European Defaults: Portugal is Next After Greece

It ain’t over until it’s over…

The yield on the 10-year Portuguese government bond closed above 14.80 percent yesterday, a new record for the euro-era. 

“The markets are pricing in a Portuguese default with 10-year bonds trading at about 50 percent of par, a deeply distressed level in the eyes of many investors.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/49916f7a-468a-11e1-89a8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kTbnc8Yy)

“Friday the 13^th may be an unlucky omen for Portugal.  On that day, almost two weeks ago, Standard & Poor’s became the last rating agency to downgrade Lisbon to junk, marking the moment for many investors when default looked inevitable for Portugal as well as Greece.” 

For more on this see my post on blogspot “Credit Downgrades and Europe” for January 16, 2012. (http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/).

The downward spiral in defaults will continue as long as Europe fails to honestly face its problems. (See my post on blogspot for January 25, 2012 titled “How Long Will Europe Continue to Lie to Itself”: http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/.)  

In the past, analysts, including myself, tried to explain what officials in Europe were doing by casually remarking that their actions amounted to “kicking the can down the road.”  Basically, the actions of the European officials were an effort to postpone dealing with the real issues, hoping that by delaying what was needed to be done the situation would eventually correct itself.

Now, it seems that the days of “kicking the can down the road” are reaching a climax. 

European officials hope to reach a deal on the Greek debt situation by the end of this month.  The current write down seems to be somewhere around 50 percent of face value, but there still remain issues to be decided like whether or not the European Central Bank will have to write down the Greek debt it has on its books. 

Bond markets have responded to this reality by dumping Portuguese debt.  Note that the yield on the ten-year government bond was about 10.40 percent (compared with 14.80 percent yesterday) around the middle of November, a time when it still seemed that maybe the European Union might be able to pull things together and avoid a Greek default. 

As the officials of Europe finally seriously travelled down the path to restructure Greed debt, the price of Portuguese debt started to weaken.  The price declines accelerated, as the possibility of a Greek write-down became more of a reality.  Today, the yield on the 10-year bond was around 15.00 percent.

I know that governmental officials hate to give in on these write-downs because they hate to concede to the “bond markets” and “speculators”. 

It is hard for governmental officials to admit that maybe the “bond markets” and the “speculators” might be right. 

It is a very difficult lesson for governmental officials to accept the fact that they cannot continue to cater to their constituencies with jobs and other benefits ad infinitum.  Over the longer-run, either taxes have to be raised or money has to be printed because the bond markets will not continue to underwrite debt that will be repaid, both principal and interest, by the issuance of more debt.

The economist Hy Minsky referred to this kind of debt financing as a “Ponzi” scheme.

 “Ponzi” schemes come to an end and the end cannot just be blamed on the “bond markets’ and the “speculators”.  In fact, the governments just line the pockets of the “bond markets” and the “speculators” by extending their uncontrolled spending until the collapse of the market becomes a “sure thing.” 

So the charade continues and Portugal seems to be next. 

Who will follow Portugal?  Spain…or Italy…who knows?

Yet, this is not the only concern that many of these officials are facing.  The austerity programs enacted by governments throughout Europe are not setting well with the people.  There is “discontent” and “upheaval” arising in many countries.

“The only consistent messages seem to be that leaders around the world are failing to deliver on their citizens’ expectations and that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media tools allow crowds to coalesce at will to let them know it.  That is not a comforting picture for the 40 heads of state  or leaders of governments who are attending the World Economic Forum (in Davos, Switzerland)…”  (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/world/europe/across-the-world-leaders-brace-for-discontent-and-upheaval.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=across%20the%20world,%20leaders%20brace%20for%20discontent%20and%20upheaval&st=cse)

The situation is quite uncomfortable.  But this is what happens when you fail to deal with a problem…when you continually try to “kick the can down the road.”  The situation does not go away and the delay in dealing with the situation often turns out messier than if the situation had been dealt with earlier. 

The only way for the officials to resolve a condition like this is to get in front of it.  I don’t see anyone around in a position to do this.  The only real possibility is Merkel but the resentment that already exists against Germany makes it that much more difficult for her to achieve what is needed. 

If no leader arises then the defaults will continue…and the austerity will grow…as will the “discontent” and the “upheaval.” 

“Europe risks being handicapped if it doesn’t deal decisively with this challenge to democracy.”  Thought provoking way to end the New York Times article.    

Credit Downgrades and Europe

The problem is the free flow of capital throughout most of the world. 

When capital flows freely you cannot escape the consequences of your actions.

What is called the “trilemma” problem of international economics makes this very clear.  The “trilemma” problem states that a country can only choose two of the following three options.  The three options are to be a part of world capital markets where capital flows freely; have a fixed exchange rate; or, be free to run an independent economic policy.

If there is a free flow of capital internationally, then the choice is reduced to just one of the two remaining options.  But, there are consequences to either choice.

First, if a country choses to run its economic policy independently of all other nations, then it must let it currency float in the foreign exchange markets.  Generally, a nation that wants to run an independent economic policy has particular domestic economic goals it wants to achieve and so wants to be able to choose an independent economic policy that supports these goals.

The goals most often chosen in the latter part of the twentieth century have been full employment and social welfare programs like government jobs, early retirement, substantial amounts of vacation, and high pension levels.  The means of achieving these goals has often been a policy of public sector credit inflation. 

If a country chooses the path of credit inflation then the price of its currency in foreign exchange markets must be allowed to float.  And, if credit inflation becomes extreme, the value of the currency in the foreign exchange markets will decline.  And, this will bring on other problems. 

This is one reason John Maynard Keynes wanted restrictions on the international flow of capital in the 1920s and 1930s. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/167893-john-maynard-keynes-and-international-relations-economic-paths-to-war-and-peace-by-donald-markwell)   A limited flow of capital internationally was a reality when Keynes helped to craft the Bretton Woods agreement that created the rules for the post-World War II international monetary system.  This agreement also included fixed exchange rates between the currencies of the participant nations. 

The purpose of this system was to allow member countries to follow their own economic policies aimed at achieving high levels of employment in their own country.  Therefore, a policy of credit inflation could be followed in each country without disrupting changes in foreign currency rates.

The Bretton Woods system fell apart as international capital markets opened up in the 1950s and 1960s and the credit inflation created in the United States in the 1960s resulted in a situation where the United States could not maintain its fixed exchange rate.  On August 15, 1971, President Nixon choose to float the value of the U. S. dollar.

A second choice, given the unrestricted flow of capital internationally, is to choose a fixed exchange rate.  But, if a nation chooses a fixed exchange rate then it must give up its sovereignty with respect to running an economic policy that is independent of other nations. 

This is what the European nations did when they choose to form a monetary union based on a single currency, the euro: in essence, they choose to have a fixed exchange rate between member nations.  But, the nations forming the union did not want to give up their sovereignty with regards to the formation of their government budgets. 

Oh, they allowed for budget deficits to be run, but they were to be limited in scope.  This, they felt, gave the included nations some flexibility in creating their budgets, but, they were not supposed to exceed the set limits.  The problem was that these limits were unenforceable. 

Which brings us to the current time.  Budget limits have been grossly exceeded and the nations forming the European currency union and these eurozone nations are unable…or unwilling…to give up the sovereignty of running their own economic policy or abiding by the rules of the union.

The “trilemma” analysis states very clearly that in circumstances like this the monetary union must be broken up and the countries must form a central budgetary unit or must once again establish their own currency units whose price will be floated against the other currencies of the former eurozone countries. 

The ultimate cost of running independent economic policies and trying to run a single currency monetary union will be the destruction of the sovereign political bodies as we know them in Europe or the euro, as we know it now, will have to become history.

Current events now relate to the break down of solvency talks, which had been taking place between the Greek government and private investors in Greek debt.  An “unrealistic” proposal has been rejected by the debt holders.     

Furthermore, the credit downgrades of France and other nations, which took place over the past week, were expected, yet no one really exhibited any sense of urgency.   Now that the downgrades have taken place a downward spiral seems to be starting.

“Both events are important because they show us the mechanism behind this year’s likely unfolding of events.  The eurozone has fallen into a spiral of downgrades, falling economic output, rising debt and further downgrades.  A recession has started.  Greece is now likely to default on most of its debts and may even have to leave the eurozone.  When that happens, the spotlight will fall immediately on Portugal, and the next contagious round of downgrades will begin.” (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/987fd2fe-3ddc-11e1-91ba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1jd5VycTs)

The European Financial Stability Facility has also been downgraded and this means that its effective lending capacity has been reduced.  The ability to “bailout” distressed countries has declined.  And, the European Central Bank cannot resolve the longer-term issues.  There is very little still available to the European officials to “kick the can down the road” any more.

I just do not see the European countries at this time getting over their resistance to form “a strong central fiscal authority with power to tax and allocate resources across the eurozone.”  Hence, I don’t have much confidence for the continued existence of a common currency for Europe, except maybe, on a much more limited scale.  Right now, I don’t see alternatives to the downward spiral mentioned above.

The bottom line is that the conditions of the “trilemma” problem seem to hold.  Given that capital is flowing freely throughout the world nations cannot just totally ignore the consequences of their choice of economic policy.  And, if the consequences of that economic policy are not realized immediately, the evidence shows that they will be realized sooner or later.  This is a lesson in macroeconomic decision-making that all countries need to take into account when determining what economic policy they should be following.  Are you listening America?