I still feel that the yields on long term Treasury issues and the value of the United States dollar are tied together. I have believed for some time now that long term interest rates will trend upwards over the next 12 months and that the value of the dollar will decline during the same time period. The strong rise in the 10-year Treasury and strong drop in the value of the dollar on August 3 just reinforce this belief.
In looking back at the 2002-2004 period there are too many similarities to feel comfortable. The Federal government is presenting us with large and growing deficits. Monetary policy is ridiculously easy. And, the dollar is under pressure.
What about long term Treasury yields? Well, in that earlier period the United States had the Chinese to pick up large amounts of the exploding Treasury debt so that long term interest rates did not have to rise significantly and the Federal Reserve did not have to monetize the debt.
The reason for the Federal Reserve behavior at that time? Chairman Greenspan was concerned that we might experience a period of deflation!
There are two theories why long term interest rates have not risen further than they have this year. First, there is still a concern among major investors about investment risk and as long as this concern lingers, funds from these investors will remain in long term Treasuries.
Now, there is a second reason given for long term interest rates remaining low and that is the enormous amount of liquidity in the commercial banking system. In recent weeks, commercial banks have started to expand their holdings of U. S. Government securities and this has put funds into the Treasury market with some of it spilling over into the longer end.
Why are commercial banks expanding their holdings of U. S. Government securities? Because the Federal Reserve has given out signals that it may keep short term interest rates low for an extended period of time: even into 2011. If this is to occur, then the reserves that the Fed has put into the banking system will have to stay for a while. That is, there will be no quick exit on the part of the Fed. Since the banks don’t want to lend to businesses or consumers they might as well get a higher yield than they do on reserves at the Fed by investing in market issues.
The reason for the Federal Reserve behavior at this time? Chairman Bernanke is concerned that we might experience a period of deflation!
As a consequence of the specific conditions of the present time, long term Treasury interest rates may not rise appreciably in the near term. However, I still believe that they will show a significant rise in the next 12 months.
I feel more certain about the decline in the value of the United States dollar. Participants in international markets are very reluctant to stick with the currency of a country that runs huge deficits with the strong likelihood that these large deficits will not go away for a long time.
Can you imagine a $2.0 trillion deficit this fiscal year and a Federal deficit of around $1.0 trillion a year for up to ten years! This is unsustainable, even for the United States.
And, what is going to fuel the further decline in the value of the United States dollar?
Oil prices. And, copper prices. And, gold prices. And, stock prices, And, housing prices. All these are rising now. As these asset prices continue to show strength, the value of the dollar will continue to decline. On August 2 I wrote a post called “Looking for Signs of a Recovery” (see http://maseportfolio.blogspot.com/). In that post I laid out some things to look for in determining whether or not the economic recovery is taking place. Rising asset prices is an important factor.
The trouble with rising asset prices at this time is that these increases are being underwritten by the extremely loose monetary policy. It is entirely possible that these asset prices may continue to rise while real economic growth remains dismal at best. And, in such a situation, consumer prices may not rise appreciably. Again, this is consistent with what we saw in the 2002-2004 period—asset bubbles and only moderate consumer price inflation.
Of course, a scenario that contains a continuing decline in the value of the United States dollar is not a good one for the Obama administration. It raises serious questions about the ability of the Federal government to finance such huge deficits as the ones that are forecast and still maintain relatively low long term interest rates without a major monetization of the debt. This whole scene seems like a replay of the first term of the Bush administration. There is just too much debt in existence. And, like the Bush administration, the Obama administration is experiencing a reduction in any “good” policy options that are available to it.
Showing posts with label U.S. deficits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. deficits. Show all posts
Monday, August 3, 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Known Unknowns
It is still too early to think that we are near or past the bottom of this economic downturn. However, in my mind, we are in the “working out” stage of the downturn, especially in the current economic restructuring we are going through, and we cannot expect this stage to be a short one.
The problem with many analysts and policy makers is that they continue to see our economic problems in Keynesian terms and think that the difficulties being experienced in banking and financial markets as a liquidity issue. Hence the search for evidence pointing to “green shoots” and for an “easing of credit.” Every day we hear when new statistics are released that the numbers just presented are “less bad” than before and this indicates that the economy is getting worse at a slower pace. An obvious sign that we are near the bottom!
In my mind, the two major issues facing the United States (and the world) are the structural problems in industry and finance and the debt problem. I have said all along that the basic cause of the financial collapse and the following economic dislocations comes more from the supply side of the economy than from the demand side as assumed by the Keynesians. And, because our problems are primarily supply side problems, governmental stimulus plans and deficit financing are not the incentives needed for restructuring the economy and putting people back to work.
In fact, demand side stimulus can even exacerbate the problems and slow down the changes that need to be made. Furthermore, treating the debt problem as a liquidity problem, as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury seem to be doing, can do the very same thing.
The “good news” is that most organizations and institutions have identified the major problems they will be facing in the near future. However, the “bad news” is that no one knows the depth or breath of the problems. The difficulty facing these organizations and institutions going forward is that these problems must be “worked through” and “worked out”. This “working through” and “working out” will take time and, since the problems are related and interconnected, the outcomes will be dependent on just how systemic and cumulative they are.
For example, greater unemployment due to structural reductions in the workforce who were employed making cars, producing parts, or selling cars will lead to more foreclosures on “prime” loans. (See “Job Losses Force Safer Mortgages to Foreclosure” in New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/business/economy/25foreclose.html?_r=1&em.) This will have further ramifications for the financial sector, housing construction and so on. The repercussions will continue on throughout the economy.
In the area of foreign trade, declining incomes lead to reductions in imports, but these imports are the exports of other countries. Countries that have built their economic growth and prosperity on their export trade face worsening times because of the decline in their exports. And, with the slowdown in these countries world trade declines. (See “Trade and Hard Times” in the New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/opinion/26tue1.html?ref=opinion.) There are more and more calls to prevent, if possible, further reductions in foreign trade in the world, especially relate to tariffs and other means of protectionism.
These are just two examples of situations where problems exist but where there is no real understanding of how far the cumulative interactions will take us. Many more situations like these exist at the present time. They are not problems that will be resolved through fiscal stimulus and the creation of government debt. There are three major problems with this response.
First, fiscal stimulus does not eliminate structural dislocations in the economy. The government (or no one else for that matter) does not know what the future structure of the economy will look like. Existing organizations, including financial institutions, can “re-tool” themselves, but this takes time and the exploration of different models for companies to find what works best. In terms of innovation, governmental funds can be made available for the next generation of energy sources and transportation systems and so forth, but no one knows exactly how these sources and systems should be put together. Restructuring and creative innovation take time and experimentation. One cannot “will” the right structure or the best innovation.
Furthermore, who wants to invest in something the government is the driving force in? Current events attest to emerging problems related to governance, decision making, and “the rule of law” when the government gets involved with a company or an industry.
Second, when the solvency problem is treated as a liquidity problem, the issue of solvency does not go away. The “toxic asset” program (P-PIP) developed by the Treasury and the efforts by the Federal Reserve to shore up various segments of the financial markets is just a “round-about” way of allowing the federal government to pay for the bad debts that are on the balance sheets of financial institutions. That is, the programs just allow the financial system to transfer financial losses to the government so that the tax payer will eventually end up with the bill for any insolvency that exists. Still, the question of the solvency does not go away.
Third, the government assumption that both problems, those related to economic restructuring and the amount of debt outstanding, can be solved by creating more and more debt is laughable if it were not so potentially tragic. International financial markets understand that in one way or another and at some time in the future, excessive amounts of government debt will end up being monetized. How this monetization works out in each particular case cannot be foretold. History has shown, over and over again, that at some time this connection between large amounts of debt and money creation becomes a reality. It cannot be avoided; it is just the timing that is uncertain.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are very straight forward. First, economic growth, even when it becomes positive again, will stay low for an extended period of time. My reading of the 1930s has lead me to believe that this decade was a time of industrial and financial restructuring (not helped very much by the government) and technological change. It was not a time that demand-side stimulus could help very much. The restructuring had to take place and World War II did not contribute to the recovery because of the added spending but because of the re-focus and restructuring of industry it forced on the nation. I believe that, like the 1930s, we may be facing an extended period of time in which we need to re-focus and restructure industry. One hopes that we do not need a world war in order to finally achieve this re-structuring.
Second, the continued creation of debt is not going to help. The government debt is going to be monetized at some time. The realization of this, I believe, has become a reality to the bond markets and the foreign exchange markets. To me, the yield on long term U. S. Treasury securities will continue to trend upwards in the foreseeable future and the value of the U. S. dollar will continue to trend downwards. The trends will continue unless some financial “miracle” takes place that eliminates the projected upcoming deficits in the government budget—perhaps an amazing recovering in tax receipts or massive savings discovered in the health care industry.
Third, whereas paper assets from the United States will not be that desirable internationally, physical assets will. For much of the two years or so ending in August 2008, the weak dollar allowed foreign countries and investors to buy U. S. companies at a record pace. With the rising strength of China, India, and Brazil, I believe that with the continued slide in the United States dollar, more and more U. S. companies and their physical assets will come into foreign hands. That is, until the U. S. Congress bans such transactions.
The problem with many analysts and policy makers is that they continue to see our economic problems in Keynesian terms and think that the difficulties being experienced in banking and financial markets as a liquidity issue. Hence the search for evidence pointing to “green shoots” and for an “easing of credit.” Every day we hear when new statistics are released that the numbers just presented are “less bad” than before and this indicates that the economy is getting worse at a slower pace. An obvious sign that we are near the bottom!
In my mind, the two major issues facing the United States (and the world) are the structural problems in industry and finance and the debt problem. I have said all along that the basic cause of the financial collapse and the following economic dislocations comes more from the supply side of the economy than from the demand side as assumed by the Keynesians. And, because our problems are primarily supply side problems, governmental stimulus plans and deficit financing are not the incentives needed for restructuring the economy and putting people back to work.
In fact, demand side stimulus can even exacerbate the problems and slow down the changes that need to be made. Furthermore, treating the debt problem as a liquidity problem, as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury seem to be doing, can do the very same thing.
The “good news” is that most organizations and institutions have identified the major problems they will be facing in the near future. However, the “bad news” is that no one knows the depth or breath of the problems. The difficulty facing these organizations and institutions going forward is that these problems must be “worked through” and “worked out”. This “working through” and “working out” will take time and, since the problems are related and interconnected, the outcomes will be dependent on just how systemic and cumulative they are.
For example, greater unemployment due to structural reductions in the workforce who were employed making cars, producing parts, or selling cars will lead to more foreclosures on “prime” loans. (See “Job Losses Force Safer Mortgages to Foreclosure” in New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/business/economy/25foreclose.html?_r=1&em.) This will have further ramifications for the financial sector, housing construction and so on. The repercussions will continue on throughout the economy.
In the area of foreign trade, declining incomes lead to reductions in imports, but these imports are the exports of other countries. Countries that have built their economic growth and prosperity on their export trade face worsening times because of the decline in their exports. And, with the slowdown in these countries world trade declines. (See “Trade and Hard Times” in the New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/opinion/26tue1.html?ref=opinion.) There are more and more calls to prevent, if possible, further reductions in foreign trade in the world, especially relate to tariffs and other means of protectionism.
These are just two examples of situations where problems exist but where there is no real understanding of how far the cumulative interactions will take us. Many more situations like these exist at the present time. They are not problems that will be resolved through fiscal stimulus and the creation of government debt. There are three major problems with this response.
First, fiscal stimulus does not eliminate structural dislocations in the economy. The government (or no one else for that matter) does not know what the future structure of the economy will look like. Existing organizations, including financial institutions, can “re-tool” themselves, but this takes time and the exploration of different models for companies to find what works best. In terms of innovation, governmental funds can be made available for the next generation of energy sources and transportation systems and so forth, but no one knows exactly how these sources and systems should be put together. Restructuring and creative innovation take time and experimentation. One cannot “will” the right structure or the best innovation.
Furthermore, who wants to invest in something the government is the driving force in? Current events attest to emerging problems related to governance, decision making, and “the rule of law” when the government gets involved with a company or an industry.
Second, when the solvency problem is treated as a liquidity problem, the issue of solvency does not go away. The “toxic asset” program (P-PIP) developed by the Treasury and the efforts by the Federal Reserve to shore up various segments of the financial markets is just a “round-about” way of allowing the federal government to pay for the bad debts that are on the balance sheets of financial institutions. That is, the programs just allow the financial system to transfer financial losses to the government so that the tax payer will eventually end up with the bill for any insolvency that exists. Still, the question of the solvency does not go away.
Third, the government assumption that both problems, those related to economic restructuring and the amount of debt outstanding, can be solved by creating more and more debt is laughable if it were not so potentially tragic. International financial markets understand that in one way or another and at some time in the future, excessive amounts of government debt will end up being monetized. How this monetization works out in each particular case cannot be foretold. History has shown, over and over again, that at some time this connection between large amounts of debt and money creation becomes a reality. It cannot be avoided; it is just the timing that is uncertain.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are very straight forward. First, economic growth, even when it becomes positive again, will stay low for an extended period of time. My reading of the 1930s has lead me to believe that this decade was a time of industrial and financial restructuring (not helped very much by the government) and technological change. It was not a time that demand-side stimulus could help very much. The restructuring had to take place and World War II did not contribute to the recovery because of the added spending but because of the re-focus and restructuring of industry it forced on the nation. I believe that, like the 1930s, we may be facing an extended period of time in which we need to re-focus and restructure industry. One hopes that we do not need a world war in order to finally achieve this re-structuring.
Second, the continued creation of debt is not going to help. The government debt is going to be monetized at some time. The realization of this, I believe, has become a reality to the bond markets and the foreign exchange markets. To me, the yield on long term U. S. Treasury securities will continue to trend upwards in the foreseeable future and the value of the U. S. dollar will continue to trend downwards. The trends will continue unless some financial “miracle” takes place that eliminates the projected upcoming deficits in the government budget—perhaps an amazing recovering in tax receipts or massive savings discovered in the health care industry.
Third, whereas paper assets from the United States will not be that desirable internationally, physical assets will. For much of the two years or so ending in August 2008, the weak dollar allowed foreign countries and investors to buy U. S. companies at a record pace. With the rising strength of China, India, and Brazil, I believe that with the continued slide in the United States dollar, more and more U. S. companies and their physical assets will come into foreign hands. That is, until the U. S. Congress bans such transactions.
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