An Economic View from the Supply Side

As I have written before, the United States economy is recovering.  It may not be recovering as fast as some would like, but economic growth is positive.  Economic growth is not as rapid as some would like because there is still a massive debt overhang that must be eliminated, one way or another.

Furthermore, unemployment and under-employment are not dropping as fast as some would like.  The labor market is not improving with any speed because the economic policies of the last fifty years has resulted in a large amount of the United States manufacturing capacity being unused.  As physical capital is unused so is human capital.

Both of these situations took a long time to get to their present state and will take a long time to regain higher levels of economic growth, capacity utilization, and employment. 

The background for this situation can be examined from the following chart.

  This chart contains a graph of real Gross Domestic Product beginning in 1960 and ending in 2010.  I start with the year 1960 because that is the year before the United States government, both Democratic and Republican, introduced a “new” economic philosophy into its policy considerations, one that emphasized the inflation of credit throughout the economy. 

To me, the important thing about this chart is that real GDP is almost continuously rising.  Yes, there is a sizeable bump at the far right-hand side of the chart, and this is associated with the Great Recession, an apt title.  Otherwise, there are other little deviations from the upward trend, but these are relatively minor movements along the way.

This is where I take my stand with the economic growth proponents.  In the United States economy, growth is almost always positive.  The annual compound rate of growth for the period covered in the chart is 3.1 percent.  The annual compound growth rate of the United States economy, ending the calculation in 2007 (the Great Recession began in December 2007) the rate of growth rises to something around 3.25 percent.  But, growth is dependent upon the private sector, not directly on the government.    

I define credit inflation as a period in which the rate of growth of debt in the economy exceeds the rate of growth of the economy.  Over the past fifty years, the debt of the United States government has increased by more that a 7.0 percent annual compound rate of growth.  The debt of the private economy has risen in the range of 11.0 to 12.0 percent every year.  This meets my definition of credit inflation because these growth rates are far in excess of the rate of growth of the economy. During this period, the purchasing power of the dollar declined by about 85 percent.  In other words, a 1960s dollar could only buy 15 cents worth of goods and services today versus a dollar’s worth in 1960.

Side note on credit bubbles: when the annual compound rate of growth of the debt being created in a subsector of the economy exceeds the annual compound rate of growth of the economic growth of the subsector, a credit bubble can be said to exist.  The housing market bubble of the early 2000s fits this definition.

Credit inflation can have a detrimental impact on economic growth.  Credit inflation creates incentives that cause manufacturers to move away from the producing of goods and to move into the creation of finance.  Two examples of this are GE and GM: for example a couple of years ago GE was earning more than two-thirds of its profits from its finance wing.  In terms of the whole economy, there has been a huge swing over the past fifty years from the manufacturing sectors of the economy to the financial services sector of the economy.

Some of the consequences of this re-allocation of capital is that the employment of capital declined: capacity utilization is around 77 percent now relative to more than 90 percent in the 1960s.  Under-employment is over 20 percent now and was under 10 percent in the 1960s.  And, the income/wealth distribution is more skewed toward the wealthy than it was 50 years ago.

This has impacted economic growth.  For example, the annual compound rate of growth of real GDP has only been 2.5 percent over the past twenty years, down substantially from the rate of growth for the whole period.  Credit inflation, as an economic policy of the government, seems to have exactly the opposite impact on the economy that is desired by policy makers.

But the other important thing to notice in the chart is the “bumps in the road”.  In my opinion, all of these “bumps” resulted in some way from dislocations in the growth of credit instruments as a result of the monetary or fiscal policies of the United States government.  In most cases, the dislocations were relatively minor. However, as the debt load expanded and the private sector devoted more and more resources to financial services, the ability to carry the load grew greater and greater.

The debt burden cannot keep growing: it has to collapse sometime and along with it the economy.  In most cases the “bumps” were relatively minor.  I know it is never fun for anybody to be un-employed or under-employed, but in the aggregate sense, the “bumps” were not large. 

During the Great Recession and following, the “bumps” were much larger because the build-up of the debt dislocations were greater than ever.  However, since the debt burden must be worked off, it will take more time for the economy to achieve the longer run rates of growth that were achieved earlier in this fifty years of economy prosperity.  But, it will come. 

We must be aware of these dislocations and the things that must be done to re-structure the economy and get back to the economic growth performance we are looking for.  For example, we cannot ignore the state of the banking industry in this recovery. (See my post from last Friday: http://seekingalpha.com/article/295630-why-banks-aren-t-lending.)  Resolving the “bumps” just means that the previously created dislocations in finance and economics must be resolved.    

Struggling With A Great Contraction

Martin Wolf of the Financial Times recently returned from vacation.   It is interesting to see where this “top” economic commentator stands after taking off from his weekly writing for a full month. 

His view on his return: The major economies of the world are “Struggling with a great contraction.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/079ff1c6-d2f0-11e0-9aae-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Wbu6HxQ0) His concern is not with the possibility of a “double dip” recession, but with something more sustained.  He asks, “How much deeper and longer this recession or ‘contraction’ might become.  The point is that, by the second quarter of 2011, none of the six largest high-income economies had surpassed output levels reached before the crisis hit, in 2008.”  Hence, the great contraction.

The turmoil in financial markets that was seen in August, he contends, tells us, first, that “the debt-encumbered economies of the high income-countries remain extremely fragile”; second, “investors have next to no confidence in the ability of policymakers to resolve the difficulties”; and third, “in a time of high anxiety, investors prefer what are seen as the least risky assets, namely, the bonds of the most highly-rated governments, regardless of their defects, together with gold.”

A pretty succinct summary…what?

There is too much debt around which means that all the efforts that governments are making to get the economy moving again face the up-hill battle of over-coming the efforts people, businesses, and local and regional governments are making to reduce their debts. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/285172-when-debt-loads-become-too-large)

While national governments deal with their own excessive debt loads and deficits, their central banks have responded with undifferentiated policies to flood banks and financial markets with sufficient liquidity in order to provide time for banks, consumers, businesses, and local and regional governments to “work out” their positions as smoothly as possible. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/290416-quantitative-easing-theory-need-not-apply)

The hope seems to be that “time will heal all things.”

Whereas there is too much deb around, there is too little leadership.  I will quote Wolf on this: “In neither the US nor the eurozone, does the politician supposedly in charge—Barack Obama, the US president, and Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor—appear to be much more than a bystander of unfolding events.” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/285658-if-the-economy-is-a-football-game-we-need-new-strategies)

If there are no leaders, then policy decisions tend to be postponed as long possible, and then, when a result is finally forthcoming, the outcome is more like a camel, something that appears to be an inconsistent piecing together of incompatible parts.

And, this is supposed to produce confidence?  To quote Mr. Wolf again: “Those who fear deflation buy bonds; those that fear inflation buy gold; those who cannot decide buy both.” 

The point being that it is not a time to commit to the future, to invest in real assets or investments.  Hence, the economies of the “high-income” nations stagnate, unemployment remains excessive, and public confidence continues to be depressed.   

Such a general condition argues for a continuance of the economic malaise and not a more robust recovery any time soon.  Hence, the great contraction.

Mr. Wolf still has hope: “Yet all is not lost.  In particular the US and German governments retain substantial fiscal room for manoeuvre…the central banks have not used up their ammunition.”  

But, this hope is based on the existence that leadership in these governments will arise.  Policy makers will come to their senses: “The key, surely, is not to approach a situation as dangerous as this one within the boundaries of conventional thinking.”  

Therein lies the problem.  Mr. Wolf is looking for the hero to ride in on her/his white stallion and provide the leadership necessary to clean up the mess and get things going forward on the right path. 

He has just argued, however, that that leadership does not seem to exist.  So, where is the leadership going to come from?

With all the debt loads outstanding, just how much can be done to overcome the drag on the spending and the economy coming from the efforts of many to de-leverage. 

The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have flooded the world with liquidity.  Their effort here is to give banks, consumers, businesses, and governments time to work out their bad debts.  This also provides time for banks and others to fail, consolidate, and/or raise capital without causing major disruptions to the whole financial system. Banks in the United States continue to fail, banks in the US and Europe continue to consolidate, and banks in the US and Europe continue to raise capital. 

Since debt seems to be the major problem here, the only other major suggestion that has been made that could relieve the credit crisis is to relieve debtors of some of their debt burden.  This would mean that some parts of the debt would need to be written off.  Whereas many have suggested such a program, the difficulty of creating such a problem is in the details and no one seems to have come up with any acceptable details of such a program.  Some have suggested that inventing such a workable and just program of debt reduction is nearly impossible.

So, we are back to square one…there are no “good” options.  And, when there are no “good” options, potential leaders tend to disappear into the woodwork.  It is easy to “lead” when you can create credit without end and encourage everyone to own a house and attempt to guarantee people jobs for their lifetime.  But, real leaders are the ones that can stand up and lead when there are no good options.

It is just that few want to be “out front” when none of the options are nice and comfortable.      

The World Economy: A Time of Transition

It seems as if “Macro” forces are dominating movements in the financial markets these days. The latest call to attention of this fact is the article by Tom Lauricella and Gregory Zuckerman on the front page of the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704190704575489743387052652.html?mod=wsjproe_hps_TopLeftWhatsNews). The “big” picture appears to be driving things and not the performance of individual investment opportunities.

Specific attention is given to a statistic called “correlation” which measures “the tendency of investments to move together in a consistent way.”

The article reports that in the 2000-2006 period the correlation of stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index was 27%, on average. However, during the events that led up to the Iraq war, correlations were near 60%. At the height of the financial crisis, October 2008 to February 2009, correlations were around 80%. They were around 80% during the sovereign debt dislocations in Europe earlier this year. In mid-August correlations dropped to 74% and now reside in the 65%-70% range.

When the prices of many or most stocks move together, individual stock picking is not the optimal investment strategy. This is why many investors have been moving to mutual funds that focus more on “macro” issues rather than on individual companies.

One of the most interesting statements in the article was this: “Prior to the financial crisis, such high correlation levels were seen previously only during the Great Depression, according to data compiled by market-strategy firm Empirical Research Partners.”

I pick up on this statement because of my belief that we are going through a tremendous period of transition. The world is changing. And, it is changing in ways that we don’t fully comprehend. As a consequence, individual “bets” are extremely risky, much more risky than “bets” that tend to aggregate outcomes.

The period of the Great Depression represented another period of major transition. During the Great Recession of the 2000s people were constantly referring back to the 1930s for “lessons learned” with respect to monetary and fiscal policies that could be applied to the current situation so as to avoid falling into as deep a hole as occurred at the earlier time.

However, the major lesson we may have to learn from the era of the Great Depression is that economies have to go through transition periods as they move from one kind of societal structure to another. In many ways, the American economy, and much of the rest of the developed world, still operated on an agricultural foundation in the 1920s. Yes, the industrial base was developing, labor unions were coming into existence, and cities were coming to dominate the rural areas but, in many ways, agriculture still dominated economic policy making.

The government in the United States supported and subsidized the agriculture sector in a way that was unsustainable relative to the emerging industrial cities. When this unsustainable effort collapsed, the economy fell apart and the 1930s through the 1940s saw America restructure from a rural society to one where prosperity resided in the cities and suburbs.

During this transition, it was not easy to pick out winning investments because no one really knew what the future was going to look like. Thus, the correlations of stock prices were high because success depended more upon how the whole economy re-structured and, consequently, how the whole economy recovered.

I believe that there are strong parallels in this respect between the current situation and that which existed in the 1930s.

Whereas America supported the farms and farmers in an earlier age because farming was “the American Way,” in the post-World War II period America supported owning a home in or near cities because it was believed that owning a home was, more or less, the right of all Americans.

Now, something else is happening. The industrial base in the United States is deteriorating, capacity utilization is around 75%, underemployment of individuals of working age is around 25%, and income inequality has become quite large. Labor unions are becoming like the dinosaurs, their species is dying. Center cities do not seem to be the wave of the future as they once were seen. And, home ownership for everyone may not fit into the future of society.

The United States government supported and subsidized the housing industry for fifty years, putting GIs into homes after World War II, financing the suburbs, rehabbing the cities, and so forth. Well, the bubble burst, just like it did for the agricultural sector.

What’s next?

That’s the interesting thing about transitions…you never know exactly where they are going to end up.

There are lots of changes taking place. Before the 1930s, the Industrial Age began: the late 19th century was just the spectacular beginning although agricultural still dominated the scene. The late 20th century saw the beginnings of an Information Age even as the cities and industrial concerns remained in the headlines.

What will an Information Age look like? That is still up to the science fiction writers.

What I am sure of is that information will continue to spread and cause changes worldwide that we cannot even imagine at this point in time. Information markets are going to become ubiquitous and innovation with respect to “Information Goods” is going to extend far beyond the field of finance.

But, there are other changes taking place that are going to “rock” the world. One of these is the political makeup of the world. There is the rise of China and the other BRIC nations. Power collected in the G-7 has been transferred to the G-20. The IMF is changing and will have to change a lot more, moving from European and American dominance to include greater roles for South America and Africa. These changes are going to have massive impacts on the way things are going to get done.

Furthermore, the emerging markets seem to be the place to invest these days. The economies of the United States and western Europe are the sluggards as they go through their needed transitions. These emerging nations are now dealing with one another because the allocation of commodities in the world is crucial for the continued progress of these areas. All these movements are “macro” in nature.

As the transition takes place, the “old” is not going to work in the way it used to. Stock investing will be different, at least for a while. The “old” political philosophies are not going to be very effective as we are finding out in the United States and in western Europe. But, this is a part of the whole process. We must adjust and find out what works and what doesn’t work.

Those that try to force things back into the “old” boxes are not going to survive!

Federal Reserve Exit Watch: Part 12

This is the twelfth edition of the Federal Reserve Exit Watch. The first edition was posted in August 2009. The Great Recession, many contend, ended in July 2009 and, at that time, the major task of the Federal Reserve System appeared to be the task of reducing, as judiciously as possible, the massive amount of reserves that the central bank had put into the banking system to combat the threat that the Great Recession might turn into a second Great Depression.

On July 8, 2009 on the Fed’s balance sheet, total factors supplying reserve funds to the banking system totaled over $2.0 trillion, up from around $0.9 trillion one year earlier. It was September of 2008 when the liquidity crisis hit the financial system in the United States which resulted in the rapid injection of funds into the banking system to protect the system from a series of systemic failures. In July 2009, excess reserves in the banking system average around $750 billion.

The concern at that time was that all of these excess reserves in the banking system would eventually end up in the money stock and this would result in inflationary pressures threatening significant increases in consumer and asset prices.

One year later on July 7, 2010, total factors supplying funds to the banking system amounted to about $2.4 trillion. Excess reserves in the banking system totaled more the $1.0 trillion. Obviously, the Federal Reserve System did not remove reserves from the banking system during the past twelve months.

The reason given for not removing reserves from the banking system is that the economy has remained excessively weak: and the Federal Reserve will not start removing reserves from the banking system until the economy seems to be picking up momentum.

My belief has been that the health of the smaller banks in the banking system, those 8,000 or so banks that are smaller than the 25 largest banks, is still not good and the Fed will not begin to remove reserves from the banking system until these non-big banks get in much better shape. With about one in eight banks in the United States on the problem bank list of the FDIC, the banking system is a long ways from being healthy.

And, the Fed has promised that it will continue to keep its target interest rate close to zero “for an extended period” of time. That is, banks should not be afraid of rising short term interest rates any time soon. Many market analysts don’t expect short term interest rates to begin rising until after the start of 2011.

One crucial thing to understand about the operations of the Federal Reserve over the past 12 months is that the injection of funds into the banking system through the fall of 2008 and into the summer of 2009 consisted primarily of “innovative” efforts by the central bank to provide liquidity to specific parts of the money and capital markets. The reserves injected into the financial system were not anything like the classical operations of a central bank which mainly came from the sale or purchase of U. S. Treasury securities in the open market and discount window borrowings from the district Federal Reserve banks.

A major part of the exit strategy of the Fed related to the reduction in these “special” sources of funds and moving back into more traditional forms of central bank operations. Therefore, in the initial stages of the Fed’s exit strategy, efforts were directed at seeing the “special” sources of reserves decline as their needs receded and replacing the reduction in reserves with the purchase of securities from the open market.

The twist in this effort was that the Fed focused, not on the purchase of traditional source of open market securities, U. S. Treasury issues, but on acquiring a lot of mortgage-backed securities, up to $1.250 trillion worth, in order to provide support for the mortgage and housing markets, and on acquiring Federal Agency issues. On July 8, 2009, mortgage-backed securities on the books of the Federal Reserve System totaled about $462 billion. On July 9, 2010, this total reached $1.1 trillion. Federal Agency issues rose from around $98 billion on the earlier date to $165 billion on the latter date. U. S. Treasury securities rose as well, but only by about $104 billion.

Thus, in this 12-month period, total factors supplying reserve balances rose by $341 billion, and the amount of securities the Federal Reserve bought outright rose by $826 billion. The portfolio purchases replaced a lot of the “special” sources of funds supplied to the banking system by the Fed over the past ten months. This was an important part of the Fed’s exit strategy.

So, in the past 12-month period, the Fed actually increased the amount of excess reserves in the banking system. However, in the last 13-week period, excess reserves have actually fallen slightly. One could strongly argue that the decline in excess reserves has come more from operating factors rather than from any overt efforts to reduce bank reserves.

One cause for the reduction in excess reserves was the increase in U. S. Treasury deposits at the Federal Reserve in the Supplementary Financing Account. This is an account set up by the Treasury Department to specifically help the Fed drain reserves from the banking system. (See my post of April 19, 2010, “The Fed’s New Exit Strategy”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/199444-the-fed-s-new-exit-strategy.) During the past 13-week period this account rose by $50 billion, helping to bring down bank reserves. Other operating factors that drained reserves from the banking system was a $12 billion increase in currency in circulation. Also, reducing reserves was a decline in central bank liquidity swaps that fell by about $8 billion during this time period.

Over the past thirteen weeks, these factors draining reserves from the banking system was offset by about $50 billion in Fed acquisitions of mortgage-backed securities.

The net effect of all factors affecting reserve balances: a $50 billion decline in excess reserves.

Over the past four weeks Federal Reserve actions have remained relatively minor. Excess reserves in the banking system fell by about $19 billion, but this primarily resulted from operating transactions like the increase in currency in circulation and a rise in U. S. Treasury balances in the Treasury’s general account which is usually connected with tax receipts. So the last 4-week period can be considered to be uneventful.

One other thing we need to check in this analysis is the behavior of the M1 and M2 measures of the money stock. All that can be said here is that the growth rate of these two measures continues to be modest and actual growth rates have been achieved by people and businesses re-arranging assets rather than from commercial banks making loans. The year-over-year rate of growth of the M1 measure in June was about 6% while the M2 measure rose by only 1.6%.

Note that the non-M1 component of M2 grew by only 0.6% during this time period. This was because, small denomination time deposits at financial institutions have fallen by more than 22% over this time period and Retail Money Funds have dropped by more than 25%. All of these funds seem to have gone into demand deposits, other checkable deposits, and money market deposits, part of M1. This, as I have written before, is not a sign of health in the economy because people continue to transfer funds out of interest-bearing accounts and into forms of money that can be used for spending. This is a sign of desperation not of an improving economy.

A consequence of this has been that the required reserves at commercial banks have continued to rise so that the Federal Reserve must increase the total reserves in the banking system so as to keep excess reserves constant.

One other measure reflecting this shift in assets: monies in Institutional Money Funds have also fallen by 25% year-over-year.

The conclusion to this Exit Watch report is that the Federal Reserve HAS NOT YET started taking reserves from the banking system. That is, over the past year the Fed has not, if fact, exited. And, people and businesses in the aggregate still need to reduce their portfolios of invested funds in order to have money available for spending on their daily needs.

The Fed is "Pushing on a String"?

During economic times like these, economists say that the Federal Reserve is “pushing on a string”. That is, the central bank has pumped a large amount of reserves into the banking system, yet banks are not lending, and the money stock is not growing.

Excess reserves in the banking system total more than $1.0 billion. Bank loans on a year-over-year basis show a negative growth rate. And, the M2 measure of the money stock, year-over-year, is growing at a 1.6% annual rate.

The Fed’s actions are not getting transferred through the banking system to the real economy!

As a consequence, economic growth does not seem to be accelerating at the speed economists and governmental policy makers would like.

Yet, if one compares the Great Recession which we have just passed through with the second worst recession in the post-World War II period the recovery does not really look that bad.

What seems to be different is the rate of growth at which the economy was growing in 1978, between 5% and 7%, and the speed it was growing before 2008, around 3%. In addition, the economy rose out of the 1981-1982 recession accelerating into the 8% range. No one seems to be predicting that the United States economy will move into this latter range in the near future. Recovery is occurring, it is just not very robust.

Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke, testifying before the House Budget Committee yesterday spoke of the economy growing at a 3.5% rate “in the months ahead.” Economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal expect the economy to grow about 3% in the second half of 2010 and continue that pace into 2011. (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703890904575296403144025366.html#mod=todays_us_front_section.)
No one seems to believe that economic growth in 2010-2011 will match the recovery achieved in 1983-1984. The difference? Banks aren’t lending. Underemployment seems to be hanging at post-World War II highs, near 20%, and industry is operating at a capacity near post-World War II lows. On this see my post, http://seekingalpha.com/article/207148-breaking-down-the-u-s-economic-recovery. The economy was expanding before the Great Recession, but substantially below the post-World War II average of about 3.4%, year-over-year.

Real growth in the period 2005 to 2010.

The American economy has been showing some substantial dislocations and these are expected to persist as the recovery continues! These dislocations are not going to be corrected with short-term fiscal stimulus packages. And, so the economy will just scrape along.

Along with the factors already mentioned as reasons for why the economy has grown so slowly in the 2000s and why it might be expected to continue to grow slowly is the perception that the economy is bifurcating. That is, one side of America seems to be doing very well and another side is not doing so well at all. This may be due to the restructuring of the United States economy and the slow transition that is occurring getting us there.

For example, big banks seem to be doing very well, thank you, while banks smaller than the 25 largest banks seem to be struggling. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/209229-federal-reserve-exit-watch-part-11.) Foreclosures remain high and are expected to remain high as unemployment (and underemployment) remains high. Personal and small business bankruptcies have not dropped off. Legacy industries are still in the process of restructuring and are only modestly turning around while younger industries are growing very nicely. The economy of the early 2000s is different from that of the 1990s and before and we cannot go back. And, government shouldn’t force us to go back.

This restructuring is taking place in balance sheets as well as in the structure of the economy. People and businesses that have built up relatively large debt-burdens are restructuring their balance sheets. Consequently, debt liquidation is exceeding debt creation within the financial system and this is resulting in a contraction of bank loans. This is also contributing to the slow growth in money stock measures. This is why it seems as if the Federal Reserve is pushing on a string in terms of stimulating credit expansion.

Economic recovery is occurring, but it seems as if it will be modest and uneven throughout the economy. It also appears as if the economy is transitioning into something else, the Information Economy and not the Industrial Economy, and this will take time and patience. And, maybe we don’t want the banks to expand their lending too rapidly…given the $1.0 trillion in excess reserves in the banking system. Maybe.

The Recession Isn't Over Until It's Over

Yesterday, the members of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle Dating Committee refused to make a decision.

The questions: Is the Great Recession over or not?

The Answer: Too soon to call.

“The committee is very careful to guard against surprises,” the chairman of the committee Robert Hall stated. Since the designation of the end of a recession is important for historical reasons, the committee wants to make sure data revisions don’t result in the need to revise it’s claim that the recession is over.

To me, the crucial part of the comment here is the emphasis on “surprises.” We get into a liquidity crises because we are surprised. Something happens in the market, something that was not expected, like the financial difficulty of a firm that, say, had highly rated commercial paper which was now going to be down-graded. This down-grading then results in investors pulling back from the market because of a concern that the commercial paper of other highly rated firms will be down-graded. Buyers in the market take a vacation until confidence is re-gained in the information pertaining to these other highly rated firms.

A credit crises occurs when investors get concerned about the value of the assets on the books of a financial institution, something that had not been questioned before. This “surprise” is connected with the fact that the financial institution either did not recognize that the value of their assets had changed and so had not reported it to the market, or, the executives in the financial institution did not want to recognize that the value of their assets had changed and were attempting to keep this information to themselves hoping that this value would revert to earlier, healthier, levels.

“Surprises” generally occur when events, which had been heading in one direction, change direction. Like, when housing prices that had been rising decade after decade begin to fall. Or, when the Federal Reserve reverses monetary policy without notice after continually following a different path. Or, when the overly optimistic expectations given an industry, like the dot.com startups, are recognized as too optimistic.

“Surprises” hurt because people, investors, have to revise expectations and markets have to absorb the new information, dig for additional information relevant to current valuations, and then adjust as fully as possible to all of the new information.

That is why, at this stage of the economic drama, we hope that the problem areas where future surprises might arise have been identified and that people and institutions are working to resolve the difficulties in as orderly a fashion as possible. “Quiet is good!”

For example, we know that states and local governments are having problems with their finances. No apparent surprises here. People are working to resolve these situations, both locally and nationally. For example, we hear that Felix Rohatyn is back at Lazard Ltd., working on the problems related to state and local government finance. He has proposed “an IMF” to help American cities and states “stave off budget crises.” (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052702304506904575180363245274300.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing)
Greece is obtaining help. But, the problems of Spain, Italy, and Portugal are well known and efforts are underway to resolve the issues being faced by these countries.

The banking system does not seem to be out-of-the-woods yet, but banks have seemingly identified their problem areas and are working to resolve them. The FDIC continues to move in an orderly fashion to close those commercial banks that are insolvent. Again, quiet is good!
Here, the Federal Reserve seems to be playing an important role in helping the commercial banking industry to get back on its feet. Having injected a huge amount of reserves into the banking system and seeing these reserves hoarded by commercial banks to the tune of $1.1 trillion excess reserves, the Fed is being very careful not to “jerk” these reserves out of the banking system at too swift of a pace. The effort on the part of the Fed is not to “surprise” the banking system by removing the excess reserves too quickly in a fashion similar to the “surprise” 1937 Federal Reserve decision to raise reserve requirements to reduce the unused reserves in the banking system just sitting idly on the balance sheets of the banks.

And, other areas in the economy are seemingly being handled in a calm, orderly manner.

The Business Cycle Dating Committee does not want surprises. Well, I don’t want any surprises either! I want a dull, ordinary, business-as-usual environment for dealing with all we have to deal with.

My guess is that the recession is over. Markets, in general, seem to be reflecting this fact. Certainly there are areas of concern here and there and new data releases are not always positive. But, financial markets seem to be reflecting that the economy is improving, even if at a very slow pace.

My first inclination is to trust the markets. It doesn’t mean that markets are always correct, but one should look first to see what the markets are trying to tell us and then, only after sufficient study, should we claim that the markets might be wrong if we can justify this latter conclusion. Yes, I still believe in markets. But, like many other people, I am more cognizant of the existence of Black Swans in the world than I was at an earlier date. We can still be hit by “surprises” but, for now, things are moving in the right direction.

There are still longer run problems in the economy that need dealing with. I will not get into those now but interested people can go to two of my recent posts to pick up my thinking on this point: See http://seekingalpha.com/article/197948-economic-recovery-what-s-missing and http://seekingalpha.com/article/192713-the-trouble-with-recovery. The existence of these longer run issues do not negate the belief that the Great Recession seems to be over.

The real question of this blog post is, does it matter whether this committee makes a decision or not? Robert Gordon, a member of the committee, has stated that delaying the decision “raises unnecessary questions about the health of the economy—that the whole committee wouldn’t think the recovery is strong enough to be able to say that it’s a recovery.”

Personally, I don’t think the committee’s decision is that important! It certainly is not going to impact my business and investment decisions.

Note: the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has apparently already declared the end of the Great Recession. Check out all their charts. The grey area on the charts depicting the start of the recession begins in December 2007. The grey area on the chart, signaling the end of the recession, stops before the beginning of the third quarter of 2009. So much for that!

The Chances for a Double Dip

I believe that the probability that we will have a double dip in the economy, a second recession following on the Great Recession, is relatively small and growing smaller all of the time.

The reason that I would give for this is that economies only change directions when there is some kind of shock to expectations. To use the words of one famous pundit with respect to an uncertain future, we just don’t know when something will change with respect to an “unknown” unknown. Even in the cases of “known” unknowns, we know where a change might occur; we just don’t know the magnitude of the change.

A liquidity crisis occurs when something happens in a market, generally a financial market, and the buyers on the demand side of the market decide it is best if they just go out and play a round of golf until the market settles and they know where prices will stabilize. The job of the central bank is to provide liquidity to the market so as to achieve this stabilization of prices. The length of a liquidity crisis is usually no more than four weeks.

A credit crisis occurs when something happens in a market, generally a financial market, and the holders of assets must significantly write down the value of their assets. Banks and other financial organizations may go out of business during the credit crisis because they don’t have sufficient capital to cover all the write downs that must take place. The job of the central bank is to provide stability to the financial markets so that the financial institutions can take their charge-offs in an orderly fashion so as not to cause multiple bank failures. The length of a credit crisis can extend for several years as the financial institutions work off their problem loans and those organizations that have to close their doors do so with the least disruption to “business-as-usual.”

In both cases, something unexpected happens and expectations about asset prices have to be adjusted. Extreme danger exists as long as bankers and investors persist is retaining the old expectations about prices and fail to make the moves necessary to adjust their thinking to a more realistic assessment of the situation. However, as these bankers and investors adjust to the “new reality”, they become more conservative and risk-averse in their decision making and work hard to get asset prices into line with the new financial and economic environment they have to deal with.

As the adjustment to the “new reality” takes place, things remain precarious, but, as long as no new surprises come along, the process of re-structuring can continue to lessen the problem and even strengthen the recovery. This is the state in which the United States is in right now.

The thing that needs to be avoided is a “new surprise”. What this can be of course is “unknown”…an “unknown” unknown.

In the 1937-1938 depression, there was an “unknown” unknown in the form of a policy change at the Federal Reserve System that is credited with “shocking” the financial and economic system into the second depression of the 1930s. The shock here was an increase in the reserves the banking system was required to hold behind deposits in banks, an increase in reserve requirements. The argument given for the increase was that there were a lot of excess reserves in the banking system and for the Federal Reserve to be effective at all during the time, the excess reserves had to be removed: hence the increase in reserve requirements.

The problem was that the banks wanted the excess reserves and with the increase in reserve requirements the banks became even more conservative causing another massive decrease in the money stock. This, of course, has been given as a reason for the “double-dip” that took place in the 1930s.

There are, as is well known, a lot of excess reserves in the banking system at the present time, almost $1.2 trillion in excess reserves. The Federal Reserve knows that they are going to have to remove these reserves from the banking system at some time. Hence, it has developed an “exit” strategy.

Banks and investors know that the Federal Reserve is going to have to remove these reserves from the banking system at some time. How the Fed is going to accomplish its “undoing” is, of course, the big unknown!

The fact that these reserves are going to be removed from the banking system is a “known” unknown!

But, how and when the reduction in reserves is going to take place, not even the Fed knows. Bernanke and the Fed have worked hard to keep the banking system and the financial markets aware of the “undoing” so that although there are still many unknowns connected with this undoing, the fact that the “undoing” is going to be done is a “known.”

The effort here is to avoid a policy “shock” coming from the central bank as in the 1937-1938 experience.

There are a lot of things going on in other sectors of the economy and the world, but these all seem to fit into the category of “known” unknowns: like the problems in Greece and the other PIIGS, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain. There are the problems of states, California, New York, New Jersey, and so on, and municipalities, like Philadelphia and others, but these are also “known”.

There are over 700 commercial banks on the problem list of the FDIC. But these are “known” and are being worked off in an orderly and professional way that seems to be the model of the world. (See the article by Gillian Tett, “Practising the last rites for dying banks,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00b740a2-350e-11df-9cfb-00144feabdc0.html.) The FDIC closed seven banks last Friday bringing the total for the year to 33. This is right on my projection of closing at least 3 banks a week for the next 12 to 18 months.

And, what about the United States deficit? Well, I would contend that this is a “known” unknown as well. The deficits over the next ten years or so are projected to be in the range of $9-$10 trillion. I believe that they will be more around $15-$18 trillion, but that is just a minor difference. But, the deficits are “on-the-table” even if the amounts are not quite certain. The deficits will be large and this will be a problem, but they are not going to be a surprise.

This is one reason, I believe, why the Obama administration made the effort they did to talk about the budget deficits publically, particularly with regards to the health care initiative. They are talking about the budget, whether one agrees with their projections or not.

And, just the passage of the health care legislation, I believe, will change the temper of things. This thing has been done and I think just this fact will change the environment…for the better.

There are always “unknown” unknowns lurking. There could be a blow up in the Middle East leading to a full-scale war…or in the east. There could be a political move to boost the price of oil. There could be a lot of things. But, as far as the economy itself and the financial markets: I believe that things are being worked out and things will continue to improve. Thus, the probability of a Double Dip has lessened.

"Sharing the Pain: Dealing with Fiscal Deficits"

Over the past week or so, I have spent a lot of time on sovereign debt and the problems being faced by various nations across this planet with respect to their budget deficits. I suggest the article “Sharing the Pain” in the March 4, 2010 edition of The Economist as a good compilation of issues relating to the situation many countries are now facing. This piece is contained in the briefing, “Dealing with Fiscal Deficits,” http://www.economist.com/business-finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=15604130.

We can separate the discussion into three categories: the problem, the pain, and the pragmatic response.

First, the problem. History shows us that when economies slow down, budget deficits appear or widen. Revenue growth declines as the needs to increase outlays rises. Put this general movement on top of decades of undisciplined management of government budgets and you can get “one hell of a problem”

The Economist article states that “deficits in several countries have increased so much and so fast during the economic crisis of the past 18 months or so that it is generally agreed that remedial action will be needed in the medium term. Deficits of 10% or more of GDP cannot be sustained for long, especially when nervous markets drive up the cost of servicing the growing debt.” It continues, “when markets do lose confidence in a government’s fiscal rectitude, a crisis can arise quite quickly, forcing countries into painful political decisions.”

Second, the pain. History shows, according to Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard, that it is highly unlikely that the “rich countries” of the world will experience a burst of rapid and prolonged growth. “Sluggish growth is more likely” and “the evidence offers little support for the view that countries simply grow out of their debts.”

“So, short of debt default or implicit default via inflation, that leaves just two other ways of closing the deficit. Spending must be cut or taxpayers must pay more.” Hence the pain!

Here we can point to the situation in Greece where much of the effort to return some fiscal discipline to the country is falling on cuts in government wages and in social benefits. This has resulted in substantial personal retrenchment and civil unrest. Today we read of a second general strike in the nation that closed all public services. See, “New Strike Paralyzes Greece,” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/world/europe/12greece.html?ref=business.

The deficits are so large in most of the affected countries that minor adjustments to spending or taxes will have little or no impact. The budget adjustments that must be made are quite substantial: hence the depth and breadth of the pain.

In recessions that are relatively minor, government monetary and fiscal stimulus seems to restore economic growth, thereby rectifying the situation and minimizing the pain. But, in a recession of the magnitude of the Great Recession the government does not seem to be able to “buy” itself out of the trouble. Hence, the spread of the pain.

Furthermore, there is an added difficulty that enters the picture in the more extreme cases. Those that are more affected by the recession and by the adjustments that need to be made in government budgets may come to see the changes as a break in the “social contract” of the country. This government that saw to their welfare, put them to work, and sustained them through the minor crises of the past, now seems to be abandoning them. And, for whom? The international financial community!

Obviously, if we get into this state of affairs, the emotions can become quite high, as in Greece.

This leads us into the third category which has to do with what government can do in such situations. The problem with the situation brought on by large budget deficits and a growing national debt is that there are no good solutions. Anything the government does in an attempt to get the budget under control while encouraging the economy to recover hurts someone.

This is why governments must be very pragmatic in what they propose. Doctrinaire approaches just do not seem to work. There are only two suggestions from the historical perspective that seem to have borne some fruit in the past. The first is that there needs to be some “social cohesion” in the country to achieve some success in the effort to get the country’s budget under control. The second is that governments “should focus on spending cuts rather than tax increases.”

The article in The Economist points to two instances where successful government tightening has taken place in recent memory: Sweden and Canada. In both cases the crisis in the country became acute enough and the ruling governments acted in a sufficiently pragmatic way so that voters finally got behind the efforts. However, this social cohesion was not always achieved on the first attempt.

Some of the social cohesion can be gained by raising some taxes, especially on the “better off”. This may be the “quid pro quo” for the less well off to accept the other things that need to be done. The downside to this is always that the “better off” have more escape hatches that will allow them to avoid any imposition of taxes they feel are excessive. And, many countries in the past twenty years or so have built up reputations as “low tax havens” to attract business. Ireland, for example, lowered its corporate tax rate to just 12.5% and is very reluctant to increase this and harm the climate they benefitted so much from. If taxes go up on these people and businesses, they can be very mobile and move to less oppression environments. Also, tax evasion can be a huge problem especially against sales or value-added taxes.

So, the burden of fiscal tightening falls on the spending side but this is not an easy road either. And, when one looks at the “big” targets for cuts, good arguments for not making cuts abound. Military spending is not a major item in many countries needing budget cuts, but it is in the United States. Here, there are two wars being fought and the need to maintain the world’s “top” military machine and keep it current through research and development makes the budget almost non-touchable.

The next major item that comes up on the list to consider is government employment. Over the last 50-60 years, governments throughout the world have exploded in terms of providing employment. Over the last several years the rate of government hiring has gone up, especially in the United States, in an effort to deal with the financial crisis and the Great Recession. Is it realistic to think that governments will shrink in size or in terms of payroll expenses? This is where Greece and Ireland and Portugal and Spain have promised to do something. And, of course, this is where much of the civil unrest has come from.

Next, social programs, a huge item in many government budgets and the primary cause of the expansion of government budgets in the post World War II period. (For more on this see Niall Ferguson’s book “The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World.) The Economist suggests that one area that can be rationalized here is the pension system in these countries.
And, there are other ideas available.

The thing the article (implicitly) points out is that the way out of the fiscal dilemma is not easy. But, I suggest three further things that need to be considered. First, leadership. The countries facing the problems discussed here need to have someone out in front that is understood and trusted. The only way out of this situation is pragmatic: not progressive, not conservative, not liberal, not socialist, or any other dogmatic approach. But, to achieve the “social cohesion” necessary for success, there must be leaders that draw people together.

Second, the proposed solutions cannot just force people back into the way things were. One reason for the depth and breadth of the Great Recession is the changing structure of the society and culture. (For more on this see my post, http://seekingalpha.com/article/192713-the-trouble-with-recovery.) If this is true, then the leadership must be forward-looking rather than serving just entrenched interests.

Finally, this will not be easy. As The Economist article closes: “There are many battles over deficits to come. Well chosen policies that foster growth may make them less fierce. They may be bloody even so.” Amen.