Restructuring Big Banks

The “new” trend amongst the big banks is to cut jobs.

The “big” HSBC has announced that it will be cutting 10,000 jobs in the near future, part of what many analysts expect to be part of a 30,000 reduction in jobs that will occur over time. 

This joins the efforts of other major banking organizations to scale down such at the Swiss banks Credit Suisse which announced earlier that it was eliminating 2,000 positions and UBS which said it was eliminating at lest 5,000 jobs.

In the UK, Lloyds Banking Group stated in June that it was cutting about 15,000 jobs which follows the news that the Royal Bank of Scotland has already dropped 28,000 positions with more to come in the near future.  Goldman Sachs is also cutting staff, as is Barclays Bank. 

Then, of course, there are the European banks in Ireland, Spain, Greece, and elsewhere that are facing massive amounts of restructuring. 

The big banks have had a fifty-year ride becoming over time huge global empires.  They have gone into this business and they have gone into that business without taking a breath in the process.  As “Chuck” Prince, former Chairman of Citigroup said…the music kept playing, so that the dancers had to keep dancing.

Which led to the situation that I discussed in my last post,  “Can Anyone Manage the ‘Too Big To Fail’ Banks?” (http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/). 

A problem associated with this situation is whether of not these “Too Big To Fail” banks can be regulated.  There is, of course, some belief that these banks cannot really be controlled, especially with the advances that are taking place in the world of information technology. (See my “The Future of Banking: Dodd-Frank at One Year”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/281090-the-future-of-banking-dodd-frank-at-one-year.)

The question I asked in the first post mentioned was whether or not their shareholders could significantly influence these large commercial banks so that some control could be established over bank managements to reign in “undisciplined” growth and risk taking.  That is, could market performance become a sufficient reason for shareholder governance in the case of these financial institutions that were deemed “Too Big To Fail”? 

The basic reason given for the reduction in jobs given by the banks mentioned above was that revenue growth had deteriorated and cost cutting was needed to bring return the banks to greater profitability.  

Banks profits rebounded after the financial crisis, first, because of trading profits earned in volatile financial markets, and, second, due to reductions in provisions for loan losses. 

However, the banks have not been able to continue producing higher profits due to these factors and with lending, even at the larger banks, so anemic, managements have had to look elsewhere to beef up margins. 

In my mind, this effort at cost cutting does not answer the fundamental question about the future of the large commercial banks. 

Cost cutting is one, immediate management response that can improve profit margins.  The fundamental question to me is whether or not this cost-cutting is connected in any way with a management effort to restructure an organization so as to make sense establish the economic rationale of the bank and to be able to better manage the risk profile of the bank. 

The concern here is that the cost cutting is tactical and not strategic. 

These large financial institutions have grown almost without limit for fifty years and have added businesses more often than not just to increase the size of the organization and have added risk to their business structure without sufficient knowledge or control of what was being assumed.  Furthermore, many organizations used accounting “gimmicks”, financial leverage, and inadequate risk-taking oversight to achieve reported performance goals, which hid basic structural weaknesses.

The fundamental question has to do with whether or not bank managements are to be held accountable for their poor performances.  Will the focus of bank management’s change? 

Many times a change in the focus of bank management will only occur if there is new leadership of the management team.  In the case of HSBC, Lloyds, and Barclays, there has been a change in the past year.  These “new” leaders are expected to shift the direction of their organizations.  Citigroup and Bank of America have had new leaders in the past two years or so.  Citi has seemingly undergone a significant change in direction although better performance is still in the future.  Bank of America seems to be going nowhere, fast.

HSBC also announced another move that seems more “strategic” in nature.  It has agreed to sell 195 branches in upstate New York to First Niagara bank.  This effort, along with the closing of branches in Connecticut and New Jersey, is part of an attempt to rationalize its branch network, worldwide.  HSBC is also seeking to sell its credit card business.    Other areas of the bank are under scrutiny.

Of course, these moves are only “strategic” if they are more than just the “fad” of the moment.  And, this is the ultimate question.  Cost cutting can be a fad.  Other organizations are doing it so I cannot be criticized for cost cutting since others are doing it. 

This “strategy” can be extended to other efforts that only last until “things start to pick up again.”  That is, this “strategy” will only continue until the music starts to play again and everyone must get out, once again, on the dance floor.

Thus, one can still ask, “Can anyone manage the ‘Too Big To Fail’ banks?”

My view is that it is too early to tell. 

Right now the incentive is to re-trench and re-structure.  However, in man circles, especially in the United States, there is still a lot of pressure for governments to inflate credit.  (Need one mention Paul Krugman of the New York Times, “The President Surrenders”, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/opinion/the-president-surrenders-on-debt-ceiling.html?_r=1&hp.) 

If credit inflation remains the policy of choice of the United States…and others…and continues to dominate the economic scene then I believe that the “fad” will end and the financial institutions will start to dance again.            

If debt deflation dominates, then I truly believe that we will see better management in the financial sector and financial conglomerates will become more rational and risk-taking will be better controlled.  As I have written elsewhere, this is the other side of the process where government provides too much stimulus for an extended period of time, people and businesses respond accordingly, and then, since this situation becomes unsustainable, people and businesses must adjust back to a position that is more sound, economically, and therefore more sustainable. 

Can Anyone Manage the "Too Big To Fail" Banks

An interesting article: “Once Unthinkable, Breakup of Big Banks Now Seems Feasible,” (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/once-unthinkable-breakup-of-big-banks-now-seems-feasible/?pagemode=print) appeared in the New York Times on Thursday.

The basic question posed in the article: “Lawmakers and regulators have failed to remake our system with smaller, safer institutions.  What about investors?”

Our largest banks are not performing that well.  Shouldn’t stockholders demand better performances?

In terms of Return on Shareholder’s Equity (ROE), Wells Fargo has been at the top of the list of the Big Four.  With the exception of 2008, Wells has earned an ROE of around 10 percent, give or take a little. 

JPMorganChase has not done as well since it was attempting to play “catch up” with the others in the Big Four in the middle 2000s.  Other than in 2008, it has consistently improved its performance with some analysts arguing that it will earn around an 11 percent ROE in 2011.

Citigroup and Bank of America are lagging substantially behind these two.  Citi seems to be recovering from the disasters of 2007, 2008, and 2009, but its performance is still far from stellar.  Bank of America is…terrible.  Both companies will probably not see a 10 percent ROE for many years. 

The point the author of the above article, Jesse Eisinger, is trying to make is that such terrible performances should be met with shareholder demands to restructure in order to improve performance.  Of the four, Citigroup has made the greatest effort to do this but it is an indication of how badly the bank was managed that even this effort has left a lot of work still to be done. 

Bank of America seems to be in a daze.  I don’t think anyone there knows what they are doing.

JPMorganChase, having survived the financial collapse as well as anyone, is trying to expand into areas round the world in which it has not previously been competitive. 

The question proposed by Eisinger is a good one.  Given the performances of these organizations, shouldn’t the shareholders demand some leadership that would rationalize these organizations and get them back on the track to earning competitive returns, which in my mind is an ROE, after taxes, that exceeds 15 percent?

How has the market reacted?  Well, the only bank whose stock price trades above book value has been Wells Fargo trading at about 1 ¼ times book.  JPMorganChase trades at book; Citigroup trades at about ¾ book; and Bank of America trades at around ½ book.

The banking industry, led by these four banks, spent the latter part of the twentieth century building up financial conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions.  The push was to build, build, build.  Financial performance came from financial engineering and financial innovation.  Increased risk taking and greater and greater financial leverage were the games to be played.  Off-balance sheet accounting became a way to hide risk and to “jack up” returns.

As former Citigroup chairman and CEO “Chuck” Prince is famous for saying, “If the music is still playing, you must keep on dancing.”

The problems that accumulated due to the merger and acquisition binge that took place before the financial crisis hit was exacerbated from actions taken after the financial crisis hit by the acquisitions these organizations made in cooperation with the federal government.  Need one mention the acquisitions of Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, and Bear Stearns, among others?

Conglomerates, generally, have never had a history of being great financial performance.  Just putting together different kinds of businesses without any reason, without the possibility of achieving any synergies, has not produced exceptional results.  In most cases the resulting performance of such combination is abysmal.

Given this belief, one really needs to ask a question about the “quality” of the performances recorded before 2007.  The amount of accounting tricks, off-balance sheet “slight of hand”, failure to mark-to-market underwater or bad assets and so on sure made some of these banks look like they were really something.

Yet, when things got tough all this “magic” went away.  Banks even stated that some of the calls for accounting “sanity” caused them all the troubles they ran into.

Again, “If you say the problem is out there, that is the problem.”

In my view, the regulators are never really going to get these organizations under control, make them economically sound.  The pressure to do this must come from the owners, the shareholders.

Eisinger presents three reasons why this is unlikely.  First, a large number of bank owners (institutions) tend to be “passive and conflicted.”  Second, top managers get paid for running larger institutions.  If the banks became smaller, top executive salaries would decline.  Third, the growth in world trade requires large banks to support the large, multinational corporations. 

To me, the only true test is performance.  Can large, multinational banks earn a return that justifies people and institutions investing in them?  Can they earn a 15 percent ROE after taxes through achieving sustainable competitive advantage?  Or, do they need to take on excessive business and financial risk accompanied by accounting “gimmicks” to earn such a return?

I have three immediate responses to this.  First, financial regulators and legislators can never do the job we would like to think they might do.  For one, they are always fighting the last war.  They are still trying to prevent a 2008-2009 crisis from happening again.  In addition, given the changes taking place in information technology, it will be extremely difficult to keep up with everything that is going on in the banking system thereby making these institutions even harder to regulate.

Second, the number of “banks” in the banking system is going to continue to decline.  Small- and medium-sized banks are going to find it harder and harder to find niches that are not being eroded by the Internet, mobile devices, and non-banking organizations.  My prediction has been that America will have less than 4,000 banks in five years and this trend will continue. 

Finally, the best thing that Congress and the regulators can do is to require more openness and transparency in the banking system.  We have seen what accounting tricks, lack of disclosure, and failure to record realistic asset values can do to “pumping” up the banking system.  Required greater disclosure can go a long way toward investor understanding what a bank and its management are doing. 

Also, other tools can be used to bring market instruments into the picture as an early-warning system like the one recently proposed by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales in the journal National Affairs, and “To Regulate Finance, Try the Market” in Foreign Policy.

The regulators are not going to correct the “Too Big To Fail” problem.  Maybe the owners of the “Big” Banks should correct the problem.

The Future of Banking: Dodd-Frank at One Year

Well, we have suffered through one year of the new financial reform act passed in 2010.

“Some critics of the law contend that it skimped on the details, leaving regulatory agencies with too heavy a burden” having to write up the specific new rules and regulations.)  

Of the 400 new rules due from the reglators, only 12 percent have been finalized while 33 percent have missed the deadline set for their finalization.  There are still 55 percent of these rules that have a future deadline.

Barney Frank, co-author of the act, said Congress had no other choice.  “We didn’t punt anything.  It’s precisely because we knew we couldn’t get everything exactly right that we did leave room for the regulators.” (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/barney-frank-financial-overhauls-defender-in-chief/?ref=todayspaper)

Part of this is because Frank…and others…didn’t really know what they were doing.  The article continues “Even he (Frank) concedes that arcane financial matters were never his strong point.” Frank jokes: “I know more now about repos and derivatives than I ever wanted to know.”

The result: we have a Congressional law, the Dodd-Frank Act, aimed at preventing 2008-2009 from happening again, written by people who knew little about banking and finance but had to do something to save the world from the people who ran Wall Street. 

The major concern of Congress was about institutions that were too big to fail.  These “large” banks were to create “living wills” that provided a blueprint of the organization’s operation that would allow regulators to dismantle the bank in an orderly fashion.  (These, of course, have not been written yet.)  And, there were other things about proprietary trading and derivatives and disclosure and so forth.

My conclusion from one year of Dodd-Frank is that the financial industry will survive…in some form…and will do very well over time although not in the way Congress will like.

I must admit, my awareness of the banking and finance industry began in the 1960s.  This was really the first decade that the laws and regulations coming out of the period of the Great Depression were really tested.  The 1940s was a period the United States was focused on war; and the 1950s were devoted toward the country getting back to some kind of normality following an era of world-wide depression and world war.

In the 1960s the fifty-year period of credit inflation got its start and this changed everything.

Since this period has spanned my professional career the evolution that took place is very real to me.  The period started out very calm and contained.  Banks were very limited in what they could do and they were especially constrained geographically.  There were unit banking states where a bank could only have one office; there were limited branching states where a bank could have multiple offices although the number were limited; and there were states that allowed state wide branching.  However, banks could not cross state lines and branch in other states!

There was a definite line between different types of financial institutions.  There were, of course, the commercial banks…and the savings and loan associations…and the mutual savings banks…and the investment banks…and so on and so forth.

The products and services offered by each type of institution were severly limited and closely regulated.  Interest rate ceilings were present to protect depository institutions engaging in “destructive” competition that would weaken the banking system. 

In my mind, two major things occurred as a result of the initiation of credit inflation in the early 1960s.  First, United States corporations grew bigger and bigger.  Second, international flows of capital were freed up from earlier constraints in order to support the growth of world trade. 

The consequence of this was that financial institutions, especially commercial banks, had to break out of their constraints so that they could serve there larger customers, both within the United States and in the world. 

Financial innovation began to roll.  The four biggest financial innovations that took place in the 1960s, I believe, were the formation of bank holding companies, the creation of the negotiable CD, the allowance of bank holding companies to issue banker’s acceptances, and the invention of the Eurodollar deposit.  These innovations basically over came state laws and allowed American commercial banks to become world bankers. 

By the start of the 1970s, state banking restrictions were effectively dead and the freed-up international flow of capital doomed the gold standard which was officially buried by President Richard Nixon on August 15, 1971 when the floated the United States dollar. 

As the credit inflation continued through the last half of the century financial engineering and financial innovation dominated just about everything else other than the growth of information technology.  Perhaps the final nail in the coffin of the 1930s financial regulation was delivered in 1999 as the United States Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  This was the act that separated commercial banking from investment banking into separate organizations.

My point in reviewing this history is to make the claim, again, that “economics works.”  If there is an economic reason for an individual or institution to “get around” laws and regulations, then that individual or institution will “get around” those laws and regulations.  Some laws and regulations will fall earlier than others but these latter laws and regulations will be circumvented over time as there develops more and more reason to do so.

In other posts I have argued that the banks that were too big to fail before are now bigger and more prominent than before the recent crash.  Also, financial institutions have already moved way beyond the “intent” of the Dodd-Frank Act in the areas that have the most economic promise, have “cooled it” in other areas, and in some areas where it has not really been worthwhile for them to fight they have relinquished those minor facilities. 

Especially in this “Information Age” finance and financial arrangements are going to be harder than ever to regulate and police.  Finance is nothing more than information, nothing more than 0s and 1s (see many of my posts in the past) and information can be “sliced and diced” almost any way one wants to slice and dice it and can flow, almost instantaneously, throughout the world.

The only thing of benefit that has come out of the new financial reform act has been some increases in transparency but this has not come anywhere close to the level I would like to see happen. 

These are some of the reasons for my conclusion of one year of Dodd-Frank that the financial system will survive.  However, the system that is evolving will be a lot different than what we see now and a lot different from what the Congress and the regulators would like to see.  Also, I am still predicting that the number of financial institutions in the system will drop below 4,000 (from a little less than 8,000 now) over the next five years. 

Let’s just hope that Congress and the regulators don’t chase most of the finance offshore.    

The Number of Problem Banks Rise in the Third Quarter

The number of problem banks, as listed by the FDIC, continued to rise in the third quarter of 2010. The number went from 829 at the end of the second quarter to 860 in the third quarter.

Forty-one banks failed in the third quarter, an average of about 3.2 banks per week. A total of 149 banks have been closed through the first three quarters of 2010, an average of 3.8 per week. Thus, the pace of bank closings has been relatively steady throughout the year, somewhere between 3 and 4 banks per week.

The total number of FDIC-insured commercial banks in the system was 7,760 at the end of the third quarter. This is down from 7,830 at the end of the second quarter and 8,195 at the end of the second quarter of 2009. So, the number of banks in the system dropped by 70 banks in the third quarter. Since June 30, 2009, the number of banks in the system has fallen by 435.

The decline in the number of banks in the banking system is not all failures as some banks are merged into other banks before the bank is closed by the FDIC. For example, in the third quarter of 2010, 30 mergers took place.

So, the industry is shrinking by bank failings and by the consolidation of healthy banks with banks that are not in very good shape. From June 30, 2009 to June 30, 2010, the number of banks in the banking system dropped by 365 banks, an average of 7 banks per week. In the third quarter of 2010 the number of banks dropped by 70 banks, an average of about 5.5 banks per week.

This fact raises concerns not only about those banks that are listed on the problem list, but what about those banks that are in serious trouble but do not “qualify” to be on the FDIC’s problem list?

How many surprises are out there?

Wilmington Trust, in Wilmington, Delaware, was considered to be doing OK. Then, the bombshell hit. Wilmington Trust ended up being sold at a 45% discount. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/234027-wilmington-trust-sold-at-45-discount.)

How many more banks in the system are facing the same fate as Wilmington Trust?

Earlier this year Elizabeth Warren told Congress that as many as 3,000 commercial banks were facing real problems over the next 18 months.

My prediction is that the total number of banks in the banking system will drop to 4,000 or so over the next five years. This is down from 7,760 at the end of the third quarter of 2010, a reduction in the number of banks of 3,760 banks or of approximately 750 banks per year for the next five years.

There is good news:
“Banks and savings institutions earned $14.5 billion in the third quarter, $12.5 billion more than the industry’s $2 billion profit a year ago, the FDIC said yesterday. The third-quarter income was below the $17.7 billion and $21.4 billion reported in this year’s first and second quarters, but agency officials said the shortfall was attributable to a huge goodwill impairment charge at one institution.

A reduction in loan-loss provisions was the primary factor contributing to third-quarter earnings…. While third-quarter loan-loss provisions were still high, at $34.3 billion, they were $28 billion -- or 44.5 percent -- lower than a year earlier. Net interest income was $8.1 billion -- or 8.1 percent-- higher than a year ago, and realized gains on securities and other assets improved by $7.3 billion, officials said.”

This was from the American Bankers Association release, “Newsbytes”.

But, the good news was not for all sectors of the banking industry. As I have been reporting in my posts, the largest twenty-five banks continue to prosper at the expense of the smaller banks. One must report that the “good news” presented above is for the industry as a whole. For the largest twenty-five banks, the news is “good”. For the other 7, 735 banks…the results are really “not-so-good”.

And this is why the worry is focused on the smaller banks.

We keep getting bits of news like that reported in the NYTimes this morning, “Large Banks Still Have a Financing Advantage” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/business/24views.html?ref=todayspaper):

“What happened to ending ‘too big to fail?’ That was one objective of the financial overhaul bill, the Dodd-Frank Act, that was passed this year. Central to the legislation were rules intended to make big banks less exciting and safer. It also created an authority meant to smoothly wind down even the largest institutions without greatly disrupting the financial system.

Five months after the bill’s passage, big banks should have lost at least some of their financing advantage over smaller rivals. But as the latest quarterly report from the FDIC shows, too big to fail is still very much alive and well.”

The point being made is that the average “cost of funding earning assets” for commercial banks in excess of $10 billion (109 banks out of the 7,760 banks in the system) was 0.80 percent. The average cost of the 7,651 smaller banks was an average of 1.29 percent so that the bigger banks had a 49 basis point advantage over the smaller banks. (Note that the gap was 69 basis points a year ago.)

The average cost of funding earning assets was even lower for the largest 25 banks in the country!

It seems like everything the policy makers are doing is benefitting the largest banks in the country.

And, what is being done for the smaller banks…the other 7,735 banks?

The Federal Reserve is pumping plenty of liquidity into the banking system so that the FDIC can reduce the number of banks in the banking system as smoothly as possible. (See my post “The Real Reason for Fed Easing”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/237834-the-real-reason-for-fed-easing-debasement-inflation.)

In reducing the number of banks in the banking system we don’t want disruptions and we don’t want panic. If this is the goal of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, then they are doing a good job. The bank closure situation has, so far, neither resulted in major disruptions to the financial system or the economy or panic over the state of the banking industry.

The dismantling of the former United States banking system is going quite smoothly, thank you.

The future United States banking system is going to look entirely different. What might that banking system look like? Try the Canadian banking system or the banking system in Great Britain…a few very large banks dominate these systems. Is that what the United States system is going to look like?