European Banks Getting Around Capital Rules

Bloomberg posted an article yesterday titled “Financial Alchemy Foils Capital Rules in Europe.” (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-09/financial-alchemy-undercuts-capital-regime-as-european-banks-redefine-risk.html) Commercial banks are up to their old tricks again.

“Banks in Europe are undercutting regulators’ demands that they boost capital by declaring assets they hold less risky today than they were yesterday.”

The issue has to do with “risk-weightings”, “the probability of default lenders assign to loans, mortgages and derivatives.”  The technical label: risk-weighted asset optimization.”

The issue has to do with how banks define how risky an asset is. 

Whoops, the whole problem depends on what the definition of is, is!

Regulators have a very tough job…and they always have had a very tough job.  Rules and regulations are put in place.  And, financial institutions have the time and the incentive to find ways to get around them.  So, financial institutions take the time and spend the resources to get around the rules and regulations.

This is just Economics 101: if there is an incentive for someone to do something to “get around” the rules…someone will find a way to “get around” the rules. 

I had direct experience of this when I was working in the Federal Reserve System around the time that a wonderful financial innovation came into existence…the Eurodollar deposit. 

The Eurodollar deposit was one of the inventions that allowed commercial banks to become “liability managers” rather than just “asset managers”.  These financial innovations allowed commercial banks, especially the larger ones, to get around the geographic restrictions faced by American banks at the time, and become fully competitive with their less restricted global competition. 

The word inside the Fed at this time was that the Fed was six months behind the banks.  That is, the Federal Reserve would institute some rules or regulations to constrain the use of these Eurodollar deposits and the commercial banks would then find ways to get around them.  However, it would take the Fed about six months to find out what the commercial banks were doing and institute some new rules or regulations to close the escape hatch.  And, the “cat and mouse” game would be played once more.

In that “primitive” time, I gained an appreciation of the inventiveness of the private sector and the frustration faced by the regulators.  The only time the rules and regulations really were strictly adhered to was in the case that the incentives for circumventing the rules and regulations were small enough so that the banks would not put out the time or resources to innovate.

Today, the sophistication and complexity of the banking system is such that regulators are at an even greater disadvantage than they were back in the “good old days.”  And, the primary reason that the bankers are some much further ahead is information technology. 

Over the last decade, I have constantly put forward the idea that finance is nothing more than information.  The whole basis for the field of financial engineering is that finance is information…and information can be cut up and re-arranged just about any way a person might find it useful to cut it up and re-arrange it.  In other words, “slicing and dicing” in a natural characteristic of information technology…that is, of financial practice.

Thus, I have been arguing for more than two years that any efforts to put new rules and regulations on financial institutions to prevent the financial crisis of 2008-2009 from occurring again are just an exercise in futility.  The Dodd-Frank financial reform act was “Dead On Arrival”…especially since most of the rules and regulations contained in the act were not even written at the time.

In fact, I would call the efforts of the legislatures and regulators in the eurozone and in the United States to control the financial industry more closely as the “regulatory employment effort of 2011”…or whatever.  In order to have any chance to know what is going on in the banking system the eurozone and the United States has had to hire hundreds if not thousands of new employees to write the rules and regulations, to interpret the rules and regulations, to enforce the rules and regulations, and to re-write the rules and regulations as it is observed that the rules and regulations are not working as expected.

And, financial institutions will still be out ahead of the politicians and the regulators.

The financial industry is going to be what it is going to be.  One thing that needs to be avoided, in my mind, is the environment of credit inflation that has existed for the last fifty years.  The environment of credit inflation just exacerbates the speed at which financial innovation takes place putting even more pressure on the government and the regulators to “keep up” and stay on top of events. 

And, what can be done?  I have been a constant advocate for increased openness and transparency in financial reporting.  Stop this hiding of assets.  Stop the switching of assets from one class to another.  Mark-to-market assets.  And so on and so on. 

Furthermore, incorporate market information into the early warning system of financial institutions. I have written about this many times before.  One such market-based early warning idea proposed by Oliver Hart of Harvard University and Luigi Zingales of the University of Chicago is based on Credit Default Swaps.  (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/207293-banks-disclosure-and-reform.) 

In my view, finance has gotten so complex and sophisticated that government regulation of the financial industry, as it is done today, is something of a lost cause.  The fact that politicians pass bills and acts to regulate the financial industry and can’t even initially write up the specific provisions of the rules and regulations and then when they do get written up it takes 3,000 pages to define the rule or regulation, is evidence of the futility of the exercise. 

Greater disclosure and market-based early warning systems seem to me to be the only real chance we have to monitor these financial institutions and then have some influence over the course of events. 

Until the politicians change their tune, however, we are going to continue to work in a financial world that is opaque and “out-ot-control.”   

Regulation Never Works As Planned

One constant seems to run through my whole professional career.  The regulators impose some new rules…and within a reasonable period of time, the private sector finds ways to get around the new rules.  Then the regulators impose further new rules…and within a reasonable period of time, the private sector finds ways to get around them.

Back in the 1960-1971 period, I was in the Federal Reserve System and one of the main new financial innovations that the Fed was dealing with at the time was the Eurodollar deposit.  The “time lag” then was about six months. 

That is, the Fed would see some activity it wanted to get greater control of and it would impose new rules or restrictions on the activity.  The banks would then respond to the new rules or regulations.  About six months later the Fed would discover what the banks were doing to get around these new rules or regulations.  Then, the Fed would move into action once again.

At that time, however, we did not refer to the commercial bankers as “greedy bastards.”

In fact, any void seemed to call forth the ingenuity of the financial community.

The credit inflation, begun in the early 1960s, provided the incentive for the financial community to engage in more financial innovation over the next fifty years than ever before in human history. 

Restrictions on the interest rates that financial institutions could pay on deposit—Regulation Q—could not stand up to the inflationary expectations that got built into interest rates.

The consequent volatility in interest rates made it worthwhile to develop interest rate futures and interest rate options.

The desire to drive more and more credit into the housing market resulted in the government creation of the mortgage-backed security and the validation of “slicing and dicing” of the cash flows generated by financial instruments.

This slicing and dicing spread to government issues and we got the Treasury “Strip” securities...and more.

And, the continued credit inflation resulted in greater and greater amounts of risk taking and things like credit default swaps to hedge against risk taking.  We got more and more financial leverage and this required new ways to “cut things up” or hide things “off-balance sheet” or make things “synthetic” or deal only in “nominal” values. 

And, the beat goes on.

To me, this comes out in the rant of JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon the other day against Ben Bernanke.   His blast, I believe, was one of pure frustration.  We want to be bankers, Dimon said, but the Fed…and Congress…and the Administration…force us to be financial innovators, constantly creating ways to get around the ill-considered new rules and regulations that continuously flow out of the government. 

He could have said, “If you want us to stop the financial innovating do two things.  First, stop inflating credit as you have done for the last fifty years and are continuing to do at this very minute!  Second, let things settle down and stop trying to regulate the very things you are causing us to do because of your inflation of credit!”

Will the government do this?  Not likely, and that is why Dimon is so frustrated.

My prediction: the financial system, over the next five to ten years, will be different in major ways from what we now see in front of us. 

The reason is that bankers…and the public…will create a new and different financial system. 

For, example, what about the “shadow-banking system” that was created in the past twenty years or so?  Maybe this “system” will become the preferred lender to business.

It is still there, thank you, and it is “filling in the current void.”  See the front page New York Times article this morning: “Bank Said No? Hedge Funds Fill Loan Void.” (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/bank-said-no-hedge-funds-fill-a-void-in-lending/?ref=business)  “With traditional lenders still avoiding risky borrowers in the wake of the financial crisis, hedge funds and other opportunistic investors are stepping into the void.  They are going after mid-size businesses that cannot easily raise money in the bond markets like their bigger brethren.”   No telling where hedge funds…and others…will be found these days.  

And, this doesn’t even include what might be done electronically.

What is money?  What is finance?

As I have argued many times in previous blog posts, money…finance…is just information…just 0’s and 1’s!

“Concerns about the integrity of money have also seen a fundamental shift…While fraud is still a concern, the financial collapse of 2008 has called into question the competence of the central banks that are supposed to manage national currencies.  In this week’s technology special we examine how the internet is allowing groups of people to set up means of exchange that are independent of both the banks and the state.”

Hold on there…

What about gold or silver?

“Private currencies are nothing new, but novel possibilities such as bitcoin now beckon.  Though bitcoins are magicked out of nothing, money is what money does, and many people are happy to accept bitcoins as payment for real goods and services.  The bitcoins in circulation are now worth around $50 million in conventional currency.”

“Governments may want to clamp down on what they see as a way to evade taxes…”

“But the future of money, as so much else, may be shaped by the internet’s ability to bring interested parties together outside the ambit of governments or big companies. “

“Under a scheme operating in the city of Macon, Georgia, special bonds are issued to residents—but each person receives only half a bond, and can only redeem it by locating the person with the matching half.  Participants must seek each other out through online social networks such as Twitter, then decide together how to spend the cash.  Attempts to set up such ‘local currencies’ have been tried many times before, but have usually proven too difficult to co-ordinate and organize.  Social media offer such schemes a new lease of life.” (New Scientist, June 4, 2011)

The point is that regulation never works as planned because humans are just too ingenious and improved information technology and the spread of information eventually winout over time.  As a consequence, regulators…and politicians…are always fighting the last war.  Another way to phrase this is that regulators…and politicians…are always out-of-date!

Bank Re-regulation Forgot to Consider Google and Twitter

One of the clearest comments I have heard recently about the financial reform actions of Congress and the regulators is that those passing the new laws and establishing the new regulations completely ignored the fact that something like Google and Twitter had been created.

In other words, times have changed and those in Congress and in the regulatory bodies have kept their focus just on the past.

Financial regulation, however, is not the only thing that is falling victim to a backward looking focus.

We are seeing a concentration on the past in dealing with state and local government problems, problems with pensions, bargaining power, and employment. The law just passed in Michigan giving the state government broader powers to intervene in the finances and governance of struggling municipalities and school districts…” has been fought by those that argue that the law “undermines collective bargaining and threatens to subvert elected local governments.” (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704360404576206603444375580.html?mod=ITP_pageone_1&mg=reno-wsj.)

Times have changed.

The years of inflation which began in the early 1960s has reached a tipping point in many areas. The days of inflated state and local government budgets, of passing on the fiscal impacts of lucrative union bargaining agreements in the form of higher property taxes, and of using the accounting gimmicks that postponed dealing with pension obligations is over. Adjustments must be made

But, that is not how people deal with the unpleasantness of current dislocations.

The inflation benefit for labor unions in manufacturing industries gave out years ago.
Manufacturers of cars and steel and so forth could neither pass on lush labor agreements to the public nor hide the increasing labor costs is limited technological advancements in their products or the production of their products.

And, the labor unions that still exist in these areas of manufacturing have shrunk, both in numbers and in terms of bargaining power.

State and local governments are now having to deal with this phenomenon.

And, what about debt?

The taking on of debt thrives in periods of credit inflation and Americans have had at least fifty years to get on this bandwagon.

And, now people have not really been borrowing. The real question is, should they start borrowing again? I have addressed this in my post “Does Getting Out of Debt Mean that People Should Start Spending More?” (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/257772-does-getting-out-of-debt-mean-people-should-start-spending-more.)

What has this debt done for people? If the number of foreclosures and bankruptcies over the last few years and the number of foreclosures and bankruptcies pending or near the edge are any indication, many people may not want to jump right into the “debt circus” again any time soon.

What accounts for the popularity of the finance guru Dave Ramsey? Take a peek at his new book, “The Total Money Makeover: A Proven Plan for Financial Fitness.” And, what is his recipe for financial fitness and greater happiness?

GET OUT OF DEBT! ALL OF IT!

This advice doesn’t apply to just families. It applies to small businesses, and medium-sized businesses, and others.

GET OUT OF DEBT!

Pass that message on to Chairman Bernanke.

And, what is the solution of Chairman Bernanke and other leaders in Washington, D. C.?

Let the presses role! Start the credit inflation once again!

The question is, will this new round of credit inflation succeed. It seems as if over the past fifty years that every time we entered a new round of credit inflation, some things got worse.

For example, capacity utilization in manufacturing continued to drop since the 1960s. That is, every subsequent peak in capacity utilization during this time period was lower than the previous peak. Furthermore, after almost two years of economic recovery, capacity utilization still remains just a little over 75%.

Underemployment has continually risen over the last fifty years and now about one out of every five individuals of working age in the United States is underemployed.

In addition, the inflationary environment of the last fifty years has benefitted the wealthy who can either take advantage of the inflation or protect themselves against it and has been exceedingly costly for the less wealthy, who cannot protect themselves. As a consequence, we have the worst skewing of the income distribution toward the wealthy in United States history.

And, there is more!

But, this is not the point.

The point is: the times have changed!

If we do not accept this fact in financial regulation, in the management of state and local governments, in our own finances, and in the federal governments budgetary policy, we will all be the sorrier for it.

Who has the credit inflation of the last fifty years really helped? The financial industry. And, I have asked the question, who is the “Bernanke Credit Inflation” going to help? This time, will the financial industry just dance alone? (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/255748-will-the-financial-industry-dance-alone.)

Commercial Banking in 2011

Commercial banking in the United States is going to change substantially in the next five years.

Most of my comments on the banking industry over the past year have been spent on the “smaller” banks, the banks are not among the 25 largest commercial banks in the industry, the banks that control about 30% of the banking assets in America. At last count there were a little less than 7,800 of these banks. The average size of the banks in this category is about $480 million, pretty small.

My concern about these banks is their solvency. The FDIC placed 860 commercial banks on its list of problem banks at the end of the third quarter. The question that is still outstanding is how many more banks are seriously challenged to remain in business. That is, how many banks are not on the problem list but “near” to being on the problem list. Elizabeth Warren gave testimony in front of Congress in the spring and stated that 3,000 commercial banks were threatened by bad loans over the next 18 months.

Commercial banks have been closed at the rate of approximately 3.5 per week during 2010 and many other acquisitions have taken place. So, the industry is shrinking. I still believe that there will be fewer than 4,000 commercial banks in the United States by the end of the upcoming decade.

However, something new is going to happen at the other end of the banking spectrum. International banks are going to play a much bigger role in the United States in the future and this is going to substantially change the playing field and will help to accelerate the decline in the number of banks in the American banking system.

What’s going on? Just in the recent past we have had the news that the Bank of Montreal, the fourth largest bank in Canada, acquired the banking firm of Marshall and Ilsley Corp., which has $38 billion in deposits, 374 branches throughout the Midwest, and is the largest lender in Wisconsin. Then we learned that TD Bank, the second largest bank in Canada, is acquiring Chrysler Financial, the former lending wing of the Chrysler Corporation.

We also learn that Deutsche Bank AG and Barclays PLC have moved up the rankings of global business when compared to other Wall Street organizations. (See the Wall Street Journal article “New Banks Climb Wall Street Ranks,” http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703581204576033514054189044.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_2&mg=reno-wsj.) These organizations have grown substantially filling in some of the hole left by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the moving of Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch into other banking firms.

The point is that the American banking scene is much more open to foreign competition on its own turf in the 2010s than it was previously. This has the potential for causing even more changes in the structure of banking in the United States and in the world than we have seen over the last fifty years.

If we go back to the start of the 1960s, the United States contained some 14,000 commercial banks and a large, prosperous thrift industry. But, things were changing. Let me point out just three of the major factors impacting the banking and thrift industries by the start of the 1970s. First, was the beginning of the credit inflation that was to spread throughout the economic system that would result in the rising interest rates which would eventually bankrupt the thrift industry and drive it out of business.

Second, the United States commercial banking system at the start of the 1960s was a mish-mash of banking rules. For one, the branching laws were such that banks could not branch across state lines, and in some states banks could only have one office, in others they faced severe limits on the number of branches they could have, while in other states there was unlimited state-wide branching.

What broke this structure down? Information technology. With the spread of information technology banks could not be constrained from branching across state lines. The death knell for state control and limited branching was sounded. National competition became the new norm and banks had to compete.

The third factor was the freeing up of the flow of funds internationally. By the end of the 1960s the capital flows were basically unrestricted between the United States and Europe. One of the major signs of this openness was the creation of the Eurodollar deposit which became an important tool in the move to “liability management” which freed up American commercial banks from limits on their ability to grow their balance sheets. This factor contributed to the demise of the “Bretton Woods” system of international finance.

All three of these factors played a big role in the changes in the financial system of the United States and the world and to the movement away from “relationship finance” and “arms-length finance”. For more on the changes in the banking system and the growing “impersonal” nature of the financial system see the book “Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists” by Raghuram Rajan (the winner of the Financial Times/Goldman Sachs award for the best business book of the year, “Fault Lines”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/224630-book-review-fault-lines-how-hidden-fractures-still-threaten-the-world-economy-by-raghuram-g-rajan) and Luigi Zingales, both of the University of Chicago.

All of these factors are still at work but we are now seeing another important factor coming into play, “competition from the outside.” Just as the forces inside the United States have been attempting to build up walls to constrain the finance industry, America is now coming to experience a breaking down of the barriers. Unless the Congress puts up restrictions on foreign financial interests acquiring domestic companies, it seems as if the door is opening for more and more banks from outside the United States to come knocking.

The result of this “opening up” according to Rajan and Zingales is that the new competition really “shakes things up.” I have contended throughout the events which began in late 2008 that by the middle of 2009 the largest 25 commercial banks in the United States had moved beyond most of the structural problems that contributed to the financial collapse. Furthermore, by the time that the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform bill got passed, these banks had moved beyond most of the onerous portions of the legislation.

Now with these foreign financial organizations moving into the competitive space of the United States banks, all banks will be using information technology and uncontrolled capital flows throughout most of the world to further outpace efforts of regulatory reform.

Another consequence of this will be the pressure on the larger banks to continue to merge and acquire and diversify their businesses in ways we have not yet imagined. And, when one brings into the picture the things that information technology can do and the progress the “Quants” have made in finance, one can only guess at how exciting the near-term evolution of the banking system is going to be.

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to Everyone!

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

What do I think of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform legislation?

I can't express it better than this:

The Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act is already "legacy".

More Stress Tests Coming for the Banks of Europe

We have been given Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) by the Federal Reserve System in the United States and now we are facing Stress Tests II (ST2) to be imposed on banking institutions in the European Union. (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703994904575646903413631856.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_0&mg=reno-wsj)

Will we eventually be facing Financial Reform Act II (FR2) that will incorporate the next round of regulatory reforms of the financial system of the United States?

I put this new round of stress tests for banks in the same place I put QE2 and the initial Financial Reform Act of 2010 and Basel III (B3)…in the dust bin. For my comments on QE2 see http://seekingalpha.com/article/234814-the-fed-s-850-billion-bet-negative-long-term-implications; for my comments on the Financial Reform Act see http://seekingalpha.com/article/206341-the-sound-and-fury-of-banking-reform; and for my comments on B3 see http://seekingalpha.com/article/225116-basel-iii-chuckle.

Regulators and reformers (R&R) just never seem to get it right!

One reason is that they are always fighting the last war. The current popular belief amongst the R&R is that the initial stress tests in Europe did not include tests on liquidity and this element of the banking structure needs to be examined to get a real view of how much “stress” the banks can take. The R&R intend to correct this omission in the next round of stress tests.

Just two points on this. First, liquidity is a market condition and not something that exists on balance sheets. One cannot look at a balance sheet and determine how liquid markets will be. Duh!

Second, if a bank cannot raise funds in financial markets because they have bad assets, this is a solvency problem and not a liquidity problem. In addition they cannot retain funds from market savvy customers

Hugo Dixon wrote in the New York Times yesterday that the Irish banks, Allied Irish Banks and the Bank of Ireland, were “excessively dependent on wholesale money from other banks and big investors.” These monies are very interest rate sensitive and very sensitive to credit risk. Even though these banks passed the earlier stress tests, when the smell of problems arose, the wholesale money “started to flee.”

However, the problem faced by these banks was not a liquidity problem. The problem arose because the wholesale depositors were concerned over the health of the banks and this is a solvency problem.

The situation here is that the R&R can only work with historical data and, consequently, are always behind the times. Their analysis is always static. The movement of the “wholesale money” is current market information and provides a forward looking assessment of the condition of a bank or banks .

What would be desirable would be current information that was “forward looking” and more accessible to the investing public. What would be desirable would be some kind of “forward looking” market information that reflected the viewpoint of market participants that were “betting” their own money.

In a recent post I included a chart that presented market information and was very current. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/239296-market-behavior-at-odds-with-european-bailouts-liquidity-vs-solvency.) This chart shows information on Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads on European banks as well as on Spanish banks. One can see that the price of these CDSs began rising in late 2009 in anticipation of the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 and began rising even more dramatically before the current crisis that Europe is now facing. It seems as if some market indicator like these CDS’s could be used as an early warning signal that trouble was brewing in the financial sector of an economy or in specific banks.

Note, that the information provided by the Credit Default Swaps could be used as an early warning signal that something was wrong and this “signal” could then set off further analysis of the institution, or institutions, involved that would be conducted by the regulatory agencies.

Just such a suggestion has been made by Oliver Hart is the Andrew E. Furer Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Luigi Zingales is the Robert C. McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business. Two references to their work are “Curbing Risk on Wall Street,” http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/curbing-risk-on-wall-street, and “To Regulate the Finance, Try the Market,” http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/blog/5478.

To quote from the latter article: “In our mechanism, when the CDS price rises above a critical value (indicating that the institution has reached an unacceptable threshold of weakness), the regulator would force the LFI (large financial institution) to issue equity until the CDS price and risk of failure came back down. If the LFI fails to do this within a predetermined period of time, the regulator will take over.”

In the former article the authors argue that “The financial crisis of 2008 resulted from a series of misguided policies, failures of regulation, and missed signals. Unfortunately, much of the conversation about regulatory reform since has revolved around ideas that would only extend and exacerbate all three.”

The problem with implementing a plan like this is it that it causes the R&R to feel like they are losing some of their control…their power. Furthermore, many people within the R&R have little confidence in financial markets…it does not fit within their worldview. This is why I ended up a recent post with this comment: “many politicians and certain economists don’t like the market system. Market performance often contradicts the world views held by these politicians and economists. And, that makes them angry”

In conclusion, I have very little confidence in a new round of stress tests and believe that ST2 will lead to ST3…and then ST4…and eventually ST(n) where n is any number you want to give it. To me the sign that an approach is not appropriate and will not be successful over time is that people continue to use the same system and attempt to make the system tougher and tougher. Their system never works because their worldview needs to be changed.

Hotshot Traders Leave Street

Jenny Strasburg captures the mood on Wall Street in her article in the Wall Street Journal this morning: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704515704575282982462922628.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.
“The competition is on to scoop up Wall Street traders and portfolio managers increasingly unnerved by the likelihood of sweeping new financial regulation.

Since political momentum began building earlier this year to limit trading for profit at Wall Street firms, traders have been exploring their options, and some have already left. Outside the banks, private investment funds looking for traders have been gearing up for a hot talent market.”

Economics works!

You change the incentives and people change…people move.

With the situation being more mobile than ever, with the technology more available and adaptable than ever, with the future more uncertain than ever…people…and the system…can change more rapidly and in more different directions than ever before.

And, that is what is happening!

This is one thing that Congress (and others) can’t seem to understand. Even after observing fifty years of the most dramatic financial innovation that has ever taken place in the world, the members of Congress seem to believe that they can “freeze” things, return to the past, and prevent the recent financial crisis from ever occurring again.

They also seem to think that the government is blameless from creating any incentives that might have a derogatory impact on the future that they want to create.

People in the Obama administration, as well as members of Congress, seem oblivious to the fact that over the last fifty years the United States government, Republicans and Democrats alike, produced a fiscal environment that created the incentives that led to a burst of innovative activity in the financial sector that produced massive changes in the way people did business and in the composition of the American economy. A brief picture of the environment.

From January 1961 through January 2009, the Gross Federal Debt of the United States rose at a compound annual rate of 7.7%. The monetized portion of the federal debt, the monetary base, rose at a compound rate of about 6.5% from January 1961 through August 2008, just before the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet exploded in response to the financial crisis that took place in the fall of 2008. The M2 money stock grew by more than a compound rate of 7.0% during the time period under review.

Thus, money and credit variables grew relatively in line with one another. Real GDP growth during this time was about a 3.4% compound rate of increase every year.

Prices, as measured by the Consumer Price Index and the GDP implicit price deflator, increased at a compound rate of about 4% during this time period resulting in a decline in the purchasing power of the dollar by around 85%. A 1961 dollar bill could only buy 15 cents worth of goods in 2008!

Inflation breeds financial innovation and the late 20th century with its relatively moderate, yet steady increase in prices, was a perfect environment for financial innovation!

The leader in financial innovation was the federal government itself, confirming what Niall Ferguson argues in his wonderful book, “The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World.” Ferguson claims that governments, historically, have been the primary financial innovator because of the need to fight wars. This, he continues, spilled over into the 20th century as governments needed to expand deficit financing to incorporate spending on social programs.

My guess is that in the next five to ten years we will see the biggest change in finance that we have ever seen and this change will be worldwide. I have written a little on this in a recent blog: “Changes Continue to Shakeup the Banking System”. See http://seekingalpha.com/article/200475-changes-continue-to-shake-up-the-banking-system.

The largest twenty-five banks in the United States, who control about two-thirds of U. S. banking assets in the country, are already changing their business. Again, they have already moved beyond what Congress and the administration are doing to regulate the banking system.

More important, foreign banks are changing the banking picture in the United States. Currently, foreign branches control about 11% of the total banking assets in the country. I have already stated that this will increase to 15% to 20% over the next five years or so. We see this expansion taking place before our eyes. Yesterday “China Finds a New Market for Loans: U. S.” (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703957604575273011917977450.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.) Today, “China Bank IPO, Possibly Biggest Ever, Set for July.” (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704875604575281690877047522.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.) And, don’t forget the sovereign wealth funds, huge accumulators of money.

The world of finance is changing because the incentives affecting finance are changing all over the world. I can’t even imagine what this world will look like with instantaneous trading, further ‘slicing and dicing’ of cash flows and other financial information, greater use of information theory to detect trading patterns (see my book review of “The Quants”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/188342-model-misbehavior-the-quants-how-a-new-breed-of-math-whizzes-conquered-wall-street-and-nearly-destroyed-it-by-scott-patterson), and more and more information markets popping up around the world (see Robert Shiller’s book “The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century”)!

In the field of Complexity Theory, researchers speak of times like this when systems go through the process they call “Emergence” and “Self-Organization.” It is during times like these that one structural system is transitioning into another structural system. The problem is that no one, before-the-fact, can predict how existing information systems combine with other information to produce the resulting system. Systems just “self-organize” and a new system “emerges” from what was formerly un-organized.

This appears to be what is happening now. The movement of “hotshot” traders is one piece of evidence of this. The restructuring of the big banks is another piece of evidence. The response of hedge funds to the Congressional threat to change how partners are paid is evidence of this. The changes in financial regulations around the world is evidence of this. The growth and increased aggressiveness of Chinese banks is evidence of this. And, so on and so forth.

Congress is just speeding this change along. However, they better be careful about what they wish for because my best guess is that what they get will be nothing like what they are planning for.

Mr. Volcker Speaks

Former Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker spoke yesterday at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. All week I had been hearing comments about this speech and how people seemed to be waiting for Volker’s remarks. Yet, this morning, there was only one report on the speech which appeared in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/business/31regulate.html?ref=business) and then it was buried at the bottom of page B6 of the business section.

It seems as if Volcker didn’t really say very much. In fact, the discussion of his remarks was combined with a discussion of the words of Robert Gibbs, the White House Press Secretary. The bottom line: it is highly likely that the United States will get a re-regulation package for its financial system this year. Gibbs even said that “the Senate might move on the legislation by the end of May”.

Just a couple of comments on the issues that were mentioned in this article.

First, the article states that the legislation to “overhaul the nation’s financial system…is intended to prevent a recurrence of the conditions that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the government bailouts that followed.”

If this is what the legislation is intended to do, we have already lost the battle. As I have stated over and over again, the problem with regulatory legislation is that it is always fighting the last war.

Let me state this as bluntly as possible: We will never have “a recurrence of the conditions that led to the 2008 financial crisis!”

Financial crises do not repeat themselves.

I do agree with Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff in their book “This Time is Different” that the buildup to a financial crisis is always accompanied by the cry of those riding the crest of the economic expansion that “This time is different!” This claim, however, refers to the belief of the perpetrators of the claim that no collapse will follow the buildup that they are going through.

When I say that financial crises do not repeat themselves I mean that the specific conditions preceding a financial collapse, the specific behavior of the financial institutions and the financial leaders, are always different from past collapses. There is new technology, new instruments, new institutional arrangements, and so forth. Things change significantly enough so that the new regulations put into effect at the end of the last financial collapse don’t quite apply to the conditions that exist before the next financial collapse.

This gets into my second point which addresses Volcker’s concern about the growth of the financial services industry relative to the growth in other sectors in the rest of the economy.

We are told that “Mr. Volcker was critical of the broad growth in the financial services industry in recent decades. Finance came to represent an ever-greater share of corporate profits, even as average earnings for most American workers did not rise.”

Volker is quoted as saying “The question that really jumps out for me is, given all that data, whether the enormous gains in the financial sector—in compensation and profits—reflect the relative contributions that sector has made to the growth of human welfare.”

The article continues, “He also asked whether the financial sector contributed to underlying imbalances in the economy, as Americans raided their savings and relied on a housing bubble to maintain excessively high consumptions levels.”

My response to this is that from 1961 through 2008, the purchasing power of the dollar declined by almost 85%. In this inflationary environment, many American families came to believe that the best way to “save” was to buy a house and watch the value of the house rise. In addition, they could further leverage the constantly rising value of their house to “maintain excessively high consumptions levels.”

Mr. Volcker, more than anyone else in the United States, recognized the problem created by the inflationary environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s and, during his tenure as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, fought inflation with all that the Fed could bring against this destructive dragon. He deserves major praise for what he accomplished at this time.

Still, over this 1961-2008 period, inflation was the major economic incentive in existence in the economy. By the end of the 1960s, commercial banks had innovated to the point that they became “liability managers” and created the ability to expand to any size that they wanted. This happened because the start of this inflationary period made it necessary for banks to have the flexibility to expand beyond the geographic and asset constraints that restricted their ability to compete.

In the early 1970s the mortgage-backed security was invented (by the government by-the-way) and in the middle 1980s the mortgage market became the largest component of the capital markets. As inflationary expectations rose and resulted in higher interest rates during this time, interest rate risk became more of an issue and the interest rate futures market was created.

Need I say more? Financial innovation thrived in the inflationary environment and, as a consequence, the financial industry grew! And, grew! And grew!

Did the “enormous gains in the financial sector reflect the relative contributions that sector has made to the growth in human welfare”? Did “the financial sector contribute to underlying imbalances in the economy”?

I think you know how I would answer both of these questions.

Another piece of the news this morning struck me. Citigroup is spinning off Primerica (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cef26d7c-3c41-11df-b316-00144feabdc0.html). Primerica was one of the first companies purchased by Sandy Weill in the late 1980s that became part of the financial conglomerate Citigroup. Everything about financial innovation and the relative growth of the financial services sector of the economy during this inflationary period is captured in Weill’s wild ride to the top as he constructed Citigroup piece by piece.

And, now we have the dismantling of Citigroup. Is this picture the icon of the new age of finance?

Higher capital requirements can contribute to sounder financial behavior. More disclosure and increased audit standards can also contribute to sounder financial behavior. Still, we cannot build a regulatory structure that will prevent a recurrence of financial crises whether based on the 2008 experience or the experience of some other time period. Furthermore, we cannot prevent greedy politicians from supporting policies that create an inflationary bias to the economy in order to get re-elected.

Regulation of the “bad guys” on Wall Street is popular now. However, it won’t prevent a volatile future.

The "Dodd" Financial Reform Bill

Well, there finally is a financial reform bill!

Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System seems to be back in the good graces of the political pros. So much for the independence of the Fed!

The only thing Bernanke seems unhappy about at the present time is that he would like to maintain more regulatory influence over banks that are less than $50 billion in asset size. Otherwise, he seems pretty satisfied.

The important thing is that the Fed and the Chairman of the Fed retain, or even increase, their power.

I have written on the future environment of bank regulation and so I don’t intend to go into that again at this time. This series began on January 25, 2010: see my “Financial Regulation in the Information Age: Part A” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/184153-financial-regulation-in-the-information-age-part-a) which was followed by Part B and Part C. Let me just say that I believe that the regulatory structure that Dodd and Congress is attempting to construct is aimed at “fighting the last war” and that the financial system, especially the part composed of large financial organizations, has already moved beyond what the politicians are fighting for. So, Congress is already behind the times.

Even more important, however, is the fact that the underlying cause of the growth in finance over the past fifty years or so, the financial innovation that took place, and the evolution of financial institutions into structures that are “too big to fail”, is not even being addressed. And, if this cause is not taken into account, any regulatory structure that Congress constructs will be doubly inadequate to handle the problems of the future.

Debt finance thrives in an inflationary environment! Need I mention again that what a dollar bill could purchase in January 1961 has declined to the point that a 2010 dollar could only buy less than twenty cents worth of the same goods and services today? The purchasing power of the dollar has declined by more than 80% since the early 1960s.

The inflationary environment that began in the early 1960s bore fruit by the early 1970s and only spread from there. The Gross Federal debt had increased by more than 40% during this time period, the largest peace-time increase in the government’s debt in history. Commercial banks had innovated to the extent that they could get-around any federal or state regulations that might limit their geographic or asset expansion by creating the ability to “manage liabilities” and hence grow to any size that they desired. The federal government had created a novel new financial innovation called the mortgage-backed security that would, in fifteen years or so, result in the mortgage market becoming the largest component of the capital markets in the world.

And, by August 1971, inflation became such a problem that President Nixon froze wages and prices in the United States and removed the dollar from the gold standard. In addition, Nixon appointed a Fed Chairman that underwrote his re-election and promoted the most expansive monetary growth in the post-World War II period to date. By the end of the 1970s decade, inflation was the number one problem in the United States. In 1978, Congress passed a second full employment bill that secured in law the “Keynesian” economic philosophy that the federal government had to achieve high levels of employment in the economy. And, as they say, with two short exceptions, the rest is history.

There is no better environment for debt and the creation of financial innovation than one that is grounded in inflation. With no constraint on the size of financial institutions, almost all of them became liability managers, banks and other financial organizations could grow and grow and grow. Where there were constraints, the environment was such that ways could be found around the constraints. And, since the constraints didn’t work in such an inflationary environment, the politicians and the regulators were even willing to remove or lessen the constraints that were still on the books. Good-bye Glass-Steagall.

Inflation, usually measured in terms of flow statistics like the Consumer Price Index, spilled over into the prices of assets, like common stocks, houses, and commercial real estate. The consumer inflation of the period before the 1990s became the “bubble” inflations of the 1990s and 2000s, and, the music continued to play.

My point is, of course, that no regulatory structure is going to withstand an economic environment in which the value of the currency declines by more than 80 percent over a period of fifty years. And, the last fifty years was a period in which the Information Age was just in its infancy. The major point in my series of posts on regulation that appeared in January was that the ability of financial institutions to innovate in the next fifty years is ever so much greater than it was in the past fifty years. Thus, the hope to “rein in” the financial system is like smoke that will just swiftly drift away into the atmosphere.

If Congress and the Obama administration want to keep a lid on the financial system they need to clean up their own house first. The attempts they are making to re-regulate this financial system, to me, are hopeless unless they abandon the fundamental philosophy that is the foundation for their economic policies. The “Keynesian” effort to keep employment at high levels in the short run hasn’t worked and it will not work in the future. The “Keynesian” effort to keep employment at high levels creates an inflationary bias in the economy. An inflationary bias produces an incentive to take on more and more debt and leverage oneself into the future. This bias is the engine that drives the excessive risk-taking that can come from accelerating financial innovation. This is story of what occurred over the past fifty years.

In conclusion, then, financial regulation is more than just controlling the behavior of “greedy” bankers!

The "Next Greece" Again

The New York Times business section carries the headline, “Traders Turn Attention to the Next Greece”: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/business/global/04bets.html?ref=business.

“Is Spain the next Greece? Or Italy? Or Portugal?”

Sounds vaguely similar to another article on the topic, my post of March 1, “Where is the Next Greece?”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/191242-where-is-the-next-greece. But, the subject is in the air these days.

The New York Times article wades into the issue of whether or not the “banks and hedge funds” should be doing what they are doing.

“Indeed, some banks and hedge funds have already begun to turn their attention to other indebted nations, particularly Portugal, Spain, Italy and, to a lesser degree, Ireland.” Aha, the PIIGS, of course without the G.

“The role of such traders has become increasingly controversial in Europe and the United States. The Justice Department’s antitrust division is now examining whether at least four hedge funds colluded on a bet against the euro last month.”

The same concern has been expressed over short sales.

Little concern was expressed about the debt policy of nations, states, municipalities, businesses and consumers when they were piling on massive amounts of debt to their balance sheets.

Of course, nations, and others, have good reasons for loading up with debt. It stimulates the economy and everyone wants prosperity and full employment. Well, don’t they?

Everyone wants businesses to prosper. Everyone wants everyone else to own their own home.

All good reasons for piling on debt.

But, when do “good intentions” spill over into “foolish behavior”?

And, in an environment where excessive amounts of credit are being pumped into the economy (thank you again Federal Reserve)n to spur on housing or some other “good”, shouldn’t it be expected that “extra-legal” means will be used to “get the credit out”.

But, when does serving “societal goals” become fraudulent and hurtful?

The problem in both cases is that there is a very blurry line between the “good” and the “bad”. On the upside, of course, emphasis is placed on the “good” being done, and the “bad” is alluded to but quickly dismissed. A common theme in such periods is that “Things are different now!”

On the other side, however, great pain takes place. One can certainly sympathize with those who live in Ireland, and Spain, and these other countries.

This, however, is just where “moral hazard” raises its ugly head. There is a downside to the excessive behavior of nations, states, and so on! There is pain on the other side of the pinnacle.
And, eventually the pain must be paid for. Bailing out those that used excessive amounts of debt just postpones the situation and usually leads people to behave just the way they did before the crisis. That is, the lesson learned is the one can behave badly and, if there is the threat of sufficient societal pain, little or no cost will be carried forward because of the previous un-disciplined behavior.

The problem is that those in power get mad at the bankers and the hedge funds and try to prohibit them in some way from moving against those private or public organizations that are financially weak. But, in doing so they are taking away a tool that can be used to enforce discipline on those who have lived excessively. The same applies to short selling.

We have seen behavior like that exhibited by the “banks and hedge funds” in the past. The last time these predators were called “shadowy international bankers”, many of whom were pictured as living in Switzerland. In that time the “ bankers” attacked the currencies of profligate nations. France, under the leadership of François Mitterrand, is perhaps the best known example of such a situation. Mitterrand, the socialist, had to pull back from his grand plans and became a believer in fiscal discipline and an independent central bank. Similar cases are on record.

It is disconcerting to see the increased efforts to reduce or eliminate financial tools that help to bring discipline to the market place. If these investment vehicles get punished or face harsh controls and regulations then the world is so much the worse for it.

Yes, I agree, at this stage it looks like the strong are kicking the weak member of the party. But, in these cases we forget that many benefitted greatly on the upside, particularly the politicians that promoted goals and objectives that were underwritten by the undisciplined use of debt. And, the central banks were prodigal in underwriting this credit inflation.

And, now the piper is calling in the debt.

It is a rule of life: those in power that create a given situation are often the most vocal opponents of those that respond to the consequences of what the powerful have created. If you create an inflationary environment fueled by excessive credit expansion then, sooner or later, the price must be paid.
Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, England, and others are now facing the downside of so many years of “good intentions.” Let’s not just blame, or punish, the “bankers and hedge funds” for creating the situation we now face

"Risk-taking at banks will soon be larger than ever"

A new report has been released by the Roosevelt Institute and has been announced by ABC News:
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/economists-warn-financial-us-economy/story?id=9990828. The chief economist of this institute is the Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz. Also, on the panel that produced the report is Elizabeth Warren of Harvard and head of the congressional group that is overseeing the spending of the TARP funds, Simon Johnson of MIT, Robert Johnson of the United Nations Commission of Experts on Finance and Peter Boone from the Centre for Economic Performance.

A major forecast of the report is that “Risk-taking at banks will soon be larger than ever.”

I am shocked!

Aren’t you?

In my view, risk-taking at commercial banks, big commercial banks, was going strong by the summer of last year. It has grown since.

Why?

Thank you Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve System!

Over the past year or so, we have seen the largest subsidization of the banking system in the history of the world!

No, I don’t mean the bailout money. I mean the money the banks have access to that costs less than 50 basis points!

There is, of course, a reason for the low interest rates. The small- and medium-sized banks in the country are is serious difficulty. See my posts, “The Struggles Continue for Commercial Banks,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/190191-the-struggles-continue-for-commercial-banks, and, “Reading Between the Lines on Bernanke’s Testimony,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/191159-reading-between-the-lines-on-bernanke-s-testimony. The concern here is that if the Fed began to remove reserves from the banking system, the great “undoing”, it would precipitate even more bank failures than are projected now, given the number of banks, 702, that are on the FDIC’s list of problem banks.

The large banks, however, the top twenty-five of which make up almost 60% of the commercial banking assets in the United States, are making out like bandits. And, why not when they can borrow for almost nothing and lend out at spreads of 350 basis points or so…risk free.

And, the dollar-trade continues to prosper internationally.

But, this is not regular bank lending, lending to businesses or consumers. Regular bank lending supports the expansion of the economy and employment of workers. That lending has been declining for months and it appears as if that lending will not pick up for many more months in the future.

The large banks were too big to fail and now the large banks produce huge profits because the Fed believes that the other 40% of the banking system is “too big” to fail.

And, what are these big banks doing?

I’m not sure that there is anyone else that knows the answer to this other than the banks themselves. I have said this over and over again beginning last summer. The big commercial banks are way beyond the regulatory system in terms of what they are doing, perhaps more so now than in normal times.

Regulation is ALWAYS behind the regulated. This is just a law of nature. The issue always is, how far behind the regulated are the regulators?

When I was in the Federal Reserve System, the estimate we used was that the Fed was about six months behind the commercial banks. The banks would try something to avoid regulations and the Fed would then have to find out what the banks were doing. Once the Fed found out they would then have to bring the “regs” up-to-date to close the loop-holes.

Last summer or so, I surmised that the commercial banks, after they had paid back the bailout money, moved ahead rapidly to take advantage of the subsidy they were receiving from the Federal Reserve in terms of exceedingly low interest rates. The subsequent profit explosion at the large banks seemed to justify my suspicions.

By the fall of 2009, I was convinced that these large banks were way ahead of the regulators in terms of what they were doing. For one, the regulators still had a financial crisis on their hands and were diverted from the “new” activity. Second, as is always the case, the politicians decided to fight the last war. Their battle cry: “We have got to stop the commercial banks from doing what they were doing.” Of course, that is why regulation is seldom very effective.

The Roosevelt Institute report calls for more financial reforms: re-regulate. Of course, Joe Stiglitz is one of the leaders in crying for new, more stringent regulation. Elizabeth Warren is there also. But, the picture I have just painted contains with it the conclusion that regulation never really is that effective because it is always behind the curve. However, if the rules and regulations are excessively restrictive then innovation and change may be delayed. (How long did it take to get the Glass-Steagall Act removed?)

In this world, the world of the Information Age, innovation and change is going to take place somewhere because, as I have said before, finance is just about 0s and 1s. (See my post “Financial Regulation is the Information Age,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/184153-financial-regulation-in-the-information-age-part-a.) My feeling is that regulation can delay but it cannot stop the changes the bankers want to make. If regulation delays the ability of commercial banks to innovate and change, the innovation and change will take place elsewhere in the world. And, funds will flow to where the innovation and change is taking place.

If the conclusion of this report is that “Risk-taking at banks will soon be larger than ever,” my question to the authors of this publication is: “Where have you been?”

Regulation and Information--Part C

The final point I would like to make in this series is that you cannot build and maintain a rigid financial regulatory system based on the achievement of specific outcomes if you insist on inflating the economy that includes this regulatory system and expect the regulated institutions to remain idle. This is the story of the last 50 years when the dollar lost 85% of its purchasing power. If the government creates an inflationary environment, financial institutions will not stand still, especially in this Age of Information.

Also, in my view, the United States government has injected large amounts of moral hazard into the economy and the financial markets over the past fifty years or so. And, the presence of this moral hazard has had a lot to do with the recent collapse of the financial markets and the economy.

Before going into this let me just say that I believe that almost everyone is greedy. I use the word greedy with all the bad things it conveys, because that is the word being tossed around so loosely these days. I do not believe, as the economist Joseph Stiglitz seems to, that the bankers of Wall Street are any more “morally bankrupt” than he is or any of the rest of us. We all are greedy and respond to the incentives that are placed before us. With that said, let’s now move on.

I want to concentrate on two specific areas in which the government has created moral hazard and helped to form the incentives that led to the bust of 2008. The first has to do with monetary policy and the second has to do with housing finance. Both have contributed to what I have called the credit inflation of the last 50 years.

A credit inflation occurs when the credit in an economy grows more rapidly than the economy itself or more rapidly than specific sectors in the economy. In the early part of the period under review, focus was primarily on consumer and wholesale price inflation. At this time, analysts were mainly concerned with money stock growth and the consumer price index or the GDP Deflator. Asset bubbles were not on the radar yet.

However, inflation creates the incentive to increase debt and as the amount of debt in the economy increases there is pressure on both financial and non-financial institutions to increase their financial leverage, to create a greater mismatch between the maturities of their assets and liabilities, and to take on riskier assets, to goose up returns. Credit creation thrives in an inflationary environment!

Inflation is good for credit and so the cumulative effect of a period of inflation is the creation of more debt! In the Age of Information, the incentive to create more debt is a license for financial innovation.

The dance began in the 1960s and, as former Citigroup CEO “Chuck” Prince so eloquently expressed it in the 2000s, if the music continues to play, you must continue to dance!

And, the enormous creation of credit spilled over into sectors other than consumer purchases creating a bubble here and a bubble there. The beauty about financial innovation in the Age of Information is that specific assets and specific asset markets don’t really matter because all that is being traded is information. The result: as “Chuck” Prince implied, the dance continued in the areas where the music was still playing. Credit flowed into the markets that had the most action so that you got one market “popping” at this time and another market “popping” at another time. And, innovations in new financial instruments and markets were created to help the music flow to all markets.

How does this scenario relate to monetary policy? Well, the monetary authorities acted in a very asymmetrical way. If markets seemed to be dropping, the Federal Reserve would come in and stop the fall. This was especially important if unemployment seemed to be impacted by the drop. The behavior became so predictable that it was given a name: the “Greenspan put.”

On the upside, the central bank attempted to maintain control of consumer price inflation, especially after the pain of the late 1970s and early 1980s, but believed that it could do nothing with respect to asset bubbles that inflated prices in various sub-markets, like housing.

The moral hazard that was created allowed prices to constantly rise for the Fed would always reflate the economy before there was any chance for prices to fall. And, consumers could only buy about 15 cents worth of goods and services in 2010 with what $1.00 could buy in January 1961. Also in asset markets like housing, prices rose and rose and rose during this period to the point where people were absolutely confident that housing prices could never fall. So, where are you going to place your bets after all this time which created the fundamental assumption that policymakers would continue the credit inflation indefinitely.

The other area where the government created moral hazard was in the housing market. To own your home is a big part of the “American Dream.” Owning your own home creates self-respect and stability. It is a great place to raise kids and it generates community. It produces good citizens.

So, anything that can be done to support home ownership in America is good!

The savings and loan industry was dedicated to financing homes. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was there to help people get mortgages for homes and played a huge role in home ownership for GIs returning home from World War II. But, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created to help mortgage finance and to make sure money flowed into the industry. Then the Department of Housing and Urban Development was created and help flowed through a myriad of programs to assist low-income families to own their own homes. And, then the mortgage-backed security was created and so on and so forth.

Ultimately, we got a great information age idea, the sub-prime loan. This program combines the drive to get home ownership to more and more individuals and families, often without the needed financial wherewithal, and credit inflation, because if housing prices never go down they must be going up. And, this allows people who cannot afford the down-payment on a house to earn that down-payment through the inflation of the price of their home. Oh, by-the-way, you can originate the loans and then get them packaged and securitized to sell to financial institutions in China or Sweden.

Isn’t the Age of Information great! If the government has anything to say about it, “No downside risk!”

Well, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac own most of the American mortgage market now and both are ‘bankrupt.’ The FHA is in deep, deep financial trouble. And, so are many banks and other financial institutions in the United States. And, the Treasury is going crazy trying to develop a program or programs that will help individuals and families stay out of foreclosure and lose their homes.

Bottom line: in the Age of Information, information spreads and spreads rapidly. Financial innovation will accelerate as we go forward for financial innovation will be applied to any area, regulated or not, that promises financial gain. Unfortunately, my guess is that the federal government and Congress will not have the discipline it needs to stop creating credit inflations and to keep from creating more and more moral hazard in the future. Consequently, the financial regulation that will be forthcoming will be backwards looking and, hence, will not prevent the next crisis.

Regulation and Information--Part B

In my previous post, “Regulation and Information—Part A” I argued that banking and finance has become nothing more than information, and in this Age of Information, money and finance have just become the movement of 0s and 1s. As a consequence, finance has gotten away from people and physical assets and paper money and other forms of wealth, like gold, and just become bits of information that can be “diced and sliced” every which way and that can be bought and sold worldwide.

This post, as promised, has to do with my ideas about the possibilities for the regulation of banking and financial institutions. I will post a Part C tomorrow.

First, I need to explain a little bit about where I am coming from. I call myself an “Information Libertarian”. I believe that history shows that information spreads and cannot be contained. Its spread can be slowed down for a while, by governments or religious bodies for example, but eventually the spread of information wins out. As an Information Libertarian, I believe that it is my responsibility to help speed along the spread of information and, where this spread is being contested or resisted, help to unlock the doors that is keeping information bottled up.

To me, information must see the light of day so that it can be tested, used, and lead to the discovery of more information. In this way false information, information not allowed to change, and other constraints on the problem solving and decision making capabilities of humans can be seen for what they are and transcended.

Rules and regulations in the past have tended to rely too much on what I would call “the achievement of outcomes” and not enough on the “process of how things are being done.”

Reliance on “outcomes” focuses upon the wrong things and is very expensive for those being regulated as well as for those that are doing the regulating. The reason: if there is sufficient incentive for the regulated to do the thing being regulated, it will get done in one way or another, in spite of the regulation. This was the essence of the quote by John Bogle, the founder and former chief executive officer of the Vanguard Group, in my post of January 19 (see http://seekingalpha.com/article/183203-bracing-for-new-banking-regulations). Bogle stated that “There are few regulations that smart, motivated, targets cannot evade.” This was a part of what I was attempting to say in Part A of my discussion of regulation and information: the means of evading regulations has become sophisticated and easier in this Age of Information.

Also the cost of regulating in such an environment has increased substantially. The talent and skill required, along with the necessary patience and persistence of the regulator has gone up exponentially. In my experience, the regulator is ALWAYS behind the industry in knowing and understanding what is going on. How far behind they are varies from situation to situation and is a constant concern. But, you can rest assured that the regulators are behind the regulated.

As I have written in previous posts, the big banks have once more jumped ahead of the regulators in the past year as these banking giants have gained strength. Nothing has helped them more than the subsidy the Federal Reserve has given them by maintaining short term interest rates at such low levels: the Fed has given them “the gift that keeps on giving.” Not only have these banks regained health, they have moved way ahead of the regulators who have been dealing with all the problem small- and medium-sized banks and the squabbles takikng place in Washington, D. C. over how the banks and other financial institutions should be regulated.

This is the problem of focusing on “outcomes.”

I have argued over and over in earlier posts that banks and other financial institutions need to be subject to greater openness and transparency. This is consistent with my views on the need for information to spread and is consistent with my views on what kind of regulation can achieve some degree of success. It is also consistent with the idea that laws and regulations should focus on “process” and not “outcomes.”

Making banks and other financial institutions open up their books and causing their operations to be more transparent is the only way that I can see, in this Age of Information, to effectively have some impact on the behavior of these organizations. Having to report accurately and often to not only the regulators but also to shareholders as well as the public in general is the only way to be able to have some impact on them over time. The idea is that if they can’t hide what they are doing they will be a little more careful about what actions they take.

I cannot buy the argument that financial institutions need to keep their information on customers or what they are doing proprietary for if they don’t their spreads will go away. We saw what a disaster this was in terms of Long Term Capital Management. To me, the running of a financial institution is like coaching a football team: everyone knows the plays; the winning team is usually the one that executes the best or is the luckiest. Everyone knew what Long Term Capital Management was doing and others mimicked them. When things went the wrong way everyone tried to exit at the same time. Sounds like the subprime mortgage market doesn’t it?

I have also been a constant proponent of “mark-to-market” accounting. Let me describe to you how I see this tool. Banks, and other financial institutions, take risks. In order to achieve a few more basis points return over competitors, executives have either taken on assets that are a little riskier than they did before, or, mismatch the maturities of assets and liabilities a little more than they did. Shouldn’t we the regulators, the investors, the depositors, the analysts know this?

They, the bankers, have taken the interest rate risk and the credit risk and should be held accountable. To me it is childish for the bankers to “cry foul” when the market goes against them saying that it is unfair to force them to recognize the mismatched position they have taken. They are the ones that took the risk, they should be held accountable for doing so. They get the credit when things go well. Shouldn’t they be called on the carpet when things go the other way? If you know you might get caught, should you go ahead and do something?

In this case, maybe the bankers need to present two sets of books. One set to show what the value of the assets are if they (the assets) are held to maturity. Another set of books to reflect actual market values. The crucial thing is that the current real position of the bank needs to be “owned” by those running the bank.

The point is that if a management doesn’t want the public and the regulators to know that they have taken excessive risks, then they shouldn’t take the excessive risks.

In the Age of Information, the probability that people will find out what you are doing, particularly if you have some prominence, is higher than before and is increasing every day. We have just seen what can happen when some prominent person lives a life all out of character with who people thought he was. And, the fall has been pretty substantial.

Again, if this person didn’t want us to find out about his extra-curricular activities, he shouldn’t have pursued them. Simple as that!

The objective in requiring openness and transparency in reporting financial data is to say to people “before the fact”: if you take on too much risk or run your business in a careless manner, we will call you out on it. The “we” stands for investors, depositors, or regulators. The financial position of a bank or a financial institution should be “out-in-the-open” in great detail and the analysis of investors and regulators should be shared. If the bankers know they may be exposed then maybe the banks will attack their problems sooner rather than later.