On August 27, 2010, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke gave the world the first news about QE2. (See my post, “Bernanke in the Hole”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/222704-bernanke-in-the-hole.)
His explanation left something to be desired.
I had just made the comment:
"The Federal Reserve has two basic problems right now. First, those running the Fed don’t know what they are doing. Second, they are doing a terrible job explaining this to the world.
Never have I seen such confusion in such an important institution. Never have I seen such inadequate leadership.
We have experienced the end of the Fed’s exit strategy, the effort undertaken by the Fed to reduce the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. The exit strategy was designed to reduce the massive amounts of reserves pumped into the financial system by the Fed so that a period of hyper-inflation would not result. That exit strategy saw the Fed’s balance sheet grow by $331 billion over the twelve-month period the “exit” strategy was in place. Excess reserves held by the banking system rose by 38% during the same time period. (Details here.)"
Guess what?
Things really haven’t improved.
Guess what again?
The Fed is now going to hold a press conference on a regular basis, four times each year after selected meetings of the Fed’s Open Market Committee, the committee that sets monetary policy for the nation.
The purpose of these press conferences? To explain monetary policy to the nation and to make things “more clear” about what the Federal Reserve is trying to do.
This, to me, would be really funny if the Fed did not have such a crucial role to play in our lives.
Why don’t we just let Alvin and the Chipmunks sing four times a year after meetings of the Fed’s Open Market Committee?
Why does the banking system need $1.4 trillion in excess reserves?
In August 2010, the banking system averaged a little more than $1.0 trillion in excess reserves.
So, excess reserves have gone up about $400 billion.
Since August 25, 2010, two days before Bernanke’s Jackson Hole speech, the Fed has added a net of $520 billion of Treasury securities to its Treasury securities portfolio. The Fed’s portfolios of Federal Agency issues and Mortgage-backed securities has declined by $183 billion.
Thus, the Fed has added a “net” of $337 billion to its “total” securities holdings since just before the speech. This compares with the proposed “net” increase in Treasury purchases of $600
billion.
Overall, “Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks”, a proxy for excess reserves in the commercial banking system, has increased by $358 billion over this time period to $1.4 trillion.
So, operationally, the Federal Reserve has done exactly what it said it would do.
By the end of June, therefore, excess reserves in the banking system should be between $1.6 and $1.7 trillion.
And, bank loans? Usually when the Fed puts reserves into the banking system, bank loans increase.
Loan and leases at commercial banks in the United States has declined by roughly $130 billion during from the time from August to the early March.
Although Commercial and Industrial (business) loans have increased slightly (about $18 billion), Real Estate loans have dropped precipitously by almost $95 billion. Consumer loans have also decreased by a little more than $65 billion.
In the real estate area, the big drop has been in commercial real estate loans which fell by almost $75 billion. Revolving home equity loans declined by another $20 billion with residential loans remaining roughly constant on bank balance sheets.
Again, one can ask the question, why does the banking system need $1.4 trillion (going to $1.7 trillion?) in excess reserves?
In explaining the reasoning for “throwing so much spaghetti against the wall” we are told that the Fed is acting in this way to spur on economic growth.
Are four more press conferences per year going to throw any more light on the rationale for these Fed actions than we already have?
Let me just reiterate something I said in the early blog post: “Never have I seen such confusion in such an important institution. Never have I seen such inadequate leadership.”
My take on the story? See my March 24 post, “Banking and Real Estate Loans: the Problems are Still There” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/259867-banking-and-real-estate-the-problems-are-still-there). I believe that the banking statistics presented above capture a part of this story. I am not sure it justifies a banking system with $1.7 trillion of excess reserves. But, then, maybe those banks smaller than the 25 biggest banks in the country are more insolvent than I believe they are. But, the Fed isn’t telling us this and four more press conferences a year is not going to shine, in my mind, any more light on the issue.
Showing posts with label bank insolvency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bank insolvency. Show all posts
Friday, March 25, 2011
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
The World Debt Crisis Lingers
The Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and others, are all desperate to keep interest rates from rising. The debt overhang in the developed world is humongous and any substantial rise in interest rates would just exacerbate the financial crisis that hangs over Europe and America.
We observe the debt crisis all around us. Gretchen Morgenson writes in the Sunday New York Times about the need of commercial banks to write off billions of dollars of mortgage loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The article is “$2.6 Billion to Cover Bad Loans: It’s a Start,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09gret.html?_r=1&ref=fairgame). She writes, “Analysts in JPMorgan Chase’s own research unit published a report last fall stating that possible mortgage repurchase liabilities for the overall banking industry ranged from a best case of $20 bill to a worst case of $90 billion.”
The Financial Times reports that “US Regional Banks Set for Consolidation,” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2388dd24-1c27-11e0-9b56-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AjUYZy6X). The gist of this article is that commercial banks have about $1,500 billion in commercial real estate loans coming due over the next four years. People have been watching these loans for about 18 months now, but they have been kept “evergreen” as bank lenders have continually renewed these loans to keep them on the books till “something good happens.” The article list 15 regional banks that have loan portfolios consisting of, at least 38% of their loans in commercial real estate loans. Seven of these banks have more than 50% of their loans in commercial real estate. The smallest of these banks is $4.2 billion in asset size.
Many corporations in the United States and Europe still have massive debt loads that continue to increase. Several times a week there is more news about corporations facing bankruptcy. Yesterday, Sbarro announced that it was hiring bankruptcy lawyers (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704458204576074214100579944.html?mod=ITP_marketplace_0&mg=reno-wsj). Last week, the Philadelphia company Tastykake indicated that it was looking for someone to buy it because of the debt problems it was having.
Another article in the New York Times on Sunday reported on “The Crisis That Isn’t Going Away,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/business/global/08euro.html?scp=1&sq=the%20crisis%20that%20isn't%20going%20away&st=cse). This article was about a report produced by Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, who claims that debt restructuring in Greece, Ireland, and Spain is inevitable: “All bank and sovereign debt is now at risk…” European debt levels, he argues, are unsustainable.
This argument is re-enforced by the information contained in another article in the Financial Times, “Europe’s Woes Put Debt Restructuring Back on the Agenda,” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c25cc3e6-1cec-11e0-8c86-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AjUYZy6X).
Not only is the sovereign debt of Portugal currently under attack but Belgian bonds came under attack yesterday.
The debt estimates for 2013 are downright scary: Greece is expected to have its debt at 144% of GDP in 2013; Italy at 120%; Belgium at 106%; Ireland at 105%; Portugal at 92%; France at 90%; the UK at 86%; and Spain at 79%.
And, what about European banks? Check out the article “Fears Mount Over European Debt, Banks,” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c25cc3e6-1cec-11e0-8c86-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AjUYZy6X). European banks are expected to go through a new “stress” test this year, one that will be much tougher than the “joke” that was administered last year. There is great concern about how these European banks will fare in the new test.
And what about government debt in America? New governors are taking a tough stance on the budgets for the upcoming year. Jerry Brown is seeking $12.5 billion in spending cuts for the upcoming California budget. And, Andrew Cuomo in New York is asking for salary cuts of 10% and is seeking even more cuts elsewhere. The governor of Illinois is (seriously) hoping that the lame-duck legislature will pass a substantial tax increase on corporations before they leave. Still many states are in dire straits, hoping to avoid bankruptcy. And, there are dozens of municipal governments on the edge of declaring bankruptcy.
Oh, and what about the federal government: Have you seen the projections for interest expense going forward given the deficits that are expected in the future?
Now, what if long term interest rates were to rise by another 100 basis points? 150% basis points?
Just how much longer can the central bankers of the world keep long term interest rates below where the market believe they should be?
Research indicates that central bank actions can keep long term interest rates lower than market conditions warrant for a short period of time. However, to maintain the rates at below market levels, central banks must inject increasing amounts of money.
QE2 was announced as a policy decision to get the economy growing faster so that the unemployment rate would be brought down.
Yet, now we see what a farce the Fed has been playing on us. Chairman Bernanke, himself, just told Congress that the unemployment rate was not going to improve much at all, even if the economy picks up speed, and that it would take five to six years for the unemployment rate to even show much of a decline.
So, one can conclude from this that QE2 is not really aimed at getting the unemployment rate down.
I have argued for a long time that the reason the Fed was providing the financial markets with so much liquidity was because of all the insolvent banks “out there”. The Fed was helping to keep banks “open” so that the FDIC could close all the banks that needed closing in an orderly fashion.
I believe that investors are coming to realize that the Fed is not trying to keep rates down in order to spur on the economy. To me, this realization contributed to the fact that the yield on 10-year Treasury securities rose by about 100 basis points after the Fed laid out its plans for QE2. The financial markets just rebounded to levels that more closely approximated where the market should be if the Fed were not “messing” with it.
Bottom line: the debt problem is still real. There is a lot of debt “out there” and the value of this debt is not really the economic value of the debt. The central banks of the world are just trying to keep long term interest rates low in order to push off the day when the debt will have to be written down to a more realistic value. The problem is that more and more attention is being paid to the fact that this debt needs to be written down. And, until this write-down takes place, we cannot really recover, economically.
We observe the debt crisis all around us. Gretchen Morgenson writes in the Sunday New York Times about the need of commercial banks to write off billions of dollars of mortgage loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The article is “$2.6 Billion to Cover Bad Loans: It’s a Start,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09gret.html?_r=1&ref=fairgame). She writes, “Analysts in JPMorgan Chase’s own research unit published a report last fall stating that possible mortgage repurchase liabilities for the overall banking industry ranged from a best case of $20 bill to a worst case of $90 billion.”
The Financial Times reports that “US Regional Banks Set for Consolidation,” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2388dd24-1c27-11e0-9b56-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AjUYZy6X). The gist of this article is that commercial banks have about $1,500 billion in commercial real estate loans coming due over the next four years. People have been watching these loans for about 18 months now, but they have been kept “evergreen” as bank lenders have continually renewed these loans to keep them on the books till “something good happens.” The article list 15 regional banks that have loan portfolios consisting of, at least 38% of their loans in commercial real estate loans. Seven of these banks have more than 50% of their loans in commercial real estate. The smallest of these banks is $4.2 billion in asset size.
Many corporations in the United States and Europe still have massive debt loads that continue to increase. Several times a week there is more news about corporations facing bankruptcy. Yesterday, Sbarro announced that it was hiring bankruptcy lawyers (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704458204576074214100579944.html?mod=ITP_marketplace_0&mg=reno-wsj). Last week, the Philadelphia company Tastykake indicated that it was looking for someone to buy it because of the debt problems it was having.
Another article in the New York Times on Sunday reported on “The Crisis That Isn’t Going Away,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/business/global/08euro.html?scp=1&sq=the%20crisis%20that%20isn't%20going%20away&st=cse). This article was about a report produced by Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, who claims that debt restructuring in Greece, Ireland, and Spain is inevitable: “All bank and sovereign debt is now at risk…” European debt levels, he argues, are unsustainable.
This argument is re-enforced by the information contained in another article in the Financial Times, “Europe’s Woes Put Debt Restructuring Back on the Agenda,” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c25cc3e6-1cec-11e0-8c86-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AjUYZy6X).
Not only is the sovereign debt of Portugal currently under attack but Belgian bonds came under attack yesterday.
The debt estimates for 2013 are downright scary: Greece is expected to have its debt at 144% of GDP in 2013; Italy at 120%; Belgium at 106%; Ireland at 105%; Portugal at 92%; France at 90%; the UK at 86%; and Spain at 79%.
And, what about European banks? Check out the article “Fears Mount Over European Debt, Banks,” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c25cc3e6-1cec-11e0-8c86-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AjUYZy6X). European banks are expected to go through a new “stress” test this year, one that will be much tougher than the “joke” that was administered last year. There is great concern about how these European banks will fare in the new test.
And what about government debt in America? New governors are taking a tough stance on the budgets for the upcoming year. Jerry Brown is seeking $12.5 billion in spending cuts for the upcoming California budget. And, Andrew Cuomo in New York is asking for salary cuts of 10% and is seeking even more cuts elsewhere. The governor of Illinois is (seriously) hoping that the lame-duck legislature will pass a substantial tax increase on corporations before they leave. Still many states are in dire straits, hoping to avoid bankruptcy. And, there are dozens of municipal governments on the edge of declaring bankruptcy.
Oh, and what about the federal government: Have you seen the projections for interest expense going forward given the deficits that are expected in the future?
Now, what if long term interest rates were to rise by another 100 basis points? 150% basis points?
Just how much longer can the central bankers of the world keep long term interest rates below where the market believe they should be?
Research indicates that central bank actions can keep long term interest rates lower than market conditions warrant for a short period of time. However, to maintain the rates at below market levels, central banks must inject increasing amounts of money.
QE2 was announced as a policy decision to get the economy growing faster so that the unemployment rate would be brought down.
Yet, now we see what a farce the Fed has been playing on us. Chairman Bernanke, himself, just told Congress that the unemployment rate was not going to improve much at all, even if the economy picks up speed, and that it would take five to six years for the unemployment rate to even show much of a decline.
So, one can conclude from this that QE2 is not really aimed at getting the unemployment rate down.
I have argued for a long time that the reason the Fed was providing the financial markets with so much liquidity was because of all the insolvent banks “out there”. The Fed was helping to keep banks “open” so that the FDIC could close all the banks that needed closing in an orderly fashion.
I believe that investors are coming to realize that the Fed is not trying to keep rates down in order to spur on the economy. To me, this realization contributed to the fact that the yield on 10-year Treasury securities rose by about 100 basis points after the Fed laid out its plans for QE2. The financial markets just rebounded to levels that more closely approximated where the market should be if the Fed were not “messing” with it.
Bottom line: the debt problem is still real. There is a lot of debt “out there” and the value of this debt is not really the economic value of the debt. The central banks of the world are just trying to keep long term interest rates low in order to push off the day when the debt will have to be written down to a more realistic value. The problem is that more and more attention is being paid to the fact that this debt needs to be written down. And, until this write-down takes place, we cannot really recover, economically.
Thursday, May 13, 2010
Government Deficits and Economic Activity
Something is different this time. There is high unemployment, about 10% in the United States, and the politicians are crying that the political issue is jobs, jobs, jobs.
The resultant policy should be to increase government spending and increase fiscal deficits. Right?
Doesn’t seem to be.
What’s going on?
The international financial community is in charge this time and they are exerting their will.
The international financial community is doing very well, thank you! Central banks have subsidized the big financial institutions and big financial players with their “Quantitative Easing.” These large institutions have plenty of money and so they are not running scared. And, this money can appear and disappear all over the world without being controlled. And, they are using the money. See “The Banks’ Perfect Quarter” at http://seekingalpha.com/article/204617-the-banks-perfect-quarter.
In the past, the big institutions like JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America and so on would have to wait until the Federal Reserve eased monetary policy by providing the financial markets with sufficient liquidity. Then their performance would begin to increase as the economic recovery progressed. But, even then, they never reached the heights that they are attaining now.
In addition, as the Federal Reserve began to stimulate the economy, it kept interest rates in line. That is, the Fed kept interest rates low, but did not let interest rate spreads get excessively “out-of-line” because that might cause the Fed to lose the sense of the financial markets they were operating within. The idea was to loosen but keep the market “taut” so that it could continue to monitor where market pressures were coming from.
The concept of “taut” came from sailing: if I am sailing a boat and I have a small craft attached to the boat with a rope, the idea is to keep the rope “taut” but not too “tight” or not too “loose.” The reason being is that if the rope is “taut” you know where the small craft is. If the rope is too “loose” you do not know where the small craft is; if the rope is too “tight” the rope can snap if the small craft is subject to another force. You want the rope attachment to maintain just the right amount of pressure, so that you know where the small boat is but not too tight so that the small boat breaks away from your ship and you lose it.
But, keeping money markets taut did not provide many trading opportunities, at least, not trading opportunities like the ones that exist today.
Today large financial institutions, internationally, are facing a bonanza market for raking in huge profits. The central banks have provided them with this opportunity to trade and it is almost risk free. And, the central banks have let the markets know that this situation will exist for an extended period of time! Wow!
Putting this in prospective, however, we see that the European Union and the governments of the U. K. and the U. S. have, over the past 50 years, created an inflationary environment that has created massive financial institutions that thrive on trading, not on what was formerly known as banking. These governmental institutions have, themselves, led the move toward financial innovation through the creations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and the Mortgage-backed securities. These were not private sector initiatives.
The incentives that existed in this world of credit inflation promoted trading and arbitrage and further innovation. Forget the fact that the profits that come from trading activities is a “zero-sum” game in which there is someone that loses exactly what someone else wins.
Trading worked for the “big guys” and they learned how to do it very well.
That is exactly what is going on right now. The large, international financial interests are scouring the world in search of “targets”. And, no one is a better target than a government that has lived way beyond its means for many years. But, governments like these are crying “foul” because they feel they are being taken advantage of even though they were the ones that got their country in the position it is in through long periods of undisciplined, profligate behavior.
What is different this time is that these huge, financial giants are being subsidized by the central banks and they are traveling the world to use what has been given them.
I believe that we will look back on this time and say that the Obama Administration was perhaps the largest contributor to an unequal distribution of income the world has seen.
How can I say this? Well, we are seeing a major bifurcation of the world today, more so than the one that existed relative to the Bush 43 tax cuts. Major amounts of wealth are being created in most major financial markets. And, the traders love volatility. These people are getting everything they want and need. So are other many firms in other areas or sectors of the market.
But, those unemployed are not building up their wealth, and those people who are underemployed are not building up their wealth, and those individuals that are foreclosed on are not building up their wealth, and the small businesses that are going into bankruptcy or cannot get a loan from their local bank are not building up their wealth.
Seems a little unfair, doesn’t it?
The Federal Reserve states that it is keeping interest rates low, waiting for the economic pickup to spread into the distressed sectors of the economy. The longer the Fed holds to this stance and explains it’s reasoning in terms recovering economic growth, the longer I look for other reasons for such a policy.
My conclusion: there are many banks that are smaller than the biggest 25 that are in deep trouble. In addition, there are many businesses that are in deep trouble that might even put these “less than giant” banks in more trouble. Also, the Fed quickly encouraged the European Central Bank to move to “Quantitative Easing” and then supported this move by re-opening the swap arrangements the Fed had with other central banks. The rumor is that this re-opening of the swap window will postpone even further the “extended period” of time that the Fed will keep its target for the Federal Funds rate at its current level. Seems like we have a massive “solvency problem” in the world and not just in the United States.
What is different now? Large financial institutions around the world have enormous amounts of funds they can deal in and excessively large interest rates spreads to work with and large amounts of market volatility to trade off of and a promise by the central banks that interest rate risk will not be a problem. Given this ammunition, governments that are or have been undisciplined in running their fiscal affairs, are “sitting ducks” for these traders.
So governments are being forced to reduce spending and not increase it, to reduce deficits and not increase them. To get re-elected politicians may want to focus on jobs, jobs, jobs and health care programs and other social welfare initiatives. However, they may not be able to do that this time!
The resultant policy should be to increase government spending and increase fiscal deficits. Right?
Doesn’t seem to be.
What’s going on?
The international financial community is in charge this time and they are exerting their will.
The international financial community is doing very well, thank you! Central banks have subsidized the big financial institutions and big financial players with their “Quantitative Easing.” These large institutions have plenty of money and so they are not running scared. And, this money can appear and disappear all over the world without being controlled. And, they are using the money. See “The Banks’ Perfect Quarter” at http://seekingalpha.com/article/204617-the-banks-perfect-quarter.
In the past, the big institutions like JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America and so on would have to wait until the Federal Reserve eased monetary policy by providing the financial markets with sufficient liquidity. Then their performance would begin to increase as the economic recovery progressed. But, even then, they never reached the heights that they are attaining now.
In addition, as the Federal Reserve began to stimulate the economy, it kept interest rates in line. That is, the Fed kept interest rates low, but did not let interest rate spreads get excessively “out-of-line” because that might cause the Fed to lose the sense of the financial markets they were operating within. The idea was to loosen but keep the market “taut” so that it could continue to monitor where market pressures were coming from.
The concept of “taut” came from sailing: if I am sailing a boat and I have a small craft attached to the boat with a rope, the idea is to keep the rope “taut” but not too “tight” or not too “loose.” The reason being is that if the rope is “taut” you know where the small craft is. If the rope is too “loose” you do not know where the small craft is; if the rope is too “tight” the rope can snap if the small craft is subject to another force. You want the rope attachment to maintain just the right amount of pressure, so that you know where the small boat is but not too tight so that the small boat breaks away from your ship and you lose it.
But, keeping money markets taut did not provide many trading opportunities, at least, not trading opportunities like the ones that exist today.
Today large financial institutions, internationally, are facing a bonanza market for raking in huge profits. The central banks have provided them with this opportunity to trade and it is almost risk free. And, the central banks have let the markets know that this situation will exist for an extended period of time! Wow!
Putting this in prospective, however, we see that the European Union and the governments of the U. K. and the U. S. have, over the past 50 years, created an inflationary environment that has created massive financial institutions that thrive on trading, not on what was formerly known as banking. These governmental institutions have, themselves, led the move toward financial innovation through the creations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and the Mortgage-backed securities. These were not private sector initiatives.
The incentives that existed in this world of credit inflation promoted trading and arbitrage and further innovation. Forget the fact that the profits that come from trading activities is a “zero-sum” game in which there is someone that loses exactly what someone else wins.
Trading worked for the “big guys” and they learned how to do it very well.
That is exactly what is going on right now. The large, international financial interests are scouring the world in search of “targets”. And, no one is a better target than a government that has lived way beyond its means for many years. But, governments like these are crying “foul” because they feel they are being taken advantage of even though they were the ones that got their country in the position it is in through long periods of undisciplined, profligate behavior.
What is different this time is that these huge, financial giants are being subsidized by the central banks and they are traveling the world to use what has been given them.
I believe that we will look back on this time and say that the Obama Administration was perhaps the largest contributor to an unequal distribution of income the world has seen.
How can I say this? Well, we are seeing a major bifurcation of the world today, more so than the one that existed relative to the Bush 43 tax cuts. Major amounts of wealth are being created in most major financial markets. And, the traders love volatility. These people are getting everything they want and need. So are other many firms in other areas or sectors of the market.
But, those unemployed are not building up their wealth, and those people who are underemployed are not building up their wealth, and those individuals that are foreclosed on are not building up their wealth, and the small businesses that are going into bankruptcy or cannot get a loan from their local bank are not building up their wealth.
Seems a little unfair, doesn’t it?
The Federal Reserve states that it is keeping interest rates low, waiting for the economic pickup to spread into the distressed sectors of the economy. The longer the Fed holds to this stance and explains it’s reasoning in terms recovering economic growth, the longer I look for other reasons for such a policy.
My conclusion: there are many banks that are smaller than the biggest 25 that are in deep trouble. In addition, there are many businesses that are in deep trouble that might even put these “less than giant” banks in more trouble. Also, the Fed quickly encouraged the European Central Bank to move to “Quantitative Easing” and then supported this move by re-opening the swap arrangements the Fed had with other central banks. The rumor is that this re-opening of the swap window will postpone even further the “extended period” of time that the Fed will keep its target for the Federal Funds rate at its current level. Seems like we have a massive “solvency problem” in the world and not just in the United States.
What is different now? Large financial institutions around the world have enormous amounts of funds they can deal in and excessively large interest rates spreads to work with and large amounts of market volatility to trade off of and a promise by the central banks that interest rate risk will not be a problem. Given this ammunition, governments that are or have been undisciplined in running their fiscal affairs, are “sitting ducks” for these traders.
So governments are being forced to reduce spending and not increase it, to reduce deficits and not increase them. To get re-elected politicians may want to focus on jobs, jobs, jobs and health care programs and other social welfare initiatives. However, they may not be able to do that this time!
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Small Bank Loan Problems
A set of findings that will be released today by the Congressional Oversight Panel which oversees the TARP effort highlights exactly the problem I have been focusing on for the past year. The problem is the health of small- and medium-sized banks.
“Nearly 3,000 small U. S. banks could be forced to dramatically curtail their lending because of losses on commercial real-estate loans.” This from the article by Carrick Mollenkamp and Maurice Tamman in the Wall Street Journal, “TARP Panel: Small Banks are Facing Loan Woes.” (http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB20001424052748703455804575057851154035196-lMyQjAyMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.html).
Elizabeth Warren, who heads the TARP oversight panel is quoted as saying, “The banks that are on the front lines of small-business lending are about to get hit by a tidal wave of commercial-loan failures.”
My question is, why has it taken so long for this concern to surface at this level? This is vital information!
There are just over 8,000 in the United States. This means that from one-third to two-fifths of our banks face serious troubles with regards to their commercial loan portfolio, let alone any other problems they might face in their loan portfolios.
At the end of the third quarter, the FDIC had 552 banks on their list of problem banks. We will not get the report on the number of banks on the problem list for the end of the fourth quarter until later this month. The number of problem banks was expected to rise this year anyway before this information came out, but this is certainly not good news.
The rough rule of thumb is that one-third of the banks on the problem list can be expected to fail, and, using the third quarter figures, this means that two to three banks will fail each week for the next twelve to eighteen months. So far this year, we are roughly on track with this pace.
There are two problems here. First, the number of failing banks. The deposits and loans of these banks have to be absorbed into the banking system and this represents a de-leveraging of banks and the banking system that is consistent with the de-leveraging that is going on in the rest of the economic system.
Secondly, and this is what the Wall Street Journal focuses on, is that this atmosphere is not conducive to an expansion of loans. Whereas most of the big banks, (remember that the top 25 banks in the country have over 50% of the bank assets in this country) have become very active again, the small- to medium-sized banks do not have neither the resources nor the markets to pick up their lending or deal-making activity.
Unless you have worked in a smaller bank, you don’t realize the effort and the commitment of resources that is needed to work with troubled-lenders, especially if a substantial part of your portfolio is in loans that are having problems. You have neither the will nor the means to give much of your attention to making new loans.
Furthermore, even if you are not a part of the 3,000 banks facing a large amount of loan problems, why should you be lending much now? First of all, if you seem to be surviving, you are probably very, very thankful that you are not in the same position of these other banks and are feeling a great deal of relief. Yes, relief, but you are still wary, because the whole thing is not over yet.
Second, and I know this from my experience in turning around banks, if you don’t make a loan, that loan cannot go bad on you. The probability of this is 100%. That’s about as close to certainty that you can get in these very uncertain times.
The other side of this is something that I have said this many times before in these posts. The good news is that things seem to be pretty quiet on the banking front. Let’s hope that this quiet continues. Quiet is good, because it can mean that the bad and the not-so-bad situations are being worked out. And, if the economy continues to improve, some of the bad situations will become not-so-bad situations and some of the not-so-bad situations will actually become acceptable situations.
So, keep your fingers crossed.
This whole situation is further evidence of the extent that credit inflation enveloped the United States (as well as the world). In a credit inflation, it pays to go further and further into debt and to make more and more loans. At least, as long as the credit inflation can continue.
The leveraging and the moves to riskier assets usually begins with the larger institutions and then works its way through the economy. In most situations, the smaller institutions are the last ones to really follow the increased exposure that has been taken on by larger banks. However, more and more people and institutions succumb to the environment the longer the credit inflation continues. But, the increased risk taking does spread throughout the economy.
When the credit inflation stops, then de-leveraging must take place and this can be a long, slow process. And, again, the smaller institutions tend to trail the larger institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that the small- and medium-sized banks are still dealing with these problems even though the larger institutions have moved on.
Unless, of course, the government is able to “goose up” credit inflation again and eliminate the need to de-leverage.
The extent of the problem relating to “loan woes” is still substantial. The existence of this problem will weigh on the officials in the Federal Reserve System because a tightening of credit will just exacerbate the existing fragility of the banking system. The Fed does not want its “undoing” of the excessive amount of excess reserves in the banking system to be the “undoing” of the commercial banking system, itself.
The commercial banking system has always been a part of any economic recovery in United States history. It is hard to see how much of a recovery is possible if the commercial banking system, this time around, is “frozen”. At least for the small- and medium-sized banks.
Guess the loans to small- and medium-sized businesses will just have to come from the government!
(Please accept this last statement as being ironic!)
“Nearly 3,000 small U. S. banks could be forced to dramatically curtail their lending because of losses on commercial real-estate loans.” This from the article by Carrick Mollenkamp and Maurice Tamman in the Wall Street Journal, “TARP Panel: Small Banks are Facing Loan Woes.” (http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB20001424052748703455804575057851154035196-lMyQjAyMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.html).
Elizabeth Warren, who heads the TARP oversight panel is quoted as saying, “The banks that are on the front lines of small-business lending are about to get hit by a tidal wave of commercial-loan failures.”
My question is, why has it taken so long for this concern to surface at this level? This is vital information!
There are just over 8,000 in the United States. This means that from one-third to two-fifths of our banks face serious troubles with regards to their commercial loan portfolio, let alone any other problems they might face in their loan portfolios.
At the end of the third quarter, the FDIC had 552 banks on their list of problem banks. We will not get the report on the number of banks on the problem list for the end of the fourth quarter until later this month. The number of problem banks was expected to rise this year anyway before this information came out, but this is certainly not good news.
The rough rule of thumb is that one-third of the banks on the problem list can be expected to fail, and, using the third quarter figures, this means that two to three banks will fail each week for the next twelve to eighteen months. So far this year, we are roughly on track with this pace.
There are two problems here. First, the number of failing banks. The deposits and loans of these banks have to be absorbed into the banking system and this represents a de-leveraging of banks and the banking system that is consistent with the de-leveraging that is going on in the rest of the economic system.
Secondly, and this is what the Wall Street Journal focuses on, is that this atmosphere is not conducive to an expansion of loans. Whereas most of the big banks, (remember that the top 25 banks in the country have over 50% of the bank assets in this country) have become very active again, the small- to medium-sized banks do not have neither the resources nor the markets to pick up their lending or deal-making activity.
Unless you have worked in a smaller bank, you don’t realize the effort and the commitment of resources that is needed to work with troubled-lenders, especially if a substantial part of your portfolio is in loans that are having problems. You have neither the will nor the means to give much of your attention to making new loans.
Furthermore, even if you are not a part of the 3,000 banks facing a large amount of loan problems, why should you be lending much now? First of all, if you seem to be surviving, you are probably very, very thankful that you are not in the same position of these other banks and are feeling a great deal of relief. Yes, relief, but you are still wary, because the whole thing is not over yet.
Second, and I know this from my experience in turning around banks, if you don’t make a loan, that loan cannot go bad on you. The probability of this is 100%. That’s about as close to certainty that you can get in these very uncertain times.
The other side of this is something that I have said this many times before in these posts. The good news is that things seem to be pretty quiet on the banking front. Let’s hope that this quiet continues. Quiet is good, because it can mean that the bad and the not-so-bad situations are being worked out. And, if the economy continues to improve, some of the bad situations will become not-so-bad situations and some of the not-so-bad situations will actually become acceptable situations.
So, keep your fingers crossed.
This whole situation is further evidence of the extent that credit inflation enveloped the United States (as well as the world). In a credit inflation, it pays to go further and further into debt and to make more and more loans. At least, as long as the credit inflation can continue.
The leveraging and the moves to riskier assets usually begins with the larger institutions and then works its way through the economy. In most situations, the smaller institutions are the last ones to really follow the increased exposure that has been taken on by larger banks. However, more and more people and institutions succumb to the environment the longer the credit inflation continues. But, the increased risk taking does spread throughout the economy.
When the credit inflation stops, then de-leveraging must take place and this can be a long, slow process. And, again, the smaller institutions tend to trail the larger institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that the small- and medium-sized banks are still dealing with these problems even though the larger institutions have moved on.
Unless, of course, the government is able to “goose up” credit inflation again and eliminate the need to de-leverage.
The extent of the problem relating to “loan woes” is still substantial. The existence of this problem will weigh on the officials in the Federal Reserve System because a tightening of credit will just exacerbate the existing fragility of the banking system. The Fed does not want its “undoing” of the excessive amount of excess reserves in the banking system to be the “undoing” of the commercial banking system, itself.
The commercial banking system has always been a part of any economic recovery in United States history. It is hard to see how much of a recovery is possible if the commercial banking system, this time around, is “frozen”. At least for the small- and medium-sized banks.
Guess the loans to small- and medium-sized businesses will just have to come from the government!
(Please accept this last statement as being ironic!)
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Bank Asset Values are a Lingering Problem
Is the recession over? Has the economic recovery begun? Will there be a double-dip recession?
The picture is fuzzy and one reason the picture is fuzzy is because so many banks and other financial institutions, investors, and regulators either don’t seem to have a good grasp of the value of many of the assets on the balance sheets of these banks and other financial institutions or because they are unwilling to confess what the asset values are.
Look at some of the recent articles that have been in the news this week. “Insurers’ Biggest Writedowns May be yet to Come” by Jonathan Weil, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=a8itsmbfm9qc. “Disclose the Fair Value of Complex Securities” by Robert Kaplan, Robert Merton and Scott Richard, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7eb082d6-8b8e-11de-9f50-00144feabdc0.html. “Citigroup’s Asset Guarantees to be Audited by TARP” by Bradley Keoun and Mark Pittman, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiWZXE5RKSCc. “We Need Daily Data to Get Credit Markets Working Again” by Richard Field, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a9f2906-8d20-11de-a540-00144feabdc0.html.
All of these articles have to do with financial institutions knowing and reporting, as well as possible and as often as possible, the current value of their assets. The managements of financial institutions claim that this will inhibit their actions and force them into decisions that are not in the best interest of their institutions or the financial markets. These managements are wrong!
We are hung up right now because we don’t know the value of those assets either because the banks don’t know what the value of those assets are or the banks are not revealing what the value of those assets are.
I believe that we would face less uncertainty now and may have even avoided a good deal of the financial collapse of the last two years if these financial institutions would have been required to regularly report the fair value of their assets and responded more rapidly to changing market conditions.
Even better, it would have been a sign of outstanding management and real leadership if the banks themselves had been more open and transparent with the financial community, rather than require regulation to force them to release this information.
Alas, this didn’t happen.
This whole dilemma, to me, comes under the “No Free Lunch” argument.
Bankers mismatch the maturities of their assets and liabilities and take advantage of the positive slope to the yield curve. But, in doing so they take on more interest rate risk. Financial markets move against them and the price of the longer term assets decline. Whoops! The benefit the bank got by taking on the extra interest rate risk has backfired. Well, nothing comes for free!
Bankers add riskier loans to their loan portfolio or buy riskier securities to increase their yield. But, in so doing they take on more credit risk. The economy slows down and now these loans or securities face a larger default rate than the bankers had anticipated. Whoops! The benefit the bank got by taking on the extra credit risk has backfired. Well, nothing comes for free!
Financial institutions leverage up their balance sheets in order to squeeze out additional return on their equity position. But, in so doing they take on more financial risk. As assets prices go down the increased leverage backfires and their solvency comes into question. Whoops!
Bankers can’t get something for nothing. And, they can’t hide behind accounting rules in an effort to wait things out until times get better. As Kaplan, Merton, and Richard argue, banks typically fail to act when markets move against the risky positions they have taken and chalk the situation up to “unusual market conditions” or to “just a bump in the road”. And, if economic declines are relatively short and relatively shallow maybe they can get away with waiting the problem assets out. But, in deeper and longer periods of economic and financial dislocation they get trapped in their own failure to act. The asset values do not return to previous levels and the longer they wait to act on the existing problems the worse the situation on their balance sheet becomes.
Richard Field argues, in the article cited above, that banking and credit markets are having problems, not because the loans and securities on the books of the financial institutions are complex, but because they are opaque. This lack of clarity has helped to get us into the current crises and will continue to plague the recovery if it is not corrected. This lack of clarity allows bankers to continue to postpone action, it prevents investors from knowing the value of their investments, and it hinders regulators from in their efforts to understand the true condition of the financial institutions they are regulating.
As I have mentioned in previous posts, I have been involved in several successful bank turnarounds. One of the first things you have to do in turning around a bank is determine the value of your assets and you have to be brutally honest about what the values are. And, in going through this process, in every turnaround I was involved in, it becomes clear that the previous management failed to accept the fact that the value of their assets had declined, they continued to hope that the “unusual market conditions” would pass, and, consequently, by failing to act, the condition of the assets got worse and worse.
Good managements are not afraid of the truth and they are not afraid of releasing that information to the public!
Unfortunately, it is likely that the opaqueness with regard to the value of bank assets will continue.
The picture is fuzzy and one reason the picture is fuzzy is because so many banks and other financial institutions, investors, and regulators either don’t seem to have a good grasp of the value of many of the assets on the balance sheets of these banks and other financial institutions or because they are unwilling to confess what the asset values are.
Look at some of the recent articles that have been in the news this week. “Insurers’ Biggest Writedowns May be yet to Come” by Jonathan Weil, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=a8itsmbfm9qc. “Disclose the Fair Value of Complex Securities” by Robert Kaplan, Robert Merton and Scott Richard, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7eb082d6-8b8e-11de-9f50-00144feabdc0.html. “Citigroup’s Asset Guarantees to be Audited by TARP” by Bradley Keoun and Mark Pittman, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiWZXE5RKSCc. “We Need Daily Data to Get Credit Markets Working Again” by Richard Field, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a9f2906-8d20-11de-a540-00144feabdc0.html.
All of these articles have to do with financial institutions knowing and reporting, as well as possible and as often as possible, the current value of their assets. The managements of financial institutions claim that this will inhibit their actions and force them into decisions that are not in the best interest of their institutions or the financial markets. These managements are wrong!
We are hung up right now because we don’t know the value of those assets either because the banks don’t know what the value of those assets are or the banks are not revealing what the value of those assets are.
I believe that we would face less uncertainty now and may have even avoided a good deal of the financial collapse of the last two years if these financial institutions would have been required to regularly report the fair value of their assets and responded more rapidly to changing market conditions.
Even better, it would have been a sign of outstanding management and real leadership if the banks themselves had been more open and transparent with the financial community, rather than require regulation to force them to release this information.
Alas, this didn’t happen.
This whole dilemma, to me, comes under the “No Free Lunch” argument.
Bankers mismatch the maturities of their assets and liabilities and take advantage of the positive slope to the yield curve. But, in doing so they take on more interest rate risk. Financial markets move against them and the price of the longer term assets decline. Whoops! The benefit the bank got by taking on the extra interest rate risk has backfired. Well, nothing comes for free!
Bankers add riskier loans to their loan portfolio or buy riskier securities to increase their yield. But, in so doing they take on more credit risk. The economy slows down and now these loans or securities face a larger default rate than the bankers had anticipated. Whoops! The benefit the bank got by taking on the extra credit risk has backfired. Well, nothing comes for free!
Financial institutions leverage up their balance sheets in order to squeeze out additional return on their equity position. But, in so doing they take on more financial risk. As assets prices go down the increased leverage backfires and their solvency comes into question. Whoops!
Bankers can’t get something for nothing. And, they can’t hide behind accounting rules in an effort to wait things out until times get better. As Kaplan, Merton, and Richard argue, banks typically fail to act when markets move against the risky positions they have taken and chalk the situation up to “unusual market conditions” or to “just a bump in the road”. And, if economic declines are relatively short and relatively shallow maybe they can get away with waiting the problem assets out. But, in deeper and longer periods of economic and financial dislocation they get trapped in their own failure to act. The asset values do not return to previous levels and the longer they wait to act on the existing problems the worse the situation on their balance sheet becomes.
Richard Field argues, in the article cited above, that banking and credit markets are having problems, not because the loans and securities on the books of the financial institutions are complex, but because they are opaque. This lack of clarity has helped to get us into the current crises and will continue to plague the recovery if it is not corrected. This lack of clarity allows bankers to continue to postpone action, it prevents investors from knowing the value of their investments, and it hinders regulators from in their efforts to understand the true condition of the financial institutions they are regulating.
As I have mentioned in previous posts, I have been involved in several successful bank turnarounds. One of the first things you have to do in turning around a bank is determine the value of your assets and you have to be brutally honest about what the values are. And, in going through this process, in every turnaround I was involved in, it becomes clear that the previous management failed to accept the fact that the value of their assets had declined, they continued to hope that the “unusual market conditions” would pass, and, consequently, by failing to act, the condition of the assets got worse and worse.
Good managements are not afraid of the truth and they are not afraid of releasing that information to the public!
Unfortunately, it is likely that the opaqueness with regard to the value of bank assets will continue.
Thursday, July 16, 2009
The State of the Banking System
There are three preliminary indicators that the banking system is coming along on its way to recovery. First, there is the “letting go” of CIT Group, Inc. The government must feel that it does not need to extend itself to help out this institution given its present troubles. (See my recent post on the CIT situation: http://seekingalpha.com/article/148730-cit-s-debt-issues-show-why-the-economy-won-t-be-picking-up-any-time-soon.) We’ll see if they continue this approach with other troubled institutions as additional situations arise.
Second, there is evidence that the regulators are taking a harder line at Bank of America and Citigroup. Each has its own problems, but the Feds seem to believe that they can step up their demands on these two financial institutions concerning boards, managements, business affairs, and so forth. They would not do this if they believed the system to be too fragile.
Third, I sense the Federal Reserve backing off from the more aggressive stance it took with respect to the bond markets one to two months ago. This is just a feeling that I will be following up on in the near future.
These actions provide some preliminary evidence that we are in the “working out” stage of the credit cycle where time is the biggest factor to contend with. Bailouts are needed to prevent “liquidity” problems when markets might crumble under cumulative selling pressures. But, this is a short run problem.
The “work out” phase of a financial crisis is the period when institutions still have severe credit problems but are not under short term pressures to relieve their balance sheets of “toxic” or “underwater” assets.
This does not mean that there will not be more failures of financial institutions and some of them may be relatively large ones. What it does mean is that the problems that still exist within the financial sector can be handled in a relatively orderly fashion. So, the banks and the regulators can operate within an environment that does not seem “desperate.” Severely troubled still, but not in a state of panic.
Within this scenario, the questions that remain about the banking system relate to earnings. We have seen Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase & Co. post strong gains for the second quarter. However, most of the gains were attributed to trading activities, with secondary help from their underwriting business. These are not good, solid “banking” results. And, these organizations are highly diversified and can post returns from these areas, something that most other banks in the United States cannot do.
Still, the banking system seems to be in the stage of recovery where current cash flows can allow the individual banks to write off more and more of their loans and other assets over time and thereby restore the integrity of their balance sheets. With the results it achieved in trading and underwriting, JPMorgan Chase was able to take large write downs of home equity loans, mortgage defaults, and credit card charge offs while also increasing the amount of funds it set aside to increase its loan loss reserve. This is what other banks will be doing to reduce the burden of bad assets they are now carrying.
Overall, Total Assets in the commercial banking system grew by 8.9% from June 2008 to June 2009. The capital residual (Assets less Liabilities) in the system grew by 7.6% so that the capital asset ratio of the banking system dropped from 10.2% to 10.1%.
In terms of how the banks are attempting to protect themselves, the Cash assets of Commercial Banks in the United States were up 186%, year-over-year, in June 2009, although this rate of increase is down from a year-over-year rate of increase of 236% increase in May 2009.
Total Loans and Leases in the banking system rose just about 1.4%, year-over-year, in June while Commercial and Industrial Loans actually decreased by 3.1%. Commercial banks are just not lending to businesses which continues the trend which began last year. Banks are lending to consumers, up 5.5% year-over-year (primarily on credit cards and other revolving credit plans), and on real estate, up 6.4% year-over-year (the largest jump coming in revolving home equity loans).
The cash assets held in the commercial banking system declined regularly throughout June as the peak in cash assets held was reached in May. Thus, it appears that banks are backing off from taking everything the Federal Reserve has put into the banking system and stashing it away in “cash accounts”. This is confirmed by the aggregate banking data put out by the Federal Reserve which indicates that total reserves in the banking system dropped throughout June 2009 and the excess reserves also fell from peak levels reached in late May.
Thus, it appears that things are working out pretty much as the Fed hoped they would. (See my explanation of what the Fed has been trying to do, http://seekingalpha.com/article/145913-is-treasury-s-tarp-debt-already-monetized-part-ii.) Of course, the game is not over yet!
Bottom line: the banking system is working through its problems. The Federal Reserve and the regulators seem to be backing off a little, allowing the system to adjust over time to its dislocations. There is still room for a surprise, but, the more time passes, the less likely a surprise is likely to occur. In other words, the unknown unknowns have been substantially reduced and the known unknowns are what we are working on.
The banks are not lending except on established credit lines (credit cards and home equity loans) and there appears to be plenty of liquidity in the system as a whole. Whereas the lack of lending slows up the possibility for an economic recovery, it is an essential component of getting the banking system healthy again which is needed if there is to be any chance of a robust economic recovery in our future.
Second, there is evidence that the regulators are taking a harder line at Bank of America and Citigroup. Each has its own problems, but the Feds seem to believe that they can step up their demands on these two financial institutions concerning boards, managements, business affairs, and so forth. They would not do this if they believed the system to be too fragile.
Third, I sense the Federal Reserve backing off from the more aggressive stance it took with respect to the bond markets one to two months ago. This is just a feeling that I will be following up on in the near future.
These actions provide some preliminary evidence that we are in the “working out” stage of the credit cycle where time is the biggest factor to contend with. Bailouts are needed to prevent “liquidity” problems when markets might crumble under cumulative selling pressures. But, this is a short run problem.
The “work out” phase of a financial crisis is the period when institutions still have severe credit problems but are not under short term pressures to relieve their balance sheets of “toxic” or “underwater” assets.
This does not mean that there will not be more failures of financial institutions and some of them may be relatively large ones. What it does mean is that the problems that still exist within the financial sector can be handled in a relatively orderly fashion. So, the banks and the regulators can operate within an environment that does not seem “desperate.” Severely troubled still, but not in a state of panic.
Within this scenario, the questions that remain about the banking system relate to earnings. We have seen Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase & Co. post strong gains for the second quarter. However, most of the gains were attributed to trading activities, with secondary help from their underwriting business. These are not good, solid “banking” results. And, these organizations are highly diversified and can post returns from these areas, something that most other banks in the United States cannot do.
Still, the banking system seems to be in the stage of recovery where current cash flows can allow the individual banks to write off more and more of their loans and other assets over time and thereby restore the integrity of their balance sheets. With the results it achieved in trading and underwriting, JPMorgan Chase was able to take large write downs of home equity loans, mortgage defaults, and credit card charge offs while also increasing the amount of funds it set aside to increase its loan loss reserve. This is what other banks will be doing to reduce the burden of bad assets they are now carrying.
Overall, Total Assets in the commercial banking system grew by 8.9% from June 2008 to June 2009. The capital residual (Assets less Liabilities) in the system grew by 7.6% so that the capital asset ratio of the banking system dropped from 10.2% to 10.1%.
In terms of how the banks are attempting to protect themselves, the Cash assets of Commercial Banks in the United States were up 186%, year-over-year, in June 2009, although this rate of increase is down from a year-over-year rate of increase of 236% increase in May 2009.
Total Loans and Leases in the banking system rose just about 1.4%, year-over-year, in June while Commercial and Industrial Loans actually decreased by 3.1%. Commercial banks are just not lending to businesses which continues the trend which began last year. Banks are lending to consumers, up 5.5% year-over-year (primarily on credit cards and other revolving credit plans), and on real estate, up 6.4% year-over-year (the largest jump coming in revolving home equity loans).
The cash assets held in the commercial banking system declined regularly throughout June as the peak in cash assets held was reached in May. Thus, it appears that banks are backing off from taking everything the Federal Reserve has put into the banking system and stashing it away in “cash accounts”. This is confirmed by the aggregate banking data put out by the Federal Reserve which indicates that total reserves in the banking system dropped throughout June 2009 and the excess reserves also fell from peak levels reached in late May.
Thus, it appears that things are working out pretty much as the Fed hoped they would. (See my explanation of what the Fed has been trying to do, http://seekingalpha.com/article/145913-is-treasury-s-tarp-debt-already-monetized-part-ii.) Of course, the game is not over yet!
Bottom line: the banking system is working through its problems. The Federal Reserve and the regulators seem to be backing off a little, allowing the system to adjust over time to its dislocations. There is still room for a surprise, but, the more time passes, the less likely a surprise is likely to occur. In other words, the unknown unknowns have been substantially reduced and the known unknowns are what we are working on.
The banks are not lending except on established credit lines (credit cards and home equity loans) and there appears to be plenty of liquidity in the system as a whole. Whereas the lack of lending slows up the possibility for an economic recovery, it is an essential component of getting the banking system healthy again which is needed if there is to be any chance of a robust economic recovery in our future.
Thursday, July 2, 2009
Is Treasury's TARP Debt Already Monetized? Part III
The discussion continues for one more post. I ended the last post with these words:
“The hope is that as the banking system works through its problems, TARP funds will be returned and the mortgage-backed securities will mature or be sold back into the market allowing the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to contract back to where it was in the summer of 2008. The banking system is apparently holding onto reserves to protect itself and that is why they are really not lending. The idea is that if they don’t need these excess reserves they will return them. This is what the Federal Reserve is planning to happen. Let’s hope that they are correct!”
On this issue, let me point out the post by Jonathan Weil on Bloomberg this morning, “Crisis Won’t End Until Balance Sheets Get Real” (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=azsX7o.atu7U). After presenting interesting data on the state of commercial bank balance sheets he argues the following:
“Banks and insurers got Congress to browbeat the Financial Accounting Standards Board into making rule changes that will let them plump earnings and regulatory capital. There also was Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s line in March about “green shoots,” which sparked a media epidemic of alleged sightings.
For all this, we still have hundreds of financial companies trading as though the worst of their losses are still to come. Just imagine what their prognosis might be if the government hadn’t pulled out all the stops.”
And, then Weil closes:
“Truth is, there’s no way to know if the economy has turned the corner, or if last quarter’s market rally will prove sustainable. Yet when this many banks still have balance sheets that defy belief, it means the industry probably hasn’t re- established trust with the investing public.
Trust, you may recall, is the financial system’s most precious asset. On that score, we still have a long way to go before we can say this banking crisis is over.”
This is the short run problem and it is the one that is going to determine whether or not the Federal Reserve is going to be able to shrink its balance sheet. This has been the point of my last two posts. And why are we facing such uncertainty at this point? Because the Mark-to-Market rule was pulled and because there is not enough openness and transparency in the public financial reporting of financial institutions. If there are going to be regulatory changes in the future, a lot is going to have to be changed as far as the reporting requirements for financial institutions is concerned.
But, this is just the short run problem.
The longer run problem is the projected budget deficits of the Federal government. Even if things work out as the Federal Reserve has planned as far as bank reserves are concerned and Federal Reserve credit retreats back to where it was in August 2008, there is the massive problem facing the country about how prospective government deficits are going to be financed. The bet is that the Fed will finance a substantial portion of the deficits to come. Let the printing presses roll!
The fear? Inflation.
But many say, we are in a severe economic contraction now. The fear should be deflation and not inflation.
The only response to this counter argument is that in the latter half of the 20th century, any nation that has run substantial deficits has, sooner or later, run into problems related to inflation. Monetary authorities are never so independent of their central governments that imprudent fiscal policies are not in one way or another underwritten through some form of monetization. And, since this happens time after time, how can the international investing community sit on the sidelines and do nothing? Yes, the United States is in a severe recession right now, but what are your odds for the monetization of a lot of the Federal debt over the next three years? Over the next five years? Over the next ten years?
Where do you look for such for an indication of market sentiment on this? Look at the value of the United States dollar. The dollar fell by about 15% against major currencies in the latter part of the 1970s as the Carter budget deficits seemed to get out-of-hand. As we know, Paul Volker played the savior there by conducting a very restrictive monetary policy to bring the value of the dollar back in line. However, the Reagan budgets became so severe by 1985 that the value of the dollar began to plummet. In the face of continuing deficits and the realization that this would continue to result in a weak dollar, Volker gave up the reins of the Federal Reserve in August 1987. The dollar did not pick up strength again until fiscal restraint was returned to Washington with the Clinton administration as the value of the dollar rose over 25% from April 1995 until the end of 2000. The massive budget deficits of Bush 43 were translated into another precipitous decline in the value of the dollar which fell by almost 40% between the middle of 2002 to March 2008.
The fiscal policy of a nation does matter to the international investment community!
But, you say, look at all the other major countries having economic problems and their budgets are out of balance as well. Look at England, Germany, Italy, France, and others.
The response to this? This is not the case for many of the major emerging countries of the world, specifically the BRIC countries. Perhaps one leaves Russia out of this, but China, India, and Brazil are going to emerge from this period much stronger relative to the United States than could have been thought even a year ago or so. So is Canada and several other important countries. This world crisis is going to shift world economic power in a way that has not been seen since the shifts in world power that took place in the 1920s and 1930s. And, international investors are realizing this!
Yes, the dollar will still be used as the reserve currency of the world…for a while longer. The Chinese, and the Russians, and the Brazilians, and the Indians all realize this. And, even though they keep talking about establishing a new reserve currency, they seem to back off and say that the dollar cannot be replaced right now. Yet, the Chinese have called for the Group of 8 to talk about a new reserve currency at its upcoming meeting. The issue IS on the table and my guess is that it is not going to go away.
Which brings me back to the deficits. In my mind, the budget deficits of the United States government are out-of-control right now and there is great concern that this administration will not be able to regain control of them in the near future. There is no “reversal” mechanism that is built into these budgets as the Fed has attempted to build in a “reversal” mechanism in its efforts. As a consequence, great pressure will be put on the monetary authorities over the next several years to monetize a substantial portion of the debt that will be created. The history of the past fifty years or so is that the Fed will not be able to avoid the pressure. This is perception that the international investing community will be bringing to the market when it place its bets. This can be translated into higher long term interest rates in the United States and a continuation in the decline in the value of the United States dollar.
“The hope is that as the banking system works through its problems, TARP funds will be returned and the mortgage-backed securities will mature or be sold back into the market allowing the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to contract back to where it was in the summer of 2008. The banking system is apparently holding onto reserves to protect itself and that is why they are really not lending. The idea is that if they don’t need these excess reserves they will return them. This is what the Federal Reserve is planning to happen. Let’s hope that they are correct!”
On this issue, let me point out the post by Jonathan Weil on Bloomberg this morning, “Crisis Won’t End Until Balance Sheets Get Real” (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=azsX7o.atu7U). After presenting interesting data on the state of commercial bank balance sheets he argues the following:
“Banks and insurers got Congress to browbeat the Financial Accounting Standards Board into making rule changes that will let them plump earnings and regulatory capital. There also was Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s line in March about “green shoots,” which sparked a media epidemic of alleged sightings.
For all this, we still have hundreds of financial companies trading as though the worst of their losses are still to come. Just imagine what their prognosis might be if the government hadn’t pulled out all the stops.”
And, then Weil closes:
“Truth is, there’s no way to know if the economy has turned the corner, or if last quarter’s market rally will prove sustainable. Yet when this many banks still have balance sheets that defy belief, it means the industry probably hasn’t re- established trust with the investing public.
Trust, you may recall, is the financial system’s most precious asset. On that score, we still have a long way to go before we can say this banking crisis is over.”
This is the short run problem and it is the one that is going to determine whether or not the Federal Reserve is going to be able to shrink its balance sheet. This has been the point of my last two posts. And why are we facing such uncertainty at this point? Because the Mark-to-Market rule was pulled and because there is not enough openness and transparency in the public financial reporting of financial institutions. If there are going to be regulatory changes in the future, a lot is going to have to be changed as far as the reporting requirements for financial institutions is concerned.
But, this is just the short run problem.
The longer run problem is the projected budget deficits of the Federal government. Even if things work out as the Federal Reserve has planned as far as bank reserves are concerned and Federal Reserve credit retreats back to where it was in August 2008, there is the massive problem facing the country about how prospective government deficits are going to be financed. The bet is that the Fed will finance a substantial portion of the deficits to come. Let the printing presses roll!
The fear? Inflation.
But many say, we are in a severe economic contraction now. The fear should be deflation and not inflation.
The only response to this counter argument is that in the latter half of the 20th century, any nation that has run substantial deficits has, sooner or later, run into problems related to inflation. Monetary authorities are never so independent of their central governments that imprudent fiscal policies are not in one way or another underwritten through some form of monetization. And, since this happens time after time, how can the international investing community sit on the sidelines and do nothing? Yes, the United States is in a severe recession right now, but what are your odds for the monetization of a lot of the Federal debt over the next three years? Over the next five years? Over the next ten years?
Where do you look for such for an indication of market sentiment on this? Look at the value of the United States dollar. The dollar fell by about 15% against major currencies in the latter part of the 1970s as the Carter budget deficits seemed to get out-of-hand. As we know, Paul Volker played the savior there by conducting a very restrictive monetary policy to bring the value of the dollar back in line. However, the Reagan budgets became so severe by 1985 that the value of the dollar began to plummet. In the face of continuing deficits and the realization that this would continue to result in a weak dollar, Volker gave up the reins of the Federal Reserve in August 1987. The dollar did not pick up strength again until fiscal restraint was returned to Washington with the Clinton administration as the value of the dollar rose over 25% from April 1995 until the end of 2000. The massive budget deficits of Bush 43 were translated into another precipitous decline in the value of the dollar which fell by almost 40% between the middle of 2002 to March 2008.
The fiscal policy of a nation does matter to the international investment community!
But, you say, look at all the other major countries having economic problems and their budgets are out of balance as well. Look at England, Germany, Italy, France, and others.
The response to this? This is not the case for many of the major emerging countries of the world, specifically the BRIC countries. Perhaps one leaves Russia out of this, but China, India, and Brazil are going to emerge from this period much stronger relative to the United States than could have been thought even a year ago or so. So is Canada and several other important countries. This world crisis is going to shift world economic power in a way that has not been seen since the shifts in world power that took place in the 1920s and 1930s. And, international investors are realizing this!
Yes, the dollar will still be used as the reserve currency of the world…for a while longer. The Chinese, and the Russians, and the Brazilians, and the Indians all realize this. And, even though they keep talking about establishing a new reserve currency, they seem to back off and say that the dollar cannot be replaced right now. Yet, the Chinese have called for the Group of 8 to talk about a new reserve currency at its upcoming meeting. The issue IS on the table and my guess is that it is not going to go away.
Which brings me back to the deficits. In my mind, the budget deficits of the United States government are out-of-control right now and there is great concern that this administration will not be able to regain control of them in the near future. There is no “reversal” mechanism that is built into these budgets as the Fed has attempted to build in a “reversal” mechanism in its efforts. As a consequence, great pressure will be put on the monetary authorities over the next several years to monetize a substantial portion of the debt that will be created. The history of the past fifty years or so is that the Fed will not be able to avoid the pressure. This is perception that the international investing community will be bringing to the market when it place its bets. This can be translated into higher long term interest rates in the United States and a continuation in the decline in the value of the United States dollar.
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Is Treasury's TARP Debt Already Monetized?--Part Two
My post from Friday June 26 contained the first part of this discussion. Today I would like to continue the discussion and there are two reasons for doing so. The first reason is to understand just what the Federal Reserve has been doing over these last nine months. The second is to understand how likely it might be for the Federal Reserve to “unwind” what it has done over the past nine months and reduce a part of the fear of future inflation. Note, I am not including any discussion of future government deficits and the probability that they will be “monetized.”
There is no doubt in my mind that the Federal Reserve has “printed” a lot of money since early September 2008, most of it before January 2009. The Monetary Base (Non-seasonally adjusted, NSA) rose from $847 billion in August 2008 to $1,712 billion in January 2009, an increase of $865 billion. Between January and May 2009, the Monetary Base only rose $63 billion.
Total Reserves (NSA) in the banking system increased by $817 billion from September 2008 to January 2009, but only increased by $42 billion since January. The most interesting thing is that Excess Reserves (NSA) in the banking system rose by almost $800 billion in the earlier period and increased by $46 billion in the January to May period.
The Federal Reserve put a lot on money into the banking system over the last nine months and the VAST MAJORITY of the funds went into Excess Reserves. The Fed “printed” a lot of money (or, created a lot of deposits at the Fed) but these monies did not find their way into the economy!
These two periods need to be separated in order to get a better picture of what the Fed has done and for some implications about what might occur in the future. My basic argument is that the Fed has put a tremendous amount of money into the world banking system and has ultimately underwritten the Treasury’s TARP program and provided much more money to the banking system than Congress authorized.
The underlying effort has two goals: first, to keep financial markets liquid; and second, to protect against the insolvency of the banking system. The first goal has basically been accomplished. The second is still playing itself out. The crucial thing to understand is that the way the Fed has acted has given the system a chance to get healthy and yet provide a net to catch insolvent banks so as to avoid a precipitous collapse of the banking system.
In the September 2008 to January 2009, the crisis period, the Fed basically ceased using the normal tools of monetary policy: open market operations consisting of outright purchases of government securities and repurchase agreements. In the fall, the Federal Reserve basically picked and choose what parts of the financial markets needed liquidity and created facilities to support these ill-liquid sub-markets. The major ways that it supplied funds or saw funds withdrawn in the September 2008 through January 2009 period and in the January 2009 through May 2009 period.
Change (billions) from Sept/08 to Jan/09: Term Auction Credit $257; Other Loans $166; Commercial Paper LLC $334; Other Fed Reserve Assets $506; for a total of $1,263. The change (billions) from Jan/09 through May 2009: Term Auction Credit (-$124); Other Loans (-$62); Commercial Paper LLC (-$206); Other Fed Reserve Assets (-$411); for a total of minus $803.
The Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF) helped to get reserves to the commercial banks that needed reserves, an effort the Fed believed was more efficient than open market operations. TAF peaked at $300 billion increase on 12/31/08. Other loans include increased borrowings from the Fed’s discount window, a facility for asset-backed commercial paper (which reached a peak increase of $152 billion on 10/8/08), a facility for primary government security dealers (which reached a peak increase of $147 billion on 10/1/08), and a facility for AIG. The commercial paper LLC was a limited liability facility that bought 3-month paper from eligible issuers (which reached its peak of $334 billion on 12/31/08). The increase in Other Fed Reserve assets was primarily Central Bank Liquidity swaps (which reached a peak of $682 billion on 12/17/08).
However, the Fed’s efforts reported here resulted in almost a $1.3 trillion increase in its assets and an $865 billion increase in the Monetary Base. Thus, almost the entire monetization ended up as excess reserves held at Federal Reserve Banks. Bank reserves at Federal Reserve Banks increased steadily throughout the fall, peaking at $856 million on December 31, 2008. Whew! The Federal Reserve had made it through this period of financial market illiquidity which accompanied the entire Thanksgiving/Christmas seasonal need for cash.
What happened in 2009? As mentioned above, the needs of specific market makers retreated, but now the solvency of the banking system came to the fore. In terms of the special facilities, as can be seen from the figures given above, a total of $803 billion was removed during the first five months of the year. Then the Fed began to conduct open market operations again. Throughout this time, securities bought outright by the Fed increased by $712 bullion. This included a program to buy government securities on a regular basis which contributed $177 billion to the Fed’s portfolio. It also added $70 billion of Federal Agency issues. Furthermore, the Fed initiated a very important program in 2009 and bought $465 billion of Mortgage-backed securities.
In essence, Total Federal Reserve Bank credit declined by about $200 billion during the first five months of the year but, as was reported earlier, the monetary base increased by $63 billion and total reserves and excess reserves in the banking system increase by more than $40 billion. In essence, the Fed operated in 2009 to keep the banking system very liquid and replaced the reserves that had been supplied to different parts of the financial markets in 2008 by interjecting funds directly into the banking system. The new twist? Directly helping banks sell their mortgage-backed securities, thereby reducing pressure on the banks to clean up their balance sheets. This was the original purpose of the Treasury’s TARP program.
The banking system faces three problems going forward: existing bad assets; bad assets that will appear over the next 18 months or so; and refinancing needs as the banks may not always be able to roll over existing liabilities.(See my post of June 15, “What Banks Aren’t Telling Us”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/143276-what-aren-t-banks-telling-us, for more on these factors.) The huge amount of excess reserves will help the banks face these problems. In terms of financing needs, the banks have the cash to pay off maturing liabilities without needing to roll the debt over. In terms of bad debts, this is where the TARP program comes in because the Treasury has provided preferred stock to banks with warrants attached. Charge offs can go against existing capital and the preferred stock and warrants can be transformed into new capital owned by the government to keep these banks afloat until something can be done with them.
Some banks have repaid the TARP funds that they had received. Several well-known large banks returned $68.25 billion this month to reduce Federal Government oversight. Still there have been 633 banks that have directly received about $200 billion in TARP funds and a total of 32 banks have now repaid about $70 billion. (On this see “Small Banks Not Shying From TARP” in June 27 Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124606040026463617.html.) So, of the roughly $800 billion that banks are now holding in excess reserves, one could argue that approximately $130 billion of them have been supplied through the Treasury program and are held, mostly, by smaller banks and $670 billion of them has been supplied by the Federal Reserve, the total of the two being the money “printed “ to get us out of the current financial crisis.
The hope is that as the banking system works through its problems, TARP funds will be returned and the mortgage-backed securities will mature or be sold back into the market allowing the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to contract back to where it was in the summer of 2008. The banking system is apparently holding onto reserves to protect itself and that is why they are really not lending. The idea is that if they don’t need these excess reserves they will return them. This is what the Federal Reserve is planning to happen. Let’s hope that they are correct!
There is no doubt in my mind that the Federal Reserve has “printed” a lot of money since early September 2008, most of it before January 2009. The Monetary Base (Non-seasonally adjusted, NSA) rose from $847 billion in August 2008 to $1,712 billion in January 2009, an increase of $865 billion. Between January and May 2009, the Monetary Base only rose $63 billion.
Total Reserves (NSA) in the banking system increased by $817 billion from September 2008 to January 2009, but only increased by $42 billion since January. The most interesting thing is that Excess Reserves (NSA) in the banking system rose by almost $800 billion in the earlier period and increased by $46 billion in the January to May period.
The Federal Reserve put a lot on money into the banking system over the last nine months and the VAST MAJORITY of the funds went into Excess Reserves. The Fed “printed” a lot of money (or, created a lot of deposits at the Fed) but these monies did not find their way into the economy!
These two periods need to be separated in order to get a better picture of what the Fed has done and for some implications about what might occur in the future. My basic argument is that the Fed has put a tremendous amount of money into the world banking system and has ultimately underwritten the Treasury’s TARP program and provided much more money to the banking system than Congress authorized.
The underlying effort has two goals: first, to keep financial markets liquid; and second, to protect against the insolvency of the banking system. The first goal has basically been accomplished. The second is still playing itself out. The crucial thing to understand is that the way the Fed has acted has given the system a chance to get healthy and yet provide a net to catch insolvent banks so as to avoid a precipitous collapse of the banking system.
In the September 2008 to January 2009, the crisis period, the Fed basically ceased using the normal tools of monetary policy: open market operations consisting of outright purchases of government securities and repurchase agreements. In the fall, the Federal Reserve basically picked and choose what parts of the financial markets needed liquidity and created facilities to support these ill-liquid sub-markets. The major ways that it supplied funds or saw funds withdrawn in the September 2008 through January 2009 period and in the January 2009 through May 2009 period.
Change (billions) from Sept/08 to Jan/09: Term Auction Credit $257; Other Loans $166; Commercial Paper LLC $334; Other Fed Reserve Assets $506; for a total of $1,263. The change (billions) from Jan/09 through May 2009: Term Auction Credit (-$124); Other Loans (-$62); Commercial Paper LLC (-$206); Other Fed Reserve Assets (-$411); for a total of minus $803.
The Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF) helped to get reserves to the commercial banks that needed reserves, an effort the Fed believed was more efficient than open market operations. TAF peaked at $300 billion increase on 12/31/08. Other loans include increased borrowings from the Fed’s discount window, a facility for asset-backed commercial paper (which reached a peak increase of $152 billion on 10/8/08), a facility for primary government security dealers (which reached a peak increase of $147 billion on 10/1/08), and a facility for AIG. The commercial paper LLC was a limited liability facility that bought 3-month paper from eligible issuers (which reached its peak of $334 billion on 12/31/08). The increase in Other Fed Reserve assets was primarily Central Bank Liquidity swaps (which reached a peak of $682 billion on 12/17/08).
However, the Fed’s efforts reported here resulted in almost a $1.3 trillion increase in its assets and an $865 billion increase in the Monetary Base. Thus, almost the entire monetization ended up as excess reserves held at Federal Reserve Banks. Bank reserves at Federal Reserve Banks increased steadily throughout the fall, peaking at $856 million on December 31, 2008. Whew! The Federal Reserve had made it through this period of financial market illiquidity which accompanied the entire Thanksgiving/Christmas seasonal need for cash.
What happened in 2009? As mentioned above, the needs of specific market makers retreated, but now the solvency of the banking system came to the fore. In terms of the special facilities, as can be seen from the figures given above, a total of $803 billion was removed during the first five months of the year. Then the Fed began to conduct open market operations again. Throughout this time, securities bought outright by the Fed increased by $712 bullion. This included a program to buy government securities on a regular basis which contributed $177 billion to the Fed’s portfolio. It also added $70 billion of Federal Agency issues. Furthermore, the Fed initiated a very important program in 2009 and bought $465 billion of Mortgage-backed securities.
In essence, Total Federal Reserve Bank credit declined by about $200 billion during the first five months of the year but, as was reported earlier, the monetary base increased by $63 billion and total reserves and excess reserves in the banking system increase by more than $40 billion. In essence, the Fed operated in 2009 to keep the banking system very liquid and replaced the reserves that had been supplied to different parts of the financial markets in 2008 by interjecting funds directly into the banking system. The new twist? Directly helping banks sell their mortgage-backed securities, thereby reducing pressure on the banks to clean up their balance sheets. This was the original purpose of the Treasury’s TARP program.
The banking system faces three problems going forward: existing bad assets; bad assets that will appear over the next 18 months or so; and refinancing needs as the banks may not always be able to roll over existing liabilities.(See my post of June 15, “What Banks Aren’t Telling Us”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/143276-what-aren-t-banks-telling-us, for more on these factors.) The huge amount of excess reserves will help the banks face these problems. In terms of financing needs, the banks have the cash to pay off maturing liabilities without needing to roll the debt over. In terms of bad debts, this is where the TARP program comes in because the Treasury has provided preferred stock to banks with warrants attached. Charge offs can go against existing capital and the preferred stock and warrants can be transformed into new capital owned by the government to keep these banks afloat until something can be done with them.
Some banks have repaid the TARP funds that they had received. Several well-known large banks returned $68.25 billion this month to reduce Federal Government oversight. Still there have been 633 banks that have directly received about $200 billion in TARP funds and a total of 32 banks have now repaid about $70 billion. (On this see “Small Banks Not Shying From TARP” in June 27 Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124606040026463617.html.) So, of the roughly $800 billion that banks are now holding in excess reserves, one could argue that approximately $130 billion of them have been supplied through the Treasury program and are held, mostly, by smaller banks and $670 billion of them has been supplied by the Federal Reserve, the total of the two being the money “printed “ to get us out of the current financial crisis.
The hope is that as the banking system works through its problems, TARP funds will be returned and the mortgage-backed securities will mature or be sold back into the market allowing the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to contract back to where it was in the summer of 2008. The banking system is apparently holding onto reserves to protect itself and that is why they are really not lending. The idea is that if they don’t need these excess reserves they will return them. This is what the Federal Reserve is planning to happen. Let’s hope that they are correct!
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Treasury's TARP Debt Already Monetized?
Where does all the TARP money show up? TARP, of course, stands for the Troubled Asset Relief Program that became law on October 3, 2008, a program aimed at providing support for the banking system. The program was initially intended to provide liquidity-help for the troubled assets that were on the balance sheets of banks but it soon morphed into a program to support troubled banks in their capital needs as funds were made available to purchase senior preferred stock and warrants from commercial banks and other troubled financial institutions.
The first $350 billion of funds was authorized to be released on October 3, 2008 and Congress approved the release of the next $350 billion on January 15, 2009. Part of the concern with the program was that the government deficit would have to increase by $700 billion in order to create the funds. Concerns arose about how the Treasury Department would finance these payments?
One quick answer was “let the Federal Reserve monetize the debt?”
What if the Federal Reserve has already monetized the debt related to TARP? If this is the case, then two questions that have been puzzling me have answers to them. The first question relates to the increase in excess reserves in the banking system. The second question relates to the concern about how the Federal Reserve will reverse out all of the reserves that it pumped into the banking system last fall. Let’s look at both in turn.
Federal Reserve Bank Credit has increased by $1.2 trillion since just before the financial meltdown in September 2008. What has increased the most in the banking system? Excess reserves in the commercial banking system have risen by about $800 billion. Excess reserves in the WHOLE banking system had run about $2 billion before September 2008. Something unprecedented obviously took place!
In terms of policy making the creation of TARP and the response of the Federal Reserve are closely tied together. (See my post of November 16, 2008, “The Bailout Plan: Did Bernanke Panic?: http://seekingalpha.com/article/106186-the-bailout-plan-did-bernanke-panic.) As mentioned above, the first round of TARP was released in October. But, the Federal Reserve could not wait. It began pumping reserves into the banking system in the latter part of September increasing Reserve Bank Credit outstanding from about $890 billion on September 10, 2008 to $1.5 trillion on October 8, $1.9 trillion on October 29, and $2.2 trillion on November 19.
In all this action, what happened to reserve balances at the Federal Reserve? They went from around $8 billion on September 10, to $175 billion, to $420 billion, to $624 billion, respectively, on the same dates as above. Excess reserves in the banking system averaged $2 billion in August, $60 billion in September, $268 billion in October, $559 billion in November, and $767 billion in December.
Excess reserves in the banking system averaged $844 billion in May and are averaging around $800 in June. Clearly a lot of money!
The question is “Why are the banks sitting on such large amounts of basically idle cash?”
My response is that they are sitting on this cash because it is connected with the receipt of TARP monies and the banks are hoping, as some of the larger and stronger institutions have done, to repay the funds as soon as possible.
Let’s look a little closer at the data. I am using information from the H.8 release put out by the Federal Reserve System on assets and liabilities of all commercial banks in the United States. Year-over-year, through May 2009, total assets in the banking system increased by 9.7% or about $1.1 trillion. Cash assets in the banking system increased a whopping $731 billion or at a year-over-year rate of 236%. This is comparable to the year-over-year increase in excess reserves observed on the H.3 release of the Federal Reserve providing data on bank reserves.
Given my post of last June 15, 2009, “What Aren’t Banks Telling Us?”, (http://seekingalpha.com/article/143276-what-aren-t-banks-telling-us) I was interested in looking a little deeper into this information to see how these excess reserves were distributed within the banking system. Roughly the division is this. The increase in cash assets at large commercial banks was $371billion, at small banks the increase was $143 billion, and at Foreign-related Institutions in the United States, $217 billion. The increase at the larger institutions, the large banks and the foreign-related institutions, was $588 billion and this represented the immediate problem to the policy makers. The problems of the smaller banks could be dealt with later.
The reason I am interested in looking into this distribution is the claim made in the above-mentioned post that commercial banks had not been fully open with the public on the problems they were still facing. In that post I mentioned three areas of concern: the bad assets now on the books of the banks; the anticipated increase in the bad assets in the upcoming months; and finally, the needs of the banks to be able to fund themselves in the future in the face of liabilities that were maturing and would not be rolled over. The build up in cash assets, it was argued, was a precaution the banks were taking to handle the uncertainty they faced as either asset values fell or a run off of liabilities forced the banks to dispose of assets.
Here is where the TARP money comes into play. If TARP money went into preferred stock and warrants, then these monies could be used to provide capital to the banks as the banks needed to write off bad loans and securities. The stock could even be converted into capital if the funds were needed to keep the banks solvent. Otherwise the banks could use the TARP funds to pay off maturing debt that could not be rolled over in the financial markets. (See Gretchen Morgenson, “Debts Coming Due At The Wrong Time,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/business/14gret.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=gretchen%20morgenson/June%2014,%202009&st=cse.) Thus, monetizing the TARP debt makes a lot of sense in that it helps to protect the banking system from either bad assets that have to be written off or from financing problems resulting from the inability of the banks to roll over maturing liabilities.
What does this have to do with the Federal Reserve being able to unwind all the Reserve Bank Credit that it has pumped into the system? Well, when the banking system gets its act in order and charges off the loans and securities that it needs to and when its refinancing needs are satisfied, banks can then repay the TARP money to the Treasury as have the large financial institutions that have already repaid the TARP funds that they received. And, as the TARP monies are repaid, Reserve Bank Credit will decline so as to reduce the concern over the Fed monetizing the federal deficit.
Nice trick! The policy makers have provided a net under the banking system if the situation gets too bad in order to protect it against things falling apart and parallelizing the financial system. And, they have built into the system the means of reducing reserves as the financial system strengthens so as to avoid concerns over possible future inflation.
One final question: have the actions of the Federal Reserve had any impact on bank lending? The answer is “Not Really!” Year-over-year, loans and leases at all commercial banks increased by a tepid $182 billion or at a 2.6% annual rate. And, where were these increases located? Generally in home equity loans, consumer loans, and other residential loans (primarily mortgages) satisfying consumers needs for ready cash through consumer credit or the refinancing of homes. And, these loans were pretty evenly spread throughout the banking system.
Bottom line, however, is that the banks aren’t lending! Especially in the areas of commercial and industrial loans and commercial mortgages. Does that tell you something?
The first $350 billion of funds was authorized to be released on October 3, 2008 and Congress approved the release of the next $350 billion on January 15, 2009. Part of the concern with the program was that the government deficit would have to increase by $700 billion in order to create the funds. Concerns arose about how the Treasury Department would finance these payments?
One quick answer was “let the Federal Reserve monetize the debt?”
What if the Federal Reserve has already monetized the debt related to TARP? If this is the case, then two questions that have been puzzling me have answers to them. The first question relates to the increase in excess reserves in the banking system. The second question relates to the concern about how the Federal Reserve will reverse out all of the reserves that it pumped into the banking system last fall. Let’s look at both in turn.
Federal Reserve Bank Credit has increased by $1.2 trillion since just before the financial meltdown in September 2008. What has increased the most in the banking system? Excess reserves in the commercial banking system have risen by about $800 billion. Excess reserves in the WHOLE banking system had run about $2 billion before September 2008. Something unprecedented obviously took place!
In terms of policy making the creation of TARP and the response of the Federal Reserve are closely tied together. (See my post of November 16, 2008, “The Bailout Plan: Did Bernanke Panic?: http://seekingalpha.com/article/106186-the-bailout-plan-did-bernanke-panic.) As mentioned above, the first round of TARP was released in October. But, the Federal Reserve could not wait. It began pumping reserves into the banking system in the latter part of September increasing Reserve Bank Credit outstanding from about $890 billion on September 10, 2008 to $1.5 trillion on October 8, $1.9 trillion on October 29, and $2.2 trillion on November 19.
In all this action, what happened to reserve balances at the Federal Reserve? They went from around $8 billion on September 10, to $175 billion, to $420 billion, to $624 billion, respectively, on the same dates as above. Excess reserves in the banking system averaged $2 billion in August, $60 billion in September, $268 billion in October, $559 billion in November, and $767 billion in December.
Excess reserves in the banking system averaged $844 billion in May and are averaging around $800 in June. Clearly a lot of money!
The question is “Why are the banks sitting on such large amounts of basically idle cash?”
My response is that they are sitting on this cash because it is connected with the receipt of TARP monies and the banks are hoping, as some of the larger and stronger institutions have done, to repay the funds as soon as possible.
Let’s look a little closer at the data. I am using information from the H.8 release put out by the Federal Reserve System on assets and liabilities of all commercial banks in the United States. Year-over-year, through May 2009, total assets in the banking system increased by 9.7% or about $1.1 trillion. Cash assets in the banking system increased a whopping $731 billion or at a year-over-year rate of 236%. This is comparable to the year-over-year increase in excess reserves observed on the H.3 release of the Federal Reserve providing data on bank reserves.
Given my post of last June 15, 2009, “What Aren’t Banks Telling Us?”, (http://seekingalpha.com/article/143276-what-aren-t-banks-telling-us) I was interested in looking a little deeper into this information to see how these excess reserves were distributed within the banking system. Roughly the division is this. The increase in cash assets at large commercial banks was $371billion, at small banks the increase was $143 billion, and at Foreign-related Institutions in the United States, $217 billion. The increase at the larger institutions, the large banks and the foreign-related institutions, was $588 billion and this represented the immediate problem to the policy makers. The problems of the smaller banks could be dealt with later.
The reason I am interested in looking into this distribution is the claim made in the above-mentioned post that commercial banks had not been fully open with the public on the problems they were still facing. In that post I mentioned three areas of concern: the bad assets now on the books of the banks; the anticipated increase in the bad assets in the upcoming months; and finally, the needs of the banks to be able to fund themselves in the future in the face of liabilities that were maturing and would not be rolled over. The build up in cash assets, it was argued, was a precaution the banks were taking to handle the uncertainty they faced as either asset values fell or a run off of liabilities forced the banks to dispose of assets.
Here is where the TARP money comes into play. If TARP money went into preferred stock and warrants, then these monies could be used to provide capital to the banks as the banks needed to write off bad loans and securities. The stock could even be converted into capital if the funds were needed to keep the banks solvent. Otherwise the banks could use the TARP funds to pay off maturing debt that could not be rolled over in the financial markets. (See Gretchen Morgenson, “Debts Coming Due At The Wrong Time,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/business/14gret.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=gretchen%20morgenson/June%2014,%202009&st=cse.) Thus, monetizing the TARP debt makes a lot of sense in that it helps to protect the banking system from either bad assets that have to be written off or from financing problems resulting from the inability of the banks to roll over maturing liabilities.
What does this have to do with the Federal Reserve being able to unwind all the Reserve Bank Credit that it has pumped into the system? Well, when the banking system gets its act in order and charges off the loans and securities that it needs to and when its refinancing needs are satisfied, banks can then repay the TARP money to the Treasury as have the large financial institutions that have already repaid the TARP funds that they received. And, as the TARP monies are repaid, Reserve Bank Credit will decline so as to reduce the concern over the Fed monetizing the federal deficit.
Nice trick! The policy makers have provided a net under the banking system if the situation gets too bad in order to protect it against things falling apart and parallelizing the financial system. And, they have built into the system the means of reducing reserves as the financial system strengthens so as to avoid concerns over possible future inflation.
One final question: have the actions of the Federal Reserve had any impact on bank lending? The answer is “Not Really!” Year-over-year, loans and leases at all commercial banks increased by a tepid $182 billion or at a 2.6% annual rate. And, where were these increases located? Generally in home equity loans, consumer loans, and other residential loans (primarily mortgages) satisfying consumers needs for ready cash through consumer credit or the refinancing of homes. And, these loans were pretty evenly spread throughout the banking system.
Bottom line, however, is that the banks aren’t lending! Especially in the areas of commercial and industrial loans and commercial mortgages. Does that tell you something?
Sunday, June 14, 2009
What Banks Aren't Telling Us?
I am still worried about what banks aren’t telling us.
Why?
Total Reserves in the banking system have increased by $857.8 billion over the twelve month period ending in May 2009. Excess reserves in the banking system have increased by $842.1 billion in the same time period.
The Federal Reserve System has overseen a 1,900% increase in total reserve in the banking system, year-over-year, for the year ending May 2009, and banks have chosen to sit on the injection almost dollar-for-dollar!
These figures come from the Federal Reserve statistical release H.3 “Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base.” I have used the “not seasonally adjusted” data.
This is unheard of! In May 2008, excess reserves were $2.0 billion and stood at 4.5% of the total reserves in the banking system. In May 2009, excess reserves totaled 93.7% of the total reserves in the banking system.
Unless someone can convince me otherwise there are, in my mind, only three reasons for this behavior. The first is the volume of bad assets currently on the balance sheets of banks that have not been recognized. The second is the volume of bad assets that banks anticipate will be forthcoming over the next year or so. The third has to do with how the banks have funded themselves in the past several years.
If these assumptions are correct, the recession cannot be called over yet and any economic recovery that might be forthcoming is going to be relatively tepid or postponed for some time. I obviously hope that I am wrong but something just does not “foot” with the data that I have reported above.
In the first category, current bad assets on the balance sheet, one would think that we know a fair amount about them. Their volume was sufficiently large so that the government put into place the TARP program and then followed that up with the idea of the P-PIP. Several banks feel sufficiently strong that they are returning their TARP money and it appears as if the P-PIP will never be actually implemented.
Financial markets have responded favorably to these events. Yet, we know that there still remain a large number of bad assets in the banking system. The current confidence has allowed some banks to return the TARP funds wanting to get the “Feds” out of their buildings and out of their compensation committees. In addition, with the relative calm in both financial and economic markets, confidence has risen within the banking system that maybe they can ride out the rest of the way to recovery, hoping that many of the remaining bad assets will turnaround or be refinanced or be worked with.
In my experience working in the banking sector, “hope seems to spring eternal” when it comes to believing that bad assets will eventually become good assets. The attitude is that “with time” the borrowers will come through.
But, what kind of confidence is it that sits on $844.1 billion in excess reserves, funds that are earning no return to the banks? Required reserves in the banking system in May only totaled $58.8 billion. What am I missing?
Let’s look at the second category, that about debt coming due or repricing in the future. We have seen more and more reports in recent weeks about the Option Mortgages that are coming due over the next 18 months or so; we read about all the commercial mortgage debt that is on the edge and this was accentuated this week with the bankruptcy filing of Six Flags; and we know that credit card delinquencies are still rising. What we don’t know is the extent of the fallout from the bankruptcies in the auto industry and how this will impact those industries and regions that have depended upon a healthy car business. In addition, personal bankruptcies and small business bankruptcies continue to rise and there is really no firm information about when the increase in these will moderate and what the effect on the banking system will be.
Finally, there is the problem of financing the banking system itself. I recommend that you take a look at the article by Gretchen Morgenson in the June 14 New York Times, “Debts Coming Due at Just the Wrong Time.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/business/14gret.html?ref=business.) Morgenson writes about the debt of the banking system and the need for bank balance sheets to shrink. The banking system, itself, needs to de-leverage and may have to do so unwillingly.
In this article, Morgenson refers to a study by Barclays Capital that discusses the amount of debt of financial companies coming due over the next year or two. The figures, roughly $172 billion of debt will mature in the rest of 2009 and $245 billion will mature in 2010. This means that financial institutions will have to refinance about $25 billion a month for the next 18 months or so. Part of the problem in refinancing this debt is that “many of the entities that bought this debt when it was issued aren’t around any more.” Furthermore, in general, “few buyers of short-term bank debt are around now.”
Raising equity capital is fine, but, over then next few years, the banks may have a larger hole to finance in terms of the debt that it must try to roll over. This, of course, will put more pressure on the policy makers. The policy makers have gone out on a limb in attempting to protect the need to write down bad assets. The policy makers have provided capital for some of the banks that were in the worst financial shape. The next issue has to do with the need for the purchase of bank liabilities. This may be a very tough balancing act to complete successfully.
But, maybe the government has already provided the funds to meet these emergencies. Maybe that is why banks are holding such large amounts of excess reserves. They know that over the next 18 months that they are going to have a severe funding problem. Excess reserves are the perfect answer to paying off the debt as it runs off, leaving the banks with a lot of funds that still can buy them time to “work out” the bad assets that remain on their balance sheets.
Why?
Total Reserves in the banking system have increased by $857.8 billion over the twelve month period ending in May 2009. Excess reserves in the banking system have increased by $842.1 billion in the same time period.
The Federal Reserve System has overseen a 1,900% increase in total reserve in the banking system, year-over-year, for the year ending May 2009, and banks have chosen to sit on the injection almost dollar-for-dollar!
These figures come from the Federal Reserve statistical release H.3 “Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base.” I have used the “not seasonally adjusted” data.
This is unheard of! In May 2008, excess reserves were $2.0 billion and stood at 4.5% of the total reserves in the banking system. In May 2009, excess reserves totaled 93.7% of the total reserves in the banking system.
Unless someone can convince me otherwise there are, in my mind, only three reasons for this behavior. The first is the volume of bad assets currently on the balance sheets of banks that have not been recognized. The second is the volume of bad assets that banks anticipate will be forthcoming over the next year or so. The third has to do with how the banks have funded themselves in the past several years.
If these assumptions are correct, the recession cannot be called over yet and any economic recovery that might be forthcoming is going to be relatively tepid or postponed for some time. I obviously hope that I am wrong but something just does not “foot” with the data that I have reported above.
In the first category, current bad assets on the balance sheet, one would think that we know a fair amount about them. Their volume was sufficiently large so that the government put into place the TARP program and then followed that up with the idea of the P-PIP. Several banks feel sufficiently strong that they are returning their TARP money and it appears as if the P-PIP will never be actually implemented.
Financial markets have responded favorably to these events. Yet, we know that there still remain a large number of bad assets in the banking system. The current confidence has allowed some banks to return the TARP funds wanting to get the “Feds” out of their buildings and out of their compensation committees. In addition, with the relative calm in both financial and economic markets, confidence has risen within the banking system that maybe they can ride out the rest of the way to recovery, hoping that many of the remaining bad assets will turnaround or be refinanced or be worked with.
In my experience working in the banking sector, “hope seems to spring eternal” when it comes to believing that bad assets will eventually become good assets. The attitude is that “with time” the borrowers will come through.
But, what kind of confidence is it that sits on $844.1 billion in excess reserves, funds that are earning no return to the banks? Required reserves in the banking system in May only totaled $58.8 billion. What am I missing?
Let’s look at the second category, that about debt coming due or repricing in the future. We have seen more and more reports in recent weeks about the Option Mortgages that are coming due over the next 18 months or so; we read about all the commercial mortgage debt that is on the edge and this was accentuated this week with the bankruptcy filing of Six Flags; and we know that credit card delinquencies are still rising. What we don’t know is the extent of the fallout from the bankruptcies in the auto industry and how this will impact those industries and regions that have depended upon a healthy car business. In addition, personal bankruptcies and small business bankruptcies continue to rise and there is really no firm information about when the increase in these will moderate and what the effect on the banking system will be.
Finally, there is the problem of financing the banking system itself. I recommend that you take a look at the article by Gretchen Morgenson in the June 14 New York Times, “Debts Coming Due at Just the Wrong Time.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/business/14gret.html?ref=business.) Morgenson writes about the debt of the banking system and the need for bank balance sheets to shrink. The banking system, itself, needs to de-leverage and may have to do so unwillingly.
In this article, Morgenson refers to a study by Barclays Capital that discusses the amount of debt of financial companies coming due over the next year or two. The figures, roughly $172 billion of debt will mature in the rest of 2009 and $245 billion will mature in 2010. This means that financial institutions will have to refinance about $25 billion a month for the next 18 months or so. Part of the problem in refinancing this debt is that “many of the entities that bought this debt when it was issued aren’t around any more.” Furthermore, in general, “few buyers of short-term bank debt are around now.”
Raising equity capital is fine, but, over then next few years, the banks may have a larger hole to finance in terms of the debt that it must try to roll over. This, of course, will put more pressure on the policy makers. The policy makers have gone out on a limb in attempting to protect the need to write down bad assets. The policy makers have provided capital for some of the banks that were in the worst financial shape. The next issue has to do with the need for the purchase of bank liabilities. This may be a very tough balancing act to complete successfully.
But, maybe the government has already provided the funds to meet these emergencies. Maybe that is why banks are holding such large amounts of excess reserves. They know that over the next 18 months that they are going to have a severe funding problem. Excess reserves are the perfect answer to paying off the debt as it runs off, leaving the banks with a lot of funds that still can buy them time to “work out” the bad assets that remain on their balance sheets.
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