There has been lots of words and press spilled on the recent revelations about who the Federal Reserve “bailed out” during the recent financial crisis. Let me just use one such article to capture some of the attitudes being expressed about this information.
Sebastian Mallaby, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the book “More Money than God”, writes in the Financial Times” (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f5584f2-fe1d-11df-853b-00144feab49a.html#axzz173T61Eok):
“The point is that the Fed bail-outs were hair-raisingly enormous, and that neither the regulators nor the regulated should be allowed to forget that. Wall Street institutions that now walk tall again survived only because the taxpayers saved them. Goldman Sachs turned to the Fed for funding on 84 occasions, and Morgan Stanley did so 212 times; Blackrock, Fidelity, Dreyfus, GE Capital – all of these depended on taxpayer backstops. The message from this data dump is that, two years ago, these too-big-to-fail behemoths drove the world to the brink of a 1930s-style disaster – and that, if regulators don’t break them up or otherwise restrain them, they may do worse next time.”
There doesn’t seem to be much movement afoot to “break them up” at this time, but there has been, and will continue to be, great efforts to “restrain them”. I don’t see the will or the leadership to “break them up”. I have my own views about the ability of the government to “restrain them” but I treat that question elsewhere.
I would like to raise another issue at this time which I believe to be integral to the situation mentioned above.
Discussions about the actions of the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis tend to be completely void of any discussion about the actions of the federal government or the Federal Reserve in creating the environment that resulted in the financial collapse.
Leading up to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was approximated fifty years of governmental actions that created the largest credit inflation in the history of the United States. The gross federal debt of the United States government increased at a compound rate of approximately 9 percent per year from 1961 to the start of the crisis. Monetary policy, throughout this time period, accommodated this growth in debt. And, this period saw the greatest burst of financial innovation and credit creation in world history.
Why did this happen?
Two major reasons: first, the short-run emphasis of the government to sustain high, perhaps unsustainable, levels of employment; second, the goal of the government to put as many Americans in their own home and provide them with a financial “piggybank” to secure their future.
The first reason meant that the government had to keep stimulating the economy to keep people employed in the jobs they had. As a consequence, many American workers did not have the incentive to grow and prepare themselves for the “jobs of the future.” As a consequence, about one out of every four Americans of employment age is “under-employed”! Furthermore, the length of being unemployed has trended upwards from the 1950s and in October 2010 the average duration of unemployment is just about 34 weeks, almost three years. (See “Unemployed and Likely to Stay That Way,” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/business/economy/03unemployed.html?ref=todayspaper.)
The second reason meant that the government had to build programs and provide financial innovation and finance so that more people could own their own homes. The inflation that took place in the real estate sector resulted in home ownership becoming the real “piggybank” of the middle class, producing for them the “best” investment they could experience over this time until, of course, the bubble burst.
The federal government set up the environment and the incentives that everyone else had to live within.
Chuck Prince, the former Chairman and CEO of Citigroup, made the now famous statement that “while the music keeps playing, you must keep dancing.”
The environment created by a government that set the example of “living beyond one’s means” created an almost perfect environment for taking financial risk, mismatching maturities, leveraging up debt, and financial innovation. The “Greenspan Put” during the 1990s and early 2000s sustained this environment by providing downside protection thereby creating greater “moral hazard.” In essence, the federal government “kept the music playing” and businesses, both financial and non-financial, had to “keep dancing” in order to remain competitive.
The question was constantly asked by executives, “How can I get a few more basis points return to be competitive with others in the industry?” The answer within such an environment was more leverage, more risk, and new financial innovations. At least, until the load became too heavy to bear.
But, in the rush to “break” companies up or to regulate and “restrain” them from such activity, most people have forgotten that the whole environment and the incentives set up were created by the same people now interested in breaking up these companies or restraining them.
So, within this call for breaking up these companies and regulating them more closely we hear
the same people calling for more government spending, more tax cuts, more quantitative easy on the part of the central bank, and greater welfare benefits to those that are hurting.
This is why the whole scenario seems to be one of trying to drive your car as fast as you can while at the same time trying to drive your car as safely as possible.
You are stepping on the gas and stepping on the car brakes at the same time!
So, where does this discussion take us? Really nowhere.
In my view, the people calling for the federal government to constantly provide fiscal and monetary stimulus to the economy are still in control and I don’t see their demise anytime soon.
People will try to regulate and restrain the financial sector, but, as I have written many times before, they will not be able to be successful. Given the global nature of finance today and the tools brought to the finance industry by information technology, these attempts to regulate and restrain will not succeed.
And, there will be renewed calls for providing social services and payments for those being hurt by the actions mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs. What is really needed to resolve the problems of the modern economy is of a long term nature and our short-sighted politicians will never implement these solutions, at least, anytime soon.
So, we must continue to face a bumpy ride. Stepping on the gas and the brake pedal at the same time produces such a ride.
Showing posts with label GE Capital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GE Capital. Show all posts
Friday, December 3, 2010
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Households and the Debt Problem
The Federal Reserve released new data on the financial condition of the household sector of the United States. Like other sectors of the economy, the financial condition of this sector has deteriorated over the past year.
The value of household assets dropped about 15% falling from $77.3 trillion to around $65.7 trillion. Most of the decline came from the fall in housing values and in their stock market portfolios.
In terms of household holdings of stocks, the value of the stocks households owned, mutual funds that were held and funds in retirement plans, the loss was $8.5 trillion. That is, the value of stock holdings fell from $20.6 trillion to $12.1 trillion.
Although mortgage credit fell during the year, total household liabilities stayed roughly the same at about $14.2 trillion. This means that debt as a percentage of assets rose from around 18% to 22% during the year (or net worth as a percentage of assets dropped from 82% to 78%).
Mortgage credit at the end of 2008 was $10.5 trillion so that other household liabilities totaled around $3.7 trillion, with consumer credit making up $2.6 trillion of this latter number. Mortgage credit fell during the year, but not because the household sector was trying to get out of mortgage debt. The primary reason for the decline was foreclosures and the reduction in the willingness of financial institutions to lend.
What this means is that households took on increased leverage during the year, not because they wanted to in order to grow their balance sheets, but because of the decrease in the value of their assets and because of the need to borrow due to lower incomes. The increased leverage was a result of the collapse of the mortgage market, in particular, and the economy, in general. The increased leverage just happened—it was not planned.
In order to protect themselves in the face of these changes, households moved assets into cash and cash equivalent accounts. Banks deposits held by households were at about $7.7 trillion at year end.
This is important information for understanding the state of the economy and the contribution the household sector might make toward turning the economy around. The household sector was in free fall in 2008 and was reacting to events, not leading them.
Households took three major shocks last year: first was the decline in housing prices; the second was the rise in unemployment; and the third was the fall in the stock market. Not only was their cash flow significantly hurt, but the value of their assets fell precipitously. They borrowed in an effort to hold on and they became more liquid so as to be prepared for that “rainy day.”
The year 2009 does not look any better than 2008. Housing prices continue to plummet. The stock market has dropped since the first of the year. And, unemployment has ratcheted up. That is, one can assume that the direction observed in the balance sheets of American household in 2008 will continue to be followed this year. Even if the stock market were to stabilize or rise through the rest of the year consumer spending, I believe, will continue to be weak. Even if housing prices stabilize. Even with the implementation of the Obama stimulus plan.
According to the best information we have there are three further shocks looming on the horizon. The first two have to do with the mortgage market: over the next 18 a large amount of Alt-A and Options mortgages are supposed to re-price. Given the weakness in employment that is expected to continue and the lower household incomes, this event could be devastating. And, on top of that credit card delinquencies are rising and these are expected to grow given the financial condition of the household sector.
Consumers will continue to withdraw from the marketplace as they add debt where they can in order to maintain at least a part of their former living standards. Also, consumers will continue to try and become more liquid so that they can be prepared should they need to need cash to tide them over a rough time. Any improvement in the stock market will be met with households selling more stock so as to move the funds into more liquid assets, the rise in the market making it easier for them to get rid of stocks—even at a loss.
And where are the funds going to go that come to households from the Obama recovery plan? My guess is that a good portion of them will go into liquid assets, or into paying down debt. Households are scared right now. They are going to use whatever they have as conservatively as possible. This even goes for those that have some security in their employment condition.
The data that are coming out confirm the strength of the problem that the policy makers face. The United States has a tremendous debt overhang. This debt problem is going to have to be worked off. Economists talk about “the paradox of thrift”, the problem that consumers are not spending at this time and probably will not spend much in the near future, even though if everyone opened up their pocketbooks and spent, everyone would be better off.
This situation is like a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game. If everyone else increases their spending reducing their savings and, willingly, increasing their debt and I don’t follow their lead, then I will be a lot better off that all these other people. But, if everyone else believes as I do and doesn’t reduce their savings and doesn’t increase their debt, then I end up losing big to everyone else. So, as in the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” everyone defaults to the decision to save more where they can and to pay off their debt. The consequence of this will be that consumer spending will remain weak and much effort will be extended, where possible, to work themselves out of debt.
The overall problem is that there is too much debt outstanding. The policy makers are focusing upon stimulating the economy by increasing spending. If the debt overhang is truly too great, then the stimulus package will only have a small multiplier effect on the economy as households try and get their balance sheets back in some kind of order.
Such behavior will not have much affect on the economy, and it will also not have much affect on the stock market. Government policy makers must direct more attention to resolving this debt problem. It seems to me that this is what the financial markets are trying to tell them. As Citigroup and Bank of America claim they are showing some signs of profitability. As General Electric survives a reduction in its credit rating, meaning that GE Capital has more of a chance to re-structure itself. As General Motors indicates that it has reduced costs sufficiently to rescind the request for another $2 billion from the government in March. And, as other financial institutions seek to repay to TARP money they had received last fall, the stock market rebounds.
It is the debt problem that is the big concern of the financial markets. In my opinion, as long as the government policy makers put their primary focus on stimulating spending, the financial markets—and the economy—will continue to flounder. When they refocus on the more crucial problem they will find that the financial markets will be more supportive of what they are doing.
The value of household assets dropped about 15% falling from $77.3 trillion to around $65.7 trillion. Most of the decline came from the fall in housing values and in their stock market portfolios.
In terms of household holdings of stocks, the value of the stocks households owned, mutual funds that were held and funds in retirement plans, the loss was $8.5 trillion. That is, the value of stock holdings fell from $20.6 trillion to $12.1 trillion.
Although mortgage credit fell during the year, total household liabilities stayed roughly the same at about $14.2 trillion. This means that debt as a percentage of assets rose from around 18% to 22% during the year (or net worth as a percentage of assets dropped from 82% to 78%).
Mortgage credit at the end of 2008 was $10.5 trillion so that other household liabilities totaled around $3.7 trillion, with consumer credit making up $2.6 trillion of this latter number. Mortgage credit fell during the year, but not because the household sector was trying to get out of mortgage debt. The primary reason for the decline was foreclosures and the reduction in the willingness of financial institutions to lend.
What this means is that households took on increased leverage during the year, not because they wanted to in order to grow their balance sheets, but because of the decrease in the value of their assets and because of the need to borrow due to lower incomes. The increased leverage was a result of the collapse of the mortgage market, in particular, and the economy, in general. The increased leverage just happened—it was not planned.
In order to protect themselves in the face of these changes, households moved assets into cash and cash equivalent accounts. Banks deposits held by households were at about $7.7 trillion at year end.
This is important information for understanding the state of the economy and the contribution the household sector might make toward turning the economy around. The household sector was in free fall in 2008 and was reacting to events, not leading them.
Households took three major shocks last year: first was the decline in housing prices; the second was the rise in unemployment; and the third was the fall in the stock market. Not only was their cash flow significantly hurt, but the value of their assets fell precipitously. They borrowed in an effort to hold on and they became more liquid so as to be prepared for that “rainy day.”
The year 2009 does not look any better than 2008. Housing prices continue to plummet. The stock market has dropped since the first of the year. And, unemployment has ratcheted up. That is, one can assume that the direction observed in the balance sheets of American household in 2008 will continue to be followed this year. Even if the stock market were to stabilize or rise through the rest of the year consumer spending, I believe, will continue to be weak. Even if housing prices stabilize. Even with the implementation of the Obama stimulus plan.
According to the best information we have there are three further shocks looming on the horizon. The first two have to do with the mortgage market: over the next 18 a large amount of Alt-A and Options mortgages are supposed to re-price. Given the weakness in employment that is expected to continue and the lower household incomes, this event could be devastating. And, on top of that credit card delinquencies are rising and these are expected to grow given the financial condition of the household sector.
Consumers will continue to withdraw from the marketplace as they add debt where they can in order to maintain at least a part of their former living standards. Also, consumers will continue to try and become more liquid so that they can be prepared should they need to need cash to tide them over a rough time. Any improvement in the stock market will be met with households selling more stock so as to move the funds into more liquid assets, the rise in the market making it easier for them to get rid of stocks—even at a loss.
And where are the funds going to go that come to households from the Obama recovery plan? My guess is that a good portion of them will go into liquid assets, or into paying down debt. Households are scared right now. They are going to use whatever they have as conservatively as possible. This even goes for those that have some security in their employment condition.
The data that are coming out confirm the strength of the problem that the policy makers face. The United States has a tremendous debt overhang. This debt problem is going to have to be worked off. Economists talk about “the paradox of thrift”, the problem that consumers are not spending at this time and probably will not spend much in the near future, even though if everyone opened up their pocketbooks and spent, everyone would be better off.
This situation is like a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game. If everyone else increases their spending reducing their savings and, willingly, increasing their debt and I don’t follow their lead, then I will be a lot better off that all these other people. But, if everyone else believes as I do and doesn’t reduce their savings and doesn’t increase their debt, then I end up losing big to everyone else. So, as in the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” everyone defaults to the decision to save more where they can and to pay off their debt. The consequence of this will be that consumer spending will remain weak and much effort will be extended, where possible, to work themselves out of debt.
The overall problem is that there is too much debt outstanding. The policy makers are focusing upon stimulating the economy by increasing spending. If the debt overhang is truly too great, then the stimulus package will only have a small multiplier effect on the economy as households try and get their balance sheets back in some kind of order.
Such behavior will not have much affect on the economy, and it will also not have much affect on the stock market. Government policy makers must direct more attention to resolving this debt problem. It seems to me that this is what the financial markets are trying to tell them. As Citigroup and Bank of America claim they are showing some signs of profitability. As General Electric survives a reduction in its credit rating, meaning that GE Capital has more of a chance to re-structure itself. As General Motors indicates that it has reduced costs sufficiently to rescind the request for another $2 billion from the government in March. And, as other financial institutions seek to repay to TARP money they had received last fall, the stock market rebounds.
It is the debt problem that is the big concern of the financial markets. In my opinion, as long as the government policy makers put their primary focus on stimulating spending, the financial markets—and the economy—will continue to flounder. When they refocus on the more crucial problem they will find that the financial markets will be more supportive of what they are doing.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
The Citigroup "Rally"
The performance of the stock market today, March 10, 2009, I believe, provides us with a clear indication of what is predominantly on the minds of investors. The major concern of investors is the value of the assets that are carried by companies on their books, and especially on the asset values on the balance sheets of financial institutions.
I say this because Citigroup has been the “poster child” of what most investors feel is wrong with the financial markets and the economy. The perception is that Citigroup is so weighed down by assets that are not performing and that must be written down that there is little or no hope for its survival outside of a full takeover by the United States government.
Focus has been so strongly focused on the “asset problem” that other institutions, like Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase & Co., have also been affected with concerns about the value of their assets. As a consequence, the stock price of these and other financial institutions have declined drastically due to the uncertainty as to whether or not they are solvent.
The stock market took off right from the opening bell this morning. The cause—a memo written by Vikram Pandit, the chief executive officer of Citigroup, to employees of his organization indicating that Citigroup had been profitable for the first two months of 2009 and was likely to turn a profit for the first quarter of the year. If this happens it will be a sharp turnaround in performance for the company, a move to the black after five consecutive quarterly losses.
There was no indication about any special write-offs or credit losses, but the memo gave hope to the idea that Citigroup, even after such write-downs, would post a profit for the first quarter.
The hope that was forthcoming, I believe, is the hope that Citigroup will now be operationally in the black going forward and that this kind of performance would give them the time and cushion to continue to work off bad assets and take more modest charge-offs against profits in the future.
The hope is certainly not that Citigroup is “out-of-the-woods.” That would be too much to hope for. To me, what is captured in the market response is that Citi may still have time and not be forced into some precipitous governmental takeover action.
Now, let me say that this was just one day and just one piece of action released by someone that needs, in the worst way, to give some sort of encouragement to his troops. Tomorrow is another day and there will be more information and more market maneuvering in the future. But, it was a day in which there was a possibility for hope—no matter have small that hope might be.
The problem had been that investors had perceived asset values declining with no bottom to be seen. And, there was no one or no event in sight that might put a stop to this decline.
This is why I believe that the financial markets have not been giving President Obama and his team “good grades” on their efforts to craft an economic policy and a bank rescue bill. The economic recovery plan was proposed and passed by Congress, yet there was no “bounce” in the market due to this program. So far, any bank rescue bill talked about or outlined has been deemed a dud.
It is this latter failure that the financial markets have been reacting to. To the financial markets the concern over asset values has dominated everything else. The recovery plan does not address this issue and so does not provide any confidence to investors over possible bankruptcies and takeovers related to institutions that are insolvent due to the bad assets on their books. Expenditures on infrastructure and education and health care and so on are one thing, but a stimulus package like the one that passed Congress cannot prevent a collapse of the financial system as the value of assets plummet and are recognized.
And, so the memo relating to the two-month performance of Citigroup hit the market and gave investors some encouragement that there might be some possibility that the problem related to asset values maybe…just maybe…could be worked out. And this attitude spread to other companies and other areas in the stock market.
We see that the stock of Bank of America Corp. rose 28 percent, the stock of JPMorgan Chase & Co. rose 23 percent, and the stocks of PNC Financial Services and Morgan Stanley increased by double digit numbers. Of especial interest is that the stock of GE rose by 20 percent reflecting the spillover of the positive attitude given to the banks was also given to GE and the concern over the fate of GE Capital.
Again, all of these companies have seen the price of their stocks decline in the past six months or so because of the concern over the value of their assets.
As mentioned, stocks rose from the opening bell, seemingly responding to the contents of the Pandit memo. But, the market responded to other news that they interpreted in a positive manner.
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke gave a speech that reinforced the “good news” coming out of Citigroup. In this speech, Bernanke discussed the need for moving onto a new regulatory system. The part of his statement that market participants focused upon was Bernanke’s claim that the accounting rules that govern how companies value their assets needed to be changed. The Fed Chairman was careful to say that he did not believe that the mark-to-market accounting rules should be changed. Still he did talk about how asset values should be treated and investors reacted to this in a positive way. Again, the focus of the market was on asset values and little else.
There was one other bit of news that the financial markets reacted to in a positive way and that was the comment of Barney Frank about the “up-tick” rule. This statement, although important in itself, was only a side-show in the movement of the stock market today. Its just that when the good news is poring in, look out!
The important take away about the performance of the stock market today is that the major focus of the investment community is on the value of the assets on the balance sheets of banks and other organizations in this country. This message should be read loud and clear by the Obama administration. Spending plans are fine, but the recovery of the country depends very heavily on what is done about the value of the assets on the books of banks and other organizations and how losses in value are going to be worked off.
This is important too because of what is on coming in the future. It seems as if the credit problem is going to accelerate as the defaults rise on credit card debt, as interest rates need to be reset on Alt-A and option payment mortgages over the next 18 months or so, and the looming bust in the commercial real estate market. The asset value issue is not going to go away soon.
So, we got a rise in the stock market. We may get several more in the next week or so. I don’t believe anyone can predict the movement in the stock market over the coming six months. There are still too many uncertainties. And, even if the stock market were to rise over the next six months, my bet is that the asset valuation problem is still going to be with us. And, in all likelihood it will still be with us next year at this time.
I say this because Citigroup has been the “poster child” of what most investors feel is wrong with the financial markets and the economy. The perception is that Citigroup is so weighed down by assets that are not performing and that must be written down that there is little or no hope for its survival outside of a full takeover by the United States government.
Focus has been so strongly focused on the “asset problem” that other institutions, like Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase & Co., have also been affected with concerns about the value of their assets. As a consequence, the stock price of these and other financial institutions have declined drastically due to the uncertainty as to whether or not they are solvent.
The stock market took off right from the opening bell this morning. The cause—a memo written by Vikram Pandit, the chief executive officer of Citigroup, to employees of his organization indicating that Citigroup had been profitable for the first two months of 2009 and was likely to turn a profit for the first quarter of the year. If this happens it will be a sharp turnaround in performance for the company, a move to the black after five consecutive quarterly losses.
There was no indication about any special write-offs or credit losses, but the memo gave hope to the idea that Citigroup, even after such write-downs, would post a profit for the first quarter.
The hope that was forthcoming, I believe, is the hope that Citigroup will now be operationally in the black going forward and that this kind of performance would give them the time and cushion to continue to work off bad assets and take more modest charge-offs against profits in the future.
The hope is certainly not that Citigroup is “out-of-the-woods.” That would be too much to hope for. To me, what is captured in the market response is that Citi may still have time and not be forced into some precipitous governmental takeover action.
Now, let me say that this was just one day and just one piece of action released by someone that needs, in the worst way, to give some sort of encouragement to his troops. Tomorrow is another day and there will be more information and more market maneuvering in the future. But, it was a day in which there was a possibility for hope—no matter have small that hope might be.
The problem had been that investors had perceived asset values declining with no bottom to be seen. And, there was no one or no event in sight that might put a stop to this decline.
This is why I believe that the financial markets have not been giving President Obama and his team “good grades” on their efforts to craft an economic policy and a bank rescue bill. The economic recovery plan was proposed and passed by Congress, yet there was no “bounce” in the market due to this program. So far, any bank rescue bill talked about or outlined has been deemed a dud.
It is this latter failure that the financial markets have been reacting to. To the financial markets the concern over asset values has dominated everything else. The recovery plan does not address this issue and so does not provide any confidence to investors over possible bankruptcies and takeovers related to institutions that are insolvent due to the bad assets on their books. Expenditures on infrastructure and education and health care and so on are one thing, but a stimulus package like the one that passed Congress cannot prevent a collapse of the financial system as the value of assets plummet and are recognized.
And, so the memo relating to the two-month performance of Citigroup hit the market and gave investors some encouragement that there might be some possibility that the problem related to asset values maybe…just maybe…could be worked out. And this attitude spread to other companies and other areas in the stock market.
We see that the stock of Bank of America Corp. rose 28 percent, the stock of JPMorgan Chase & Co. rose 23 percent, and the stocks of PNC Financial Services and Morgan Stanley increased by double digit numbers. Of especial interest is that the stock of GE rose by 20 percent reflecting the spillover of the positive attitude given to the banks was also given to GE and the concern over the fate of GE Capital.
Again, all of these companies have seen the price of their stocks decline in the past six months or so because of the concern over the value of their assets.
As mentioned, stocks rose from the opening bell, seemingly responding to the contents of the Pandit memo. But, the market responded to other news that they interpreted in a positive manner.
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke gave a speech that reinforced the “good news” coming out of Citigroup. In this speech, Bernanke discussed the need for moving onto a new regulatory system. The part of his statement that market participants focused upon was Bernanke’s claim that the accounting rules that govern how companies value their assets needed to be changed. The Fed Chairman was careful to say that he did not believe that the mark-to-market accounting rules should be changed. Still he did talk about how asset values should be treated and investors reacted to this in a positive way. Again, the focus of the market was on asset values and little else.
There was one other bit of news that the financial markets reacted to in a positive way and that was the comment of Barney Frank about the “up-tick” rule. This statement, although important in itself, was only a side-show in the movement of the stock market today. Its just that when the good news is poring in, look out!
The important take away about the performance of the stock market today is that the major focus of the investment community is on the value of the assets on the balance sheets of banks and other organizations in this country. This message should be read loud and clear by the Obama administration. Spending plans are fine, but the recovery of the country depends very heavily on what is done about the value of the assets on the books of banks and other organizations and how losses in value are going to be worked off.
This is important too because of what is on coming in the future. It seems as if the credit problem is going to accelerate as the defaults rise on credit card debt, as interest rates need to be reset on Alt-A and option payment mortgages over the next 18 months or so, and the looming bust in the commercial real estate market. The asset value issue is not going to go away soon.
So, we got a rise in the stock market. We may get several more in the next week or so. I don’t believe anyone can predict the movement in the stock market over the coming six months. There are still too many uncertainties. And, even if the stock market were to rise over the next six months, my bet is that the asset valuation problem is still going to be with us. And, in all likelihood it will still be with us next year at this time.
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
A Case Study in Unknown Asset Values: A. I. G.
My blog of March 1, 2009, “Uncertain Asset Values and the Stock Market” (http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/), was written before the most recent news surfaced about the continuing bailout of A. I. G. I believe that the example of A. I. G. represents a perfect ‘test case’ for what was presented in that post.
The March 1 blog contended that the major uncertainty facing the investment community…and the Federal Government…is the value of assets on the books of many of the nations businesses…especially many large and important firms that are “too big to fail.” The argument is that this uncertainty has to be cleared up as much as possible before the economy is really going to have a chance to regain its health.
The problem now is that not only are companies withholding information from the investing public…but the government is also withholding information from the investing public. Specifically, companies…and the government…are afraid to release information on who they are dealing with…the “web of counterparties”…because of their concern that the release of these names would cause a panic leading to deposit withdrawals or the cashing in of insurance policies and so forth.
This is the old “after-the-fact” problem. I used to be a part of “information sessions” for journalists to help them understand banking and the issues that surrounded the banking industry. One of the concerns that always came up at these sessions was about what responsibilities “the press” had in reporting on troubled banks. That is, if a journalist “knew” that a bank was in trouble…what responsibility did that person have to report that the bank was having problems…and thus, perhaps, cause a “run” on the bank.
This is an “after-the-fact” problem. The bank is already a troubled bank…now what do I do?
One of the arguments I made was that journalists should keep up closely enough with banks to report when banks were starting to experience difficulties. By making this information public, the press could help prevent the bank getting too far into a mess because it would want to avoid the bad publicity and work to rectify the difficulties before they got “out-of-hand.”
This, of course, was very difficult because of the insufficient reporting requirements applied to banks and the secrecy surrounding the regulatory examinations. And, if banks knew that they were being scrutinized that closely by “the press” they would certainty make it just that much more difficult for the “outsiders” to obtain information.
So, investors and communities had little information on financial institutions that were important to them and had to “trust” the regulatory agencies to apply the appropriate oversight to the banking system. Of course, the regulatory agencies did not always have “full information”, especially as the financial conglomerates began transacting in very sophisticated derivative securities and taking many assets “off balance sheet.”
I believe that the company A. I. G. is a striking picture of how this scenario played out. A. I. G. is a holding company that began as an insurance company and then diversified itself into a financial conglomerate that included a hedge fund and other “black box” investment vehicles. Their primary regulators were the state insurance regulators (and some international regulatory requirements) and the state laws caused the subsidiaries to be highly segregated so as to ensure the safety of those the insurance subsidiary had insured.
The rest of the company was not regulated to any degree. As a consequence, A. I. G. was able to build up a huge financial conglomerate that could engage in untold transactions that were both un-regulated…and un-disclosed! The accounting and reporting rules were such that investors…and the public…and the government…and even other areas within the company did not have any idea about the risk exposure of the holding company or the “spider-web” of relationships that made it a potential “carrier of contagion.”
And, we…and the government…still don’t know what the potential damage could be from this dismal situation!
As a consequence, the probability of a fifth (this last bailout was the fourth return to A. I. G.) is a lot higher than we would like it to be. And a sixth? And a seventh?
With the government owning almost 80% of the company it would seem like any additional funds would be relatively small.
But, that is the problem…we don’t know! No one seems to have a handle on the value of the A. I. G. assets!
And, as I argued in “Uncertain Asset Values and the Stock Market”, this problem exists throughout the economy. What about the assets of Citigroup? What about the assets of Bank of America? Again, to quote the earlier blog, “It is not altogether clear that even the people running a large part of this economy have any idea about the value of their own assets.” Again, I take A. I. G. as the example.
And, then we have General Electric…and the problems of GE Capital. Again…we have another conglomerate with few pieces that go together. For years, GE Capital carried the rest of General Electric. And, what happens if you have one subsidiary making up for the “not-so-good” performance of other subsidiaries? You put more and more pressure on the performing subsidiary to produce exceptional results. And, how do you do that? You take riskier assets into your portfolio and you increase leverage. Simple!
Now, GE Capital is suffering along with other financial companies that attempted to extend “exceptional” returns. And, with GE Capital failing to perform…the spotlight is being focused on all the other subsidiaries that were only mediocre performers. Consequently, General Electric must face the value of ALL of its companies and determine what are the asset values under its umbrella.
This, to me, is the picture that is unfolding…and the problems we face are not going to be resolved until we get a better grasp on asset values. But, we need to do this quickly because…and this is the problem of bad assets…the value keeps dropping if the difficulties are not resolved. This is true of bad assets in an individual institution…I saw this over and over again in the banks I helped turnaround…and it is true with the financial and economic system. In fact, that is the problem with a contagion…bad assets tend to play off of bad assets…and the difficulties cumulate. This is all the more reason for attempting to get a handle on asset values as soon as possible.
A $787 billion economic recovery plan is insufficient to overcome the possibilities of a multi-trillion dollar write-down of assets!
The March 1 blog contended that the major uncertainty facing the investment community…and the Federal Government…is the value of assets on the books of many of the nations businesses…especially many large and important firms that are “too big to fail.” The argument is that this uncertainty has to be cleared up as much as possible before the economy is really going to have a chance to regain its health.
The problem now is that not only are companies withholding information from the investing public…but the government is also withholding information from the investing public. Specifically, companies…and the government…are afraid to release information on who they are dealing with…the “web of counterparties”…because of their concern that the release of these names would cause a panic leading to deposit withdrawals or the cashing in of insurance policies and so forth.
This is the old “after-the-fact” problem. I used to be a part of “information sessions” for journalists to help them understand banking and the issues that surrounded the banking industry. One of the concerns that always came up at these sessions was about what responsibilities “the press” had in reporting on troubled banks. That is, if a journalist “knew” that a bank was in trouble…what responsibility did that person have to report that the bank was having problems…and thus, perhaps, cause a “run” on the bank.
This is an “after-the-fact” problem. The bank is already a troubled bank…now what do I do?
One of the arguments I made was that journalists should keep up closely enough with banks to report when banks were starting to experience difficulties. By making this information public, the press could help prevent the bank getting too far into a mess because it would want to avoid the bad publicity and work to rectify the difficulties before they got “out-of-hand.”
This, of course, was very difficult because of the insufficient reporting requirements applied to banks and the secrecy surrounding the regulatory examinations. And, if banks knew that they were being scrutinized that closely by “the press” they would certainty make it just that much more difficult for the “outsiders” to obtain information.
So, investors and communities had little information on financial institutions that were important to them and had to “trust” the regulatory agencies to apply the appropriate oversight to the banking system. Of course, the regulatory agencies did not always have “full information”, especially as the financial conglomerates began transacting in very sophisticated derivative securities and taking many assets “off balance sheet.”
I believe that the company A. I. G. is a striking picture of how this scenario played out. A. I. G. is a holding company that began as an insurance company and then diversified itself into a financial conglomerate that included a hedge fund and other “black box” investment vehicles. Their primary regulators were the state insurance regulators (and some international regulatory requirements) and the state laws caused the subsidiaries to be highly segregated so as to ensure the safety of those the insurance subsidiary had insured.
The rest of the company was not regulated to any degree. As a consequence, A. I. G. was able to build up a huge financial conglomerate that could engage in untold transactions that were both un-regulated…and un-disclosed! The accounting and reporting rules were such that investors…and the public…and the government…and even other areas within the company did not have any idea about the risk exposure of the holding company or the “spider-web” of relationships that made it a potential “carrier of contagion.”
And, we…and the government…still don’t know what the potential damage could be from this dismal situation!
As a consequence, the probability of a fifth (this last bailout was the fourth return to A. I. G.) is a lot higher than we would like it to be. And a sixth? And a seventh?
With the government owning almost 80% of the company it would seem like any additional funds would be relatively small.
But, that is the problem…we don’t know! No one seems to have a handle on the value of the A. I. G. assets!
And, as I argued in “Uncertain Asset Values and the Stock Market”, this problem exists throughout the economy. What about the assets of Citigroup? What about the assets of Bank of America? Again, to quote the earlier blog, “It is not altogether clear that even the people running a large part of this economy have any idea about the value of their own assets.” Again, I take A. I. G. as the example.
And, then we have General Electric…and the problems of GE Capital. Again…we have another conglomerate with few pieces that go together. For years, GE Capital carried the rest of General Electric. And, what happens if you have one subsidiary making up for the “not-so-good” performance of other subsidiaries? You put more and more pressure on the performing subsidiary to produce exceptional results. And, how do you do that? You take riskier assets into your portfolio and you increase leverage. Simple!
Now, GE Capital is suffering along with other financial companies that attempted to extend “exceptional” returns. And, with GE Capital failing to perform…the spotlight is being focused on all the other subsidiaries that were only mediocre performers. Consequently, General Electric must face the value of ALL of its companies and determine what are the asset values under its umbrella.
This, to me, is the picture that is unfolding…and the problems we face are not going to be resolved until we get a better grasp on asset values. But, we need to do this quickly because…and this is the problem of bad assets…the value keeps dropping if the difficulties are not resolved. This is true of bad assets in an individual institution…I saw this over and over again in the banks I helped turnaround…and it is true with the financial and economic system. In fact, that is the problem with a contagion…bad assets tend to play off of bad assets…and the difficulties cumulate. This is all the more reason for attempting to get a handle on asset values as soon as possible.
A $787 billion economic recovery plan is insufficient to overcome the possibilities of a multi-trillion dollar write-down of assets!
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