Robert Shiller of “Irrational Exuberance” has given us the answer to our problems in the Sunday New York Times. See “Stuck in Neutral? Reset the Mood!” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/economy/31view.html?scp=1&sq=robert%20shiller&st=cse. Shiller argues that, “In reality, business recessions are caused by a curious mix of rational and irrational behavior. Negative feedback cycles, in which pessimism inhibits economic activity, are hard to stop and can stretch the financial system past its breaking point.”
“Solutions for the economy must address not only the structural instability of our financial institutions, but also these problems in the hearts and minds of workers and investors—problems that may otherwise persist for many years.”
The solution: people must believe in the cause! “Reset the Mood!” “In most civilian fields, job satisfaction may not be a life-or-death matter, but a relatively uninterested, insecure work force is unlikely to bring about a vigorous recovery.”
But, the problem goes beyond the current malaise. Shiller advises us to look at the whole post-World War II period. He cites data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and states that the annual growth of business output per labor hour averaged 3.2% from 1948 to 1973. From 1973 to 2008 the growth rate was 1.9%. He quotes Samuel Bowles of the Santa Fe Institute who has argued that the causes of this slowdown “are to be found as much in the loss of ‘hearts and minds’ of workers and investors as in the technology.”
A cause of this “loss of ‘hearts and minds’ of workers and investors” is not presented. Let me provide a possible cause: inflation!
Since January 1961 through 2009, the purchasing power of $1.00 has declined by about 85%, depending upon the price index used. That is, a $1.00 that could purchase $1.00 when John Kennedy became president could only purchase around $0.15 in 2009.
The “guns and butter” expenditure pattern of the federal government in the 1960s resulted in the wage and price freeze that came about in August 1971 along with the separation of the United States dollar from gold. The excessive inflation of the latter part of the 1970s resulted in the Federal Reserve tightening of monetary policy which finally broke the back of inflation in the early 1980s. Yet, even though the United States went through a period of moderate price inflation during the next twenty years or so (the Great Moderation) credit inflation continued. (For a review of what I mean by credit inflation see http://seekingalpha.com/article/184475-financial-regulation-in-the-information-age-part-c.)
This period of inflation had two major impacts on the United States economy. First, American manufacturers worried less about productivity than they did about getting products to market. Inflation does this to producers. Why? Because the pressure is on manufacturers to quickly get in new equipment so that they can meet the rising demand for goods and this means that executives focus less on the longer-lived, more productive plant and equipment and give their attention to more short-lived investments. As a consequence, productivity suffers!
The impact of this change in the composition of the capital stock of the United States is reflected in two other measures. First, capital utilization in manufacturing industry has continued to decline from the 1960s to the present time. (See chart: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU?cid=3.) For example, capacity utilization was above 90% in the middle of the 1960s. Through all the cycles in capacity utilization over the next 45 years, the peak rate constantly declined. In February 1973 the rate was slightly below 89%. The next peak was in December 1978 and was below 87%; then about 85% in January 1989; and again in January 1995 and in November 1997. The next peak came in August 2006 at about 81%. The most recent trough in capacity utilization came in June 2009 and has rebounded to 72% in December 2009. Expectations: it will not reach 81% again.
In addition, labor force participation has changed dramatically during this time period. Labor force participation increased substantially from the latter part of the 1960s until the latter part of the 1980s, primarily due to more women taking part in the measured labor force. Since the late 1980s the growth of total labor force participation began to slow down and in the 200s total labor force participation began to decline as more and more people became discouraged in looking for a job or only could find temporary employment. In 2009 the number of under-employed individuals of working age amounted to between 17%-18% of the labor force. Thus, we have unused capacity in the labor force as well.
The second major impact this period of inflation had on the United States economy was on the use and creation of debt. Inflation is good for debt creation! But, the foundation for the increase in debt during this time was the Federal Government, as the gross federal debt increased at an annual rate of 7.85% per year for the period of time from fiscal 1961 through fiscal 2009. The federal debt held by the public rose by 7.31% over the same time period.
Private debt, of course, increased very, very rapidly during this time period as did the financial innovation that spread debt further and further through the economy. Inflation is good for debt and it is also good for employment in the area of finance and financial services. As is well known there was a tremendous shift in the work force during this time from non-financial firms to financial firms. Furthermore, labor productivity does not increase as much annually in the finance industry as it does in non-finance.
Why should the labor force put its “hearts and minds” behind the future of the United States economic machine?
One sees no end to the environment of “credit inflation” created by the federal government. Estimates of federal government budget deficits still range in the $15-$18 trillion range for the next ten years which would more than double the gross federal debt that now exists. Then there are questions relating to the Federal Reserve’s inflation of the monetary base and the possibility that the central bank can pull off a magical “exit” strategy where the Fed removes roughly $1.1 trillion “excess” reserves from the banking system without causing any disruptions. The eminent scholar of the Federal Reserve System, Allan Meltzer, seems to have serious doubts about the Fed being able to pull this off. (See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704375604575023632319560448.html#mod=todays_us_opinion.) The failure to succeed here, along with the rise in the federal debt, would just further underwrite credit inflation in the whole economy.
The international investment community continues to have concerns over the ability of the United States to do anything different from what it has done over the last 50 years or so. There is nothing to indicate anything more than “business as usual” in Washington, D. C. If this is true, then we will see continuing credit inflation, sluggish performance in labor productivity, continued declines in labor force participation, and further softness in capacity utilization. And, if the environment of credit inflation continues, finance and financial innovation will continue to thrive.
We don’t need a change in the “hearts and minds” of the labor force. The change in “hearts and minds” that is needed is in the politicians in the federal government.
Showing posts with label labor participation rate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label labor participation rate. Show all posts
Monday, February 1, 2010
Saturday, July 25, 2009
Is the Recession Over?
For the third month in a row the index of leading economic indicators rose. This is the first time this has occurred since 2004. And, it gives us some sign that maybe the economic recession that we have been in since December 2007 is reaching its climax. James W. Paulson, chief investment strategist at Wells Capital Management, is quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying “We’ve got tons of information telling us we’ve turned the corner.” Ataman Ozyildirim, an economist at the Conference Board which produces the report, states that “The process of coming out of the recession, although still fragile, may be starting.”
I hope that these people are right and that we are coming out of the recession. There are fears of a “W” (not Bush) or a “double-dip” recession and these should not be discounted. But, we don’t really want the recession to carry on in any form; we really don’t want the risks associated with the down-side.Even though we may be at or near the bottom of the recession there are still plenty of concerns to deal with.
My continued concern is that the collapse in the economy was primarily due to a supply side shift and was not initiated by a fall in aggregate demand. This I have tried to capture in posts like my June 22 effort: http://seekingalpha.com/article/144508-structural-shift-in-the-u-s-economy-is-really-in-supply. If the recession was, in fact, initiated by supply shifts then there are structural dislocations in the economy that need taking care of that cannot be satisfied by just increasing aggregate demand to put people back in the jobs in which they were formerly occupied. We cannot just return to factories that are only being partially used or have been cvacated. Trying to push things back to where they were just postpones the restructuring of the economy that needs to take place.
In the past twenty years or so, we, in the United States, have experienced two credit bubbles or credit inflations. These bubbles have created excess growth first in information technology in the 1990s and then in the housing sector of the economy in the 2000s. But, these credit bubbles were not just restricted to the United States.There was a credit inflation throughout the whole world. Evidence of this has just been released in a report by Close Brothers Corporate Finance in the UK. (See “UK is Europe’s capital of distress” in the Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aba06ea2-758e-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html.) The report claims that “The UK has western Europe’s highest percentage of financially distressed companies after being the leveraged buy-out capital over the past decade.” But, the report goes on to show that the credit bubble resulted in the serious collapse of the European manufacturing sector, as well as in the retail and leisure sectors. And, of course, there is the case of Japan in the 1990s and 2000s.
The problem created by credit bubbles or credit inflations (in addition to the excessive amounts of debt created) is that too much capacity is created in areas of the economy that cease to be needed any more once the bubble has burst. The normal response of the economy is to restructure so as to eliminate the excess capacity that exists and re-deploy resources into areas that are experiencing growth and development. A Keynesian effort to “pump up” aggregate demand is just an effort to re-employ resources in the same areas that formerly prospered but that now need to be “down-sized.”
This does nothing to get rid of the excess capacity and postpones the restructuring of the economy. Furthermore it retains the misallocation of financial capital that evolved during the period of the credit inflation or credit inflations.
The drop in capacity utilization in the United States since the start of the recession has been extremely dramatic. Firms have gone from using about 81% of their capacity to using only 68%, a drop of 16%. This is the steepest drop for the longest period of time in the data series.But, even more important in my mind is that capacity utilization has been dropping steadily since 1967.
Obviously, capacity utilization drops in periods of economic recession. Yet, as the economy has recovered in every economic cycle in the United States since the 1960s capacity utilization, after a recession, has never returned to the peak level it reached in the previous period of economic expansion. Thus, capacity utilization has trended lower throughout this time, evidence that there has been a shift in the structure of manufacturing in the United States.
Although the United States has grown around 3% compounded annually over the last forty years and employment, through most of the period, has been at relatively high rates, there are still two pieces of information that are rather unsettling. The first is the continuing decline in capacity utilization just mentioned. The second is the decline in the civilian participation rate. For the United States, this rate peaked in the 1990s a little above 67.0% and has declined through the late 2000s remaining below 66.2% since 2004. This may not seem like much of a fall but it indicates that a lot of people have left the labor force!The latter problem can be confirmed by figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
There are major sectors of employment in the United States that have experienced significant reductions in jobs and employment. These are in industries that one could seriously argue were in substantial need of restructuring. (I will return to this topic soon in another post.) The question is, should people to be pushed right back into these jobs again by a government stimulus program of increasing aggregate demand? Instead, it seems as if there needs to be a significant education of a large portion of the civilian population that would like to participate in the labor force again.
If there are structural problems in the United States and in the world that result from the existence of excess capacity in industries that are declining or less technologically relevant, shouldn’t we let these industries decline or try to become technologically relevant rather than stagnant? Should we try and keep people producing buggy whips when there are means of transportation evolving other than buggies?So, to reclaim full economic health there is a need to reduce the excess capacity that has been built up in industries that are not so relevant any more and a need to deleverage financial structures. Unfortunately, a large portion of the needed financial deleverging is connected with firms that have excess capacity.
Furthermore, there is a need to restructure U. S. manufacturing and business, and train more of the workforce to fit into twenty-first century jobs so as to get the labor participation rate up.
In my study of the Great Depression, this is one of the reasons why it took so long for the United States economy, and the world economy, to recover through the 1930s. The structural change in the United States taking the country from an agricultural society to an industrial society did not really take place until the beginning of the Second World War My concern is that the needed current economic restructuring will be delayed if Washington continues to focus on companies with redundant capacity by stimulating the re-employment of the same workers that used to work in them. The economic statistics (the leading economic indicators) may continue to improve in such cases, but the economic recovery will continue to languish.
I hope that these people are right and that we are coming out of the recession. There are fears of a “W” (not Bush) or a “double-dip” recession and these should not be discounted. But, we don’t really want the recession to carry on in any form; we really don’t want the risks associated with the down-side.Even though we may be at or near the bottom of the recession there are still plenty of concerns to deal with.
My continued concern is that the collapse in the economy was primarily due to a supply side shift and was not initiated by a fall in aggregate demand. This I have tried to capture in posts like my June 22 effort: http://seekingalpha.com/article/144508-structural-shift-in-the-u-s-economy-is-really-in-supply. If the recession was, in fact, initiated by supply shifts then there are structural dislocations in the economy that need taking care of that cannot be satisfied by just increasing aggregate demand to put people back in the jobs in which they were formerly occupied. We cannot just return to factories that are only being partially used or have been cvacated. Trying to push things back to where they were just postpones the restructuring of the economy that needs to take place.
In the past twenty years or so, we, in the United States, have experienced two credit bubbles or credit inflations. These bubbles have created excess growth first in information technology in the 1990s and then in the housing sector of the economy in the 2000s. But, these credit bubbles were not just restricted to the United States.There was a credit inflation throughout the whole world. Evidence of this has just been released in a report by Close Brothers Corporate Finance in the UK. (See “UK is Europe’s capital of distress” in the Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aba06ea2-758e-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html.) The report claims that “The UK has western Europe’s highest percentage of financially distressed companies after being the leveraged buy-out capital over the past decade.” But, the report goes on to show that the credit bubble resulted in the serious collapse of the European manufacturing sector, as well as in the retail and leisure sectors. And, of course, there is the case of Japan in the 1990s and 2000s.
The problem created by credit bubbles or credit inflations (in addition to the excessive amounts of debt created) is that too much capacity is created in areas of the economy that cease to be needed any more once the bubble has burst. The normal response of the economy is to restructure so as to eliminate the excess capacity that exists and re-deploy resources into areas that are experiencing growth and development. A Keynesian effort to “pump up” aggregate demand is just an effort to re-employ resources in the same areas that formerly prospered but that now need to be “down-sized.”
This does nothing to get rid of the excess capacity and postpones the restructuring of the economy. Furthermore it retains the misallocation of financial capital that evolved during the period of the credit inflation or credit inflations.
The drop in capacity utilization in the United States since the start of the recession has been extremely dramatic. Firms have gone from using about 81% of their capacity to using only 68%, a drop of 16%. This is the steepest drop for the longest period of time in the data series.But, even more important in my mind is that capacity utilization has been dropping steadily since 1967.
Obviously, capacity utilization drops in periods of economic recession. Yet, as the economy has recovered in every economic cycle in the United States since the 1960s capacity utilization, after a recession, has never returned to the peak level it reached in the previous period of economic expansion. Thus, capacity utilization has trended lower throughout this time, evidence that there has been a shift in the structure of manufacturing in the United States.
Although the United States has grown around 3% compounded annually over the last forty years and employment, through most of the period, has been at relatively high rates, there are still two pieces of information that are rather unsettling. The first is the continuing decline in capacity utilization just mentioned. The second is the decline in the civilian participation rate. For the United States, this rate peaked in the 1990s a little above 67.0% and has declined through the late 2000s remaining below 66.2% since 2004. This may not seem like much of a fall but it indicates that a lot of people have left the labor force!The latter problem can be confirmed by figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
There are major sectors of employment in the United States that have experienced significant reductions in jobs and employment. These are in industries that one could seriously argue were in substantial need of restructuring. (I will return to this topic soon in another post.) The question is, should people to be pushed right back into these jobs again by a government stimulus program of increasing aggregate demand? Instead, it seems as if there needs to be a significant education of a large portion of the civilian population that would like to participate in the labor force again.
If there are structural problems in the United States and in the world that result from the existence of excess capacity in industries that are declining or less technologically relevant, shouldn’t we let these industries decline or try to become technologically relevant rather than stagnant? Should we try and keep people producing buggy whips when there are means of transportation evolving other than buggies?So, to reclaim full economic health there is a need to reduce the excess capacity that has been built up in industries that are not so relevant any more and a need to deleverage financial structures. Unfortunately, a large portion of the needed financial deleverging is connected with firms that have excess capacity.
Furthermore, there is a need to restructure U. S. manufacturing and business, and train more of the workforce to fit into twenty-first century jobs so as to get the labor participation rate up.
In my study of the Great Depression, this is one of the reasons why it took so long for the United States economy, and the world economy, to recover through the 1930s. The structural change in the United States taking the country from an agricultural society to an industrial society did not really take place until the beginning of the Second World War My concern is that the needed current economic restructuring will be delayed if Washington continues to focus on companies with redundant capacity by stimulating the re-employment of the same workers that used to work in them. The economic statistics (the leading economic indicators) may continue to improve in such cases, but the economic recovery will continue to languish.
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