Showing posts with label overpriced stock markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label overpriced stock markets. Show all posts

Monday, October 3, 2011

The Banking Mess: It's Not Over Until It's Over


Credit inflation impacts asset values.  In a credit inflation, the expansion of credit takes place at a faster rate of growth than does the rate of increase in the production of the underlying assets.  Credit inflation can create bubbles. This occurred, as we know, in the dot.com bubble of the 1990s and the housing bubble of the 2000s.

The Federal Reserve is desperate to get credit inflation going again. This was the whole point behind the Fed’s QE2 operations.  Now, we have a version of “Operation Twist” an effort to lower longer-term interest rates relative to shorter-term interest rates.   

At present, the only bubbles the Federal Reserve has created have been in foreign assets like commodities and the stocks in emerging markets.

So far, the policy of the Federal Reserve has not been very successful in the way of domestic assets.  Credit expansion in the United States remains moribund.  And, as a consequence, asset prices seem to be remaining level.

Housing prices continue to fall, or, at best, stay relatively constant.  The stock market has gone nowhere.  Year-over-year, the Dow-Jones Average is up just 0.8 percent.  Since the same time in 2007, around the start of the recent recession, the Dow-Jones Average is still down 21.6 percent.

The only major borrowers of any consequence seem to be the largest companies and they seem to be either holding onto the cash or using the cash to repurchase their own stock.  Where once it was felt that these funds would be used for the acquisition of other companies, so far the number of acquisitions taking place have fallen below expectations as the future remains listless and uncertain.

We still have to look at the banking system for any sign of a recovery in credit and the credit inflation cycle.  And, in looking at the banking system, the signs of expansion still are absent.

A start up of bank lending is going to depend upon the status of the banks themselves…and this picture is mixed, at best.

The good news is that the FDIC is closing two of its three temporary offices.  Due to a decline in the amount of bank problems and the severity of those problems, the FDIC has decided that it can handle problem banks primarily out of its permanent offices.  The period of the ramping up of staff and the sending of staff all over the country, seven days of week, seems to be over.

Also, only 74 commercial banks have been closed this year through Friday, September 30.  In 2010 the total number of banks that failed were 157 with 30 closings coming in the fourth quarter of the year.  In 2009 a total of 140 banks failed.   Bank failures are on the wane.

Note that the number of bank failures does not include the decline in the number of banks in business.  For example, since December 31, 2007, 396 commercial banks have failed.  Yet, the number of banks in the banking system declined by 871.  This left the commercial banking system with 6,41 banks in existence. 

Likewise, about 1,000 banks and savings institutions have disappeared since the end of 2007, leaving only 7,513 FDIC insured institutions in existence on June 30, 2011.

And, still there are 865 banks on the FDIC’s list of problem banks at the end of June, down only slightly from a total of 884 at the end of March 2011.

“Camden Fine, president of the Independent Community Bankers of America, a trade group, predicted another 1,000 to 1,500 banks will vanish between now and the end of 2015.” (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576603130578559172.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_2&mg=reno-wsj)

My prediction has been more in the range of a further decline of 2,000 to 2,500 banks.  This will put the total number of commercial banks in the United States below 4,000.  And, I believe that the total number of FDIC insured institutions will drop below 5,000. 

The way that credit inflation works is through the rate of increase in asset prices.  In essence, if asset prices are increasing rapidly, the “real” value of the credit goes down making it much easier for the debtor to handle the increased leverage on his/her balance sheet.  This is, of course, what happened over the last fifty-year period of credit inflation. 

But, credit inflation is a cumulative process.  As people begin to borrow more, asset prices begin to rise.  And, as asset prices rise, borrowing, in real terms, becomes cheaper and so more borrowing takes place.  But, this causes asset prices to rise further, and so on and so forth.

Right now, people and businesses are not borrowing.  They are trying to reduce their debt loads because asset prices are remaining relatively constant or are declining.  The Fed is trying to get to the first stage of the cumulative process…to get people to begin borrowing again.  The commercial banks, especially the small- to medium-sized ones are not contributing to this cycle, either because the people aren’t borrowing or because the banks, because they are in trouble, are not lending. 

And, on top of this the commercial banks face two other problems.

First, the banks are facing a tougher regulatory environment that is resulting in increased costs of doing business.  Either they have to absorb the increased costs…or they have to pass them along to customers.  The debit card fees announced by Bank of America and others are just one result of this.  There is more, a lot more, coming.

Second, the banks are facing further interest margin squeezes due to the Fed’s “Operation Twist.”  Balance sheet arbitrage is dependent upon the ability of the banks to “borrow short” and “lend long.”  If these margins are narrowed because of what the Fed is doing, more pressure will be put on the banks to raise fees in order to survive.  The small- and medium-sized banks will suffer more because of this.

I believe that we need to keep a close eye on the banking system to determine whether or not the economy is going to pick up.  The banking system is still in a troubled state.  If either Camden Fine, of the Independent Community Bankers of America, or myself is correct about the continued decline in the number of banks in the United States, the commercial banking sector has a lot of adjustment to go through over the next four years or so and the focus of the industry will not be on lending. 

On the other side, the Federal Reserve is acting relentless in its efforts to start up credit inflation once again.  And, given the political climate in Washington, D. C. I don’t see any change in this attitude.

The question then becomes, when do we reach the tipping point?  When does the unwillingness of the banks to lend and the unwillingness of families and businesses to borrow lose out to the efforts of the Fed to create the credit inflation it so badly wants?  The problem is that once a tipping point is reached, the cumulative credit cycle buildup begins and I don’t really see how the Fed can prevent this from happening. However, there is no indication that another bout of credit inflation will produce more robust economic growth and job creation.   Still, keep your eye on the banks.

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Asset Values: A Look At The Stock Markets


Over the past year, I have spent a lot of time discussing the problems created by falling house prices and the effect this has on debt levels and personal solvency. Falling house prices have placed many owners in the uncomfortable position of having no equity or negative equity in their homes.

Recently, I wrote a post considering the economic value of small businesses and the impact this is having on the sales of these organizations.  The falling valuations of small businesses have put many owners in a similar position where the equity they have in their businesses has become rather small or has even become negative. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/279506-debt-deflation-and-the-selling-of-small-businesses)

Today in the Financial Times, financial manager and author Andrew Smithers provides us with a look at the valuations attached to larger businesses as represented by their values on stock exchanges.  (See “The Conditions For The Next Crisis Are Firmly In Place”, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f1ff9be8-a3e5-11e0-9f5c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1SZnxOYcr.)

His fundamental conclusion, the US stock market is “overvalued” and this connected with high levels of private sector debt point to a very precarious situation for the economy.  In the US, “private sector debt is 2.6 times gross domestic product, and nearly twice the level reached after the 1929 crash.”

His estimates of the US stock market: it is “about 60 percent overpriced.” 

Smithers comes to this conclusion using two well known measures of stock market valuation: the “q” ratio, “the ratio of market value of non-financial companies to their net worth, adjusted for inflation”; and CAPE, “which is the cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio.”  (The “q” ratio was developed by Nobel-prize winning Yale economist James Tobin and CAPE was developed by current Yale economist Robert Shiller.)

He cautions about the use of the ratio in trying to determine market moves: “Value provides little guide to short-term market movements.” 

“If we are lucky, stock markets will not fall sharply for some time.”

The reason is that when corporations are strong buyers of their own stock, the stock markets stay buoyant.  In fact, “the US stock market has risen and fallen exactly in line with corporate buying.”

Thus, Smithers continues, it is important to “predict whether companies will continue to be strong net buyers of shares in the months ahead.”

A key predictive variable…whether or not companies have “relatively high levels of cash compared with their total debt levels”…which US companies currently possess. 

“Over the past decade, at least, cash ratios have been a leading indicator of equity purchases by firms.” 

But, Smithers warns about the near-record level of debt that corporations hold “whether measured gross or net of cash, and whether compared with net worth or output.”

He says that this fact is “startlingly at variance with the claims frequently made that US company balance sheets are in great shape.”  Smithers argues that the aggregate data are most important here and not the individual balance sheets.

It is here I differ with Smithers.  I have argued over the past year that the economy has split into two components...those companies that are in “good” to “great” shape and have a lot of cash on hand and have even borrowed at the excessively low interest rates to improve their cash positions…and those that are in “bad” to “terrible” shape.  The division is, in essence, between the “haves” and the “have not’s.”

Some big companies are in really good shape financially while many other large- to medium-sized companies are not in very good shape at all.  These well off big companies are “keeping their powder dry”, buying companies here and there, and also purchasing some of their stock.  The others…well…they are really struggling. 

This is one reason merger and acquisition activity has been so strong this year.

But, this situation is also one underwritten by the Fed with very, very low interest rates and quantitative easing.  The “haves” have it all!  The “have not’s” have next to nothing.

So far the Fed’s quantitative easing has kept the stock market going and part of this, as described by Smithers, has been the underwriting of the cash accounts of many of the biggest corporations which has led to a portion of the stock buybacks that have taken place.  (Further gains have been achieved by using the Fed’s money to go “off shore” and get into world commodity and equity markets. See http://seekingalpha.com/article/276909-federal-reserve-money-continues-to-go-offshore.)

Of course, the businesses that are not in “good” financial health cannot engage in these activities.

Thus, the big and better off are fed…and the others must scratch for their survival.

Other than this slight disagreement with Smithers, we can get back to the crux of the story.

The US stock market, according to the two measures discussed here, is overvalued by about 60 percent. 

We cannot predict the exact timing of market movements, but, historically, whenever these measures get so “out-of-line” there has eventually been a correction. 

Smithers places this correction out somewhere in 2013.  Why?  “It’s the first year of the new Chinese government, of the new European stability mechanism, and—most important of all—the first year of the new US government.” 

Wherever the “blow” comes from, corporate cash flows “will almost certainly fall sharply”

Consequently,Smithers asks, “If corporate cash flow drops, who will buy the stock market?”

My question is, “When will the large- and medium-sized firms that are not in good financial shape and that are overvalued have to sell?”  We have seen this phenomenon take place in real estate.  We have seen it take place with the smaller businesses. Given the analysis presented above, this phenomenon is going to spread over the next year or two to even the larger businesses.  And, with market values too high, acquisition prices will be below stock market values, hence the markets will fall.

This is something that fiscal stimulus and quantitative easing cannot offset.  It is a part of the debt deflation process that follows years of credit inflation.