Why Bet on Treasury Securities?

First Warren Buffet and now Bill Gross, of Pacific Investment Management Company, have publically stated that buying United States Treasury securities is not a good bet. (See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/gross-echoes-buffett-saying-treasuries-have-little-value-on-debt-dollar.html.)

Gross wrote, in his most recent monthly investment outlook, that Treasuries “have very little value.”

One could couch this in other terms: “What is the probability that long term interest rates will go up over the next twelve months?”; and “What is the probability that long term interest rates will go down over the next twelve months?”.

How many people do you know that believe that the higher probability can be applied to the second of these two questions?

Most people I know and respect are arguing over whether the probability that long term interest rates will go up is 75% or 80% or higher.

The only significant argument I hear about falling interest rates on long term Treasury issues is that the Eurozone might collapse and there will be a “run to quality”, a run to United States government securities. Almost all other arguments go the other way.

The economic recovery, however weak, is continuing. The banking system (and the housing industry) is not going to collapse even though the banking industry is going to continue to grow smaller and smaller in terms of the number of commercial banks that are in the system while the biggest banks, including large foreign banks, are going to control more and more of the banking industry itself. The Federal Reserve will continue to keep money flowing into the banking industry so as to keep banks open while the FDIC makes sure that the banking industry shrinks in an orderly fashion.

Are we going to get QE3? Depends upon the rate at which insolvent banks can be closed without disrupting the financial system. The strength of the economic recovery is not the issue. The issue, to me, depends upon what the FDIC can achieve.

The federal government is going to continue to add more and more debt to the total already outstanding.

There just is no credibility in Washington, D. C. concerning the reduction in the cumulative deficits over the next ten years or so. I still believe that the government will add another $15 trillion or more to the federal debt outstanding over the next ten years.

The Libyan situation is a case in point. The federal government is so over-extended fiscally that other demands on its resources are just going to stretch budgets even further and keep the cumulative deficits at near-record levels. Then the government ends up doing two things, neither desirable: the government is limited in what it can do in very important situations; and even if the government cannot do much, whatever it does will increase the cumulative deficit.

Then there are other issues, like the boom in commodity prices worldwide, the acceleration of the merger and acquisition business in America, Europe, and the emerging countries, and currency speculation throughout the globe.

As a consequence, I see no reason to back off my earlier thoughts on the future of the interest rate on long term U. S. Government securities. See http://seekingalpha.com/article/250838-long-term-treasury-yields-and-inflationary-expectations. This post was written when the yield on the 10-year Treasury security was 3.48 percent, roughly two months ago at the beginning of February. Yesterday the 10-year Treasury closed at about 3.46 percent.

At that time I claimed that a forecast of 5.00 percent to 5.50 percent was not out of reason for a Treasury security of this maturity somewhere in the next 12 to 18 months.

The basic reasoning for this: my estimate of the expected long run “real” rate of interest is roughly 3.00 percent, (Similar, I found out, to the belief of the Wharton School’s Jeremy Siegel.)

I further believe that investors will come to build in a premium for inflationary expectations in longer term interest rates in the neighborhood of 2.00 percent to 2.50 percent.

How strongly do I feel about this prediction? I believe that the odds are in the neighborhood of 3- or 4-to one that rates will move into this range over the next 12 to 18 months.

Thus, I would have to agree with Bill Gross (and Warren Buffet) that Treasuries “have very little value” and are not a good “buy and hold” at this time.

Long-Term Treasury Yields and Inflationary Expectations

The yield on the 10-year Treasury bond closed at 3.48 percent yesterday. Just a little over five months ago the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond was at 2.48 percent, a full 100 basis points lower than the current yield. What’s happening and where are we going?


Two extraordinary factors are impacting Treasury yields at the present time and have been there for quite some time now. The first of these is the effect that the quantitative easing of the Federal Reserve is having on market rates. The second is the “flight to quality” that has kept the yields on Treasury securities below what they otherwise might be. How do I account for these two factors?

Well, first I start out with a “rough” estimate of the real rate of interest. The base figure that I have used for years has been 3.0 percent.

(I just found out this morning that this is similar to what my former colleague Jeremy Siegel,
Professor of Finance at the Wharton School, UPENN, uses: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00d6f8d0-2ec7-11e0-9877-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Chh2pOYC.)

This figure, the 3 percent estimate is a “before-the-fact” estimate and therefore is a long term expectation. An “after-the-fact” estimate is often made by taking the nominal rate of interest, say the roughly 3.5 percent mentioned above and then subtracting actual inflation from this figure. This is “after-the-fact” because the numbers used to calculate the real rate have already occurred.

The 3 percent estimate is important because it can be compared to another, so-called, real rate of interest, the yield on inflation-protected securities, called TIPS. Yesterday, the yield on 10-year inflation-protected securities was 1.04 percent at the closing, substantially below the 3 percent estimate.

Siegel, I believe rightly, calls our attention to this discrepancy because he believes that the current yield on inflation-protected securities must rise toward the higher number and this will mean that the holders of these securities may suffer substantial capital losses on the securities because the price of the securities must decline to allow the yield to rise.



Investors are not fully aware that this decline might happen in this area of the bond market.

The difference between the current market yield on these securities and the “before-the-fact” estimate of the real rate of interest represents the impact that the Fed’s quantitative easing along with investor’s “flight-to-quality” is having on the current market yields. If this is true then the nominal bond yields in the market are roughly 200 basis points below where they would be without the Fed’s actions as well as including the international flight to safe United States Treasury issues.



If this is the case then we could argue that the yield on the 10-year Treasury security should be around 5.50 percent rather than 3.50 percent.

If this is the case then the longer-term “inflationary expectations” that investors have built into market yields would be around 2.5 percent.



The question then becomes, is this estimate of inflationary expectations “in the ball park”?
I like to look at the year-over-year rate of change of the GDP price deflator as my estimate of the rate of inflation because I have less concern that this figure is being “messed” with than the more popular Consumer Price Index. Looking at this measure of actual inflation we see that inflation does seem to be picking up.



In this chart we see that the rate of inflation is picking up and is now just below 1.5 percent. We can note that once inflation starts to pick up, it does not reverse itself in the near term. Furthermore, looking at the performance of inflation over the past ten years, an inflation rate of 2.5 percent is not unreasonable for a moderately growing United States economy. And, remember, this 2.5 percent can be interpreted as the compound rate of inflation over the next 10 years, a period far beyond the inflation that might be experienced over the next year or so.

Added to this is the fact that inflation is picking up, not only in the developed countries in the world, but also in the emerging countries. Inflation in the Eurozone is running a little above 2.0 percent, in the UK, a little under 4.0 percent, and in China and India, the rate of inflation is now in excess of 5.0 percent. Thus the trend in the world is for increasing rates of inflation.



My rough estimate that the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond should be around 5.50 percent in 2011 is slightly above the forecast I presented earlier. (See “Long-Term Treasury Yields in 2011: http://seekingalpha.com/article/243018-long-term-treasury-yields-in-2011.) The reason for this change, I believe, is that investors, world wide, are believeing that inflation is becoming a bigger problem than earlier expected. The European Central Bank has ceased its special purchase program of securities because of the rising concern over price increses. The Bank of England has experience similar concerns. The only central bank that does not seem concerned yet is the Federal Reserve.



And, of course, my forecast assumes that the Federal Reserve will, at some point this year, back off from quantitative easing.



But, why should we expect the Federal Reserve to back off from QE2 any time soon? Chairman Bernanke has been late on every shift in monetary policy since he has been a member of the Board of Governors. Why should we expect anything different this time?

Federal Reserve QE2 Watch: Part 2

The second application of “Quantitative Easing” on the part of the Federal Reserve System has now been on the books for several months. So, what has been going on at the Fed over this period of time?

One difficulty in examining the period running from the middle of November to the first of January is the “operating” factors that impact bank reserves due to the holiday season and end of year activity.

One such operating factor is that individuals and businesses build up their cash holdings seasonally in order to meet the needs of the holiday purchases. The Fed usually supplies this currency “on demand.”

In addition, due to pending government disbursements, the United States Treasury usually builds up its General Account at the Federal Reserve, the account the Treasury writes checks against.

In the four week period ending January 5, 2011, currency outstanding rose by almost $3 billion and the General Account of the U. S. Treasury rose by $86 billion, a total of $89 billion in reserves that the Fed had to replace in the banking system through its purchase of securities. These were all “operating factors” the Federal Reserve had to deal with.

In the thirteen weeks ended January 5, 2011, currency outstanding rose by about $22 billion and funds in the Treasury’s General Account rose by $56 billion. Furthermore, there was an accounting adjustment related to the AIG bailout operation which withdrew another $27 billion from the banking system in the third quarter of 2010 that also was replaced by the Fed’s purchase of securities, bringing the total of off-setting Fed purchases during this time period to $105 billion.

Therefore, the “net” purchases of securities held outright by the Federal Reserve rose by almost $50 billion over the last four weeks, and rose by about $120 billion over the last thirteen weeks.
As a consequence, commercial bank Reserve Balances at Federal Reserve banks decreased by $28 billion over the last four weeks but rose by around $33 billion over the last thirteen weeks. (Totals don’t add precisely because of other “operating” factors, but these are minor relative to the major changes that I have highlighted.)

The net effect of Federal Reserve operations on bank reserves over these time periods has been relatively minor: consequently excess reserves held by commercial banks remained relatively steady.

On the other hand, the significant QE2 changes in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet have come in the composition of the Fed’s portfolio of securities held outright. In the last four weeks ending January 5, 2011, the holdings of mortgage-backed securities and Federal agency holdings fell by $31 billion. The Fed’s holdings of U. S. Treasury securities rose by about $81 billion, hence the total amount of securities held by the Fed rose by almost $50 billion, as reported above.

Over the last thirteen weeks, the portfolios of mortgage-backed securities and Federal Agency securities dropped by slightly more than $93 billion while the holdings of U. S. Treasury securities rose by $212 billion. Total securities held outright by the Fed increased by almost $120 billion, as reported above.

I would argue that up to this point in time, quantitative easing has had very little impact on commercial bank reserves and consequently on changes in liquidity or bank lending. Mostly, the Fed has just replaced maturing Federal Agency issues and maturing mortgage-backed securities with Treasury securities. Otherwise, much of the Fed’s operations during this time have been “operational” in nature.

Now, let’s step back a bit, since we are at the beginning of a new year and review what happened to the Fed’s balance sheet over the past year.

Reserve Balances that commercial banks hold at Federal Reserve banks rose by only $9 billion from January 6, 2010 to January 5, 2011. Not much change for all the talk going on about the Fed’s actions.

The question then is “what was the most significant change that took place on the Fed’s balance sheet during the year?”

My post of April 9, 2010 discussed a new strategy for getting reserves into the commercial banking system. This “new” strategy had to do with the creation of something called the U. S, Treasury Supplementary Financing Account. (See my post “The Fed’s New Exit Strategy?”: http://seekingalpha.com/article/199444-the-fed-s-new-exit-strategy.)

Well, the Treasury's Supplementary Financing Account increased by $195 billion in the calendar year of 2010. This account “absorbs” bank reserves, in the same way that moving funds from Treasury Tax and Loan accounts at commercial banks into the Treasury’s General Account at the Federal Reserve transfers bank reserves. Thus, to replace these reserves, the Federal Reserve had to buy securities in the open market to “supply” bank reserves. This, in essence, is “printing money” to substitute for the Federal Debt.

After taking into account other transactions, the Fed supplied about $202 billion in reserves to the banking system which offset a net $193 billion in factors “absorbing” reserve so that commercial bank reserve balances at the Federal Reserve only rose by the $9 billion stated above.

Excess reserves in the commercial banking system actually fell from December 2009 to December 2010 by about $67 billion. Given that excess reserves averaged around $1.0 trillion for most of 2010, the $67 billion drop does not seem particularly significant. The decline did not seem to have much impact either on bank lending or on money market interest rates.

Excess reserves may have fallen during the year because banks needed more required reserve to cover the continued shift in deposits within the financial system from time and savings accounts to demand deposits and other checkable deposits. My last comments on this phenomenon were posted on December 8, 2010: “America Continues to Go Liquid” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/240614-america-continues-to-go-liquid). This shift in funds results in an increase in required reserves because banks have to hold more reserves behind demand deposit accounts and fewer reserves behind savings deposits.

It can also be noted that Americans continued to decrease their holdings of Retail Money Funds” (about $30 billion since September 2010) and Institutional Money Funds (about $50 billion over the same time period). Low interest rates and the need to be liquid seem to be dominating the asset holdings of many.

The Fed’s Quantitative Easy in supposed to keep longer term interest rates low so that the economic recovery can accelerate and unemployment can be brought down. The yield on the ten-year Treasury security was around 2.40 percent in early October before the specifics of QE2 were announced. Over the last two weeks this security has been trading around 3.40 percent. Optimists are claiming that this rise in rates is a good sign, a sign that the economy is getting stronger and that inflationary expectations are beginning to grow.

Guess I am not that confident. My experience is that you cannot force long term interest rates below where the market wants them and then maintain them at this lower rate without continually increasing the liquidity being forced into the system. Otherwise, these interest rates will tend to rise of their own volition. At this time I have not seen the Fed actually propping up the financial markets with the “new wave” of liquidity needed to maintain the lower long term rates attained in late summer.

Long-term Treasury Yields in 2011

Yesterday, I attempted to lay out how I thought 2011 would play out in terms of the value of the United States dollar. In “The U. S. Dollar in 2001” (http://seekingalpha.com/article/242766-the-u-s-dollar-in-2011) I argued that the general outlook for United States monetary and fiscal policy was more of the same policy stance that the United States government had taken for the last 50 years: credit inflation. (For more on this see the Financial Times/ Goldman Sachs business book of the year, “Fault Lines” by Raghu Rajan: http://seekingalpha.com/article/224630-book-review-fault-lines-how-hidden-fractures-still-threaten-the-world-economy-by-raghuram-g-rajan.)

The year 2011 will follow the pattern of large fiscal deficits and monetary ease and this will carry into the foreseeable future. As a consequence, the long term direction of the value of the United States dollar will be downward. I focus on this initially because this sets the stage for how financial market participants view the actions of the United States.

This downward movement, however, will be interrupted in the short run by the continued problems relating to the sovereign debt of various countries within the European Union. The United States, in 2011, will still be seen as a refuge from risk which will result in the dollar being supported by a “risk averse” investment community through much of 2011.

The turmoil in Europe is taking the pressure off of the policy makers in Washington, since they will be free of any criticism that might come their way because of a declining value of the dollar. As a consequence, the Obama administration will not need strong leadership to execute an “unpopular” monetary or fiscal policy: this was the case in the late 1970s and early 1980s as Paul Volcker, leading the Federal Reserve, put the brakes on the economy and the value of the dollar rose significantly; and Robert Rubin, leading the Treasury Department in the 1990s, helped to bring the federal budget from a deficit to a surplus, which produced another significant rise in the value of the dollar.

So, my basic expectation for the economy for the next year (and for the near future) is similar to that being called “the new normal”. The new normal incorporates sluggish economic growth, high unemployment, and weak inflation. (See “Champions of the ‘new normal’ stick to their guns,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b9c8a49e-0c5b-11e0-8408-00144feabdc0.html#axzz18l9xj6XV.)

The sluggish economic growth of the United States will remain around 3.0 percent to 3.5 percent, year-over-year, something way below what ordinarily has occurred in economic recoveries in the past. This modest growth rate under-scores the structural problems exhibited in the economy, the unusually low level of capacity utilization on the part of industry, the fact that the under-employment rate will remain in the 20 percent to 25 percent range as employers remain reluctant to bring back workers on a full time basis, and the fact that the year-over-year rate of growth of industrial production has been dropping off every month since June 2010.

I do see three ominous clouds on the horizon present in the financial sector. First, the solvency problems in the smaller commercial banks will continue to linger. As readers of this column know, I believe that the Quantitative Easing on the part of the Federal Reserve is more to keep the banking system afloat as the FDIC closes a sizeable number of banks over the next year or so. This will keep a lid on bank lending.

Second, there are the financial problems being experienced by state and local governments and these problems spill over into the financial markets for the bonds of these entities. The implications of this situation for the reduction in budges are huge.

Finally, large corporations have accumulated a huge chest of cash (both in the United States and Europe). It is my belief that this accumulation of cash is for “buying” purposes and we will see a sizeable pickup in mergers and acquisitions as the economic recovery continues. But, this restructuring of the economy will not create more jobs and increase production. In fact, it will do just the opposite. Large banks will also participate in this expansion of mergers and acquisitions. And, the big will get bigger.

Overall inflation will remain moderate. The year-over-year rate of increase in the implicit price deflator of gross domestic product remains around 1.0 percent and this probably will not go much above 1.5 percent this year, if it goes that high. Thus, general inflation does not seem to be a near-term problem.

However, given the current stance of monetary policy we see the possibilities of bubbles forming all over the place. (See “The Fed: Bubble, Bubble, Everywhere,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/240732-the-fed-bubble-bubble-everywhere.) As we saw over the past 25 years or so, general inflation was low and policy makers felt under control of things. Yet we saw bubbles here and bubbles there. Now, the actions of the Federal Reserve are being picked up in a rise in commodity prices, rising stock markets of emerging nations, and the buildup of inflationary pressures in export driven countries like China and Germany.

Putting this all together, my view of long term Treasury yields for 2011 is up, with the 10-year Treasury security reaching 4.5% to 5% in the upcoming year, a rise from around 3.3% to 3.5% now. The 30-year Treasury security will rise to the 5.5% to 6.0% range, up from around 4.4% to 4.5% now. The spread between the yields of these two maturities will be about 100 basis points, slightly lower than it is at the present time.

Bernanke will not be able to keep long-term interest rates down!

This just puts long term Treasury yields back at the levels they were for much of the 2000s.

From this, I argue that the long run expectation for inflation built into these securities would be in the 2.0 percent to 3.0 percent range. For myself, I find that this level of inflationary expectations over the next ten to thirty years is low. But, that is another story.

The major uncertainties in this picture? The first uncertainty pertains to the stability of the banking system. I believe, however, that the Federal Reserve will continue to flood the financial market with liquidity in order to allow the failing banks to be worked off in an orderly fashion. If this occurs, the recovery will continue but at a slow pace.

The second uncertainty pertains to state and local finance. My feeling is that the federal government will not allow this situation to get out of hand. Welcome to the bailouts of 2011.

The third uncertainty pertains to the bubbles that have been created or are being created. As we have learned, bubbles can last only so long. The question will remain about how long the bubbles created will last. Given that the Fed will continue to flood the market with liquidity, it is unlikely that the world will be bubble-free.

One thing mentioned above I believe will be an uncertainty only in timing. That is the increase in the amount of mergers and acquisitions taking place. I believe that 2011 will see a continuation in the acquisition splurge that has already started and will continue beyond this coming year. The only uncertainty related to this is the reaction of the federal government to the bigger companies. My guess is that the new Congress won’t challenge this and the Obama administration will not have the will to challenge it.

Long-Term Yields, the Fed and QE2: The Weekly Fed Data

The 10-year United States Treasury issue backed off somewhat today. At 4:00 pm in New York the bond yielded about 3.43 percent, up from about 3.23 percent last week at this time. On Wednesday December 15, these bonds yielded around 3.55 percent, up from the previous Wednesday close of 3.30 percent.

Both Martin Wolf at the Financial Times and Jeremy Siegel, of the Finance Department at the Wharton School, in the Wall Street Journal attributed this rise in interest rates to the strengthening of the economy, which they both took as a good sign.


Although I hear their arguments, I am not quite convinced. This year, the yield on this 10-year security fell from a range of 3.80 percent to 4.00 percent in the March/April time frame. This fall in rates was attributed to the financial turmoil going on in Europe.

As can be seen in the chart, the rate feel almost constantly until late August. And, what happened in late August? Ben Bernanke spoke about QE2 at a Federal Reserve conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming and guess what? The yield on the 10-year bond started up immediately and has continued to rise ever since. The timing of the rise was very specifically connected with the Bernanke speech and subsequent Fed releases. Where did the strength of the economy come into play? Wolf and Siegel just aren’t convincing.






So, the long term bond yield is rising. This isn’t what was supposed to happen. So the Federal Reserve got active. I reported this last Thursday evening as soon as the Fed statistics were released. (See http://seekingalpha.com/article/241050-fed-actions-aimed-at-long-term-interest-rates.)


Here is a part of what I said, “The Federal Reserve added over $32 billion in Treasury notes and bonds to its portfolio from Wednesday, Dec. 1, to Wednesday, Dec. 8. This move was not to replace mortgage backed securities as was the case over the past few weeks.
Also, this increase was not to replace reserves lost through operating transactions. Quite the contrary, deposits with Federal Reserve Banks other than reserve balances, which includes the General Account of the U.S. Treasury, fell by almost $8 billion, which also added reserves to the banking system.


All-in-all, over $50 billion was added to Reserve Balances with Federal Reserve Banks over the past week. Most if not all of this will show up in Excess Reserves at commercial banks.”


This week the Fed bought more United States Treasury securities, but this time the purchases were a substitution for the securities that were maturing in the Fed’s portfolio of mortgage backed securities. The Fed purchased outright $18 billion in United States Treasury securities. This went to offset a decline in the mortgage backs securities of almost $14 billion.


Net, the Fed supplied reserve funds in the amount of $3.5 billion. (The figures don’t match exactly because of other small changed that took place in the balance sheet.)


An interesting aberration took place in the data released at 4:30 PM today. The Fed statistics show that the “average” increase in the United States bond portfolio for the week was $23.6 billion and the decline in mortgage backed securities was $2.0 billion. These figures differ from those given above because the figures above relate to the Fed’s balance sheet as of the close of business on each Wednesday. The figures reported in this paragraph relate to the average of daily figures for the week ending each Wednesday. The only thing that can be said about the two sets of figures is that most of the purchases of Treasury securities for the week ending December 8 must have come on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday of the week so that the weekly average was closer to the portfolio held for the week ending December 2. That is why the numbers relating to the weekly average are so large relative to the end-of-week numbers.
Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks, a proxy for commercial bank excess reserves, fell by about $64 billion during the week. The primary cause of this was an increase in the general account of the Treasury held at the Federal Reserve. These Treasury deposits rose by $72 billion during the week as the Treasury sent out checks to the private sector and withdrew funds from the government Tax and Loan accounts held at commercial banks.


This movement between accounts was purely an “operational” transaction and should not be considered a part of the QE2 process.


So, the conclusion for the week is that Federal Reserve open market operations for the week were primarily a substitution of United States Treasury securities for maturing mortgage backed securities. Thus, it seems that very little effort was put into trying to keep interest rates from rising.


The 20 to 25 basis point rise in the yields, seemingly, were not resisted by the Fed.

Long-term Bond Yields and QE2

One of the fundamental things I learned when working in the Federal Reserve System and in running financial institutions was that the Federal Reserve could only temporarily lower long term interest rates.

In attempting to achieve a goal of lowering these rates, the yield on long-term Treasury securities would initially dip below its previous level and then rise to a point where it was above the previous level. The moral of this market behavior was that attempts to keep long term interest rates lower than the market desired only ended up causing the rates to go up as the market adjusted to the efforts of the central bank.

In my professional career I have not observed anything that would lead me to change this viewpoint.

Yet, supposedly, the QE2 efforts of the Federal Reserve are aimed at reducing the yield on long-term Treasury securities so as to encourage a more robust recovery of the economy. The argument given is that there is little or no indication that inflation will pick up because, if anything, the probability that we might enter into a period of deflation is high enough to be of concern.

As recorded in my post yesterday, I believe that on the subject of inflation/deflation, Ben Bernanke is a lagging indicator. He always seems to be behind what is happening. (See “The Fed: Bubble, Bubble Everywhere,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/240732-the-fed-bubble-bubble-everywhere.)

Let me start from where I am. First, the United States economy IS recovering. However, this recovery is going to be a very slow one because of all the re-structuring that needs to be done within the economy of the United States. We have considerable under-employment with one out of every four individuals of working age being under-employed. We have a capital structure in which a lot of capital is not being used: current capacity utilization is around 75% and the previous peak “high” was only about 81%. We have built too many houses and there seems to have been too much development of commercial properties. There is still too much debt outstanding: more deleveraging needs to take place. And, this doesn’t even come close to touching the needs of our educational system. (See “Top Test Scores from Shangshai Stun Educators,” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/education/07education.html?ref=education.) And, so on.

I just do not believe that monetary stimulus, or, for that matter, further fiscal stimulus is going to achieve much faster economic growth.

The financial system is still fragile and this, I have argued is the real reason for the Fed’s attempt to flood the world with liquidity. Banks, other than the largest 25 banks, are still extremely distressed. State and local governments face huge fiscal problems. And, the federal government is going to post $15-$18 trillion in new debt over the next ten years given the current budgetary posture. Financial markets must be kept calm so that the FDIC and others can work off insolvent banks; where pension accounting in government can be brought into line; and assets values can be written down throughout the economy.

Let me reiterate: the economic recovery is progressing.

And, what about inflation?

According to the implicit price deflator of Gross Domestic Product, inflation was running at about a one percent year-over-year annual rate in the third quarter of this year. I prefer this measure of inflation as opposed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) because of all the expert “fussing” with this latter measure over the past 15 years. Also, I do not really trust an indicator that has a large component relating to the rental price of owner-occupied housing that is estimated and has been shown to have substantial biases.

As can be seen from this chart, the year-over-year rate of change in prices did not turn negative during the Great Recession and seems to be on a relatively steady upward movement. It is my belief that the inflation shown in the GDP Implicit Price Deflator will continue to rise, but not explosively.

That is, the economy will continue to grow, but only modestly over the near term. And, I believe that the longer-term trend in prices in the United States economy is up. Furthermore, I believe that the longer-term trend in the value of the dollar is down.

In terms of the last forecast I believe that the value of the dollar will continue to decline in world markets over time in spite of the best efforts of Europe to “prop up” the dollar through the absence of leadership and guts that seems to prevail in the halls of the European Union.

Now, back to bond yields. Within the scenario I have described above, I really cannot see how the Federal Reserve, through its QE2 efforts, can keep long-term Treasury yields down. I guess my major question becomes, is this really the goal of the Federal Reserve? Or, are the statements coming out of the Federal Reserve a diversion to keep people from looking too deeply into the continuing problems of the banking system, and of the state and local governments, and asset values? Are the efforts of the Federal Reserve just a holding action while the value of assets, those of banks, those of state and local governments, those of home owners, and those of businesses, are written down?

To me, long-term bond yields should rise over time. I just can’t see how the Fed can keep them down.

What is most disturbing in all of this to me is the fact that the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has become the primary spokesperson of the Obama administration. Tim Gaithner has failed in that role; Christina Romer has failed in that role: and Larry Summers has failed in that role. Now, Ben Bernanke has become the voice of Obama on economic affairs. How sad!!!

Future Long Term Treasury Rates

The ten year Treasury yield hit 4.00% yesterday, a level not hit since June 6, 2009. Then one has to go back to October 31, 2008 for the next time this yield hit the 4.00% level. The big question is, of course, where is the rate going to go from here?

Many experts claim that the outlook for longer term interest rates depends upon what is going to happen to inflationary expectations in the financial markets. With the Consumer Price Index for All Items hovering around the 2.0%-2.5% range, year-over-year, and the CPI less Food and Energy at the 1.0%-1.5% range, year-over-year, actual inflation is extremely low given the experience of the past 50 years or so.


So, what is the market anticipating in terms of inflationary expectations for the next ten years?


If one uses inflation-indexed government bonds as an estimate for the real rate of interest, then for a ten-year Treasury security the market seems to be estimating that the real rate of interest is now around 1.50%. If so, then with the nominal 10-year Treasury security around 4.00%, one could say that the market expects inflation, over the next ten year period to run about 2.5% or approximately at the upper end of the current range for the CPI for all items.


However, one could argue that the Treasury market has been the beneficiary over the past 15 months or so of two unusual forces, both connected with the financial collapse that began in the fall of 2008 and continue to this day. The first of these forces is the huge amount of funds that have flown to the United States and to Treasury securities connected with the “flight to quality” from the rest-of-the world. This “flight-to-quality” began in late 2008 and continued throughout most of 2009 with lapses here and there.


The second factor is the quantitative easing on the part of the Federal Reserve. This has helped to sustain very low market interest rates, long-term as well as short-term. The quantitative easing has also been accompanied by the Fed’s huge purchase program of mortgage-backed securities and Federal Agency securities that have provided a substantial amount of liquidity to the financial markets.


Both forces have resulted in Treasury yields that are substantially below what I would consider to be normal on a historical basis. And, these forces have impacted the inflation-indexed securities as well as the nominal-yield securities. Expected real rates of interest just do not drop to the level that the inflation-indexed securities have fallen to.


Historically, for the last fifty years, the estimate I have used for the real rate of interest tends to be around 3.0%. I won’t argue with 2.8% or with 3.2% because that is not the crucial issue. Before the 1960s, the real rate of interest seemed to be about 2.5% due to the slow growth period of the 1950s and this helps to account for nominal interest rates being so low throughout most of that period of time. Beginning in the sixties, however, the higher, 3.0% rate, seems to provide a relatively better estimate for the “expected” real rate of interest.


If one assumes that the “expected” real rate of interest for the next ten years is 3.0%, then one could argue that the current “realized” real rate of interest from the inflation-indexed securities resulting from the international “flight-to-quality” and the quantitative easing of the Federal Reserve is 150 basis points below what it otherwise would be.


Carrying this argument further, one could argue that the nominal 10-year Treasury security should be around 4.50% once the influence of the foreign “risk-averse” money and the Federal Reserve easing is accounted for. This would imply that the inflationary expectations built into the Treasury yield by the financial markets was about 1.5%, a figure that is at the high end of the current rate of inflation indicated by the CPI less food and energy costs.


But, you could go further than this. The Fed and Ben Bernanke have stated that the “informal” inflation target of the Federal Reserve is about 2.0%. If it is assumed that the Fed is able to contain inflation at this 2.0% level for the next decade, then one would assume that the 10-year Treasury yield should be around 5.0% to reflect an expectation of inflation of about 2.0%.
If the market believes that in the long run, the costs of food and energy should be accounted for in inflation, then, assuming that the upper bound of the current rate of CPI inflation for All Items, 2.5% is achieved over the next 10-years, then inflationary expectations should be at this level and the nominal 10-year Treasury yield should be around 5.5%


Of course, there is another body of thought that looks at the $1.1 trillion of excess reserves in the United States banking system and contends that there is no way the Fed will be able to remove these excess reserves from the banking system before bank loans expand excessively, money stock growth becomes extremely rapid, and inflation becomes a major problem again. To these investors, the assumption of inflationary expectations of 2.5% is ridiculous. Consequently, even a 5.5% 10-year bond rate seems excessively low.


One can argue that, as in the decade of the 2000s, many foreign countries have helped to finance the United States deficit and, as a consequence, and this has also kept United States interest rates lower than perhaps they would have been otherwise. Some analysts believe that this will continue. One can argue from many different sides of this argument for a specific level of interest rates relative to expected real rates plus inflationary expectations. I don’t really find this “supply of funds” argument convincing.


I believe that long term interest rates are headed up. How far they will go depends upon a lot of things, some of which I have tried to present in this post. If the economy continues to strengthen, I feel that the 10-year yield on Treasury securities should, over the next two years, be closer to the 6.00% level than the 4.5% level. There, I am on the record.

Looking For Signs of a Recovery

Amid everything else going on, we still continue to look for signs of a recovery. This weekend I spent some time looking at the investment side of the economy to see if I could pick up any sign of life on the capital spending front. At the end of the weekend, I gave up looking for encouraging information, either in terms of business investment or investment in real estate.

Let’s look at the supply side first, the companies and businesses that supply physical capital, either in terms of real estate or in terms of business equipment. In order to summarize the information on the supply side of the market there seems to be one favorable factor that would encourage the production of investment goods and two that are not encouraging concerning the production of capital goods or real estate.

The positive factor is short term interest rates. The supply of capital goods in the past has been dependent upon the cost of short term funds and right now, of course, short term interest rates are as low as we can ever expect them. If these rates stay at these levels and other factors encouraging investment production improve, we should start to see the economy recover. The word out of the Federal Reserve is that short term interest rates are going to be kept low for an extended period of time and this weekend we heard that these rates may stay low into the year 2011.

The two negative factors relate to the internal cash flow of firms and the terms on which lenders are willing to lend. In terms of internal cash flow, potential suppliers of investment goods are still in a position in which they are trying to de-leverage and actually reduce the amount of debt they have outstanding relative to their internal sources of funds. Thus, there is not much effort to expand production from the suppliers of goods because they have not yet got their balance sheets back in order as of this time.

Lenders, of course, are not lending. If anything, most lenders are still risk adverse and continuing to tighten up on the maturities and terms of any lending they do. As a consequence, we see very little willingness on the side of lenders to encourage the supply of funds to expand.

Therefore, whereas the Federal Reserve is consciously keeping short term interest very low and intends to keep them low for a long period of time, potential suppliers of capital have not seemingly restructured their balance sheets sufficiently to begin to produce again and lenders seem far from willing to take any chance on who they lend to. We are back in the position where bankers, and others, will not lend to someone unless the potential borrower does not need the money.

In terms of the demand side of the market the factors that tend to support investment expenditures all seem to be in the negative range. Long term corporate interest rates have fallen some over the summer and this is encouraging. Moody’s AAA corporate bond rate was at a yearly high in June averaging 5.61% for the month. This rate moderately bounced downward in July but seemed to be rising into the 5.50s toward the end of the month. Moody’s BAA corporate bond rate has declined significantly from March 2009 when it averaged around 8.40% and has fallen to the 7.10% range toward the close of July.

The decline in corporate rates has been encouraging and indicates that the financial market’s taste for risk has improved at the expense of longer term Treasury issues whose yields have been rising since March. The question here is whether there will be a continued rise in Treasury bond rates over the next 12 months or so. If Treasury interest rates continue to rise, as I believe they will, this will put a floor under corporate rates, one that will tend to rise as longer term rates rise in general. And, with the spread between AAA and BAA securities around 150-160 basis points one cannot see this spread getting much narrower as long term interest rates rise over the next year or so.

Less favorable trends appear to be the lack of growth in cash flows This means that those that want to acquire capital goods or real property still face the need to continue to de-leverage their balance sheets. This concern can be combined with the fear that many economic units have about the possibility that they could face default or foreclosure in the upcoming twelve month period. There are still a lot of financial issues that must be resolved and this attitude does not produce a lot of optimism on the part of businesses or individuals to extend their own resources into risky investments in the near future.

This attitude coupled with the economic forecasts that the recovery will be tepid at best for the next 12 to 18 months does not do much to create optimism about future profit expectations. Profits have increased but the general consensus is that a large portion of these profits have been achieved either through cost cutting or through trading operations. Neither one of these can be expected to contribute to a general increase in profit expectations for the future since cost cutting can only do so much and trading profits are sporadic and cannot be counted on on a regular basis. The prospect for growing profit expectations is not strong presently. Confidence can change rapidly, but it appears that it will remain relatively low for the near term.

There are some firms and some industries that are producing solid profits and can be expected to generate profits going forward. How much they will stimulate the sectors that are not performing well and how much they will contribute to a growing optimism concerning the future performance of the economy is anybody’s guess right now. These companies continue to look for an uptick in their business in the coming months as well. It is possible that these companies could lead the economy out of the recession, but they don’t seem to be in a mood to over extend themselves or to take on too much more than they are doing at the present time. They are happy to be making profits and intend to do so in the future: but, in a controlled and conservative manner.

The needed conditions for coming out of a recession are not really present at the current time. The Federal Reserve has, of course, have kept interest rates quite low and there has been the favorable movement in longer term, non-Treasury yields which have declined in recent months as financial markets have moved back into securities that are riskier than U. S. Treasuries. In respect to the cost of money, everything is in place for the recovery. The problem of achieving a sustained increase in real investment, either in plant or equipment or in real estate, rests upon the potential borrowers and the possible lenders. Neither seems to be in any shape to begin borrowing or lending in the near term and this shows both on balance sheets and in the market place.

We have observed in the past that “animal spirits” can be revived and they can be revived relatively quickly. Question marks are always present relating to the issues of what is going to set off the animal spirits and when are they going to be set off. We can only keep looking at the major factors that are related to the psychology of economic units and attempt to determine when the direction of the economy is going to change.

At present, there are indications that a recovery is possibly starting to mount. For example, the index of leading economic indicators rose recently for the third month in a row. Still, the dark clouds fail to go away. Unemployment is, of course, still a big concern. And, with unemployment benefits increasingly running out while unemployment continues to grow and with the further prospect of additional credit difficulties in the banking system while bank failures continue to rise, care still must be exercised before one extends ones self by taking on more debt and by committing ones self to the purchase of expensive capital goods. I don’t believe that animal spirits will be on the rise anytime soon.