drives down returns. In some instances, the firm with the competitive advantage may be able to sustain competitive advantage. However, the company may not be able to sustain the competitive advantage…in many cases, it is just not possible. In such cases the only really effective action management can take is to become very efficient and reduce expense ratios.
One recognizes when these foundational principles are being neglected when firms resort to gimmicks to achieve performance. In the last post I mentioned two such gimmicks: increased leverage and the mismatching of maturities. There are many other gimmicks that can be used such as assuming additional risk, accounting tricks (hello Enron), attempts at diversification, and secrecy. As I argued, these efforts generally represent an attempt to force results and come about either from greed or hubris or both. Because they are forced and are not related to basic underlying market realities they eventually fail, often at great cost. Arguing that the world has changed and that this world-change requires new standards only lasts for so long. Losing or changing focus may produce results in the short run but it never succeeds in the longer run.
Financial institutions represent a special case that needs to be discussed separately. The reason for this is that financial institutions are generally intermediaries and therefore depend upon the two ends of the market that they intermediate. The commercial bank is the prime example of an intermediary for historically a commercial bank took small deposits from relatively small economic units that didn’t have any alternatives to depositing it’s funds in the bank, and made large loans to larger economic units that needed the funds to run their businesses. As a consequence of the nature of the business, a commercial bank was grounded in its local or regional economy. Only a few borrowers had a national presence.
This dependency started to break up in the 1960s. Bank borrowers got larger and larger and demanded larger and larger loans. Financial markets developed so that these larger borrowers found that they had more sources of funds than before. In order to support these borrowers, commercial banks had to create new instruments to raise the funds they needed to meet the changing conditions. Commercial banks began to innovate and the result was the large negotiable Certificate of Deposit and the Eurodollar markets. These markets were large and deep, sufficiently so that commercial banks could buy or sell all the funds they wanted to at the going market interest rate. (In the terms of the economist, the supply curve of funds became perfectly elastic.) “Liability Management” was created! Now banks were only limited in their size by their capital base. And, commercial banks could become truly international!
The large customers of the banks found that their sources of funds became more elastically supplied and hence their demand for funds from their commercial banks became more elastic. Bank spreads declined!
Competition worked! Now the race was on! The rest is history!
The problem with innovation in financial markets is that finance is just about information…and the marginal cost of creating more and more information is very, very low. (For an example of this idea see “Information Markets: What Businesses Can Learn from Financial Innovation” by Wilhelm and Downing, Harvard Business School Press, 2001.) Consequently, information can be cut up in many, many different ways. The primary example of this is the Mortgage Backed Security that allows mortgages to be cut up into tranches, including toxic waste, into interest only securities, principal only securities, or any other way that might be thought of and sold.
Thus, financial innovation in making financial more efficient narrows spreads as the supplies of funds becomes more and more elastic…people can buy and sell as much as they want without affecting the price of the funds they are buying or selling. But, in such markets, leverage can become infinite! And, how do people then make money? Well, they must find mismatches…mismatches in risk, mismatches in maturities, mismatches in information, mismatches in timing. There becomes no limit to gimmicks.
We have seen two types of responses to this. First, there was an increase in secrecy. With spreads narrowing it becomes imperative that others not know what you are doing. Long Term Capital Management was noted for its attempts to keep secret what it was doing. The reason…if others know what you are doing the spreads narrow even more. (Three cheers for competition!) Another way to increase secrecy was to put things “off-balance sheet”. In this way institutions could get away with smaller capital bases and riskier business than if they kept these assets “on” the balance sheet.
The second type of response is to review your business model. This is an appropriate thing to do, but in changing ones business model one must be careful about whether or not the change really builds a different business model or not. Financial institutions responded to declining interest rate spreads by cultivating the “fee-based” business model. It can be argued that this effort really did not change the nature of the business but just shifted business. If I create the mortgage, I can then sell the mortgage for a fee. Another institution can package mortgages and get a fee for that. And, another organization can service the mortgages and get a fee for that. And, another institution can…. And, so on and so on.
In this example, the financial business has not changed…just different pieces of the package have been shifted around…and risk is located somewhere else out in the world, someplace no one knows where.
A business model can be changed in a way that can create value. This is what I think the financial services industry is going to have to do. The financial institutions industry is not the only industry that is facing massive changes in this Information Age. When it becomes nearly costless to create information, the old business loses relevance and must find a new way to create value. The question for management becomes, “What is it about what I do that I can, at least initially, create a competitive advantage?”
The follow up question becomes, “After I create the initial competitive advantage, what do I do next?” We see in the case of Information Goods that time pacing becomes extremely important. I tell the young IT entrepreneurs that I work with, “It is all fine and good that you have captured a niche in the market but you must already be planning the next generation of the product or the new, new product that you will bring to market.” Modern technology produces such an environment.
What does this mean for the management of financial institutions? That is for the future to determine. I have my own ideas. But, another question is…and this is just as important…what does this mean for the regulation of financial institutions? In building new financial regulation in this Information Age we cannot just fight the past wars…especially the wars we are now engaged in. That, of course, is the hardest thing for the Government…both the President and Congress…to do! It is going to be an interesting ride.
Competitive advantage produces exceptional returns but these returns are difficult to sustain because potential competitors, seeing the exceptional returns, attempt to duplicate the results and aggressive market response reduces the firms’ advantage and drives down returns. In some instances, the firm with the competitive advantage may be able to sustain competitive advantage. However, the company may not be able to sustain the competitive advantage…in many cases, it is just not possible. In such cases the only really effective action management can take is to become very efficient and reduce expense ratios.
One recognizes when these foundational principles are being neglected when firms resort to gimmicks to achieve performance. In the last post I mentioned two such gimmicks: increased leverage and the mismatching of maturities. There are many other gimmicks that can be used such as assuming additional risk, accounting tricks (hello Enron), attempts at diversification, and secrecy. As I argued, these efforts generally represent an attempt to force results and come about either from greed or hubris or both. Because they are forced and are not related to basic underlying market realities they eventually fail, often at great cost. Arguing that the world has changed and that this world-change requires new standards only lasts for so long. Losing or changing focus may produce results in the short run but it never succeeds in the longer run.
Financial institutions represent a special case that needs to be discussed separately. The reason for this is that financial institutions are generally intermediaries and therefore depend upon the two ends of the market that they intermediate. The commercial bank is the prime example of an intermediary for historically a commercial bank took small deposits from relatively small economic units that didn’t have any alternatives to depositing it’s funds in the bank, and made large loans to larger economic units that needed the funds to run their businesses. As a consequence of the nature of the business, a commercial bank was grounded in its local or regional economy. Only a few borrowers had a national presence.
This dependency started to break up in the 1960s. Bank borrowers got larger and larger and demanded larger and larger loans. Financial markets developed so that these larger borrowers found that they had more sources of funds than before. In order to support these borrowers, commercial banks had to create new instruments to raise the funds they needed to meet the changing conditions. Commercial banks began to innovate and the result was the large negotiable Certificate of Deposit and the Eurodollar markets. These markets were large and deep, sufficiently so that commercial banks could buy or sell all the funds they wanted to at the going market interest rate. (In the terms of the economist, the supply curve of funds became perfectly elastic.) “Liability Management” was created! Now banks were only limited in their size by their capital base. And, commercial banks could become truly international!
The large customers of the banks found that their sources of funds became more elastically supplied and hence their demand for funds from their commercial banks became more elastic. Bank spreads declined!
Competition worked! Now the race was on! The rest is history!
The problem with innovation in financial markets is that finance is just about information…and the marginal cost of creating more and more information is very, very low. (For an example of this idea see “Information Markets: What Businesses Can Learn from Financial Innovation” by Wilhelm and Downing, Harvard Business School Press, 2001.) Consequently, information can be cut up in many, many different ways. The primary example of this is the Mortgage Backed Security that allows mortgages to be cut up into tranches, including toxic waste, into interest only securities, principal only securities, or any other way that might be thought of and sold.
Thus, financial innovation in making financial more efficient narrows spreads as the supplies of funds becomes more and more elastic…people can buy and sell as much as they want without affecting the price of the funds they are buying or selling. But, in such markets, leverage can become infinite! And, how do people then make money? Well, they must find mismatches…mismatches in risk, mismatches in maturities, mismatches in information, mismatches in timing. There becomes no limit to gimmicks.
We have seen two types of responses to this. First, there was an increase in secrecy. With spreads narrowing it becomes imperative that others not know what you are doing. Long Term Capital Management was noted for its attempts to keep secret what it was doing. The reason…if others know what you are doing the spreads narrow even more. (Three cheers for competition!) Another way to increase secrecy was to put things “off-balance sheet”. In this way institutions could get away with smaller capital bases and riskier business than if they kept these assets “on” the balance sheet.
The second type of response is to review your business model. This is an appropriate thing to do, but in changing ones business model one must be careful about whether or not the change really builds a different business model or not. Financial institutions responded to declining interest rate spreads by cultivating the “fee-based” business model. It can be argued that this effort really did not change the nature of the business but just shifted business. If I create the mortgage, I can then sell the mortgage for a fee. Another institution can package mortgages and get a fee for that. And, another organization can service the mortgages and get a fee for that. And, another institution can…. And, so on and so on.
In this example, the financial business has not changed…just different pieces of the package have been shifted around…and risk is located somewhere else out in the world, someplace no one knows where.
A business model can be changed in a way that can create value. This is what I think the financial services industry is going to have to do. The financial institutions industry is not the only industry that is facing massive changes in this Information Age. When it becomes nearly costless to create information, the old business loses relevance and must find a new way to create value. The question for management becomes, “What is it about what I do that I can, at least initially, create a competitive advantage?”
The follow up question becomes, “After I create the initial competitive advantage, what do I do next?” We see in the case of Information Goods that time pacing becomes extremely important. I tell the young IT entrepreneurs that I work with, “It is all fine and good that you have captured a niche in the market but you must already be planning the next generation of the product or the new, new product that you will bring to market.” Modern technology produces such an environment.
What does this mean for the management of financial institutions? That is for the future to determine. I have my own ideas. But, another question is…and this is just as important…what does this mean for the regulation of financial institutions? In building new financial regulation in this Information Age we cannot just fight the past wars…especially the wars we are now engaged in. That, of course, is the hardest thing for the Government…both the President and Congress…to do! It is going to be an interesting ride.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
