European Bankers Balk at Big Write Downs

In my experience there are three ways for bankers with “bad” assets to move on.  First, the bank can “work out” the bad assets, but this takes time and in some cases a lot of luck.  The “lot of luck” component of this solution often refers to a recovery of the economy, local or national, that lifts up all asset values and brings the value of the “bad” assets more in line with the accounting values that exist on a banks’ balance sheet.

The second way is to get someone else to take over the “bad” assets.  Can the bankers find a “sucker” to acquire the “bad assets” at a price near book value and relieve the bank of the need to write down the value of the asset?  There are “suckers” out there, but the “suckers” then have the problem of having an overvalued asset on their balance sheet.  Of course, in some cases, the “sucker” turns out to be the government…or, should we say the “sucker” turns out to be the taxpayer. 

Third, the bank can write down the assets to a realistic value and get on with business. 

The first way is what bankers generally try to do.  Bankers are notorious for their optimism concerning the value of the assets on their balance sheets.  “We just need a little more time and everything will be fine.”  “The borrower just had some bad luck, but is getting things back in order.”  “The economy is improving and we just have to hold on until things get better.”  Of course, in the case of bonds on the balance sheet: “We plan to hold on to them until maturity.” 

In many cases, the old line applies: “People told to smile because things could be worse, so I smiled and sure enough things got worse.”

When the hole gets deeper the problem becomes more severe. 

I have successfully completed three bank turnarounds in my professional career and my general impression is that bankers tend to “look the other way” and postpone dealing with their problems, particularly when the problems pile up.  In many cases, the time runs out and the bank either has to be sold or taken over or has to be closed.

In terms of the second avenue, “suckers” are all around.  However, in the case of one bank “selling” a “bad asset” to another investor, the bank escapes the problem of dealing with an overvalued asset, but the “system” does not get rid of the overvalued asset.  It still has to be dealt with.  In the case of the government (Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) buying the asset, or, as in the case of the FDIC closing a bank, or, in the case where the government “bails out” a company or an industry and sets up a company with the “bad assets, the government must absorb the difference between the accounting value of the asset and the market value of the asset.  The losses incurred in this way must be paid by the taxpayer over time. 

Admitting one made a mistake and writing down the value of assets is the only way for a bank to really get on with business.  This is a hard thing to do, but to recognize the problem early on and deal with the problem as soon as possible is the only way to allow the bank to get back to the business as usual.  If bankers take the first or second route mentioned above, they lose focus and their performance suffers. 

This is why I am such an advocate of banks marking their assets to market on a regular basis.  It forces them to address their problems as early as possible and after facing their problems head on, they can then turn their focus back to what they should be doing, making loans and building their customer base. 

Even in the case of the bankers buying long-term securities with short-term funds: bankers are doing this to increase the interest rate spread they earn.  They are intentionally taking on interest rate risk in order to improve their performance.  To me it is disingenuous for these bankers to act surprised and perplexed when interest rates rise and the market value of their long-term securities drop relative to their accounting value.

The problems bankers face related to overvalued assets can never really go away until the bankers fully embrace the situation and write down the value of their assets to realistic values.  The asset values must be written down to a level that, at least, eliminates the uncertainty about whether or not the bankers are fully recognizing the problem.

This is one of the freedoms of coming into a troubled situation to “turnaround” a bank.  The “turnaround” specialist can assume a “worst case” scenario and write down assets sufficiently to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the value of the assets.  If the “turnaround” specialist does not do this, he or she is only creating further problems for themselves sometime down the road.  It is the only way to move on!

European banks still appear to be somewhere in the middle of these three paths to the future.  See, for example, the piece “Bankers Balk at EU push for Bigger Greek Losses” in Bloomberg this morning. (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-16/bankers-balk-at-eu-push-for-bigger-greek-losses-higher-capital.html)

The problems faced by the European banks are huge.  The problems faced by European governments are huge.  The lack of fiscal discipline on the part of European governments for the past fifty years or so has caught up with both the governments and the banks that supported this deficiency.  Now, the governments and the banks find that they cannot continue to ignore the problem and hope for things to get better.  Furthermore, the governments and the banks cannot just push the problems off on the taxpayers.

Still they continue to hold out!

The only way the Europeans can resolve their current difficulties is to “bite the bullet” and accept the fact that several of the governments in Europe are insolvent and that the value of the sovereign debt issued by these governments must be written down to values that will eliminate the uncertainty pertaining to whether or not the governments are really accepting the severity of the problem. 

A difficulty inherent in this solution, however, is that the European Union may have to become more politically unified.  Letting the EU dissolve at this time is almost unthinkable and would end up, I believe, in an unconscionable banking catastrophe for the continent.  This may be the “unforeseen consequence” of the formation of the EU…that the crisis resulting from the way the union was initially set up may result in the nations of the EU forming a more unified political structure.  Imagine…

But, the financial problems will not go away as long as those running the governments of Europe continue to face up to the real issues and then deal with them.  The real issues relate to the fiscal irresponsibility of several of the European nations and the consequent insolvency that has resulted.  This insolvency is threatening the insolvency of the European banking system.

Unless this reality is accepted and acted upon, the crisis will just continue to play itself out. 

FDIC Bill for Loan Losses at Failed Banks to Reach $30 Billion

The good news is that the FDIC payments to those organizations and institutions buying failed banks during the present crisis are smaller than the regulatory officials anticipated. The FDIC has paid out $8.89 billion to “cover losses” at 165 banking institutions that have failed during the recent financial crisis. (See Wall Street Journal article: http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704396504576204752754667840.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_0&mg=reno-wsj.)

The reason for this good news, I believe, is the monetary policy followed by the Federal Reserve over the past three years, now captured in the quaint symbol QE2. Excess reserves pumped into the banking system by the Fed now total around $1.3 trillion.

I have argued for at least a year-and-a-half now, that the Federal Reserve is pumping all these reserves into the banking system to help the FDIC close banks in an orderly manner. The basic premise is that if the Fed can provide sufficient “liquidity” to the financial markets in order to maintain the value of financial assets it wil give the FDIC breathing room to close banks as rapidly as they can without causing major disruptions to the many other troubled banks in the system.

The Federal Reserve has argued that it has pumped all these reserves into the banking system to help stimulate the economy. The economic recovery has almost reached its two-year anniversary, although there is general dissatisfaction with the speed of the recovery, and looks likely to extend beyond this milestone.

However, the recovery seems to have taken place without the Fed’s help except for the argument that there have not been further disruptions to the recovery due to major cumulative banking failures. Certainly, one cannot argue that the Fed’s actions have provided banks with the incentives to increase their lending activity for they have not. Commercial banks are still sitting on the money.

This is exactly my point! The policy of the Federal Reserve has been to support the FDIC and allow the FDIC to close insolvent banks in an orderly manner.

Thus, the monetary policy followed by the Federal Reserve over the past three years has succeeded.

Added evidence that the policy of the Federal Reserve has been successful is that reported above: the FDIC payments to those acquiring banks have been “smaller than FDIC officials anticipated.” Without the market liquidity, results would have been much worse.

The Wall Street Journal even reports: “Some executives at U. S. banks that bought failed institutions using the FDIC lifeline agreed that losses on the troubled loans aren’t piling up as high or as fast as they previously anticipated.”

The bad news?

“FDIC officials expect to make an additional $21.5 billion in payments from 2011 to 2014. More than half of that total is predicted for this year, followed by an estimated $6 billion in loss-share reimbursements in 2012, according to the agency.”

According to my calculations, $21.5 billion is almost two-and-one-half times the $8.89 billion the FDIC has already paid out during this cycle of bank failures!

This would bring the total of FDIC payments up to more than $30 billion!

It also seems to mean that we have a lot of bank failures that still have to be resolved!

The banking system now has less than 8,000 banks in it. Over the past year or so, I have argued that this number will drop to less than 4,000 by 2015.

I see nothing inconsistent between my forecast about the number of banks that will be in the banking system and the estimates made by the FDIC, itself, concerning the amount of payments it will need to make to those that acquire banks to cover loan losses.

Bottom line: there are still a massive amount of bad loans that still reside on the balance sheets of commercial banks!

Consequently, there are still a lot of commercial banks that need to be closed!

And, what does this mean for the Fed and QE2? The Fed claimed on Tuesday that the economic recovery is picking up. However, QE2 will need to continue, as planned, through June. Also, the Fed will maintain its interest rate targets at current levels for “an extended period”. NO CHANGE IN MONETARY POLICY!

If I am correct the Fed will only change its monetary policy when it…and the FDIC…believe that problems connected with bank closings have receded sufficiently so that more normal operations can be resumed.

Since the Fed…and the FDIC…have never claimed that the excessively loose monetary policy over the past few years has been to assist the regulatory closing of commercial banks, any statements about changing policy will not be worded in a way that ties the policy with the closing of banks.

Maybe it has been just as well for us…that we have not really known how bad off the banking system has been. But, so much for openness and transparency.

The Games Banks Play

I would like to recommend another article on bank accounting practices. This is the article by Michael Rapoport in the Monday’s Wall Street Journal titled “’Toxic’ Assets Still Lurking At Banks.” (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704570104576124701144189910.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_0&mg=reno-wsj) I don’t want to repeat all that is in the article because I would just copy the article. So, I highly suggest you read the whole thing. But, the issue has to do with when and how do you recognize the value of loans and securities on the balance sheet of a bank.

How does one know what value should be placed on a commercial bank franchise?

The answer: in the current environment, one doesn’t.

I have had my say (once again) on the “mark-to-market” controversy: see “Risk Management: Key in Future Economic Performance for Banks. (http://seekingalpha.com/article/249440-risk-management-key-in-future-economic-performance-for-banks)

In my mind, not only are bankers attempting to fool the regulators and the investment community…they are trying as hard as they can to fool themselves.

Rapoport quotes the banking expert Bert Ely: "In a lot of cases banks are probably deluding themselves" about the future value of those securities, and whether they will ultimately recover as much from those securities as they contend they will”

Bankers are notorious for “deluding “ themselves.

“The sun will come out…tomorrow…bet your bottom dollar…that tomorrow…”

But, Rapoport just discusses information from the top 10 banks in asset size and the data come from the September 30 financial reports.

As readers of this blog know, much of my concern has been with the banks that are smaller than the biggest 10 banks…or the biggest 25 banks.

We just don’t have any idea how deep the pool of trouble is for most of the banking system.

We get some encouragement from a recent Congressional study. Quoting from another Wall Street Journal article: “ A year ago, Elizabeth Warren, who headed the congressional panel overseeing the Troubled Asset Relief Program, predicted a "tidal wave of commercial-loan failures." On Friday, at a follow-up hearing on commercial real estate held by the same oversight panel, Patrick Parkinson, a Federal Reserve official, said that "worst-case scenarios are becoming increasingly unlikely." (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704843304576126442295848066.html?mod=ITP_pageone_1&mg=reno-wsj)

One year ago, Elizabeth Warren stated at a Congressional hearing that 3,000 commercial banks were going to experience serious problems in their portfolio of commercial real estate. I am glad to hear that “worst-case scenarios are becoming increasingly unlikely.”

So, how many commercial banks are going to experience serious problems in their commercial loan portfolios? How many more are going to experience more problems in their securities portfolios? How many more have not recognized on their balance sheets assets that are still “toxic” or “troubled”?

In order to obtain some idea of how bad the condition is of the “smaller” banks, I look at the behavior of the bank regulators that should know.

First, the Federal Reserve System: the Federal Reserve System has put over $1.1 trillion in excess reserve into the commercial banking system and is still engaging in “quantitative easing” to “get banks to start lending again.” However, the “smaller” banks are still not lending.

Second, the behavior of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: the FDIC continues to close 3 banks per week and it looks as if it will continue to close 3 banks a week for the indefinite future. And, this does not include the banks that disappear from the system because they have been acquired.

These are the two government agencies that really should know how bad off the banking system is...and they are acting in this way?

The Fed is providing funds to keep a lot of commercial banks open so that they can either be closed in an orderly fashion by the FDIC or be acquired outright by another bank, domestically or by a foreign source.

The problem is that because of the accounting rules, investors, regulators, and even bankers don’t know what shape the banking system is in. But, every quarter we seem to get several “surprises”, banks being taken over or acquired because of their financial condition. And, no one seems to have seen these “surprises” coming. How many more Wilmington Trust’s are there out there?

Still No Life in Banking

Over the last two months I have been hoping that the smaller banks in the United States were starting to lend a little bit again. I was even looking for “Green Shoots”. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/220685-green-shoots-in-smaller-bank-lending.)

My latest review of the commercial banking data released by the Federal Reserve gives little indication that things are picking up through August. Total assets at the smaller domestically chartered banks in the United States (defined as all domestically chartered commercial banks except the largest 25) grew by a little over $11 billion in the last five weeks. However, the cash assets of these banks rose by slightly more than $8 billion of this total. Only about $1 billion went into bank loans.

The total assets at the 25 largest domestically chartered commercial banks fell by about $26 billion during this time period, but the cash assets held by these banks dropped by even more. Cash assets fell by about $41 billion. What asset class rose? The securities held by these banks rose by almost $23 billion.

At these large banks, Treasury and Agency securities increased by about $210 billion over the last year. These banks can acquire funds at interest rates approaching zero percent and purchase securities with no credit risk and earn several hundred basis points spread on the transaction. And, there is little or no interest rate risk because the Federal Reserve has stated that it will keep short term interest rates extremely low for “an extended time.”

One can see this arbitrage situation setting up over the last year as these large commercial banks have changed the way they have financed their assets relying on less expensive sources of funds and substituting cheaper and cheaper liabilities.

No wonder the large commercial banks have been producing a lot of profits while at the same time building up their loan loss reserves!

Why should commercial banks lend when they have a riskless way to make money?

Business loans? Commercial and Industrial loans are down by more than 12% at all banks, from August 2009 through August 2010. At large commercial banks, however, C&I loans are down by even more, dropping at a 14%, year-over-year rate. In just the last 13 weeks, these loans are down by almost $12 billion which is about one-tenth of all the business loan portfolio in the banking system.

Commercial real estate loans are down by more than $140 billion. Of this drop more than half of the decline was registered at the smaller commercial banks. Of course, this is where people are expecting a lot more trouble over the next twelve months or so.

Surveys have indicated that banks are easing up on lending terms. Well, that may be true, but this is still not resulting in any jump in commercial bank lending.

We are told that businesses and consumers are reluctant to borrow. I believe that this is true. There are two reasons for this. First, many businesses, families, and individuals are still reducing the debt load they had built up over the last decade or more. With the economy so weak, it still represents a substantial risk to go further in debt given the uncertainty about future prospects.

In addition, many of the companies that are better off are accumulating large amounts of cash balances. The play here, I feel, is that mergers and acquisitions will pick up over the next year or so. Analysts are still shaking their heads about all the activity that took place on this front in August. My guess is that companies believe that they can achieve better market share and even have a chance to gain sustainable competitive advantages in their markets by building scale through acquisition of financially “weak” companies as opposed to attempting to expand on their own at this time. Keep the cash so that you can move as quickly as possible when the time is right.

Bottom line: it seems as if very few banks want to extend money to businesses at this time; and very few institutions (except for the federal government) want to put on a lot more debt at this time.

There will be no recovery of any strength without a pickup in commercial bank lending. I have written about this earlier: http://seekingalpha.com/article/218027-no-banks-no-recovery. This is one reason why I am skeptical of the spending and tax-cutting proposals presented by President Obama last week. The economy is in a position where debt positions, both in the financial and non-financial industries have to be worked out and this will take time.

I continue to believe that the Federal Reserve will continue to keep short term interest rates at or near their very low current levels until the commercial banking industry stabilizes. The Fed and the FDIC are doing a good job in helping the smaller banks work through their problems. Still, there are a sizeable number of the smaller banks that are still in serious trouble and asset values are still the problem. As mentioned above, there are anticipated difficulties ahead in the commercial real estate area and some investment portfolios are still substantially under-water.

With all these difficulties, why should these smaller banks, in aggregate be expanding their loan portfolios? The main thrust in the commercial banking sector over the next twelve to eighteen months is still survival and consolidation.

My prediction still remains: over the next five years or so the largest 25 domestically chartered banks in the United States will come to control about 75% of banking assets in America, up from about 67% at the present time.

No "Green Shoots" in the Banking Sector Yet

Although analysts have detected “Green Shoots” in the economy signaling the possibility that there may be a recovery occurring sometime soon, it is my belief that we will need to see some signs of life in the banking system before we can get too excited about any sustainable upswing. Right now, I don’t see any “Green Shoots” in the area of commercial banking.

The only indication that something might be starting to happen in the banking sector is the apparent “credit thaw” in the money markets. An article in the Wall Street Journal touts the “voracious demand for short-term debt issued by U. S. and European banks.” We are told by one New York trader that “bank commercial paper ‘flies off the screen.” (See “Credit Thaw Is Spurring Appetite for Bank IOUs” at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124890956451491803.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.) The London interbank offer rate has dropped and relative interest rate spreads have fallen indicating that confidence is returning to this sector of the money market.

Yet commercial banks are not lending. They are not lending to each other and they are not lending to businesses. Commercial banks are still reducing their own debt or just holding onto the cash! The only lending that seems to be happening is on pre-approved home equity loans and on pre-approved credit card balances and other revolving consumer credit. Year-over-year, the change in total commercial bank lending and leases is roughly zero.

In terms of banks lending to other banks, from June last year to June this year, the decline in Fed Funds lending and reverse repurchase agreements with other banks has dropped 15%. These loans have dropped another $60 billion in the four week period ending July 15 from a total of $319 billion!

Credit risk is not the reason that the commercial banks are not lending to each other. In normal times, commercial banks lend to each other through the Federal Funds market or through using repurchase agreements in order to manage their reserve positions at the Federal Reserve. However, these are not normal times.

Commercial banks really don’t need to lend to each other in order to manage their reserve positions at the Federal Reserve because they are over-whelming liquid!

Note that in the two weeks ending July 15, the Federal Reserve reported that excess reserves in the banking system totaled $743.9 billion dollars! This is up from $1.9 billion in July 2008. Commercial banks have no concerns with meeting their reserve requirements because they are holding reserves at Federal Reserve banks that are far in excess of what is required. And, why should there be any trading of Federal Funds when there are such excesses within the system.

The commercial banking system is recording cash assets, as of July 15, 2009, of $958.7 billion which is up from $320.0 billion in the month of June 2008.

Right now, the lending market seems to be compressed on both sides of the market, supply as well as demand. Not only do banks seem to be reluctant to make loans, there seem to be a dearth of borrowers at this time.

The argument on the supply side is that commercial banks still have two major concerns on their minds. The first is the value of assets on their balance sheets. In terms of asset values, there still is the problem of mortgage foreclosures. We are starting a period of re-pricing of Alt-A and Option mortgages at a time when unemployment impacts are growing. Next year there is apparently another round of re-pricings of subprime mortgages. Credit card losses continue to rise. And, there are still big problems expected in commercial real estate loans. This says nothing about the securitized loans that are still on the books of the banks. The second concern of the banks is who to lend to if they were to make loans. Given the uncertainties with respect to the strength of the recovery and the state of the labor market commercial bank lending practice has reverted to the principles of the “good old days” which begin with “don’t lend to anybody that needs to borrow.”

The demand for loans is tepid at best. De-leveraging and saving are the primary focus of a large portion of the business and family population. Small businesses and individuals are scared enough that they are shrinking their needs for outside funding and are looking more and more to greater self-reliance. Experts in the field don’t see this new behavior pattern changing soon. More larger firms that possess some degree of financial strength seem to be moving to take advantage of the economic distress of others and so they are borrowing more, but not from the commercial banks.

The consequence of this? Commercial and industrial loans at commercial banks have declined by more than $120 billion this year. Consumer loans have declined by $30 billion since February 2009. Real estate loans have remained roughly constant this year.

There is still one more factor that is weighing on the minds of commercial bankers. The Federal Reserve has created a situation in which commercial banks have ended up with well over $700 billion in excess reserves. The question on the minds of commercial bankers is when and how will the Federal Reserve remove these excess funds?

It is obvious from his testimony in front of Congress last week that Chairman Bernanke does not have an “exit strategy” for the Federal Reserve to remove these reserves from the banking system.

My question to you is, “Would you lend out these reserves if you had no idea when the central bank was going to take them away from you?” I certainly would not! I think any banker that wanted to put these excess reserves to work under the current leadership of the Federal Reserve would be foolish!

There may be indications that money markets are warming to the commercial banking sector and this is good. However, this is not putting money out into the economy. We need to keep looking at the commercial banking sector to see when lending starts to pick up. Until it does, consumers and businesses will just have to rely on their own resources to finance a recovery. This does not bode well for a rapid turnaround.

Is Treasury's TARP Debt Already Monetized?--Part Two

My post from Friday June 26 contained the first part of this discussion. Today I would like to continue the discussion and there are two reasons for doing so. The first reason is to understand just what the Federal Reserve has been doing over these last nine months. The second is to understand how likely it might be for the Federal Reserve to “unwind” what it has done over the past nine months and reduce a part of the fear of future inflation. Note, I am not including any discussion of future government deficits and the probability that they will be “monetized.”

There is no doubt in my mind that the Federal Reserve has “printed” a lot of money since early September 2008, most of it before January 2009. The Monetary Base (Non-seasonally adjusted, NSA) rose from $847 billion in August 2008 to $1,712 billion in January 2009, an increase of $865 billion. Between January and May 2009, the Monetary Base only rose $63 billion.

Total Reserves (NSA) in the banking system increased by $817 billion from September 2008 to January 2009, but only increased by $42 billion since January. The most interesting thing is that Excess Reserves (NSA) in the banking system rose by almost $800 billion in the earlier period and increased by $46 billion in the January to May period.

The Federal Reserve put a lot on money into the banking system over the last nine months and the VAST MAJORITY of the funds went into Excess Reserves. The Fed “printed” a lot of money (or, created a lot of deposits at the Fed) but these monies did not find their way into the economy!

These two periods need to be separated in order to get a better picture of what the Fed has done and for some implications about what might occur in the future. My basic argument is that the Fed has put a tremendous amount of money into the world banking system and has ultimately underwritten the Treasury’s TARP program and provided much more money to the banking system than Congress authorized.

The underlying effort has two goals: first, to keep financial markets liquid; and second, to protect against the insolvency of the banking system. The first goal has basically been accomplished. The second is still playing itself out. The crucial thing to understand is that the way the Fed has acted has given the system a chance to get healthy and yet provide a net to catch insolvent banks so as to avoid a precipitous collapse of the banking system.

In the September 2008 to January 2009, the crisis period, the Fed basically ceased using the normal tools of monetary policy: open market operations consisting of outright purchases of government securities and repurchase agreements. In the fall, the Federal Reserve basically picked and choose what parts of the financial markets needed liquidity and created facilities to support these ill-liquid sub-markets. The major ways that it supplied funds or saw funds withdrawn in the September 2008 through January 2009 period and in the January 2009 through May 2009 period.

Change (billions) from Sept/08 to Jan/09: Term Auction Credit $257; Other Loans $166; Commercial Paper LLC $334; Other Fed Reserve Assets $506; for a total of $1,263. The change (billions) from Jan/09 through May 2009: Term Auction Credit (-$124); Other Loans (-$62); Commercial Paper LLC (-$206); Other Fed Reserve Assets (-$411); for a total of minus $803.

The Term Auction Credit Facility (TAF) helped to get reserves to the commercial banks that needed reserves, an effort the Fed believed was more efficient than open market operations. TAF peaked at $300 billion increase on 12/31/08. Other loans include increased borrowings from the Fed’s discount window, a facility for asset-backed commercial paper (which reached a peak increase of $152 billion on 10/8/08), a facility for primary government security dealers (which reached a peak increase of $147 billion on 10/1/08), and a facility for AIG. The commercial paper LLC was a limited liability facility that bought 3-month paper from eligible issuers (which reached its peak of $334 billion on 12/31/08). The increase in Other Fed Reserve assets was primarily Central Bank Liquidity swaps (which reached a peak of $682 billion on 12/17/08).

However, the Fed’s efforts reported here resulted in almost a $1.3 trillion increase in its assets and an $865 billion increase in the Monetary Base. Thus, almost the entire monetization ended up as excess reserves held at Federal Reserve Banks. Bank reserves at Federal Reserve Banks increased steadily throughout the fall, peaking at $856 million on December 31, 2008. Whew! The Federal Reserve had made it through this period of financial market illiquidity which accompanied the entire Thanksgiving/Christmas seasonal need for cash.

What happened in 2009? As mentioned above, the needs of specific market makers retreated, but now the solvency of the banking system came to the fore. In terms of the special facilities, as can be seen from the figures given above, a total of $803 billion was removed during the first five months of the year. Then the Fed began to conduct open market operations again. Throughout this time, securities bought outright by the Fed increased by $712 bullion. This included a program to buy government securities on a regular basis which contributed $177 billion to the Fed’s portfolio. It also added $70 billion of Federal Agency issues. Furthermore, the Fed initiated a very important program in 2009 and bought $465 billion of Mortgage-backed securities.

In essence, Total Federal Reserve Bank credit declined by about $200 billion during the first five months of the year but, as was reported earlier, the monetary base increased by $63 billion and total reserves and excess reserves in the banking system increase by more than $40 billion. In essence, the Fed operated in 2009 to keep the banking system very liquid and replaced the reserves that had been supplied to different parts of the financial markets in 2008 by interjecting funds directly into the banking system. The new twist? Directly helping banks sell their mortgage-backed securities, thereby reducing pressure on the banks to clean up their balance sheets. This was the original purpose of the Treasury’s TARP program.

The banking system faces three problems going forward: existing bad assets; bad assets that will appear over the next 18 months or so; and refinancing needs as the banks may not always be able to roll over existing liabilities.(See my post of June 15, “What Banks Aren’t Telling Us”, http://seekingalpha.com/article/143276-what-aren-t-banks-telling-us, for more on these factors.) The huge amount of excess reserves will help the banks face these problems. In terms of financing needs, the banks have the cash to pay off maturing liabilities without needing to roll the debt over. In terms of bad debts, this is where the TARP program comes in because the Treasury has provided preferred stock to banks with warrants attached. Charge offs can go against existing capital and the preferred stock and warrants can be transformed into new capital owned by the government to keep these banks afloat until something can be done with them.

Some banks have repaid the TARP funds that they had received. Several well-known large banks returned $68.25 billion this month to reduce Federal Government oversight. Still there have been 633 banks that have directly received about $200 billion in TARP funds and a total of 32 banks have now repaid about $70 billion. (On this see “Small Banks Not Shying From TARP” in June 27 Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124606040026463617.html.) So, of the roughly $800 billion that banks are now holding in excess reserves, one could argue that approximately $130 billion of them have been supplied through the Treasury program and are held, mostly, by smaller banks and $670 billion of them has been supplied by the Federal Reserve, the total of the two being the money “printed “ to get us out of the current financial crisis.

The hope is that as the banking system works through its problems, TARP funds will be returned and the mortgage-backed securities will mature or be sold back into the market allowing the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve to contract back to where it was in the summer of 2008. The banking system is apparently holding onto reserves to protect itself and that is why they are really not lending. The idea is that if they don’t need these excess reserves they will return them. This is what the Federal Reserve is planning to happen. Let’s hope that they are correct!

Are Banks Telling the Truth?

On the front page of the Financial Times this morning we read the disconcerting headlines, “’Tarp cop’ to investigate whether banks have ‘cooked their books.’” (See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/163c85c4-2789-11de-9b77-00144feabdc0.html.) Neil Barofsky, special investigator-general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), is “seeking evidence of wrongdoing on the part of banks receiving help from the fund.”

The game—“institutions applying for TARP money had to show they were fundamentally sound, potentially prompting them to misstate assets and liabilities.” Barofsky is quoted as saying, “I hope we don’t find a single bank that’s cooked its books to try to get money but I don’t think that’s going to be the case.”

Mr. Barofsky also said the Treasury’s expanded Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was ripe for fraud.

The potential—fraudsters would be receiving indictments!

Two thoughts cross my mind when reading this. First, bankers in deteriorating situations tend to hide their heads in the sand when it comes to bad assets because they keep hoping that things will get better and the assets will recover their value. Having (successfully) completed several bank turnarounds I have found that this is one of the first things that becomes obvious when you initially investigate the loans and other assets of a troubled institution. Bankers, lenders, or portfolio managers continually think that ‘the economy will turn around’ or that ‘the company is getting its act in order’ or that some other event will come along that will result in the ‘asset gone bad’ becoming the ‘asset has become good again.’ And, so the asset is carried along but never comes back to life.

The problem with this is that these bad assets continually undermine the ability of the financial institution to right itself and become profitable again. The example is always there on the books of the banks and whether the executives or officers admit the fact, internally they know that things are not right and this drains efforts to instill a healthy culture to “do the right thing.” Managements that allow this unhealthy culture to continue are just perpetrating a bad situation, one that very rarely ever turns itself around.

The managements that participate in such a charade tend to be desperate and susceptible to moving to the next step when they are thrown a life boat like many financial institutions received in the past nine months or so.

Before following up on this point, let me just say that, historically, the bank either brings in someone to turn the institution around, or, a regulatory agency steps in and dissolves the organization. The American banking system has worked very well in the past with respect to “sick” banks. Contagion has been avoided through quick action connected with the swift resolution of problem assets. Financial institutions that were in trouble were taken care of—period!

But, that is not the case in the current situation. We have had a bailout. The banks have been tossed a life boat. However, financial institutions were supposed to be “fundamentally sound” in order to obtain TARP money. Here we get into the muddy waters of conducting a “general” bailout.

Let me just say that I have been suspicious from the start when government officials claimed that the need for the TARP funds was because the banks were facing “a liquidity problem” with respect to their troubled assets.
Again, my experience in doing bank turnaround’s is that the officers of the bank that claimed their assets were in trouble because of liquidity problems were attempting to cover up the real difficulties connected with the assets which were almost always associated with the issue of solvency.

It would not be much of a surprise to me to hear that the banks justified to the government that they were “fundamentally sound” because their asset problems were associated with liquidity issues rather than ones of solvency. This assessment could perhaps be supported if government officials only took a cursory glance at the assets. But, one could argue that this is the conclusion that government officials wanted to hear at that time.

Is this fraud? That is what Mr. Barofsky is going to have to find out.

Other than outright “cooking of the books”, in many cases the distinction between liquidity and solvency may fall back on an argument about “judgment”, about the “eye of the beholder.” Thus, Mr. Barofsky is going to have his problems proving his case.

In my opinion, many of the banks that received bailout relief had and still have a solvency problem and until the situation is handled that way the dislocations associated with the banking industry and the financial markets are going to continue. Consequently, I believe that Mr. Barofsky and others are going to find evidence that all along the issue has been solvency and not liquidity. If so, then there is a real issue of whether or not that these institutions that received TARP money were “fundamentally sound.”

My second thought on this issue is a very simple one. If people inside the banks covered up the real issues related to solvency heads should roll. Those that committed fraud should be indicted! Those that knowingly misled should be dismissed!

And, top executives, even though they were not directly involved in fraud or in a cover up, should be removed from their positions as well. They have proven that they cannot manage their institutions with sufficient control to justify their ability to move those institutions on into the future. The “buck stops with the top position” and the argument that they didn’t know what was going on is insufficient. It was their responsibility to know what was going on!

Risk management, the other “bug-in-the-coffee”, and financial control are not glamorous pursuits, especially when compared with the “jet pilots” of finance that were tossing around all sorts of money chasing narrow spreads with lots and lots of leverage. Performance over time, however, is closely related to an institution’s ability to successfully exert risk management and financial control.

We have to know what is going on in the banks and other financial institutions. The pressure needs to be stepped up to find out where things are. And, the sooner this pressure is exerted the sooner we will be able to find ways out of the mess we are in.

And this brings me to one final point. The Financial Times also had another headline on its front page that I found disturbing. The article cried out “AIG in derivatives spotlight.” (See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb2ddafc-278c-11de-9b77-00144feabdc0.html.) “The unit that all but destroyed AIG has failed to sign up for the overhaul of the global derivatives market, which was given added impetus by the troubles at the US insurance group.” The government is involved with AIG—the government owns most of AIG. It is mind boggling to me that a government that supposedly wants to bring greater openness and transparency to the financial markets allowed this to happen!